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This thesis elucidates the relationship between the emergence of literary 
aestheticism and ambiguities in the status and meaning of religious doubt in late 
Victorian Britain. Aestheticism has often been understood as a branch of a larger, 
epochal crisis of religious faith: a creed of ‘art-for-art’s-sake’ and a cult of beauty 
are thought to have emerged to occupy the vacuum created by the departure of 
God, or at least by the attenuation of traditional forms of belief. However, the 
model of secularisation implicit in this account is now often challenged by 
historians, sociologists, and literary critics, and it fails to capture what was at 
stake in Swinburne and Pater’s efforts to reconceptualise aesthetic experience. I 
suggest affinities between their shared insistence that art be understood as an 
independent, disinterested realm, a creed beyond creeds, and secularisation 
understood as the emptying of religion from political and social spheres. 
Secondly, I analyse how Swinburne and Pater use the apparently neutral space 
created by their relegation of religion to imagine the secular in far more radical 
terms than conventional Victorian models of religious doubt allowed. Their 
varieties of aestheticism often posit secularism not as a disillusioning effect of 
modern rationality but as a primordial enchantment with the sensuous and earthly, 
prior to a ‘fall’ into religious transcendence. I explore their tendency to identify 
this ideal of the secular with aesthetic value, as well as the paradoxes produced by 
their efforts to efface the distinctions between the religious and the aesthetic. 
My argument proceeds through close readings that reveal how the logic of 
aestheticism grows out of Swinburne’s and Pater’s efforts to challenge and 
refashion the models of religious doubt and secularism established by a previous 
generation of Victorian writers – Matthew Arnold, Robert Browning, Thomas 
Carlyle, George Eliot, John Stuart Mill, and Alfred Tennyson – and situates this 
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It is often remarked that Victorian aestheticism was a ‘religion of art’.1 It is a 
phrase whose appositeness owes everything to its ambiguity. It seems to imply 
that aestheticism was a secular phenomenon that elevated art at the expense of 
religion, or channelled religious forms and modes of feeling toward secular ends. 
And certainly aestheticism, or the concept of ‘art-for-art’s-sake’, was and is often 
defined as a rejection of the idea that art is answerable to religious criteria. As 
secular discourse often does, aestheticism presents itself as a realm of neutrality 
and freedom, a creed beyond the complications of creed. Yet the phrase ‘religion 
of art’ is sometimes used derisively, or with at least a shade of irony, since it 
implies that aesthetes did not manage to content themselves with art at all: rather, 
they engaged in a kind of idolatry, striving (properly or improperly, depending on 
the point of the view of the critic) to make art an adequate object for essentially 
religious impulses.2 In other words, the phrase seems at once to imply art’s 
usurpation of religion, and the failure of the secular to be quite secular. Likewise, 
the phrase seems to honour the idea that art and religion are inseparable, even 
equivalent, while it also suggests that this relationship can in fact be teased apart, 
debased, or superseded. 
                                                
1 Leon Chai takes the phrase as the subtitle for his book on aestheticism (which he treats 
as both a Victorian and a modernist category); see Aestheticism: The Religion of Art in 
Post-Romantic Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). Karl Beckson 
focuses on modernist writers but also discusses Oscar Wilde and Thomas Hardy in The 
Religion of Art: A Modernist Theme in British Literature, 1885-1925 (New York: AMS 
Press, 2006). The phrase had Victorian currency; for example, in 1883, F. W. H. Myers 
distinguishes between aestheticism’s ‘religion of art’ and the ‘older and more accredited 
manifestations of the Higher Life’. See Myers, ‘Rossetti and the Religion of Beauty’, 
Cornhill Magazine 47 (1883), 213. 
2 This more derisory usage also had Victorian currency; for example, in 1876, a writer in 
the Saturday Review decries the emergence of a ‘religion of art independent of all 
theological restraints’, and names Algernon Charles Swinburne as the key offender, 
characterising him as the ‘passionate apologist’ for ‘an artistic religion of Paganism’. See 
‘Christianity Between Two Foes’, Saturday Review 41 (1876), 326. Theodore Ziolkowski 
uses the phrase to characterise efforts to satisfy religious needs by means of art; see 
Modes of Faith: Secular Surrogates for Lost Religious Belief (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 53-82. For a more celebratory treatment of the nexus between 
aestheticism and faith, see Ellis Hanson’s Decadence and Catholicism (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997).  
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The ‘religion of art’ phrase is sometimes deployed in a way that makes 
aestheticism seem like a bit-player in a larger drama of secularisation: art, 
literature, or an Idealist cult of beauty fills the void created by the departure of 
God, or at least by the waning of traditional Christian forms of belief and 
authority.3 Yet characterising aestheticism as a surrogate for religion raises as 
many questions as it answers. As Michael Kaufmann points out, the argument that 
art or literature function as modern surrogates for religion often hinges on an 
‘analogical paradox’:  
 
To arrive at a final act of differentiation, [such] narratives must 
initially rely on a supposed similarity. That is, the larger trajectory 
of a secularization narrative aims at a final differentiation between 
the religious and the secular, between religion and literature. And 
yet along the way it must assert that the two are so similar that they 
are practically interchangeable: literature can replace religion with 
very little fanfare, very little conflict ... “Secular” literary culture, 
so goes the theory, is analogous enough to dogmatic religion to be 
able to replace, and then eventually oppose it. The initial act of 
identification in the replacement narrative enables a final and 
determinative act of differentiation.4  
 
And to the extent that Victorian aestheticism is symptomatic of a process 
of secularisation, it is clearly a branch of the narrative which departs from any 
simple progressivist trajectory: in the 1890s, aestheticism’s ‘religion of beauty’ 
was often pivoted toward affirmations of the beauty of religion, and – sometimes 
in conjunction with the equally slippery cognate discourse, ‘decadence’ – became 
a viable language for charting prodigal journeys back toward faith, most notably 
toward Rome.5 Arguably, the religious turn that Victorian aestheticism took was 
no turn at all, only a re-efflorescence of the religious seeds always present in an 
artistic and cultural movement which drew so much of its inspiration from pre-
Raphaelite paintings (themselves often poised controversially between the sacred 
                                                
3 For instance, Chai writes, ‘all of Aestheticism might be said to emerge out of the 
twilight of a waning religious faith in the later nineteenth century’. See Aestheticism, ix. 
4 Michael W. Kaufmann, ‘The Religious, the Secular, and Literary Studies: Rethinking 
the Secularization Narrative in Histories of the Profession’, New Literary History 38.4 
(2007), 616. 




and the secular) and from the writings of Matthew Arnold and John Ruskin, and 
whose genealogy is sometimes traced to the Oxford Movement.6 So by what acts 
of differentiation did aestheticism ever seek independence from religion? Given 
that it has often been understood – both in the Victorian age and by subsequent 
critics – as a cusp between the secular and religious, what ways of thinking about 
the secular did aestheticism enable, and in what senses did it constitute an 
experiment in secular aesthetics?7 To what extent did it understand itself not 
simply as a witness but as an agent of secularisation? 
This thesis attempts a partial answer to those questions through a close 
study of Algernon Charles Swinburne and Walter Pater, writers who are 
conventionally regarded as the two seminal figures for Victorian aestheticism but 
who have rarely been studied alongside each other in detail. Both Swinburne and 
Pater have nonetheless enjoyed considerable scholarly attention over the last 
thirty years, and it seems newly possible to dispense with the rhetoric of critical 
embattlement which has often seemed a necessary preamble to any discussion of 
either writer. Yet the fact that Swinburne’s rehabilitation has been somewhat 
slower and more uneven than Pater’s – and the fact that Pater is conventionally 
paired with Oscar Wilde because of interest in the ways in which aestheticism 
rendered modern homosexual identity legible – have obscured the extent to which 
aestheticism emerged in their works as part of a complementary effort to 
formulate a vibrant alternative to established models of religious doubt and 
unbelief.  
This was a common project partly because, while Swinburne and Pater 
seem to have known each other only slightly and were temperamentally very 
                                                
6 Hilary Fraser suggests that Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde’s aestheticism has a religious 
genealogy which stretches back to the Oxford Movement in Beauty and Belief: Aesthetics 
and Religion in Victorian Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); 
see183-233. 
7 Some critics take the secular orientation of aestheticism as a given. For instance, Angela 
Leighton remarks that aestheticism was ‘almost always impure, [and] unconformingly 
materialist and secular in its outlook’. Yet it is not clear if Leighton simply conceives of 
secular materialism as a non-conformist stance in the period, or understands the 
secularism of aesthetes to be unconventional in some way. See Leighton, On Form: 
Poetry, Aestheticism, and the Legacy of a Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
37.   
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different, they emerged from the same intellectual milieu. As children, they were 
profoundly influenced by the devout high Anglicanism of their respective mothers 
(though Swinburne later denied that he had ever been ‘a theist’); both lost their 
faith while undergraduates at Oxford, where they were near contemporaries 
(Swinburne went up to Balliol in 1856; Pater to Queen’s in 1858).8 Both were 
tutored by Benjamin Jowett, the Regius Professor of Greek who was one of the 
contributors to the scandalous and pivotal Essays and Reviews (1860), a volume 
that argued in favour of a liberalised interpretation of Christianity. Yet what 
Gerald Monsman has noted of Pater is also true of Swinburne: the liberalised 
Christianity then stirring controversy at Oxford seems only to have sharpened 
their scepticism.9 Both were members of ‘Old Mortality’, an exclusive student 
discussion club with a radical sensibility; both became known among their peers 
for being provocative critics of religion; and both were avidly reading the same 
French authors (Charles Baudelaire, Théophile Gautier, Victor Hugo) from whom 
they would derive the kernel of their shared ‘art-for-art’s-sake’ position.10 Charles 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) was published before either of them 
began their careers, but on the whole, there is only oblique engagement with 
evolutionary theory and with the age’s scientific debates more generally in their 
works; while neither writer laments that science is unweaving the rainbow, there 
is an effort to sustain a strategic distance from its discourses.11 Each would 
produce a book early in his career – Swinburne’s Poems and Ballads, First Series  
                                                
8 For these biographical details, see Gerald Monsman, Walter Pater (Boston: G.K. Hall, 
1977), 17-47; and Rikky Rooksby, A. C. Swinburne: A Poet’s Life (Aldershot: Scolar 
Press,1997), 24-25 and 45-63. Swinburne claimed that he was never a theist in 1875; see 
his letter to E. C. Stedman in Major Poems and Selected Prose, eds. Jerome McGann and 
Charles L. Sligh (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 471. 
9 Monsman, Pater, 23. 
10 For discussions of the influence of French writers on Swinburne and Pater, see 
Charlotte Ribeyrol, ‘A Channel Passage: Swinburne and France’, in A. C. Swinburne and 
the Singing Word: New Perspectives on the Mature Work, ed. Yisrael Levin (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2010), 107-122; and Lene Østermark-Johansen, Walter Pater and the Language 
of Sculpture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011), 113-151. Leighton discusses the French origins 
of the ‘art-for-art’s-sake’ slogan; see On Form, 32-36. 
11 Jonathan Loesberg gives a good account of this strategic distance in relation to 
Swinburne in Aestheticism and Deconstruction: Pater, Derrida, and de Man (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), 13-14. 
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(1866); Pater’s Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873) – which became a 
succès de scandale because of its mixture of sensuality, irreligion, and stylistic 
virtuosity, and which would define their reputations not only for their 
contemporaries but also for subsequent generations of readers. Aristocratic 
privilege enabled Swinburne to remain impenitent in the face of public censure; 
Pater, the lower-middle-class don, made his accommodations with the Oxford 
establishment (though his career would be partially stymied by an intramural 
scandal over his love affair with a male student).12 The degree of mutual influence 
has never been closely appraised, though we know that Swinburne enjoyed 
Pater’s early essays (some of which were reprinted in The Renaissance), and was 
gratified when Pater told him that he considered Swinburne’s own critical prose a 
key influence.13 Both writers are often thought to have disavowed their 
aestheticist positions almost as soon as they became notorious for them: 
Swinburne in the name of a more idealistic and politically coherent form of 
secularism in his volume in celebration of the Risorgimento, Songs Before Sunrise 
(1871), and later for the sake of alcoholic detox in Putney, where – according to a 
now-exploded critical orthodoxy – he produced mostly lacklustre poetry; Pater’s 
position became more opaque as his prose became more byzantine, though he 
clearly grew more sympathetic toward Christianity, and troubled by his reputation 
as an immoralist.14 But reading their ‘art-for-art’s-sake’ positions as merely the 
opening gesture and their subsequent careers as long exercises in recantation 
depends upon a narrow understanding of aestheticism. Swinburne and Pater 
originally developed their varieties of aestheticism partly in order to critique and 
enrich what each found impoverished in contemporary conceptions of religious 
doubt and unbelief, and neither writer abandoned this complicated enterprise. 
Indeed, both men were in many ways loyal to their original visions, though they 
continuously sought ways to refine and expand upon them. 
                                                
12 On this scandal, see Billie Inman, ‘Estrangement and Connection: Walter Pater, 
Benjamin Jowett, and William H. Hardinge’, in Pater in the 1990s, eds. Laurel Brake and 
Ian Small (Greensboro: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 1-20.  
13 Swinburne received a presentation copy of The Renaissance. See Catherine Maxwell, 
Writers and Their Work: Swinburne (Tavistock: Northcote House, 2006), 82. 
14 For analysis of Pater’s later receptivity to Christianity, see Monsman, Pater, 102-104. 
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Insofar as aestheticism struck Pater and Swinburne’s contemporaries as a 
form of secularism, it seemed a peculiarly improper one. There is some irony in 
the fact that the young journalist who would become one of the age’s most 
prominent freethinkers (as well as a liberal statesman) wrote the first and perhaps 
the most influentially damning review of Poems and Ballads, First Series.15 
Scholars routinely use John Morley’s highly quotable invective – Swinburne 
‘revealed to the world a mind all aflame with the feverish carnality of a schoolboy 
over the dirtiest passages in Lemprière’ and had cast himself as the ‘libidinous 
laureate of a pack of satyrs’ – to illustrate the tenor of the controversy the volume 
stirred, no doubt because, taken out of context, such phrases sound suggestive of 
the overheated prudery of Victorian culture.16 The logic behind Morley’s reaction 
to Poems and Ballads is best grasped in relation to the terms in which he later 
celebrated Pater’s Renaissance: 
 
… this more recent pagan movement is one more wave of the great 
current of reactionary force which the Oxford movement first 
released … it is equally a protest against the mechanical and 
graceless formalism of the modem era, equally an attempt to find a 
substitute for a narrow popular creed in a return upon the older 
manifestations of the human spirit, and equally a craving for the 
infusion of something harmonious and beautiful about the bare 
lines of daily living. Since the first powerful attempt to revive a 
gracious spirituality in the country by a renovation of 
sacramentalism, science has come. The Newmanite generation in 
Oxford was followed by a generation who were formed on Mr. 
Mill’s Logic and Grote’s Greece. The aesthetic spirits were no 
longer able to find rest in a system associated with theology. Then 
Mr. Ruskin came, and the Pre-Raphaelite painters, and Mr. 
Swinburne and Mr. Morris, and now lastly a critic like Mr. Pater, 
all with faces averted from theology, most of them indeed blessed 
with a simple and happy unconsciousness of the very existence of 
the conventional gods. … But here is Mr. Pater courageously 
saying that love of art for art’s sake has most of the true wisdom 
                                                
15 Swinburne’s friend and biographer Edmund Gosse thought that Morley’s notice 
sparked the furor. See Gosse, The Life of Algernon Charles Swinburne (London: 
Macmillan, 1917), 150-152. Clyde K. Hyder is sceptical of Gosse’s account, but it seems 
plausible that Morley’s vituperative tour de force inspired other critics. See Hyder, 
Algernon Swinburne: The Critical Heritage (London: Routledge, 1970), xvii. 




that makes life full. The fact … that a serious writer should thus 
raise aesthetic interest to the throne lately filled by religion, only 
shows how void the old theologies have become.17  
 
At first sight it is curious that Pater’s book, which evinced such an obvious 
kinship with Swinburne’s aestheticism (and which, like Poems and Ballads, First 
Series, provoked a scandal because of its neo-pagan materialism) should receive 
Morley’s praise where Swinburne’s received his blame. This apparent 
inconsistency can be explained in terms of Morley’s sensitivity to the politics of 
Victorian religious doubt. As would become clear in his 1874 liberal polemic, On 
Compromise, Morley was committed to the secularisation of society, yet believed 
it was an ideal which could be realised only if freethinking intellectuals pursued it 
prudently. One of the major themes of On Compromise is the imperative for 
unbelievers to adhere to codes of civility and moral responsibility without merely 
sacrificing their beliefs on the altar of convention. The essay as a whole manifests 
ambivalence toward ‘the historic, semi-conservative and almost sympathetic 
quality, that distinguishes the unbelief of today from the unbelief of a hundred 
years ago’: on the one hand, Morley urges secularists to compromise, ‘to move 
very slowly, to bow to the conditions of the status quo, to practice the very utmost 
sobriety, self-restraint and accommodation’; on the other, he looks back wistfully 
to the Enlightenment philosophes, and gibes at the ‘flaccid latitudinarianism’ of 
Victorian culture.18  
Soon after he reviewed Swinburne’s volume, Morley became the editor of 
the Fortnightly Review, which he transformed into a bellwether of literary 
liberalism and scientific thought. As Gowan Dawson notes, the Fortnightly was 
the ‘periodical of choice for [T. H.] Huxley, [John] Tyndall, [W. H.] Clifford, and 
many other leading exponents of evolution and scientific naturalism’, as well as 
for the notable ‘aesthetic’ writers of the 1870s: William Morris, Pater, Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti – and Swinburne.19 The fact that Swinburne and Morley 
                                                
17 John Morley, ‘Mr. Pater’s Essays’, Fortnightly Review 13.76 (1873), 476. 
18 John Morley, On Compromise (London: Macmillan, 1923), 83, 130-131, 93, and 103. 
19 Gowan Dawson, Darwin, Literature and Victorian Respectability (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 17. 
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developed a warm professional relationship in the years immediately following 
Morley’s hatchet job – coupled with the fact that Morley could, seven years later, 
write approvingly of Swinburne as an anti-theological ‘aesthetic spirit’ – seem to 
measure both Swinburne’s affinities with and distance from the more respectable 
liberal wing of Victorian secularism. In his capacity as editor, Morley frequently 
had to wrangle with Swinburne over the vehemence of his anti-Christian 
positions, and one wonders if Morley’s own ideal of responsible unbelief 
crystallised partly under the pressure of editing Swinburne: 
 
I find myself in a thrice confounded strait. I shall most assuredly 
get into a fiendish scrape with my masters, print-masters and 
public, if I print that ugly sentence about the ‘edible and potable’ 
God, and that yet more sanglant utterance … <illegible> wind up 
about Christ and John Wilkes. I have ever found you so kind and 
considerate as to my awkward difficulties, but I venture to urge 
you to be as merciful as you are strong – and to leave out (or 
soften) the mocking edge of that closing sentence …20 
 
With reference to the two changes of phrase in your article on 
Shelley. Of the second – the place of Bayne’s god – I cannot 
speak; I cannot remember touching it …The other alteration – the 
limitation of the opinion of the evil wrought by Xianity to Shelley 
– I made, because I assumed that you meant no more than this; and 
because, if you meant no more, it was as well to avoid a phrase 
calculated to shock or displease even a majority of unbelievers.21 
 
The fact that Morley immediately embraced Pater as an exemplar of his 
own model of liberal secularism while he perceived Swinburne as a threat to the 
respectability of that same program is intelligible insofar as Pater’s aestheticism 
had a progressive and recognisably humanist orientation, while Swinburne’s was 
to some extent the product of what he himself later characterised as a youthful 
‘turbid nihilism’ (though in Songs Before Sunrise, he would proselytise on behalf 
of secular humanism more explicitly than Pater ever did, and this thesis will 
question the extent to which terms such as ‘nihilism’ or ‘pessimism’ are in fact 
                                                
20 [Morley to Swinburne, May 23, 1880], Uncollected Letters of Algernon Charles 
Swinburne, vol. 2, edited Terry Myers (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2005), 221-222. 
21 [Morley to Swinburne, May 15, 1869], ibid., vol.1, 161.  
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applicable to Swinburne’s work).22 It is not difficult to perceive why the 
blasphemies, dark eroticism, and sheer playfulness of Swinburne’s volume 
seemed so egregious to Morley. Swinburne clearly confounded Morley’s 
identification of atheism with rationality, and seemed to make a mockery of his 
own desire to defend a secular eudaemonism: ‘It is a good thing to vindicate 
passion, and the strong and large and rightful pleasures of the sense, against the 
narrow and inhuman tyranny of shrivelled anchorites. It is a very bad and silly 
thing to try to set up the pleasures of sense in the seat of the reason they have 
dethroned’.23 As Dawson has demonstrated, prominent Victorian scientists as well 
as freethinking radicals continuously had to contend against the association of 
unbelief with immorality in general and sexual immorality in particular.24 In 
explicitly conflating unbelief with perverse pleasure, Swinburne’s Poems and 
Ballads, First Series violated not simply traditional Christian sensibilities but the 
emerging protocols of respectable secularism. 
The nature of this double violation is partly a matter of style or aesthetics. 
Morley’s initial hostility to Swinburne was partly an aversion to the excesses of 
his style: ‘libidinous laureate of a pack of satyrs’ obviously pastiches Swinburne’s 
mellifluousness, specifically his habits of assonance and alliteration. Given that 
Pater’s prose was also often condemned as florid and morally suspect by 
Victorian critics, it may seem surprising that his style should be markedly more 
acceptable to Morley than Swinburne’s. Yet Pater’s critiques of Christianity tend 
to be pointillistic, constructed through erudite allusion, telling juxtapositions and 
ellipses, and fine qualifications. In other words, Pater’s style could seem as if it 
conformed to Morley’s ideal of judicious, high-minded unbelief. Nonetheless, I 
would suggest that Pater’s Renaissance caused a scandal partly because it pushed 
the polite discourses of religious doubt to their limits, exploiting the insinuating 
power of euphemism and turning the formal constraints placed upon critiques of 
Christianity into an occasion for aesthetic connoisseurship. Morley appears to 
detect this almost parodic quality when he notes that Pater’s style contains ‘the 
                                                
22 Swinburne, [letter to Stedman], Major Poems, 471. 
23 Morley, ‘Swinburne’, 145. 
24 Dawson, Darwin, 1-25. 
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germs of possible excess’, and suggests that Pater only delivers himself from the 
‘peril of … effeminate and flaccid mannerism’ on account of his overarching 
‘scrupulosity’ and ‘reserve’.25 One might turn this formulation around and say 
that the elaborate ‘reserve’ that writers were obliged to display when they wished 
to critique Christianity could itself be exploited as a richly ambiguous literary 
‘mannerism’ – that is, it could become an aesthetic end in itself. Pater seems self-
conscious about this possibility in the opening passage of his first published 
essay, ‘Coleridge’s Writings’ (1866), which begins its attack on Coleridge’s 
Christian transcendentalism by welcoming ‘the spectacle of the reserve of the 
elder generation exquisitely refined by the antagonism of the new’.26 In other 
words, the stylistic ‘reserve’ of the elder generation does not pass away but is 
rather perfected as something beautiful in itself under the pressure of new, 
subversive ideas. (Morley later commented privately that he was so much in 
sympathy with what he took to be Pater’s effort to beautify secularism that he was 
willing to pardon Pater’s ‘transgressions’, though he did not specify what these 
transgressions were: he was probably referring to the volume’s homoerotic 
undercurrents, though perhaps also to a more general apprehension that Pater’s 
variety of secularism courted some of the same risks that Swinburne’s did.)27 
Morley was being fanciful when he suggested that Pater and Swinburne 
embody ‘simple and happy unconsciousness of the very existence of the 
conventional gods’: both writers remain preoccupied by Christianity throughout 
their careers. Yet the phrase captures one of the fantasies they share: casting off 
the legacy of Christian (and Platonic) transcendentalism, and returning to a pagan 
enjoyment of the earthly. Every reader of Pater and Swinburne knows that they 
call for a rehabilitation of the senses, and that they often declare their passion for 
the transient; yet where modern literary criticism has tended to construe this 
primarily as a call for more expansive and liberated conceptions of sexuality, 
Victorian readers also construed it as an effort to cast secularism in peculiarly 
                                                
25 Morley, ‘Pater’, 471-472. 
26 Pater, ‘Coleridge’s Writings’, Westminster Review 29.1 (1866), 106. 
27 Quoted in Franklin E. Court, Pater and His Early Critics (Victoria, B.C.: University of 
Victoria, 1980), 77. 
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seductive terms.28 There is something discordant about discussing the ‘secular’ – 
a category which invokes the commonsensical, the transparent, things-in-their-
facticity – in terms of fantasy, and one might object that when Pater and 
Swinburne idealise a lost Hellenic wholeness, or try to retrieve a pagan 
appreciation of the beauty of the material world, it is a lost religious fullness that 
they are yearning for, albeit one conceived in opposition to Christianity. Yet Pater 
and Swinburne’s ‘paganism’ often demands to be read as a form of secularism 
insofar as they generally celebrate paganism for its vindication of what the 
Catholic philosopher Charles Taylor would call a ‘closed’ or self-sufficient 
immanent frame: that is, an ideal of human flourishing that is conceived without 
reference to the transcendent, or to anything beyond or higher than the human and 
the natural. As Taylor notes, there is a distinctive strand of modern anti-religious 
thinking which understands the ‘human good as in its very essence sensual, 
earthly; whoever identifies a transcendental goal departs from it, betrays it’.29 
This logic forms a powerful current in both Swinburne and Pater’s works. More 
specifically, they often identify the pagan with a primordial capacity to find 
mortal life in the world sufficient unto itself, prior to a ‘fall’ into theological 
abstraction, melancholy Christian inwardness, and, as Pater puts it, the 
‘crucifixion of the senses’.30 A locus classicus for this mode of secularism is this 
passage from Pater’s ‘Winckelmann’ essay: 
 
It has been sometimes said that art is a means of escape from ‘the 
tyranny of the senses’. It may be so for the spectator; he may find 
that the spectacle of supreme works of art takes from the life of the 
senses something of its turbid fever. But this is possible for the 
spectator only because the artist in producing those works has 
gradually sunk his intellectual and spiritual ideas in sensuous form. 
He may live, as Keats lived, a pure life; but his soul, like that of 
Plato’s false astronomer, becomes more and more immersed in 
                                                
28 For discussions of aestheticism as a mode of sexual liberation, see Richard Dellamora’s 
Masculine Desire: The Sexual Politics of Victorian Aestheticism (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1990), as well as the essays collected in Victorian Sexual 
Dissidence, ed. Richard Dellamora (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
29 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 547. 
30 Pater, ‘Winckelmann’, Westminster Review 31.1 (1867), 106. Pater excised this phrase 
when the essay appeared in The Renaissance. 
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sense, until nothing else has any interest for him. How could such a 
one ever again endure the greyness of the ideal or spiritual world? 
The spiritualist is satisfied in seeing the sensuous elements escape 
from his conceptions; his interest grows, as the dyed garment 
bleaches in the keener air. But the artist steeps his thought again 
and again into the fire of colour. To the Greek this immersion in 
the sensuous was indifferent. But Christianity, with its 
uncompromising idealism, discrediting the slightest touch of sense, 
has lighted up for the artistic life, with its inevitable sensuousness, 
a background of flame. … It is hard to pursue that life without 
something of a conscious disavowal of the spiritual world; and this 
imparts to genuine interests a kind of intoxication.31 
 
This reaches beyond a critique of Christian asceticism. Even a Christianity 
more hospitable to the sensuous (and Pater’s later work emphasises that 
Christianity is in fact a sensuous faith) would not answer to the logic here, since 
Pater insists that art derives its power from pure immersion in sense, and as such, 
is antagonistic toward the possibility of another, spiritual realm. Pater’s metaphor 
works to insist that Christianity is just another colour in humanity’s palette of 
sense: it aims to transcend sense, but in so doing, manages only to be ‘grey’ or 
‘bleached’. Even the spectator who fancies that art allows him to escape from 
sense is disabused (he is just having his senses soothed, not leaving them behind); 
and for artists, Christianity’s pallor simply adds fuel to the general ‘fire of colour’ 
(though it is hard to say if this ‘background of flame’ is a holy fire or the flames 
of hell). Pater’s career as a whole may be understood as a comprehensive effort to 
vindicate the perspective of Plato’s ‘false astronomer’, or to insist on the 
thoroughly sensuous nature of all perception (and late in his career, Pater 
suggested that Plato himself was a false astronomer, devoted to the sensuous and 
the this-worldly after all.)32 But there is a twist in the argument; where for the 
Greeks immersion in sense was unmediated, artists of the Christian era perform a 
‘conscious disavowal of the spiritual world’ in order to achieve the same effects. 
Pater seems to cast aside Christian and Platonic transcendentalism as something 
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Oxford University Press, 2010), 111. 
32 For discussion of Pater’s ‘sensuous’ Plato in Plato and Platonism (1893), see David W. 




without ‘interest’, but there is a profound investment in perpetuating the argument 
between the Christian and the pagan, the spiritual and the worldly, since the 
‘conscious’ nature of the disavowal is at least partly what allows for intoxication, 
now artists have lost a Hellenic sense of the world’s immediacy. This 
contradictory movement is typical of both Pater and Swinburne’s aestheticism: 
first, the religious is banished in the interests of a pure experience of the aesthetic; 
second, the friction between the secular and the religious is re-inscribed as the 
essence of art. In other words, their aestheticism is nourished by the question it 
apparently neutralises.33  
Pater and Swinburne also identify a ‘pagan’ perspective with art far more 
promiscuously: their aestheticism is, in part, a sweeping effort to claim that such a 
radical love of the worldly for its own sake is discernible in all great art, even 
where it is repressed or disavowed. Such claims produce a paradox: the secular is 
identified with all that is intuitive, familiar, and vividly real; and yet it is also 
imagined to be an exotic and deeply buried idea, one that requires careful 
excavation (as well as urgent advocacy). It is this paradox, I suggest, which 
underpins Pater and Swinburne’s ‘art-for-art’s-sake’ position. The near-
tautological assertion that art has – or should have – no purpose beyond or higher 
than itself often functions as an assertion about the autotelism of secular life, its 
completeness-unto-itself. Like the ‘art-for-art’s sake’ catchphrase, this mode of 
secularism often hovers between an assertion about the way things are and an 
assertion about the way things should be: on the one hand, art has always – if 
secretly – sought its own, aesthetic ends, though it has been yoked to other 
purposes; on the other, art should renounce all its false aspirations and be satisfied 
with its status as art.  
The secularising burden the art-for-art’s-sake phrase often carries similarly 
tends to shuttle between a description, a prescription, and an optative trope: 
sometimes Pater and Swinburne invoke a purely immanent conception of 
existence as if simply registering an intransigent reality; sometimes it takes the 
form of an assertion that we ought to find earthly life enchantment enough; at 
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others it appears as a wistful suggestion that, if only we could renovate our 
perceptions, or make ourselves more properly receptive, all the ecstasy religion 
promises in transcendent terms would be available here and now. Tracing this 
(sometimes knotted) logic across Pater and Swinburne’s work, this thesis 
emphasises the extent to which aestheticism had ambitions to be not simply a 
philosophy of beauty but something like a philosophy of happiness, and it tends to 
catch both writers in their more blithe and joyful moods. Of course, this is not to 
suggest that darker and more melancholic currents are absent from their work; nor 
is it to suggest that they never articulate desires for something beyond the 
limitations of secular existence. (Indeed, one might detect a longing for 
transcendence in the elaborate ways both writers often deny or reconfigure such 
longings.) Yet the effort to cast the secular in terms of pleasure and fulfillment is 
a dense and continuous thread in both their works. It is discernible even in some 
of the most apparently despairing visions conjured in Poems and Ballads, First 
Series, where Swinburne’s sadomasochistic poetics enable him to perform a kind 
of perverse version of the rational loss-and-gain calculations that the Victorians so 
often liked to make when belief and unbelief were in the balance; his early poems 
work not simply by negation, but insist that there is a complex pleasure, a higher 
vitality, or strange consolation to be found even in what seems most inimical 
about a purely secular understanding of things.34 Likewise, even when Pater 
attempts a rapprochement with Christianity in the latter part of his career, it is 
with a remarkably sun-lit and hedonic conception of the secular, rather than with 
the more familiar Victorian model of unbelief as a type of ‘freezing reason’, with 
which he compares the attractions of Christianity.35 
To emphasise that Pater and Swinburne’s aestheticism was an effort to 
cast secularism in terms of desire and pleasure is in a sense only to echo their 
most virulent contemporary detractors: for instance, in 1879, W. S. Lilly claimed 
                                                
34 The gains-and-losses idea, given currency by the title of John Henry Newman’s 1848 
novel, is such a common motif that Robert Lee Wolff adopts it as the title of his 
comprehensive study of Victorian novels of faith and doubt. See Gains and Losses: 
Novels of Faith and Doubt in Victorian England (London: John Murray, 1977). 
35 Tennyson, ‘In Memoriam A.H.H.’, Tennyson: A Selected Edition, ed. Christopher 
Ricks (Harlow: Pearson and Longman, 2007), 469. 
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that they were ‘evangelists’ for a ‘sentimental materialism’: the ‘mawkish and 
unwholesome jargon of aestheticism’, with its ‘Circean spells’ and ‘deification of 
the flesh’, was transparently reducible to this ‘gospel’, whose effect was to at 
once degrade and efface the human: ‘the man vanishes, and you have instead a 
“creature more subtle than any beast of the field, but likewise cursed above any 
beast of the field”’.36 In a similar vein, Harry Quilter decried the aestheticism of 
Pater and Swinburne as a ‘gospel of intensity’ which exploited the religious doubt 
of the age and made it the occasion for ‘pure sensuousness’, albeit sensuousness 
of a peculiarly cultured variety.37 Quilter emphasised that the ‘new Renaissance’ 
they sought to inaugurate under the aegis of aestheticism was in fact entirely 
‘melancholy’ – the ‘gospel of intensity’ induced only ‘self-consciousness [about] 
a miserable, thwarted, and limited existence’.38 Strikingly, such critics find 
‘aestheticism’ immoral not simply because of its glorification of pleasure, nor 
simply because it seems atheistic, but because its hedonism recasts in desirable 
terms something understood as irreducibly painful – the loss of religious belief. 
Such critics register aestheticism’s ambitions to provide something akin to 
religious enchantment and inspiration in secular terms – hence the attacks not 
merely on its sexual or religious improprieties, but on its sentimentality, its spells, 
its ‘gospel’ – and seek to underline the doomed nature of any such effort. 
The Victorian ‘crisis of faith’, once a convenient stock phrase in studies of 
the period, is increasingly hard to deploy without rhetorical embarrassment. The 
Victorian ‘crisis of faith’ narrative forms a crux within contemporary debates over 
the concept of secularisation both in literary studies and in the fields of history 
and sociology, though scholars have only recently begun to reappraise Victorian 
literature in the light of challenges to the ‘secularisation thesis’ (the theory that 
modernity inevitably leads to the decline of religion). Contesting prior accounts of 
the Victorian age as a period marked by the ebbing of the ‘Sea of Faith’ and the 
‘disappearance of God’, such reappraisals have underscored the vitality and 
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diffuseness of Victorian religion, and emphasised that secularisation did not entail 
the decline of faith so much as the prismatic diversification of the forms of belief 
(including the emergence of new secular beliefs).39 Reading Victorian literature 
without assuming that the period witnessed the decline of religion in any simple 
sense entails an effort to hold contradictions together, and to sustain a double 
perspective that William McKelvy evokes memorably: 
 
It was the best of times and the worst of times for religion; it was 
the age of Darwin and the age of Newman, an age that begins to 
draw to an end when we can imagine an esoteric reader in a 
London flat making his way through Nietzsche, basking in the 
roseate twilight of the idols, while down on the street the Salvation 
Army, with brass artillery thundering, wins yet another celestial 
victory.40 
 
 Yet sustaining this perspective also creates complications insofar as many 
prominent Victorians believed that they were beholding the inexorable decline of 
religion – and this belief, typically framed as a melancholic one, was itself often 
both rendered and understood as an extension of a writer’s faith, or as a quasi-
religious compensation for their lack of faith. Charles LaPorte suggests that we 
take such Victorian intimations of religion’s decline with a pinch of salt: they 
attest to the ‘Victorians’ impressions of secularisation rather than to secularisation 
per se’, and when, in ‘Dover Beach’, Arnold thinks he can hear ‘the melancholy, 
long, withdrawing roar’ of the ‘Sea of Faith’, he is perhaps only hearing the sound 
of his ‘own ear pressed against a seashell’.41 Yet there is no need to dismiss 
Arnold’s vision as false testimony because too many portentous assertions about 
the death of God have been extrapolated from it: there is no insoluble 
                                                
39 The retreat of the ‘Sea of Faith’ is Arnold’s metaphor for the Victorian religious crisis 
in ‘Dover Beach’ (1867). Books which situate their readings of Victorian literature in 
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contradiction between understanding Victorian culture as substantially religious 
and understanding it as pervaded by doubt and anxieties about religion’s decline, 
at least insofar as many Victorians construed such doubts and anxieties as pious, 
and they attest powerfully to how much Victorian culture valued religion. As 
Lance St John Butler observes, ‘The avowedly religious discourse of the 
Victorians is shot through with … doubt, while the avowedly unreligious or 
antireligious discourse of the period is shot through with metaphysical 
assumptions, and with vocabulary and imagery that betray the cultural pervasion 
of religion’.42  
 Much recent work on religion and secularisation in literary studies is 
informed by Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, partly because he provides ways of 
drawing lucid yet complex distinctions between the secular and the religious.43 
Taylor carefully distinguishes between two types of ‘secularisation’. The first he 
defines as the ‘emptying of religion from autonomous social spheres’, a 
phenomenon he regards as salutary and as a development partly internal to the 
logic of Christianity itself.44 Taylor emphasises that this type of secularisation 
may take place while a given society remains broadly religious, though belief is 
rendered a private matter, and God is driven from the public square. To point out 
that this type of secularisation was occurring across the nineteenth-century, 
though gradually and unevenly, is uncontroversial. Throughout the period, the 
state moved toward secularisation largely by virtue of demands for religious 
                                                
42 St John Butler, Victorian Doubt: Literary and Cultural Discourses (Hertfordshire: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 6-7. 
43 While I focus on the nebulous boundaries between the secular and the religious in the 
Victorian period, particularly as they were encoded in Victorian ‘doubt’, my underlying 
assumption about the difference between the two conforms to Taylor’s distinction 
between ‘closed’ and ‘open’ immanent frames (a ‘closed frame’ identifies the good with 
the human and the this-worldly, without reference to the transcendent; an ‘open frame’ 
entails the perception that the good is ‘inextricably linked to God, or to something 
ontically higher [transcendent])’. See A Secular Age, 544. Critics often flatten distinctions 
between the religious and secular in order to contest the secularisation thesis, but as 
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toleration: 1828 saw the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, relieving 
Dissenters from civic disabilities (Catholics were emancipated the following 
year); the requirement that students at Oxford and Cambridge subscribe to the 
Thirty Nine Articles upon matriculation was abolished in 1851; and Jews could 
enter the House of Commons from 1858. Yet freedom of religion and freedom 
from religion were not coterminous: it was not until 1886 that Charles Bradlaugh 
– after having been elected as the member for Northampton four times – was 
allowed to take up his seat as the first avowed atheist in parliament.45 Perhaps 
most crucially for my purposes, the Oxford that Swinburne and Pater attended 
was very much wandering between worlds: while Anglican orthodoxy was no 
longer required of students, it was still required of dons. (Pater would be elected 
as a Fellow of Brasenose college in 1864 during the first wave of non-clerical 
fellowships, although Oxford and Cambridge fellowships remained closed to non-
Anglicans until 1871.) Pater and Swinburne’s insistence upon the autonomy of 
art, its proper independence from other spheres and types of knowledge, was as 
much a product of the partial and confusing secularisation they encountered at 
Oxford as it was the exotic fruit of their mutual interest in French literature. The 
notion of art as a neutral sphere, committed only to its own disinterested laws, has 
often been understood by modern scholars as an alibi for something else – as an 
escapist flight from economic or political realities, or, more recently, as an effort 
to engage politics, especially the politics of sexuality or gender, in alternative 
terms.46 Yet the idea of ‘art-for-art’s-sake’ was also quite explicitly a petition for 
the type of secularisation I have sketched above in relation to art – with the twist 
that art, particularly literature, was more usually conceived in the period as one of 
the semi-private realms in which religion could find sanctuary as its presence in 
the public sphere was increasingly contested.47 
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 Taylor also analyses secularisation in its more nebulous sense – that is, the 
question of what happens to religious belief under the conditions of modernity. In 
his view, secularisation does not refer to the disintegration of religion (though he 
acknowledges that religion has declined), but rather to a ‘nova effect’: new 
positions, both religious and secular, proliferate, and all positions become 
‘fragilised’ and open to contestation.48 Taylor is also interested in what it feels 
like to be secular. He suggests that across the spectrum of secular and religious 
positions, modern people often experience the ‘malaise of a disenchanted 
world’.49 Where the premodern self was porous, open to ‘enchantment’ – that is, 
to the influence of transcendent spirits and moral agencies, both good and bad – 
the modern self is ‘buffered’ by its rationality, and largely impervious to such 
influences; at its most secular, it ‘see[s] itself as invulnerable, as master of the 
meanings of things’.50 Taylor actually discusses Pater’s work in passing. Glossing 
the ‘Conclusion’ to the Renaissance, he classifies Pater’s aestheticism as one of 
the ‘“subtler languages” of post-Romantic literature’ which, rather than sustaining 
the indeterminate stance toward religious possibility that such language can 
afford, repudiates  ‘transcendent object[s]’ and underscores that all aspirations are 
‘fulfilled at the level of experience’.51 This seems an accurate assessment of the 
‘Conclusion’, yet it overlooks the extent to which Pater’s essay runs against the 
grain of Taylor’s larger thesis: Pater identifies the lack of a transcendent object 
not with rational self-mastery but with a radically porous self, and he claims that 
it is at least possible to find this condition both fulfilling and enchanting, albeit 
‘enchanting’ from within a purely immanent frame. Taylor’s identification of 
secularisation with disenchanted rationality would have resonated with many 
Victorian writers and thinkers, but it is an identification that Pater and 
Swinburne’s aestheticism resists. Of course, one could read Pater and 
Swinburne’s emphasis upon radical receptivity to experience and the possibilities 
                                                                                                                                
‘to the increasingly stressed secular spaces that have sought to displace religion’. See 
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48 Taylor, Secular Age, 300 and 303. 
49 Ibid., 302. 
50 Ibid., 38. 
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of worldly ecstasy as symptoms of the buffered, rationalised nature of modern 
subjectivity, which perversely wishes for the transcendent goods it denies itself. 
As George Levine repeatedly confesses in a recent essay, claiming to derive the 
satisfactions proffered by religion in secular terms is – to say the least – a move 
fraught with rhetorical difficulty.52 Arguably, much of the West’s literary 
inheritance is ranged against the possibility of rendering such claims plausible. 
And surely one of the reasons why aestheticism would often seem facile and 
embarrassing to a later generation of modernist writers was its tendency to stake 
its claims on the beauties of the material world and upon the richness of the 
gratifications available in the here and now.53 Yet, as the modernists also felt – 
often in spite of themselves – such claims also have their allure, if only because of 
their audacity or poignancy. This thesis reads Pater and Swinburne’s works as 
efforts to explore the possibilities of secular consciousness at the perimeters of the 
established Victorian discourses of religious doubt. Both writers tend to frame a 
secular perspective not as the chastening effect of an intellectual struggle with 
scientific or historical evidence, but as a perception that may be authenticated 
through an encounter with a work of art or with the natural world, an imaginative 
or self-consciously ‘heretical’ interpretation of the past, or even by sexual desire. 
The novelty of their project may be gauged by the extent to which it both troubled 
and excited the positivist Morley; the ambiguities it always harboured, by the 
extent to which aestheticism could ultimately be used by Pater – as well as by 
other writers – as a means of dramatising ambivalent returns to faith. 
 The word ‘secular’ holds ambiguities within itself by definition. Its 
primary meaning derives from the medieval period, where it simply denoted 
members of the clergy who moved in society at large rather than remaining 
confined within a monastic order. (Both Pater and Swinburne are fascinated by 
this kind of liminality: the figure of the medieval clerk who is tempted by worldly 
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things constitutes a shared topos.)54 Etymologically, the word implies a time 
rather than a place: it comes from the same Latin root (sæculum) as the French 
word siècle. In this sense too it seems germane to Pater and Swinburne – in their 
works, the transience of time and the co-implication of life and death are often 
framed as age-old themes that nonetheless have the force of shocking new 
realities now that they have been separated from hopes for immortality. Thirdly, 
the cognate term, ‘secularisation’, implies an act of expropriation wherein things 
formerly held to belong to the Church become the property of the state. When 
literary theorists discuss religion and secularisation, this metaphor of political 
expropriation often looms large: literary ‘secularisation’ is understood as the 
annexing of forms, tropes and ideas formerly held to be religious property, and 
their delivery into secular territory. This type of literary secularisation is often 
considered partial and ambiguous; the purportedly secular, for all its rhetoric of 
independence, is shown to have the same features as its religious parents.55 As I 
have suggested, the filiation between aestheticism and discourses of decadence is 
often linked to the idea that aestheticism constituted an illegitimate or debased 
expropriation of religious goods. This idea can also be understood as internal to 
aestheticism itself; Pater in particular sometimes presents aestheticism as an 
illicit, secular fetishisation of the religious. Yet Pater and Swinburne also often try 
to turn such logic on its head, and suggest that religion was itself an expropriation 
of originally secular and aesthetic goods.  
Morley’s review of the The Renaissance captures another distinctive 
feature of aestheticism. By characterising Pater’s work as an effort to continue the 
Oxford Movement’s sacramentalism in a scientifically informed, anti-theological 
spirit, he suggests a simple passing of the torch from a religious to a secular 
imagination; science has ‘come’, so a sense of sacramental beauty is transferred 
from theology to art. Swinburne and Pater in fact often strive to present such 
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shifts as easeful, and to suggest that religious ways of seeing can be translated 
into secular ones without tension or loss. Nonetheless, this thesis emphasises the 
complexity and paradoxes of their efforts to secularise aesthetic experience, and 
the extent to which it depended upon ambiguities within the discourses of 
Victorian doubt. It is telling that when Swinburne makes his early declarations of 
aesthetic independence, he frames these not in terms of an opposition to 
Christianity per se but in opposition to conventionalised religious doubt and 
religiously-toned secularism: ‘Let us no longer be pestered with the frantic and 
flatulent assumptions of quasi-secular clericalism willing to think the best of all 
sides, and ready even, with consecrating hand, to lend meritorious art and poetry a 
timely shove’; he defines himself against ‘Christian sceptics, hand-cuffed fighters, 
tongued-tied orators …; believers whose belief was a sentiment, and freethinkers 
who saw nothing before Christ or beyond Judea’.56 This thesis analyses Pater and 
Swinburne’s aestheticism not as a critique of a monolithic Christianity – though 
admittedly at times they present it as such – but rather as a phenomenon that 
grows out of the cracks in established ways of discussing religious doubt and the 
possibilities of the secular. As developed by Swinburne and Pater, aestheticism 
responds to a cultural moment in which a particular discourse of religious doubt – 
cultured, melancholic, morally serious, and either eager to confirm the pious 
character of doubt or to express nostalgia for a departed faith and tenderness for 
the heritage of Christianity – had acquired respectability and begun to settle into 
recognisable literary tropes and forms. Swinburne and Pater’s varieties of 
aestheticism have intimate but transgressive relationships with this discourse, 
drawing upon its authority even as they call attention to its exclusions. Crucial to 
my project is an attempt to delineate the poetics of aestheticism in relation to a 
historical juncture at which Christianity could look both hegemonic and fragile, 
and, by virtue of apparently minor tricks of style, religious scepticism could seem 
either scandalous or conventional.  
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Chapter 1 discusses blasphemy in relation to Swinburne’s experiments 
with the dramatic monologue, a form closely associated with Robert Browning 
and often used by the older poet as a medium for Christian apologetics. I suggest 
that Swinburne appropriates Browning’s form in order to dramatise the 
instabilities of the politicised distinction between respectable doubt and 
blasphemy, and to interrogate Browning’s efforts to posit doubt as a ground for 
authentic religious faith. Chapter 2 examines Swinburne’s critiques of the 
Victorian identification of religious doubt with melancholy and disenchantment, 
an identification given a poetic inevitability by Alfred Tennyson and Arnold. I 
analyse Swinburne’s handling of conventional themes and forms such as the 
carpe diem topos, the Romantic sublime, courtly love, and the epic as efforts to 
answer Tennyson and Arnold, and to propose a more expansive understanding of 
the secular. Chapter 3 is divided into three sections. The first examines Pater’s 
essay ‘Diaphaneitè’ (1864) in relation to Thomas Carlyle’s The French 
Revolution (1837), and suggests that Pater’s aesthetic prose seeks to transfigure 
the nexus between unbelief, apocalypse, and revolution in the Victorian 
imaginary. Section two argues that three essays from Pater’s Renaissance – 
‘Aucassin and Nicolette’, ‘Botticelli’, and ‘Pico della Mirandola’ – operate partly 
by reinforcing the submerged links between Arnold’s ideal of disinterested 
cultural criticism and the concept of heresy, and by transvaluing those links as 
principles of aestheticism. Section three considers Pater’s ‘Conclusion’ and 
‘Coleridge’s Writings’ in relation to John Stuart Mill’s ‘Coleridge’ (1840) and An 
Examination of  Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (1865), and analyses Pater’s 
bids to turn the apparently distressing implications of modern thought into sources 
of secular enchantment. The final chapter reads Pater’s Marius the Epicurean 
(1881) alongside George Eliot’s Romola (1862-1863) and suggests that Pater’s 
novel uses Epicureanism to interrogate Victorian assumptions about the 
distinction between secular and Christian morality, particularly in relation to 
concepts of altruism and self-sacrifice. I also seek to historicise the famously 
enigmatic nature of Pater’s novel by situating it in relation to the diffusion of 
Huxley’s coinage, ‘agnosticism’, and to contests over the implications of the new 
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paradigm that animated the periodical press in the late 1870s and early 1880s.  
































Chapter One: Parleying with Robert Browning and Matthew Arnold: 
Blasphemy, the Dramatic Monologue, and Swinburne’s Poems and Ballads, 
First Series 
 
While still an undergraduate at Oxford, Swinburne fantasised about reviewing his 
own poetry and identifying its ‘models’ as ‘blasphemy and sensuality’ – an 
arresting formulation that seems to posit transgression itself as a celebrated 
literary form or precursor poet.1 When Swinburne’s fantasy of literary scandal 
was in a sense spectacularly fulfilled in the ‘trial-by-review’ of Poems and 
Ballads, First Series, Swinburne apparently minded the imputations of 
‘blasphemy’ far less than he did those of sexual ‘indecency’.2 In Notes on Poems 
and Reviews (1866), the pamphlet he composed in response to the controversy 
that followed the publication of Poems and Ballads, Swinburne retaliated 
energetically against the criticisms that had been directed at erotic poems such as 
‘Hermaphroditus’, but he only defended the volume’s anti-Christian content in 
relation to a single poem (‘Anactoria’), and he buried his sharpest riposte to the 
‘blasphemy’ charge in a footnote:  
 
 As I shall not return to this charge of ‘blasphemy’, I will here cite a 
notable instance of what does seem permissible in that line to the 
English reader. (… It is the line of demarcation which admits, if 
offense there be, the greater offender and rejects the less – it is this 
that I do not understand.) After many alternate curses and denials 
of God, a great poet talks of Christ ‘veiling his horrible Godhead’, 
of his ‘malignant soul’, his ‘godlike malice’. Shelley outlived all 
this and much more; but Shelley wrote all this and much more. 
Will no Society for the Suppression of Common Sense – no 
Committee for the Propagation of Cant – see to it a little? Or have 
they not already tried their hands at it and broken down?  For the 
poem which contains the words above quoted continues to this day 
to bring credit and profit to its publishers – Mssrs. Moxon and Co.3 
                                                
1 Quoted by Hyder, introduction to Swinburne: Critical Heritage, xiii.  
2 I borrow this formulation from Joss Marsh, who emphasises the prosecutorial character 
of Victorian literary reviews. See Word Crimes: Blasphemy, Culture, and Literature in 
Nineteenth-Century England, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 94. 




 This gibe at Moxon & Co. – the reputable firm that initially published 
Poems and Ballads and then, fearing that prosecution would follow the damning 
reviews, withdrew the volume – is more charged that it appears. As Swinburne 
surely knew Queen Mab (1813), the Shelley poem to which he alludes, had in fact 
brought Moxon & Co. not simply ‘credit and profit’ but a blasphemy conviction.  
In 1841, the Chartist and freethinker Henry Hetherington sued Edward Moxon for 
blasphemous libel in order to dramatise the injustice of the fact that the 
blasphemy law was only invoked in the cases of ‘unrespectable’ writers and 
publishers like Hetherington himself.4 As Donald Thomas points out, Moxon & 
Co. panicked over the reviews of Poems and Ballads partly because Edward 
Moxon’s successors at the firm recalled the legendary Queen Mab case.5 In effect, 
Swinburne here adopts the strategy used by Hetherington: he points out that 
‘blasphemy’ is embedded in esteemed works of literature, and decries the 
arbitrariness of the ‘line of demarcation’ between the literary and the 
blasphemous. Yet this protest is partly disingenuous: Swinburne of course knew 
that the atheistic moments in Shelley’s work marred his reputation in the eyes of 
many Victorian readers and his sense of affinity with Shelley was partly founded 
upon his conception of the poet as a Romantic infidel. What aggrieves Swinburne 
is not the charge of ‘blasphemy’ per se but the failure of his critics to share his 
Romantic faith in a correlation between transgression and poetic genius.  
Joss Marsh has argued that the Queen Mab case was pivotal in what she 
calls the ‘literary redefinition’ of blasphemy in the nineteenth century.6 As 
critiques of traditional religion became more commonplace and socially 
acceptable, ‘blasphemy’ increasingly came to signify not a verbal offence against 
religion as such but the unsavoury twin of polite agnosticism and doubt. Marsh 
argues that the Victorian concept of blasphemy was class-coded and profoundly 
political insofar as it hinged less on the actual claims of a given critique of 
                                                
4 Joss Marsh, Word Crimes: Blasphemy, Culture, and Literature (Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press), 90-109. 
5 Donald Thomas, Swinburne: The Poet in His World (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1978), 127-128. 
6 Marsh, Word Crimes, 91. 
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religion than on the felt manner and sensibility of the critique; as it was enshrined 
in law, ‘blasphemy’ essentially constituted a crime against literary decorum or 
aesthetic taste.7 Although Marsh’s book focuses on the working-class secularists 
who fell victim to this distinction between sanctioned and unsanctioned styles of 
religious critique, it also has implications for the study of an aristocratic poet like 
Swinburne, whose aestheticism was partly a bid to preserve the transgressive 
potential of atheism at a moment when polite ‘doubt’ had accrued a considerable 
measure of cultural legitimacy. 
Swinburne reflected more candidly on the blasphemies of Poems and 
Ballads in a letter to William Michael Rossetti: 
  
As to the anti-theism of Félise, I know of course that you know that 
the verses represent a mood of mind and phase of thought not 
unfamiliar to me; but I nonetheless maintain that no reader … has a 
right (whatever he may conjecture) to assert that this is my faith 
and that the faith expressed in such things as the ‘Litany’ or 
‘Carol’ or ‘Dorothy’ is not … it is not the less formally dramatic 
than the others; and this is the point on which it seems to me 
necessary to insist … I forsee I shall soon have to defend myself 
from the charge of being a moralist – a deist – even (chi lo sa?) a 
Galilean. It is really very odd that people (friendly or unfriendly) 
will not let one be an artist, but must needs make one out a parson 
or a pimp. I suppose it is part of the fetid and fecund spawn of the 
‘Galilean serpent.’8  
 
 While Swinburne here claims that the tendency to evaluate art as an index 
to the beliefs of its creator is one of the pernicious legacies of Christianity, he 
immediately betrays his own Romantic investment in the idea of art as a testament 
of (rebellious) authorial intentions: his delineation of his ideal of the disaffiliated 
aesthete, free to venture across the terrain of belief and unbelief without 
commitment to any public identity, culminates abruptly in an invocation of 
Shelley as a Romantic infidel and revolutionary (‘Galilean serpent’ alludes to 
Shelley’s ‘Ode to Liberty’ [1820]: ‘the Galilean serpent forth did creep,/And 
                                                
7 Ibid., 90-109. 
8 [Swinburne to William Michael Rossetti, October 9, 1866], The Swinburne Letters 
vol.1, edited Cecil Lang (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 193. 
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made thy world an undistinguishable heap’ [119-120]).9 This letter also suggests 
that Swinburne’s espousal of an art-for-art’s sake position – which here seems 
essentially a rhetorical feint, a means of asserting and disavowing radical 
convictions, perhaps especially anti-Christian ones, in the same gesture – was 
shaped by his sense of the prestige of the ‘dramatic’ form, a poetic genre 
associated with Browning and, to a lesser degree, with Tennyson, the age’s two 
great poets of religious doubt. 
Swinburne also defends his poems on the grounds that they are ‘formally 
dramatic’ in Notes on Poems and Reviews: here he declares that his poetry is 
‘dramatic, many-faced, multifarious; and no utterance of enjoyment or despair, 
belief or unbelief, can properly be assumed as the assertion of its author’s 
personal feeling or faith’.10 He claims that his use of the ‘dramatic’ form is 
actually a mark of his respect for propriety: where Byron and Shelley used the 
confessional Romantic lyric to engage in full-dress assaults on the pieties of their 
culture, he adopts the ‘dramatic method’, a mode of indirection and authorial self-
effacement. 11 Yet he adds a teasing double negative to this protestation: ‘I do not 
say that, if I chose [to attack social conventions], I would not do so to the best of 
my power’.12 We can only appreciate the archness of Swinburne’s self-
positioning here when we examine the monologues in question, for Swinburne 
uses the freedom of subject matter and the appearance of ideological neutrality 
afforded by the ‘dramatic method’ to reinvigorate a tradition of Romantic 
iconoclasm he associated with Byron and Shelley (as well as with Blake).13 
Moreover, Swinburne uses the form to engage in an agon with Browning – 
specifically, to interrogate Browning’s representations of religious doubt, and to 
propose an alternative vision of the relationship between religion and art. 
                                                
9 Shelley, The Major Works, eds. Zachary Leader and Michael O’Neill (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 470. 
10 Swinburne, Major Poems, 349. 
11 Ibid, 344. 
12 Ibid., 349. 
13 For a discussion of Swinburne’s indebtedness to a tradition of Romantic iconoclasm, 
see David G. Riede’s ‘Swinburne and Romantic Authority’, in The Whole Music of 
Passion: New Essays on Swinburne, eds. Rikky Rooksby and Nicholas Shrimpton, 




‘Hymn to Proserpine’ and ‘Cleon’ 
 
Swinburne was by turns an avid admirer and detractor of Browning’s poetry. 
During his time at Oxford, he referred to Browning’s Sordello (1840) as ‘one of 
my canonical scriptures’, wrote an essay in praise of Browning to read to the Old 
Mortality Society, and was given to chanting Browning poems to his friends.14 In 
1875, Swinburne included in his book on George Chapman a lengthy excursus on 
Browning in which he defended his fellow poet against the charge of ‘obscurity’ 
that had dogged his career.15 While Swinburne is generous in his praise of 
Browning, he displays marked ambivalence toward Browning’s rhetorical 
virtuosity, which he compares to that of a ‘greater debater or an eminent leading 
counsel’, and toward the forensic character of the dramatic monologue form more 
generally:16 
 
The action of so bright and swift a spirit gives insight as it were to 
the eyes and wings to the feet of our own; the reader’s 
apprehension takes fire from the writer’s, and he catches from a 
subtler and more active mind the infection of spiritual interest; so 
that any candid and clear-headed student finds himself able to 
follow for the time in fancy the lead of such a thinker with equal 
satisfaction on any course of thought or argument; when he sets 
himself to refute Renan through the dying lips of St John or to try 
conclusions with Strauss in his own person, and when he flashes at 
once the whole force of his illumination full upon the inmost 
thought and mind of the most infamous criminal, a Guido 
Franceschini or a Louis Bonaparte, compelling in the black and 
obscene abyss of such a spirit to yield up at last the secret of its 
profoundest sophistries …17  
 
Tellingly, when Swinburne praises Browning for his capacity to induce 
readers to interpret against the grain of their ordinary feelings, he remarks first 
upon Browning’s suasive power in relation to Christian apologetics and only 
                                                
14 See Rooksby, Swinburne, 50 and 56; and Gosse, Swinburne, 39-40. 





secondly upon the psychological depth Browning grants dictators and criminals. 
Swinburne insinuates that Browning not only represents but also specialises in 
‘profoundest sophistries’: what is most remarkable about his poetry is the way it 
lures readers into agreeing with ‘equal satisfaction’ to ‘any course of thought or 
argument’. Swinburne’s intention was probably not to pay Browning a spiked 
compliment, but to express an earnest fascination with the ‘secret’ of Browning’s 
persuasive gift and, in particular, Browning’s capacity to convey to readers the 
‘infection of a spiritual interest’. That Swinburne read Browning distrustfully, 
struggling to quarantine aesthetic admiration from any concession to Browning’s 
Christian commitments, is also discernible in his 1870 essay on D. G. Rossetti’s 
poetry: 
 
There are two living and leading writers of high and diverse genius 
whom any student of their work utterly apart as their ways of work 
lie – may and must, without prejudice or presumption, assume to 
hold fast, with a force of personal passion, the radical tenet of 
Christian faith. It is as difficult for a reasonable reader to doubt the 
actual and positive adherence to Christian doctrine of the 
Protestant thinker as of the Catholic priest; to doubt that faith in 
Christ as God – a tough, hard, vital faith which can bear at need 
hard stress of weather and hard-thought – dictated ‘A Death in the 
Desert’ or ‘Christmas Eve and Easter Day’, as to doubt that it 
dictated the ‘Apologia’ or ‘Dream of Gerontius’: though neither in 
the personal creed set forth by Mr. Browning nor in the clerical 
creed delivered by Dr. Newman do we find apparent or flagrant – 
however they may lurk, tacit and latent, in the last logical 
expression of either man’s theories – the viler forms and more 
hideous outcomes of Christianity, its more brutal aspects and 
deadlier consequences; a happy default due rather to nobility of 
instinct than to ingenuity of evasion.18 
 
Swinburne’s display of critical disinterestedness here enables him to cast 
Christianity as a ‘radical’ ideology that a ‘reasonable’ reader will want to sift out 
of any aesthetic appreciation of Browning’s genius. At the same time, Swinburne 
comes close to suggesting that Browning is too good for his creed anyway: 
Browning’s ‘noble’ willingness to subject his faith to ‘hard thought’ and contend 
                                                




with the demythologisation of the scriptures performed by Renan and Strauss only 
confirm his incapacity to recognise the ugly truths of Christianity. Swinburne’s 
own dramatic monologues aim to make manifest what he considered the repressed 
content of Browning’s religious monologues:  namely, the ‘viler forms and more 
hideous outcomes of Christianity, its more brutal aspects and deadlier 
consequences’, which he felt ‘lurk[ed], tacit and latent’ in Christianity’s modern 
and liberal guises. 
As Nicholas Shrimpton observes, though poems like ‘The Leper’ and 
‘Hymn to Proserpine’ fulfill the genre’s basic technical requirements, there has 
been a tendency to dismiss Swinburne’s claim to be working within the dramatic 
genre as ‘a mere subterfuge, or convenient mask, for the expression of 
inconveniently controversial impulses or opinions’.19 Where Shrimpton defends 
Swinburne against the charge that his monologues are simply mouthpieces for his 
own preoccupations and lack Browningesque historicism and irony, I would 
suggest that ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ and ‘The Leper’ in fact parody the 
tendentiousness often submerged in Browning’s use of the form.20 More 
precisely, Swinburne parodies the way in which Browning used the form as a 
vehicle for Christian apologetics by instead pressing it into the service of his own 
anti-Christian agenda. In this, Swinburne’s dramatic monologues exemplify his 
delight in pushing the established literary paradigms of religious doubt to their 
limits and exploiting them to glorify the very threat of atheism which, in the 
hands of other writers, they had been used to sublimate or contain.  
In poems such as ‘Cleon’ (1855), ‘A Death in the Desert’ (1864), and ‘An 
Epistle Containing the Strange Medical Experience of the Physician of Karshish’ 
(1855), Browning dramatised moments in early Christian history in order to 
address the predicament of the modern Christian unsettled by a sceptical historical 
awareness.21 Although these poems are designed to pose hermeneutic problems 
                                                
19 Nicholas Shrimpton, ‘Swinburne and the Dramatic Monologue’, in Whole Music, eds. 
Rooksby and Shrimpton, 52-3. 
20 Ibid., 60-71. 
21 Robert Browning, ‘Cleon’, ‘A Death in the Desert’ and ‘An Epistle Containing the 
Strange Medical Experience of the Physician of Karshish’ in Robert Browning: The 
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for the reader in a way that approximates the perplexities faced by a modern 
exegete of the scriptures in the wake of the German higher criticism, their 
polemical thrust is decipherable. All three poems feature speakers whose failure 
to apprehend the divinity of Christ or to trust in a divine miracle reveals their 
spiritual limitations as much as the mitigating complexities of their historical 
contexts (though in the case of ‘A Death in the Desert’, the voices of scepticism 
are only filtered through the speech of the poem’s main protagonist, St. John). In 
each poem, this strategy works to relativise Victorian scepticism, which is made 
to seem less prestigiously ‘modern’ and more like a manifestation of a basic 
resistance to mystery that has always made faith a difficult achievement. More 
broadly, Browning aims to recuperate religious doubt for Christianity by 
revealing that it was always already woven into the fabric of faith. 
Of these Browning religious monologues, ‘Cleon’ is the crucial intertext 
for ‘Hymn to Proserpine’. That ‘Cleon’ is a revision of Arnold’s Empedocles on 
Etna (1852), a poem that Browning admired as much as Swinburne did, has long 
been recognised, and I would suggest that Empedocles also stands behind ‘Hymn 
to Proserpine’.22 All three poems displace a Victorian perception of spiritual 
malaise onto a classical and/or early Christian context, and take world weary, 
cultured, rhetorically commanding men for their speakers. At stake in all three 
poems is the question of whether the evanescent pleasures of the here and now – 
identified with sexuality and with art or aesthetic contemplation – are sufficient 
unto themselves and can compensate for the wretchedness of old age and the fact 
of mortality. Unsurprisingly, both Arnold and Browning answer this question in 
the negative, though for different reasons, while Swinburne makes the pessimism 
of his speaker the ground of a complicated affirmation of pagan worldliness. 
The protagonist of ‘Cleon’ is a fictional first century A.D. Greek polymath 
who, over the course of the poem (which takes the form of an epistle from Cleon 
to his patron, King Protus), unwittingly exposes the depths of his spiritual 
                                                                                                                                
Major Works, ed. Adam Roberts (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 2005), 269-278, 186-
194, and 311-328. 
22 See Anthony H. Harrison, Victorian Poets and Romantic Poems: Intertextuality and 
Ideology (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1990), 147-151. 
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sterility. An ageing sensualist and aesthete who has ‘loved his life over-much’ 
(322), Cleon can neither believe in anything ‘more’ than his ‘animal life’ (215) 
nor reconcile himself to mortality. He considers his reputation as an artist meagre 
solace for the fact that his appetite for life exceeds his ‘bounded physical 
recipiency’ (246), and this makes him wistful about the possibility of an afterlife, 
though the intractability of his essentially secular and materialist imagination is 
indicated by the fact that his concept of an afterlife is really only a fantasy about 
the prolongation of worldly pleasure (320-35). The throwaway final lines of his 
epistle are a famous instance of Browningesque irony:  
 
Thou canst not think a mere barbarian Jew 
As Paulus proves to be, one circumcized, 
Hath access to a secret shut from us? 
 …… 
Oh, the Jew findeth scholars! certain slaves 
Who touched on this same isle, preached him and Christ; 
And (as I gathered from a bystander) 
Their doctrine could be held by no sane man. 
    (343-5; 350-3)                                                 
 
Cleon’s cavalier dismissal of Christ – whom he confuses with St. Paul – 
encourages us to reinterpret his prior statements in a more jaundiced light. Earlier 
in the monologue, Cleon seems an attractively ‘modern’ figure: like a Victorian 
artist, he looks back upon a golden age of Greek culture and struggles to make a 
virtue of his sense of belatedness (64-71). However, by the monologue’s end, it is 
apparent that Browning is using the figure of Cleon to critique the Victorian age’s 
narcissism about its own ‘modernity’ and a growing tendency among intellectuals 
to treat Christianity as a primitive superstition, or as a ‘doctrine [that] could be 
held by no sane man’. Cleon’s conviction that he lives in a super-civilised, 
‘composite’ age – that is, a ‘late’ or decadent phase of culture defined by its sense 
of historical relativism – as opposed to a primitive and ‘heroic’ one necessarily 
seems myopic to the Victorian reader, who grasps the significance of what looks 
negligible to Cleon: the advent of Christianity. Browning’s gift for capturing the 
dissonances of colloquial speech is especially effective here: after Cleon’s 
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grandiloquent ruminations on mortality and the value of art, his slur against Christ  
– ‘mere barbarian Jew’ – is jarring, and unmasks the ugliness of his intellectual 
chauvinism at a stroke. In turn, this works to alert the reader to the limitations of 
his or her own historical perspective, and to unmask the overweening character of 
‘modern’ scepticism. 
Like ‘Cleon’, ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ returns to the moment of Christian 
historical rupture and adopts a vantage point, radically defamiliarising for the 
Victorian reader, from which Christianity looks like a new and alien ideology. 
However, where Browning casts Christianity as the sympathetic underdog, 
disdained by sophisticates like Cleon, Swinburne seizes upon a moment where 
Christianity symbolically gains hegemonic status: as his subtitle tells us, ‘After 
the Proclamation of the Christian Faith in Rome’. We might interpret this 
difference as Swinburne’s allegorical correction of Browning: while modern 
Christianity may look embattled to Browning, it still looks hegemonic to 
Swinburne. More broadly, the poem’s subtitle alerts us to Swinburne’s desire to 
destabilise what was a stock trope of representations of the distinction between 
early Christianity and Roman religion: where the latter was a state religion that 
consisted primarily of public ritual and ceremony, with little emotional 
significance for the individual, Christianity was a passionately emotional religion 
that flourished in spite of political persecution and promised the individual a 
personal relationship with God. As Frank Turner writes, ‘Victorian commentators 
did not regard the Roman world as having produced any religion or philosophy 
that might have significantly contributed to or challenged the spiritual or moral 
insights of the Christian faith. They considered Roman religion as extremely 
political, intellectually uninteresting, and lacking in moral power’.23 ‘Hymn to 
Proserpine’ inverts this traditional economy: in this poem, Christianity is the 
sterile hand of political authority, and pagan religion the repressed locus of 
passionate feeling. 
                                                
23 Frank Turner, Contesting Cultural Authority: Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 319. 
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‘Hymn to Proserpine’ also pointedly inverts the Christian irony of ‘Cleon’, 
principally by revising Browning’s use of the topos of classical decadence.24 We 
are meant to recognise Cleon’s jaded sophistication, his preoccupation with 
worldly success and with the life of the senses, as well as his inaccessibility to 
Christianity, as symptomatic of the spiritual exhaustion of the Roman empire and, 
by analogy, of Victorian England. ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ also exploits the Roman 
decadence analogy, but instead plays with the scandalous notion – familiar to 
Victorian readers from Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 
(1776-89)  – that Christianity tended toward Roman decadence rather than 
constituting its cure.25 Swinburne’s speaker famously disdains Christianity as an 
etiolated offshoot of the paganism it displaced: ‘Thou hast conquered, O pale 
Gailean; the world has grown grey from thy breath’ (35). A rehabilitated Cleon, 
Swinburne’s speaker is not an arid sophisticate but a vatic figure whose antipathy 
to the new Christian dispensation reveals his pagan fullness of being. Where 
Cleon fails to foresee the triumph of Christianity, Swinburne’s pagan prophesies 
its eventual decline. The speaker’s sense of the transience of all things also works 
to defamiliarise the figure of Christ, who is here projected as a kind of 
Ozymandias figure whose claims to omnipotence will seem worse than void in the 
fullness of time. Swinburne heightens this sense of defamiliarisation by making 
his Roman sound anachronistically like a Victorian doubter lamenting the retreat 
of the ‘sea of faith’: 
 
I am sick of singing: the bays burn deep and chafe: I am fain 
To rest a little from praise and grievous pleasure and pain. 
For the Gods we know not of, who give us our daily breath, 
We know they are cruel as love or life, and lovely as death. 
O Gods dethroned and deceased, cast forth, wiped out in a day! 
                             (9-13) 
 
                                                
24 Swinburne, ‘Hymn to Proserpine’, Complete Poetic Works I, (London: Heinemann, 
1924), 67-73. 
25 For a discussion of the Victorian currency of Gibbon’s interpretation of Rome’s 
decline, see Norman Vance, The Victorians and Ancient Rome (Oxford: Blackwell 




Via a simple inversion, Swinburne parodies alarmist contemporary 
responses to the rise of unbelief: in this poem, the rise of Christianity is 
constructed as a comparably precipitous descent into decadence, nihilism and 
despair. In particular, Swinburne is parodying the elegiac sage posture that many 
intellectuals adopted in response to a perceived decline of faith: his pagan is in 
possession of the grandly dolorous, apocalyptic rhetoric of an Arnold, a Carlyle, 
or a Tennyson, yet what he mourns is the triumph rather than the erosion of 
Christianity. The poem is designed to make such melancholia over lost faith look 
narrow and sentimental, for his pagan mourns not the loss of consolation, as 
Christianity was often constructed within the discourse of doubt, but a belief 
system at once more ‘bitter’ and ‘beautiful’ (8) than Christianity. 
As Margot Louis observes, ‘Hymn to Proserpine’, like many of 
Swinburne’s anti-Christian poems, seeks to ‘undermine the yearning for 
immortality’.26 Louis reads this poem, as well as several other of his poems that 
invoke the Proserpine myth, as radically pessimistic and suggestive of 
Swinburne’s affinities with the Marquis de Sade and Arthur Schopenhauer: ‘his 
Proserpine poems repudiate not only the transcendent but also the deeper, more 
widespread assumption that life per se has value – an assumption that is the very 
basis of the yearning for immortality’.27 Conversely, I would suggest that 
Swinburne aims to critique the perception that the value of life depends upon the 
promise of an afterlife, an idea that is an unmistakable subtext of Browning’s 
‘Cleon’ and arguably of Arnold’s Empedocles as well. Rather than celebrating 
pessimism, Swinburne indicts Christianity for its pessimism, for its denigration of 
‘all the joy before death’ (101), and, in a characteristic move, elevates above 
Christianity a quasi-pagan atheism that heroically embraces life’s dialectic of 
‘grievous pleasure and pain’ (10). Louis finds the speaker's ‘yearning for death’ 
typical of Swinburne's pessimistic strain, yet this yearning is presented quite 
specifically as the speaker’s response to the triumph of Christianity. According to 
the poem’s imaginative economy, the pagan religions were emotionally complete 
                                                
26 Margot K. Louis, Persephone Rises: 1860-1927, Mythography, Gender, and the 
Creation of a New Spirituality (London and Vermont: Ashgate, 2009), 56. 
27 Ibid., 57. 
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because they honoured life’s ambivalence, its ‘mutable wings’ (30) and bracing 
mix of joy and suffering. Christian monotheism, in contrast, is tantamount solely 
to worshipping Proserpine, here posited as the goddess of death and the 
underworld, to the exclusion of Apollo and Venus, the deities of art and love 
respectively. In effect, Swinburne suggests that Christianity is only a ‘hymn to 
Proserpine’ by another name. Louis’s comment that the poem ‘turn[s] a Christian 
trope against itself [and] exposes Christianity as a delusory way station on the 
road to nihilism and the worship of death’ is exact; yet her suggestion that 
Swinburne simply endorses this nihilism renders the poem’s critique of 
Christianity incoherent. 28 The governing irony of the poem is that Christianity has 
partially ‘conquered’ the imagination of Swinburne’s pagan: he has become a 
morbid monotheist, retreating from life’s vicissitudes and worshipping Proserpine 
at the expense of all the other gods in the pantheon. In other words, he has ‘fed on 
the fullness of death’ (36) and partly succumbed to the logic of the Christianity he 
reviles as a death-cult – an irony more piquant for the fact that his speech is 
presented as a deeply personal non serviam in the face of an official fiat. In this 
respect, Shrimpton is right to argue that ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ is less 
straightforwardly ‘polemical’ than is generally assumed; its speaker does not 
simply ventriloquise Swinburne’s hostility to Christianity, but constitutes 
Swinburne’s attempt to imagine his way into a liminal historical figure, one who 
embodies the ethos of the old pagan religions even as he shows signs of having 
acceded to the new orthodoxy.29 In this sense, ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ is a 
classically Browningesque dramatic monologue: it takes for its speaker a heroic 
individualist whose rhetoric recoils upon him, creating an ironic gap between 
what he intends to express and what he actually discloses to the reader. Swinburne 
is sometimes caricatured as an unreflective rebel, blithely épatant le bourgeois; 
yet ‘Hymn to Proserpine’, one of his most famous poems, is about the difficulties 
of formulating, even inwardly, a coherent opposition to a dominant ideology. 
While Swinburne’s Roman asserts that the Christian attempt to supplant Venus 
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with the Virgin Mary and restrain ‘the world’s desire’ is futile, like an effort to 
‘chasten the high sea with rods’ (65), he also wonders plaintively at Christianity’s 
power to divest him of his pagan deities: ‘Ye are fallen, our lords, by what token? 
We wist that ye should not fall’ (89).Thaïs Morgan interprets the poem as a 
triumphant affirmation of the fact that ‘Christ will never truly oust Venus, for we 
will never prefer death over life’, but this preference is actually in question 
throughout the poem; the pessimistic undertow of the speaker’s imagery and 
argument is always dragging against the swell of his rhetoric, and his ultimate 
embrace of death, or Proserpine, underscores the allure not simply of 
Christianity’s romance of death, but of its newly minted official status: ‘Ye, once 
we had sight of another: but now [the Virgin Mary] is queen, say these’ (77).30  
This ironic gap is also crucial to understanding Swinburne’s sense of 
Christianity as a paradoxical force, mighty and oppressive in its very ‘pale’ 
doctrines of compassion, asceticism, and eternal life. This contradiction, which 
manifests also in the curious mix of triumphalism and defeatism in the speaker’s 
tone, often fissures Swinburne’s anti-religious polemics: we are persistently asked 
to imagine Christianity as at once frail and tyrannical, moribund and all-
pervasive. Noting this tension, Louis remarks, ‘even a sympathetic reader must 
suspect that, if God is dead, we need not rage at him’.31 Yet we might understand 
this less as a failure of logic than Swinburne’s engagement with the equivocal 
status and meaning of scepticism in mid to late Victorian England. Even at his 
most vituperatively anti-Christian, Swinburne is highly self-conscious about the 
fact that religious doubt had been at least partially freed of its traditional 
associations with sin and heresy, had grown conventional as a literary theme, and 
to a significant extent, had become available as a common language for both 
committed Christians and unbelievers.32 Swinburne’s anti-Christian poems labour 
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to negotiate the fact that more moderate, decorous critiques of Christianity as well 
as explicitly Christian explorations of doubt were ubiquitous in the work of an 
older generation of Victorian writers, including Browning. As a parody of 
Browning’s religious monologues, ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ at once calls attention to 
the kinds of formal conventions that had made religious scepticism speakable and 
to the more radical possibilities those conventions repressed.  
 Francis O’Gorman has noted that Leslie Stephen and John Tyndall 
frequently cast agnosticism in manly, heroic terms in an effort to establish a 
counterdiscourse to the ‘muscular Christianity’ popularised by Thomas Arnold 
and Charles Kingsley.33 Similarly, Swinburne’s poetry often attempts to valorise 
unbelief as a form of manly heroism. Key to ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ is a gendered 
distinction between a ‘pale’, effete Christianity and a vigorous, atheistic 
paganism. It may seem something of a misnomer to speak of Swinburne’s pagan 
as an atheist, yet as Kerry McSweeney observes, his speaker does not seem to 
believe in the pagan deities he invokes; his conceptions of Apollo, Venus, and 
Proserpine seem fully reducible to metaphors for art, sexuality, and death (though 
this may be interpreted as the outcome of the triumph of Christianity, which has 
perhaps reduced his deities to a bundle of metaphors).34 In either case, the poem 




I shall die as my fathers died, and sleep as they sleep; even so. 
For the glass of the years is brittle wherein we gaze for a span; 
A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is man. 
So long I endure, no longer; and laugh not again, neither weep. 
For there is no God found stronger than death; and death is a sleep. 
    (105-110) 
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 The aphoristic starkness of these lines aims to confer grandeur upon the 
speaker’s lack of belief in an afterlife, and to cast his wish for ‘thou, Proserpina, 
death’ as a triumph of stoicism. (The speaker’s death wish seems intended to 
invoke the Roman ideal of a noble suicide.) Elsewhere in the poem Swinburne 
constructs his speaker’s resistance to Christianity as a form of martial valour in 
the face of defeat: ‘Thou all men abase them before you in spirit, and all knees 
bend/I kneel not neither adore you, but standing, look to the end’ (45-46). The 
latter line carries a double freight of metaphor: it at once casts the speaker as the 
last pagan standing in a doomed struggle against Christianity, and as the last man 
who will die clear-eyed and uncowed, able to contemplate his ‘end’ without the 
Christian expectation of an afterlife. 
 Swinburne’s attempt to glamorise atheism by constructing it as a form of 
stoicism and heroic individualism calls to mind Arnold’s Empedocles. This long 
dramatic monologue takes for its speaker the Stoic philosopher Empedocles, who 
was thought to have committed suicide by throwing himself into the volcano of 
Mt. Etna. Arnold uses Empedocles to explore the paralysis of the modern 
intellectual, a predicament which is seen to stem from a failure of religious 
conviction. Like many Victorian intellectuals and arguably Arnold himself, 
Empedocles can only avow a comfortless species of agnosticism (II. 347-351).35 
As Arnold wrote of his Empedocles, ‘[he] has not the religious consolations of 
other men … He sees things as they are – the world as it is – God as he is: in their 
stern simplicity … but cannot be transported and rapturously agitated …’36 Yet 
imperviousness to rapture seems to have a grandeur of its own: in the course of 
the poem, Empedocles’s agnosticism and even his suicide attain a kind of gnomic 
majesty and intellectual seductiveness. For this reason, Arnold suppressed the 
poem soon after its initial publication, explaining in the Preface to the 1852 
volume that Empedocles had been omitted because it depicted a world in which 
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‘everything was to be endured, nothing to be done’, and therefore failed to fulfill 
poetry’s obligation to ‘inspirit and rejoice the reader’.37 Arnold’s self-censorship 
reflected perhaps not merely his commitment to an uplifting ideal of art, but the 
more exigent fact that an author who granted unbelief even an ambiguous degree 
of intellectual warrant courted vilification at the hands of reviewers. Ironically, 
even the bowdlerised 1852 volume was subject to reproach on this ground: for 
example, John Duke Coleridge warned of the ‘incalculable mischief of a sceptical 
and irreligious train of thought … presented to the mind in melodious verse, and 
clothed with the graces of a refined and scholarlike diction’, and condemned 
Arnold as representative of modern writers who ‘appear to think themselves 
justified in standing ab extra to Christianity’.38 
Revising an 1867 review of Arnold's poems for publication in 1875, 
Swinburne deplored Arnold’s self-censorship in a revealing fashion: he inserted 
into his original review a spurious quotation from a ‘French critic’ that permitted 
him to mount an attack on both Browning and Tennyson. Through biting 
innuendo, Swinburne takes Browning and Tennyson to task for conspiring to 
create a literary culture in which a poet like Arnold retracts his masterpiece 
because he imagines that scepticism is a subject that may be treated only 
homeopathically, within a safe framework of Christian affirmation. The passage is 
both a diatribe against the intellectual prestige of honest doubt and one of 
Swinburne's most vibrant exegeses of his ‘art for art’s sake’ position: 
 
English poets go astray with rational religion. Not that the English 
are actually either too religious or too rationalistic but rather that 
they always want to reconcile things irreconcilable ... Let us turn to 
the arts: What do you want from a painter? Paintings? Not at all! 
We want a little morality, a bit of purpose, the beautiful true, the 
true beautiful, the actual idea, the ideal actuality, a thousand other 
respectable things of that sort. It is that evil spirit - not very 
spiritual - which has come to suggest to poets the fine idea of 
playing the part of apostle-reconcilers between the believer and the 
freethinker ... poetry has no use for all that … Every creed that 
rouses, that makes vibrate, reverberate, strike just one inner chord - 
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every veritable religion, sombre or radiant, tragic or gay, is a thing 
essentially poetic … Venus or Moloch, Jesus or Brahma – it 
doesn’t matter … All emotion is serviceable to it, that of the 
anchorite no more or less than that of the blasphemer. For morals, 
it is bad and good, chaste and libertine; for religion, unbelieving 
and faithful, submissive and rebellious. But religious or moral 
impotence, the thought that lisps, the spirit that squints, the soul 
that fears both to submit to and to revolt, the halfway faith that 
weeps sceptical tears, the tasteless emanations, sorrowful and 
loathsome, of spiritual decay, the sickly plants, the dried up sprigs, 
the sprouts without sap of an uncertain and twilight epoch – what 
do you expect to make of all that? [In art], even negation is not 
sterile; with it, Lucretius has his place as well as Moses, Omar as 
well as Job. But it would not know where to tuck away little 
questions of evidence, little theological bickerings.39  
 
 Significantly, Swinburne does not object to Christian poetics per se; rather, 
he objects to the poetry of a disenchanted and defensive Christianity, one that 
seeks to reconcile the claims of traditional faith and modern reason. Swinburne 
implies that he actually has greater imaginative access to the ecstatic heights of 
religious experience than do Browning and Tennyson; where they reason 
themselves into a ‘not very spiritual’ compromise position, he can open himself to 
all the intensities of religion precisely because religion’s truth-claims are a matter 
of indifference to him. In other words, he claims superiority for his aestheticism 
both on the grounds of an intellectual disinterestedness and of a greater 
receptivity to feeling. Of course, Swinburne’s imagination is not as ecumenical as 
he implies; his aesthetic ideal does not seek synthesis but rather to reinforce 
polarities between Job and Lucretius, the anchorite and the blasphemer, since 
these vivify what is at stake in a contest between religion and his secularism. 
Swinburne’s contempt for rational religion or for any kind of via media is partly 
underpinned by his Romantic assumption that the artist must be a rebellious, 
antinomian figure; he might disturb social norms through his religious fervor 
(Christianity of a ‘heretical’ stripe sometimes wins his approval, notably in his 
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critical study of Blake), or through the vehemence of his unbelief, but he does not 
flatter the status quo.40 
 Swinburne liked Empedocles for the reason that Arnold deemed it morally 
irresponsible: it represents agnosticism in what Arnold called ‘the grand style’, 
affording it the gravitas of classical verse.41 Conflating Arnold with Empedocles, 
Swinburne commends them both as essentially secular thinkers whose 
philosophies never ‘leave … [their] hold upon earth’.42 Swinburne also links 
Arnold’s poetry with the ‘wise and sublime verses of Epictetus’, which perhaps 
suggests that he had Empedocles in mind when he wrote ‘Hymn to Proserpine’. 
The poem makes its closing gesture of stoic pessimism by way of Epictetus: the 
poem’s antepenultimate line, ‘A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is 
man’, is a rendering of a remark attributed to him.43 More generally, the 
sententious style of the poem’s closing passage seems to be Swinburne’s homage 
to the ‘solemn’,  ‘plain,’  and ‘direct’ neoclassicism of Arnold’s poem.44 Yet 
Swinburne’s essay on Arnold also suggests that ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ was partly 
conceived as a critique of such stoic pessimism. While Swinburne approves of 
Arnold’s purportedly secular sensibility when it assumes the form of heroic 
individualism, he demurs when it seems to entail ascetic rejection of the world. 
Because Swinburne thinks that the primary reward for a secular sensibility is an 
enhanced appreciation of the earthly, he is perplexed that Arnold’s poetry takes 
‘no fullness or comfort in the eternal elements made of like matter with us, but 
better made, nor in any beauty nor in any life of the laborious and sleepless soul 
of things’.45 He faults Arnold for neglecting sensuous detail in favour of ethereal 
abstraction: Arnold’s poetry induces ‘discomfort and depression’ because it is ‘a 
poetry of the bodiless intellect which [does not] touch … the finger-tip or wing tip 
of the edge of actual things’; it overlooks ‘bodily life and terrene circumstance’ in 
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its endeavour to ‘buoy … upward the naked fleshless feet of the spirit’.46 (This 
complaint is perhaps surprising given that Swinburne’s own poetry is often 
faulted for its lack of vividly observed detail.)47 Asserting the naturalness of his 
own identification of aesthetics and secular materialism, Swinburne puns on the 
word ‘matter’: disembodied ‘spirit’ leaves poetry with ‘no matter to work upon’, 
attenuating it to mere ‘floating complaint’ (my italics).48  
 If Swinburne’s pagan is a rehabilitated Cleon, he is also a markedly 
sensual Empedocles, one who, at least prior to the rise of Christianity, prized ‘all 
the joy before death’ (26). Certainly Swinburne seems at pains to emphasise the 
life-affirming vigour of the paganism that his speaker is losing as he falls under 
the influence of Christianity. This paganism involves an acute consciousness of 
the interrelationships between life and death, pleasure and pain (an idea 
ubiquitous in Swinburne’s poetry, and one that he associates with the art of poetry 
itself.) Like many of Swinburne’s poems, ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ seems indebted 
to John Keats’s ‘Ode on Melancholy’ (1819), which similarly invokes the 
feminine fatality of Proserpine (‘Nor suffer thy pale forehead to be kist/By 
nightshade, ruby grape of Proserpine’ [4]) and suggests that maintaining a 
hyperawareness of mortality may be at once a form of aesthetic connoisseurship 
and a heroic self-discipline.49 Keats’s ode is organised around a play of gender 
codes: while melancholy is personified as feminine and associated with female 
mythological figures (Proserpine and Psyche), contemplation of melancholy is not 
of itself effeminising; at its most refined (one might say, at its most ‘feminine’), it 
is a ‘strenuous’, manly endeavour, akin to the pursuit of a ‘troph[y]’ (27, 30). As 
Swinburne often does, ‘Ode on Melancholy’ emphasises the mutual 
embeddedness of pain and pleasure and of life and death, and suggests that 
fathoming these paradoxes is not only the path to aesthetic bliss but to a heroic 
masculinity. 
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 Swinburne gives what Keats calls ‘the wakeful anguish of the soul’ (10) a 
specifically anti-Christian inflection by suggesting that his pagan’s lack of belief 
in an afterlife that has lent an almost unbearable intensity to his experience: 
 
The laurel, the palms and the pæan, the breasts of the nymphs in the brake; 
Breasts more soft than a dove’s, that tremble with tenderer breath; 
And all the wings of the Loves, and all the joy before death 
All the feet of the hours that sound as a single lyre, 
Dropped and deep in the flowers, with strings that flicker like fire. 
       (24-28) 
 
Swinburne’s pagan here asserts that sexual love cannot be equalled by 
Christian love (a nymph’s breast is said to be ‘more soft’ and ‘tenderer’ than a 
dove’s, the conventional symbol of the Holy Spirit). Likewise, the claims of art 
(here symbolised by the ‘lyre’) trump Christian claims. There is an argument 
embedded in these lines: sexuality and art cannot be understood in Christian terms 
because appreciation of their splendour depends upon a recognition of death’s 
untranscendable nature, the fact ‘no man outliv[es] his day’ (31). Swinburne 
implies early in the poem that his speaker is a poet-singer who has lost his 
creativity (he is ‘sick of singing’ [9]), and we are perhaps meant to infer that 
Christianity has destroyed his muse because his sense of art’s value depends upon 
the perception of life’s unredeemable finitude; poetic feet are inspired by the feet 
of the hours. At such points in Swinburne’s poetry, a secular paganism and 
aestheticism are indistinguishable: just as art should not be judged according to 
the alien criteria of moral or utilitarian purpose, the value of life should not be 
judged sub specie aeternitatis; just as art is its own justification, so life is 
sufficient unto itself.  
Strikingly, Swinburne’s pagan never stops to ponder the obvious question 
of whether Christianity is true. His loyalty to paganism is not a matter of belief 
but of emotional and aesthetic preference – paganism is better than true because it 
enhances life. There is an important sense in which Swinburne’s poetry simply 
changes the subject when it comes to the Victorian faith and doubt debate: at issue 
is not whether Christianity is true (the question at the centre of Browning’s 
religious monologues), or even whether Christian morality is viable without belief 
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(the question at the centre of, say, Mrs Humphry Ward’s crisis-of-faith bestseller 
Robert Elsmere [1888]), but whether it is life-enhancing – or, one might say, 
whether it constitutes good art. 
 
‘The Leper’ and ‘Porphyria’s Lover’  
 
As many critics have noted, Swinburne’s ‘The Leper’ is a homage to Browning’s 
‘Porphyria’s Lover’.50 It is also an instance of poetic one-upmanship: as Maxwell 
points out, it hyperbolises Browning’s penchant for the grotesque by transforming 
the ‘slight hint of necrophilia in the conclusion of Browning’s poem [into…] the 
six-months dead body adored by Swinburne’s speaker.’51 In effect, Swinburne 
appropriates the Gothic romance premise of Browning’s monologue and escalates 
it into a full-blown experiment in the decadent aesthetics he had absorbed from 
Baudelaire’s Les fleurs du mal (1857). Rosenberg connects ‘The Leper’ to an 
observation Swinburne made in a rhapsodic review of the volume that he wrote 
while in the process of revising ‘The Leper’: ‘Even of the loathsomest bodily 
putrescence and decay he can make some noble use; pluck out its meaning and 
secret, even its beauty, in a certain way, from actual carrion.’52 Swinburne’s 
construction of necrophilic passion for a leper as the nec plus ultra of romantic 
love recalls several specific poems from Les fleurs du mal: ‘Danse Macabre’, ‘A 
Martyr’, and ‘A Carcass’ all have thematic affinities.53 Yet ‘The Leper’ does more 
than ratchet up the shock value of ‘Porphyria’s Lover’ by infusing it with the 
Baudelairean perfume of ‘beauty in carrion’: it uses decadent aesthetics to critique 
the equation between atheism, madness and evil implied by Browning’s poem, 
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and to articulate a provocative vision of art as a mode of sacred transgression, or 
‘holy insurrection’.54 
The speakers of Browning’s monologues – who are typically male – are 
famous for the intricate ways they betray themselves while caught up a process of 
self-vindication. ‘Porphyria’s Lover’ is traditionally read alongside ‘My Last 
Duchess’ as a study in the murderous extremes of male narcissism and sexual 
possessiveness. Yet ‘Porphyria’s Lover’ might also be paired with ‘Cleon’, for, 
like that poem, the speaker’s unwitting self-betrayal turns upon an apparently 
incidental impiety at the end of the poem: ‘And all night long we have not 
stirred/And yet God has not said a word!’(59-60). Here Browning offers clue to 
the logic behind the crime at the centre of the poem. The speaker strangles his 
higher-born beloved in a remote cottage, ostensibly so that he might possess her 
more completely and render their love immutable. However, even before the final 
line, there are a number of indications that the speaker does not really imagine the 
murder as the romantic liebestod that he makes it out to be. The fact that the 
speaker ‘debated what to do’ (35) before committing the act emphasises that, for 
all his rhetoric of passion, this murder has been reasoned out. The act seems 
undertaken in a spirit of childlike curiosity: the speaker winds his lover’s hair 
around her throat like ‘one long yellow string’ (39) as though sshe is playing with 
a doll or with a ball of yarn, while the fact that he afterwards pushes open her 
eyelids, which he notes were each ‘shut like a bud that holds a bee’ (43), makes 
him sound as if he were hunting for insects in a flowerbed, or, again, absorbed in 
oddly clinical play with a doll. That strangling his lover with her hair seems to 
him merely ‘a thing to do’ (38), suggesting an arbitrary choice, one idle diversion 
among others that might be ‘found’ (37), also gives an impression of bizarre 
nonchalance. The final line suggests that his perception of God’s absence from 
the world has neutralised within his imagination the categories of life and death, 
sex and violence: passionate love may just as easily inspire murder as ‘joy’, while 
a corpse inspires romantic sentiment just as well as a living woman. In effect, the 
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poem dramatises the dictum often attributed to Fyodor Doestoevsky: ‘If God is 
dead, everything is permitted’.55 
Yet Browning complicates this equation between atheism and moral 
insanity even as he proposes it, and in such a way as to position the poem as an 
oblique commentary on Victorian religious scepticism. As Terry Eagleton 
observes, the final exclamation can make the speaker sound either exultant or 
aggrieved that his crime has met with cosmic silence.56 Either reading suggests 
that the speaker has transgressed in order to bait God into showing his face. In this 
light, the woman is little more than a pawn in a cosmic experiment, and the 
speaker a kind of psychopathic counterpart to the respectable Victorian doubter, 
yearning for concrete proof of God’s existence. This analogy cuts both ways: 
Browning implies that the quest for such proof is psychologically akin to 
strangling a lover so as to achieve total possession; both desires emerge from a 
remorseless literalism, a need to reduce a sacred mystery (God, a beautiful female 
other) to something one can squeeze between one’s hands. Both desires are also 
self-consuming in their violence: they destroy the faith or love they strive to 
consummate. For its early readers, the religious subtext of ‘Porphyria’s Lover’ 
was reinforced by its placement beside ‘Johannes Agricola in Meditation’ (1836) 
under the title ‘Madhouse Cells’: this monologue uses the medieval Antinomian 
heresy to dramatise the psychology of religious fanaticism and the wickedness of 
presuming to know God’s will. Read together, these monologues imply that 
atheism and religious fanaticism are two sides of the same coin – an insight in 
keeping with Browning’s allegiance to a liberalised Christianity, and his 
resistance to the polarisation of faith and scepticism. 
‘The Leper’ reprises the stock romance motif of ‘Porphyria’s Lover’ –  a 
humble man loves an elusive higher-born woman – but Swinburne renders his 
setting explicitly medieval, and his speaker is not a murderer but a clerk who 
tends his lady through the ravages of leprosy. As Rosenberg suggests, Swinburne 
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uses ‘clerk’ in the archaic sense, that is, a cleric in holy orders although in the 
medieval period, ‘clerk’ was also used more loosely as a synonym for a scholar, 
secretary, or man of letters (OED).57 The fact that Swinburne’s ‘clerk’ – who, by 
the end of the poem, becomes a figure for his ideal of the artist as a heroic anti-
theist and poète maudit – occupies an uncertain place on the medieval continuum 
between the ecclesiastical and the literary reflects Swinburne’s desire to 
destabilise a common Victorian faith in an age-old entente between religion and 
literature. Swinburne appends in a postscript a concocted French medieval source 
for the story that spells out the poem’s status as a fable about the benightedness of 
Christian morality. In a pastiche of archaic French, Swinburne invokes the 
medieval superstition that constructed leprosy as God’s punishment for carnality: 
the poem is supposedly inspired by the story of an adulterous noblewoman named 
Yolande de Sallières who contracted leprosy and was cast out by her family as a 
‘thing cursed of God, stinking and abominable to all men’, while her former 
lovers reviled her as a ‘detestable sinner’.58 Swinburne stresses the hegemonic 
authority behind her ostracism by noting that King Philip was also ‘greatly 
displeased’ by the presence of lepers in his country, which he interpreted as a sign 
of God’s wrath.59 As Clyde K. Hyder observes, Swinburne is most likely thinking 
of Philip V, notorious for burning lepers at the stake and expelling Jews from his 
country for their supposed collaboration in a plot to contaminate wells with 
leprosy.60 (Though Hyder does not note this, the reference to ‘well-water’ that is 
‘not so delicate to drink’ in the opening stanza seems to confirm that Swinburne 
indeed had this horrifying episode in mind [2-3].) The imaginative labour of 
Swinburne’s poem is to dismantle the moral absolutes he ascribes to medieval 
Christianity in his bogus ‘source’, and to suggest that the figure of the leper has 
profound truths to impart about the pitilessness with which Christian societies 
maintain distinctions between the morally pure and impure. 
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By turning Browning’s murderous speaker into a ministering clerk, 
Swinburne renders his speaker a more humane figure – yet only queasily humane, 
since the clerk’s ministrations seem lecherous, and persist after his lady dies and 
her corpse begins to decay. Like ‘Porphyria’s Lover’, ‘The Leper’ encourages us 
to understand male sexual perversion as a longing for ultimate knowledge, yet 
Swinburne renders unmistakable what is only insinuated by the final line of 
Browning’s poem: the suggestion of an equivalence between the desire to fathom 
the relationship between sex and death via a woman’s corpse and the desire to 
fathom the nature of God. Where in ‘Porphyria’s Lover’ a madman’s 
strangulation of his lover seems to allegorise the reductiveness of sceptics who 
demand tangible evidence for God’s reality, ‘The Leper’ grants moral heroism to 
its speaker’s necrophilia, which is cast as a Promethean bid to sustain an ideal of 
romantic love in the face of a malignant God who afflicts his creatures with 
disease and death. Yet the poem’s crowning irony is that the clerk has been drawn 
into this morbid passion by an almost saintly commitment to the spirit, if not the 
letter, of Christianity; he is a paragon of humility and charity, prepared to risk 
infection so that he may tend a despised outcast. Owing to the example of Christ, 
whose curing of lepers (Mark 1:41) illustrates the miracle of his compassion, the 
figure of the leper constitutes a ‘sanctified outcast’ within the Christian 
tradition.61 The fact that the clerk’s lady is also a sexual sinner means she 
symbolically doubles as a fallen woman or Mary Magdalen type, another 
archetypal recipient of Christian charity. The speaker’s eagerness to tend a 
leper/fallen woman – which, as we learn from Swinburne’s ‘source’, costs him his 
life – thus perversely resembles the feats of charity and martyrdom for which 
medieval Christian saints are venerated.  
The clerk’s love is also ironically Christian in its metaphysical aspirations. 
His necrophilia pursues to its logical extremity the privileging of spirit over flesh 
in the Christian-Platonic ideal of love: the disintegration of his beloved’s body 
and even her death do not curdle his carnal interest in her because sex only 
                                                
61 Ronald B. Bond, ‘Leprosy’, in A Dictionary of Biblical Tradition in English Literature, 
ed. David L. Jeffrey (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1992), 444. 
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expresses a transcendental love, impervious to gross materialities. As one 
Victorian commentator quipped, the speaker’s love is a ‘triumph of mind over 
matter’.62 This irony is compounded by the fact that the speaker’s description of 
his lady is a travesty of a Petrarchan blazon, the courtly Renaissance tradition of 
idealising an unattainable lady by cataloguing her physical attributes, often 
through hyperbolic conceits. In this case the conceit is obviously the fact that the 
lady’s reduction to beautiful parts is a peculiarly gruesome organic process. 
Swinburne means us to notice that his speaker’s fetishisation of the necrotic 
‘fragments’ (98) perversely literalises the rarefied fragmentation of an ideal 
woman that is standard within the courtly love tradition.  
‘The Leper’ hinges upon the malevolent deity topos that Swinburne used 
to controversial effect in the choruses of his neo-classical drama Atalanta in 
Calydon (1865) and in two other major poems in Poems and Ballads, First Series, 
‘Anactoria’ and ‘Félise’. Like Sappho in ‘Anactoria’, the speaker of ‘The Leper’ 
derives ecstasy from masochistic sexual love because such love honours ‘the 
mystery of the cruelty of things’, Sappho’s definition of God (154). Yet, for the 
speaker of ‘The Leper’ as for Sappho in ‘Anactoria’, deriving pleasure from pain 
is also a means of snatching fire from this sadistic God. Since the scorn of the 
lady and the scorn of God converge in the speaker’s mind, lavishing love upon the 
lady against her consent (because she is either too ill to resist or dead) is 
simultaneously to prevail over God:63 
 
Sometimes when service made me glad 
The sharp tears leapt between my lids, 
Falling on her, such joy I had, 
To do the service God forbids.  
                                     (77-80) 
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The syntax makes this passage troubling: is it a moment of servility (the 
speaker’s tears ‘fall’ on the woman for joy of tending her) or of rape (the speaker 
himself ‘falls’ onto the woman, who is still alive at this point in the poem)? The 
word ‘service’ here suggests both sexual servicing and the speaker’s ministering 
role, and this indeterminacy produces another: is the speaker suggesting that God 
is so cruel as to ‘forbid’ compassionate ‘service’ to a cursed leper (an implication 
in keeping with his complaints against the God who ‘hates’ him [15]) – or 
affirming the ‘joy’ of having violated a taboo, and raped a dying woman? Though 
for convenience I have called the speaker ‘necrophiliac’ thus far, it is crucial that 
the poem is in fact hazy on this point. Swinburne strives to hold our moral 
judgment in suspense; it is impossible to say whether the speaker is beyond the 
pale, a rapist and a necrophile, or enacting a Christian paradigm sometimes called 
‘foolishness for Christ’ – that is, flouting social norms in the name of a higher 
spiritual purpose – and giving chaste comfort to a suffering sinner.  Yet the poem 
also refuses to allow us to keep these alternatives separate; always both open, they 
contaminate each other as we read. Likewise, the fact that the speaker so exalts in 
his servitude, or in the abjection of his love, creates the impression that he has 
achieved via his submission to his lady a Christ-like exaltation-through-humility. 
His tears of ‘joy’ suggest either or both romantic sentiment and religious ecstasy. 
In sum, Swinburne suggests that, through ‘doing the service God forbids’, the 
speaker has achieved a paradoxical state of grace – though we cannot be quite 
sure of the nature of this ‘service’. 
Swinburne’s construction of necrophilic/leprous love as a form of profane 
grace or sacred transgression in ‘The Leper’ is best glossed by one of his more 
intriguing musings in his William Blake:  
  
 The belief in ‘holy insurrection’ must be almost as old as the oldest 
religions or philosophies afloat or articulate. In the most various 
creeds this feature of faith stands out sharply with a sort of tangible 
human appeal. Earlier heretics than the author of Jerusalem have 
taken this to be the radical significance of Christianity; a divine 
revolt against divine law; an evidence that man must become as 
God only by resistance to God … that if Prometheus cannot, Zeus 
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will not deliver us; and that man, if saved at all, must be indeed be 
saved ‘so as by fire’ – by ardour of rebellion ...64  
 
The extensiveness of Swinburne’s parodic use of Biblical typology has 
been established by Louis, and we are, I think, meant to recognise that the speaker 
of ‘The Leper’ is a type of Job, who is associated with leprosy because Job 2:7 
states that Satan smote him with boils (Job is venerated as the ‘patron saint’ of 
lepers).65 Like Swinburne’s speaker, Job is a figure of righteous suffering, one 
who assumes a contestatory attitude toward a God who appears senselessly 
punitive. Job’s complaint against God’s justice led some nineteenth-century 
readers – perhaps most notably Heinrich Heine – to view The Book of Job as the 
‘subversive’ or ‘skeptical’ book of the Hebrew Bible, against the orthodox view 
of Job as an exemplar of patience and piety, God’s ‘suffering servant’.66 
Swinburne was certainly familiar with Blake’s Illustrations of the Book of Job 
(1825), which, as Lawrence Besserman notes, ‘stress … the propriety of Job’s 
rebellious questioning of God’s justice’ and ‘refashion … Job into a Romantic 
rebel’.67 One suspects Swinburne was thinking of Blake’s rendering of Job when 
he claimed that all religions possess figures of ‘tangible human appeal’ who 
betray the paradoxical, revolutionary ‘truth’ that ‘man must become as God only 
by resistance to God … that man, if saved at all, must be indeed be saved … by 
ardor of rebellion’. Within the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Book of Job is often 
cited as the locus classicus for the problem of theodicy: given that there are 
innocent people in the world who experience unspeakable suffering, how is it 
possible that God is at once omnipotent and benevolent? This is the ‘old question’ 
to which Swinburne’s monk refers at the end of the poem. He is presumably now 
going ‘blind’ because he too is smitten with leprosy: 
 
 I am grown blind with all these things: 
 It may be now she hath in sight 
                                                
64 Swinburne, Blake, 157-159. 
65 Louis, Swinburne, 14-20; and Bond, ‘Leprosy’, 444. 
66 See Katherine Julia Dell, The Book of Job as Sceptical Literature (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1991), 44-45. 
67 Lawrence L. Besserman, ‘Job’, in A Dictionary of Biblical Tradition, ed. Jeffrey, 404. 
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 Some better knowledge; still there clings 
 The old question. Will not God do right?  
               (137-140) 
  
There is a parallel between the speaker’s capacity to love a leper and 
Swinburne’s own willingness to portray the speaker sympathetically: just as the 
speaker finds exquisiteness in his lady’s decay, so Swinburne is able to find 
beauty and nobility in a repellent subject. In effect, the monk is a figure for 
Swinburne’s aestheticism, an analogy hinted at toward the end of the poem when 
the speaker likens his love to his work as a scribe: ‘It may be all my love went 
wrong –/A scribe’s work writ awry and blurred,/Scrawled after the blind 
evensong…’ (129-131). The image of the monk’s blurred handwriting after 
‘evensong’ furnishes us with an image for the operations of Swinburne’s poem, 
which so comprehensively blurs conventions of Christian morality. As Rosenberg 
remarks, ‘The true audacity of ‘The Leper’ lies not in monstrous subject matter 
but in Swinburne’s making, through the transfiguring power of language, the 
morally loathsome aesthetically beautiful’.68  
The clerk’s obsessive, Christian love for a disintegrating corpse may be 
read as a grotesque figure for Browning’s efforts to reanimate early Christian 
history in his religious monologues and thus preserve it from sceptical critique in 
the present. Similarly, Swinburne’s bogus source may be understood as a sly joke 
on Browning’s engagements with the Higher Criticism in poems such as ‘Cleon’. 
Like ‘Hymn to Proserpine’, ‘The Leper’ aims to expose, to repeat Swinburne’s 
phrase, ‘the viler forms and more hideous outcomes of Christianity, its more 
brutal aspects and deadlier consequences’, which he believed ‘lurked’ not only in 
Browning’s religious monologues but in the interstices of the official historical 
record. In this way, ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ and ‘The Leper’ parody the biases of 
Browning’s Christian historicism by flaunting their own polemical investments 
and ‘recovering’ decadent or pagan counterhistories, moments of ‘holy 
insurrection’ against Christianity’s power.  
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Reflecting upon Swinburne’s appropriation of the phrase attributed to 
Julian the Apostate (‘Vicisti Galilæe’) in ‘Hymn to Proserpine’, L. M. Findlay 
suggests Swinburne identified art with heresy because ‘no less than religious 
hypostasis, aesthetic apostasis bears witness to the need to stand somewhere and 
for something’.69 The centrality of concepts of heresy and blasphemy to 
Swinburne’s Poems and Ballads, First Series, reveals the extent to which his 
aestheticism was from the start a bold attempt to ‘stand somewhere and for 
something’ in relation to the Victorian crisis of faith and its sanctification of a 
‘halfway faith that weeps skeptical tears’. Equally, however, Swinburne’s 
aestheticism attests to the confusions and ambiguities that intrinsic to his attempt 
to keep alive what he understood as a Romantic tradition of infidelity.70 The 
second half of the Victorian period was an age of blasphemy trials and militant 
Secularism, but also an age in which the bestselling poem (Tennyson’s In 
Memoriam) and, by some estimates, the bestselling ‘serious’ novel (Ward’s 
Robert Elsmere) were epics of honest doubt.71 In this notoriously reactionary 
After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy (1931), T. S. Eliot lamented that 
blasphemy is impossible in the context of a secularised modernity because the 
true blasphemer ‘profoundly believes in that which he profanes’; when this is no 
longer true, blasphemy is mere rudeness.72 Swinburne’s poetry suggests he 
arrived at a similar insight: at a very moment heresy and blasphemy begin to seem 
obsolescent, Swinburne revives them as under the sign of ‘aestheticism’ in order 
to preserve religious questioning – and art – from respectability. 
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Chapter Two: ‘Though Hearts Reach Back and Memories Ache’: 
Melancholy, Religious Doubt, and Swinburne’s Strenuous Joy 
 
Thus runs our wise man’s song: 
Being dark, it must be light; 
And most things are so wrong 
That all things must be right; 
God must mean well, he works so ill by this world’s laws. 
This, when our souls are drowning, 
Falls on them like a benison; 
This satisfies our Browning 
And this delights our Tennyson 
And soothed Britannia simpers in serene applause. 
- A. C. Swinburne, ‘[The High Victorian Tone]’1 
 
By the time Swinburne embarked on his poetic career in earnest with the 
publication of Atalanta in Calydon in 1865, the monumentalisation of Lord Alfred 
Tennyson as the ‘poet of the age’ was well advanced.2 Since the publication of In 
Memoriam in 1850, Tennyson had been widely honoured as an intercessor 
between the revelations of Victorian science and Christian belief, not least by 
Queen Victoria, who made him poet laureate that year and later famously claimed 
that the poem was second only to the Bible in providing solace during her grief 
over the death of Prince Albert.3 By 1870, In Memoriam had gone through 
twenty-one editions in Britain, and, as Robert M. Ryan notes, ‘those who never 
saw or read the printed text became familiar with its verses by hearing them 
repeated over and over in Sunday sermons, for which the poem provided 
inspiration in abundance’.4 Like Browning, Tennyson reassured the Victorian 
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titled by editors.  
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reading public that religious doubt was best understood as a heroic test to be 
overcome, or as a felix culpa that granted a richer, more enlightened faith. 
Browning’s aphorism in ‘Easter Day’ (1850), ‘You must mix some 
uncertainty/With faith, if you would have faith be (71-72)’ dovetails with 
Tennyson’s more famous aphorism in In Memoriam, ‘There lives more faith in 
honest doubt/believe me, than in half the creeds’.5 ‘The High Victorian Tone’, the 
squib that forms my epigraph, is a piece of juvenilia that Swinburne never 
published, and which was probably composed around 1859.6 It therefore most 
likely dates from the period just before Swinburne abandoned his studies at 
Oxford, and it is telling that he was at this moment chafing against Browning and 
Tennyson’s theodicies and the prestige that attached to their efforts to ‘soothe’ a 
doubtful ‘Britannia’. If the paradigmatic Victorian narrative of lost faith is one of 
earnest self-questioning and heroic despair, the sheer blitheness of ‘The High 
Victorian Tone’ immediately alerts us to Swinburne’s maverick quality. Around 
the moment Tennyson and Browning’s redemptive treatments of religious doubt 
acquired fresh relevance to many readers with the publication within the space of 
four months of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) and Essays and Reviews 
(1860), Swinburne pronounced such consolations empty and began to perceive 
that ‘honest doubt’ constituted a poetic model against which he might define 
himself. 
Herbert Tucker has speculated that Tennyson’s immense contemporary 
popularity, which far surpassed that of any contemporary poet, emerged from a 
paradoxical conjuncture of melancholy and authoritativeness of voice and 
conviction in his work: ‘An important clue to his popularity is probably that, 
writing during a crisis of authority, he was able simultaneously to gratify 
conflicting needs. The seal of certitude allayed publicly a cultural malaise that the 
                                                
5 Robert Browning, ‘Easter Day’, in The Complete Works of Robert Browning, vol. V, ed. 
Roma A. King et al. (Athens: Othio University Press, 1981), 99. Lord Alfred Tennyson, 
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note of melancholy was secretly feeding all the while’.7 Certainly, the notion that 
Tennyson was Britain’s supreme poet because he was a melancholic sage for a 
doubting zeitgeist, gifted at finding a plangent via media between scepticism and 
spirituality, modern thought and traditional feeling, was a commonplace rarely 
questioned until the final decade of the century. Reflecting on the reverend aura 
that clung to Tennyson in the public imagination, Richard Le Gallienne wrote in 
1926: 
 
… his place in the English world of the day was exalted, 
enthroned, with even with a touch of sacredness, such as that 
which attached to a great cardinal. The image is worn enough, but 
his passage was like the fall of a great oak in a forest of lesser 
trees. As it crashed down, the landscape seems to grow suddenly 
empty, devoid of meaning, filled with the naked light of common 
day.8 
 
 Like his attitude to Browning, Swinburne’s attitude to Tennyson passed 
from youthful idolatry through iconoclasm to a tempered scepticism. As a first 
year undergraduate at Oxford, Swinburne was particularly enraptured by Maud, 
exclaiming: ‘To think that this time last year the world was without [it]!’9 When 
he was visiting Radley College, a nearby public school, the summer of the same 
year, he reportedly stormed out of a meeting of the debating club and pronounced 
its members philistines when the merits of the same poem were questioned.10 Yet 
during the Poems and Ballads, First Series phase of his career, Swinburne 
imagined his own poetry as an alternative to the palatability of the laureate’s: ‘I, 
and my betters … are athirst for a larger and clearer draught in these Tennysonian 
times (the Laureate is of course delicious at his best – but one can’t live … on 
sorbets – it isn’t digestible without bread and wine’.11   
 The asperity which often runs through even the most generous of 
                                                
7 Herbert Tucker, ‘Tennyson and the Measure of Doom’, PMLA  98.1 (1983), 15. 
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Swinburne’s mature assessments of Tennyson is more complicated than a younger 
poet’s competitiveness toward a venerable precursor. The logic behind it is partly 
revealed in an 1865 letter to his friend Lord Houghton. After deriding what he 
takes to be Tennyson’s efforts to reconcile his fondness for classical subject 
matter with his Christian beliefs, Swinburne writes: 
 
Not that I am disloyal to Tennyson, into whose church we were all 
in my time born and baptized as far back as we can remember at 
all; but he is not a Greek nor a heathen; and I imagine does not 
want to be; and I greatly fear believes it possible to be something 
better: an absurdity which should be left to the Brownings and 
other blatant creatures begotten on the slime of the modern 
chaos.12 
 
Unsurprisingly, Swinburne links Tennyson’s project with Browning’s and 
rejects both as misbegotten efforts to be a Christian in the ‘chaos’ of the modern 
world. His suggestion that there is something outrageous and besmirching about 
trying to be a modern Christian is an inversion of the rhetoric of moral turpitude 
that could still attach to atheism in the 1860s; the reference to ‘slime’ seems to 
allude to the degradation of humanity conjured in the minds of many Christians 
by evolutionary science. Given that praising Tennyson as a secular prophet and 
priest had by this time hardened into a cliché, Swinburne’s ecclesiastical 
metaphor seems at least partly tongue in cheek, and his likening of Tennyson’s 
poetry to an institution that exerted an influence over him before he had the 
chance to think for himself is revealing. Clearly, Swinburne is piqued not merely 
at the ‘absurdity’ of Tennyson framing his poems on classical topics with 
Christian commitments, but at Tennyson’s immense cultural cachet in an age of 
religious uncertainty. Analysing this letter, Kerry McSweeney points out that 
Swinburne is ‘seldom judicious’ in his letters to Lord Houghton.13 Yet 
theatricality and irony often mark Swinburne’s rhetoric when he engages with 
religious questions, and this mode of rhetorical excess is key to his radical critique 
of the conventions of earnestness and reserve that governed the Victorian debate 
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over belief. It also reflects the uncompromising nature of his project. For 
Swinburne was not content with simply attacking Christianity; he sought to 
exorcise the sense of regret and tenderness that many Victorian doubters and 
unbelievers felt toward it: 
 
The tree of faith ingraffed by priests 
Puts its foul foliage out above thee, 
And round it feed man-eating beasts 
Because of whom we dare not love thee; 
Though hearts reach back and memories ache, 
We cannot praise thee for their sake. 
     (63-68)14 
 
The poem is ‘Before a Crucifix’, from Songs Before Sunrise, and the 
addressee is Christ. Ostensibly, Swinburne seeks to debunk Christianity’s claims 
to compassion in the name of a higher, politically efficacious compassion for the 
poor and downtrodden; more precisely, he is attacking the Catholic Church, and 
proselytising for republican liberty. Yet even here, as Margot Louis suggests, the 
aggression seems covertly directed toward those doubters and unbelievers for 
whom Christianity itself has become an object of compassion; those who refrain 
from direct attack and who praise the figure of Christ in an apparently secular 
spirit, as well as those for whom Christianity still holds emotional appeal even if 
actual belief is difficult to sustain.15 In a characteristic move, Swinburne suggests 
he is honouring Christ’s compassion for the poor more faithfully by repudiating 
all reverence for Christ, whose name is irredeemably tainted by the oppressions it 
has sanctified; yet Christianity is nevertheless posited as a temptation (‘we dare 
not love thee’ [my italics]. Swinburne’s desire to construct an unflinching and 
unregretful model of secularism engenders a career-long compulsion to argue 
with and rewrite the confession of religious doubt that the Victorian reading 
public had embraced as a kind of epochal scripture: Tennyson’s In Memoriam. 
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66 
 
The Carpe Diem Religion: Swinburne’s Minor Decadent Poems and 
Tennyson’s In Memoriam  
Aside from McSweeney, who has helpfully analysed Swinburne’s most explicit 
engagements with Tennyson, the few critics who have explored the relationship 
between the two poets in detail have been more curious on the whole about the 
impact of Swinburne’s career – and especially of his sexually transgressive 
poetics – upon the work of the laureate than about Tennyson’s presence in 
Swinburne’s.16 A notable exception to this tendency is Francis O’Gorman’s essay, 
‘Swinburne’s Returns: The Endurance of Writing in Poems and Ballads, Second 
Series’, which builds upon Melissa Ziegler’s suggestion that Swinburne’s elegy to 
Baudelaire, ‘Ave Atque Vale’ (1878), inaugurates a modern, anti-consolatory 
tradition of elegy.17 O’Gorman persuasively argues that Swinburne’s elegies in 
Poems and Ballads, Second Series evince a struggle to formulate a post-Christian 
‘language of regret and loss’ that could rival that of Tennyson’s In Memoriam.18 
Yet, as I have been arguing, key to Swinburne’s work is a comprehensive effort to 
demystify Victorian doubt, which received its most culturally resonant poetic 
expression in In Memoriam; it follows that Swinburne poems that might be read 
as engagements with In Memoriam are many and varied. For example, 
Swinburne’s desire to challenge the august Tennysonian language of grief is 
discernible in early poems such as ‘Anima Anceps’, ‘Félise’, ‘Ilicet’, ‘Rococo’ 
and ‘Before Dawn’, all critically neglected poems from Poems and Ballads, First 
Series. To complicate O’Gorman’s model, Swinburne in these poems seems less 
concerned to devise alternative models of grief than to destabilise the very 
assumption that grief, melancholy, and contemplativeness represent profound 
responses to mortality.   
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In his notes to Poems and Ballads, First Series, editor Kenneth Haynes 
suggests that the title ‘Anima Anceps’ (which means ‘two-fold soul’) has its 
origin in Victor Hugo’s Notre-Dame de Paris (1831), in which ‘Go therefore, 
divided soul, may God be merciful to you’ is said to be the formula intoned by a 
priest as a signal to a hangman.19 This seems fitting, for the poem is a kind of 
playful anti-catechism, the question-and-response structure of the first two stanzas 
and the inculcation of a ‘moral’ lesson or maxim in the final stanza working to 
subvert the solemnity of grief and to suggest that light-heartedness reflects a wiser 
apprehension of life’s flux than ‘prayer’ and ‘tears’: 
  
Though time rend after 
Roof-tree from rafter, 
A little laughter 
    Is much more worth 
Than thus to measure 
The hour, the treasure, 
The pain, the pleasure, 
      The death, the birth; 
Grief, when days alter, 
Like joy shall falter; 
Song-book and psalter, 
    Mourning and mirth. 
Live like the swallow; 
Seek not to follow 
Where earth is hollow 
Under the earth. 
  (33-48)20 
 
Swinburne’s nimble, almost nursery-rhyme-like iambic dimeter, which 
embodies the evanescence the poem celebrates, yokes piety and grief together 
with death, underlining that such emotions are morbid efforts to ‘follow’ the dead 
under the earth rather than aspirations toward heaven, and are in any case subject 
to the very mutability they lament or strive to assuage. Haynes suggests another 
possible source for the poem’s title is Arthur Clough’s Dipsychus, which was 
published posthumously in parts in 1865; the title means ‘double-minded’ or 
                                                
19 Swinburne, Poems and Ballads & Atalanta in Calydon, ed. Kenneth Haynes (London: 
Penguin Classics, 2000), 340. 
20 Swinburne, CPWI, 101. 
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‘double-souled’, and the poem dramatises a crisis of faith as a kind of 
psychomachia between Dispychus, an idealist appalled by the prospect of 
unbelief, which he equates with the negation of all moral value, and Spirit, a voice 
of carpe diem worldliness. Swinburne was contemptuous of Clough, regarding 
him (rather unjustly) as a religiose honest doubter in the pattern of Browning and 
Tennyson but without their poetic gifts.21 It seems likely that this contempt was 
partly a reaction to the fact that Clough’s supposed failure to live up to his 
intellectual promise had become in the eyes of many of his contemporaries a 
cautionary tale about the self-destructive nature of religious scepticism.22 
Swinburne’s Latin title ‘Anima Anceps’, with its echo of Clough’s Greek title, 
perhaps suggests that the poem is a something of an oblique, irreverent elegy to 
Clough; more broadly, it seems to allude to the way in which poets like Clough 
and Tennyson elevated wavering religious belief and the concomitant anguished 
self-anatomising into a master trope of emotional and intellectual complexity in 
poetry. In his essay on Rossetti, Swinburne also casts Clough as Tennyson’s 
epigone and posits them both as examples of the liberalised modern Christianity 
to which Rossetti’s aestheticism (and presumably Swinburne’s own) are to serve 
as correctives: 
 
A certain section of Mr. Rossetti’s work as a poet and as a painter 
may be classed under the head of sacred art … Its religious quality 
is singular and personal in kind … The fire of feeling and 
imagination which feeds it is essentially Christian, and is therefore 
formally and spiritually Catholic. It has nothing of rebellious 
Protestant personality, nothing of the popular compromise of 
sentiment which is the hybrid jargon of a school of hybrids, we 
may call liberalized Christianism. The influence which plainly has 
passed over the writer’s mind, attracting it as by chain of sound or 
vision, by spell of colour or of dream, towards the Christian forms 
and images, is in the main an influence from the mythologic side 
of the creed … Now the sacred art of Mr. Rossetti, for all its 
                                                
21 For Swinburne’s 1891 lampoon of Clough’s religious doubt – ‘We’ve got no faith, and 
we don’t know what to do:/To think one can’t believe a creed because it isn’t true!’ – see 
‘Social Verse’, in Arthur Clough: The Critical Heritage, ed. Michael Thorpe (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1996), 340. 
22 For discussion of how Clough became the tragic symbol of the age’s religious doubt, 
see LaPorte, Changing Bible, 111-152. 
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Christian colouring, has actually no more in common with the 
spirit of either Browning or Newman than it has with the semi-
Christianity of “In Memoriam” or the demi-semi-Christianity of 
“Dipsychus”. It has no trace, on the other hand, of the fretful and 
fruitless prurience of soul which would fain grasp and embrace and 
enjoy a creed beyond its power of possession; no letch after Gods 
dead or unborn, such as vexes the weaker nerves of barren brains, 
and makes pathetic the vocal lips of sorrowing scepticism and 
“doubt that deserves to believe” … The hankering and restless 
habit of half fearful retrospect towards the unburied corpses of old 
creeds which, as we need not Shelley’s evidence to know, infected 
the spiritual life and disturbed the intellectual force of Byron, is a 
mirage without attraction for this traveller; that spiritual calenture 
of Christianity is unknown to his soul; nor has he ever suffered 
from the distemper of minds fretted and worried by gnatstings and 
fleabites of belief and unbelief till the whole lifeblood of the 
intellect is enfeebled and inflamed. The intermittent Christian 
reaction apparently perceptible in Baudelaire was more than half of 
it mere repulsion from the philanthropic optimism of sciolists in 
whose eyes the whole aim or mission of things is to make the 
human spirit finally comfortable. Contempt of such facile free-
thinking, still more easy than free, took in him at times the form of 
apparent reversion to past creeds; as though the spirit should seek a 
fiery refuge in the good old hell of the faithful than the watery new 
paradise of liberal theosophy and ultimate amiability of all things. 
Alone among the higher artists of his age, Mr. Rossetti has felt and 
given the mere physical charm of Christianity, with no admixture 
of doctrine or of doubt.23  
 
Here, in an essay that McGann and Sligh rightly suggest had a powerful 
influence on Pater, Swinburne’s theory of aestheticism can be observed emerging 
from the convolutions of an argument about the relationship between Christianity 
and art, and specifically from an effort to critique the ‘sorrowing scepticism’ of 
Clough’s Dipsychus and Tennyson’s In Memoriam.24 The scabrous and free-
wheeling rhetoric is all an effort to surmount the stumbling block that Rossetti’s 
attraction to Christian motifs and iconography poses to Swinburne’s sense of 
artistic kinship with Rossetti and, more broadly, to his conviction that art ‘[cannot 
in any way become a] handmaid of religion’.25 By differentiating Rossetti so 
                                                
23 Swinburne, ‘Rossetti’, 562-563. 
24 McGann and Sligh, explanatory notes to Swinburne: Major Poems, 490.  
25 Swinburne, Blake, 90. 
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elaborately from other Christian and agnostic contemporary poets, Swinburne is 
able to insist that Rossetti’s variety of ‘sacred art’ is idiosyncratic to the point 
where it cannot be spoken of in relation to Christianity without a finely tuned – 
one might say hair-splitting – sense of artistic and intellectual discrimination. 
Although Swinburne begins with the premise that Rossetti is ‘essentially 
Christian’, all that is essential here turns out to be the ‘mere physical charm of 
Christianity’: the beautiful surface is more profound than the interior depths of 
belief, which Swinburne identifies with maudlin and inauthentic doubt. Arguably, 
Rossetti inclined toward a reverent agnosticism that was closer to the honest 
doubt of Browning and Tennyson than to the crusading secularism of Swinburne 
(one suspects that Rossetti was defining himself against Swinburne when he 
wrote to James Smethan in 1865 that while he lacked strong faith, he was by no 
means a ‘confident denier’ and certainly no ‘apostle of opposition’).26 This is 
precisely the complication that Swinburne’s argument about Rossetti’s ‘aesthetic’ 
Christianity, which consists in the ‘mere physical charm of Christianity, with no 
admixture of doctrine’ or only in the ‘mythologic side of the creed’, aims to 
overcome; it turns ‘Christian’ and ‘sacred’ into beautiful forms or mythological 
machinery, and strives to establish that Rossetti’s loyalty lies with the sensuous 
and the worldly, not with any aspiration toward transcendence. The possibility of 
authentic belief thus foreclosed, ‘aesthetic’ Christianity can be celebrated as more 
profoundly religious than the work of poets like Tennyson and Clough, who yearn 
for belief beyond their ‘power of possession’. The transgressive play with a 
surface-versus-depth distinction in relation to religion that Ellis Hanson has 
shown to be so crucial to the aestheticisms of Pater and Wilde might be traced to 
the complexities Swinburne encounters in his critical writings when he seeks 
radically to attenuate the role that Christianity has played within Western art and 
literature or to account for the attractions it continues to possess for apparently 
secular artists like Rossetti.27 For Swinburne, Christianity is a welcome guest in 
the palace of art only when it leaves all its ideological force at the door  – and 
                                                
26 Quoted in Jan Marsh, Dante Gabriel Rossetti: Painter and Poet (London: Orion Books, 
2005), 107. 
27 Hanson, Decadence, 169-218 and 229-345. 
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with the catch that he thinks that Christianity is at its most insidiously ideological 
(and, by extension, at its most inartistic) when it assumes the form of ‘liberalized 
Christianism’.  
‘Ilicet’, which could be considered a companion piece to ‘Anima Anceps’, 
similarly scorns conventional emotional and philosophical attitudes toward death 
as anthropocentric mistakes; death is precisely that which negates human 
categories of value, by which ‘all life stands chidden’ (137).28 The poem’s title 
means ‘it’s all over’ in Latin and each stanza is a sententious assertion of death’s 
absolute finality: 
  
 Outside of all the worlds and ages, 
 There where the fool is as the sage is, 
 There where the slayer is clean of blood, 
 No end, no passage, no beginning, 
 There where the sinner leaves off sinning, 
 There where the good man is not good. 
 …………………………………… 
 No soul shall tell nor lip shall number 
 The names and tribes of you that slumber; 
 No memory, no memorial. 
 ‘Thou knowest’ – who shall say thou knowest? 
 There is none highest and none lowest: 
 An end, an end, an end of all. 
    (7-12, 37-42) 
 
 Death is not an ultimate moral reckoning but rather a democracy of 
meaninglessness where none is ‘highest and none lowest’ and which obliterates 
individual personhood, making a mockery of efforts at memorialisation.29 This 
reads as a pointed deflation of the quasi-apotheosis or ‘secular canonisation’ of 
Arthur Hallam performed in In Memoriam, which goes beyond paying tribute to 
the personal qualities of a friend and exalts Hallam as ‘nature’s best’ (LXXII.20), 
as a type of Christ and, as Devon Fisher points out, as an ‘exemplar of civic 
virtue’.30 Swinburne perhaps chose the title for its proximity to the word ‘illicit’, 
                                                
28 Swinburne, ‘Ilicet’, CPWII, 74-78.  
29 Ibid., 75. 
30 Tennyson, In Memoriam, 413. Devon Fisher, ‘Spurring an Imitative Will: The 
Canonisation of Arthur Hallam’, Christianity and Literature 55.2 (2006), 232. 
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since the poem suggests that sanctified forms of grief and memorialisation contain 
or covertly promote transgressive or ‘illicit’ emotion, specifically the eroticisation 
of death, which the poem characterises as a futile quest for ‘purple pleasure’ (83) 
or ‘fruit that comes not of the vine’ (72). Swinburne’s decadent use of pagan 
and/or Catholic imagery implies that rituals of mourning are in fact sensuous 
death-worship, performed ‘in death’s favour’ (67); elsewhere mourning is a 
superstitious effort to propitiate or ‘fe[e]d’ the ‘pale old lips of death’ (51). Far 
from being poignant or ethereal emotions, grief and the yearning for life after 
death are perverse fixations on what may be seen and touched. In effect, 
Swinburne is casting a critique of the longing for immortality in the resolutely 
sensuous, earth-bound terms of his aestheticism: the longing constitutes merely an 
abstracted hedonism, a desire to transmute ‘things of sweet shape and of sweet 
savour’ into an imponderable variety of pleasure, ‘fruit that comes not of the vine’ 
(68-72).  (Swinburne also suggests that the desire for immortality is the epitome 
of hedonism in his essay on Arnold’s poems: ‘… when pleasure-seekers fail of 
pleasure in this world, they turn their hearts Godward, and thence in the end 
expect joy which the world could not give’).31 This logic culminates in the 
scandalous suggestion that mourning rituals are displacements not merely of 
erotic but of violent or atavistic impulses; he implies they are civilised 
reminiscences of pagan blood sacrifice (73-78). Yet rather than simply offering a 
perverse antithesis to the noble, Christian modes of mourning and 
memorialisation that inspire In Memoriam, the decadent sensationalism of ‘Ilicet’ 
might be said only to make flagrant some of the stranger currents of feeling that 
run through Tennyson’s poem. As John Rosenberg observes: 
 
The most startling effects in In Memoriam all have a transgressive 
quality, a crossing of borders that normally separate the living 
from the dead, the natural from the supernatural, one sex or species 
from another. Death in In Memoriam, especially in the darker, 
earlier sections, is not so much the cessation of life as a displaced 
activity, corpses in motion or embraces underground.32 
 
                                                
31 Swinburne, ‘Arnold’, 64. 
32 John D. Rosenberg, ‘Stopping For Death’, Victorian Poetry 30. 3/4 (1992), 295. 
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In Memoriam everywhere makes vivid the embodied nature of grief, and 
occasionally this shades into the suggestion that there is something faintly 
luxurious or even debauched about the experience. For instance, early in the poem 
it is personified as a partner in a bacchanal or danse macabre:  
 
Let Love clasp Grief lest both be drowned, 
Let darkness keep her raven gloss; 
Ah, sweeter to be drunk with loss, 
To dance with death, to beat the ground, 
(I. 9-12)33  
    
The speaker’s obsessive longing for Hallam’s physical presence is often 
tinged with Gothic morbidity as well as with homoeroticism. For instance, 
Tennyson gently conjures a necrophiliac scene of passion in an effort to convey 
his speaker’s abandonment to grief and the twin-like intensity of the fraternal 
bond he has lost: 
 
Ah yet, even yet, if this might be, 
I falling on his faithful heart, 
Would breathing through his lips impart 
That life that almost dies in me; 
   (XVIII. 13-16)34 
 
Similarly, there is a faintly ghoulish physical tenderness in Tennyson’s 
image of the graveyard tree whose roots ‘grasp’ at Hallam’s remains: 
 
Old Yew, which graspest at the stones 
That name the under-lying dead, 
Thy fibres net the dreamless head, 
Thy roots are wrapt about the bones. 
    (II.1-4)35 
 
Despite Tennyson’s moral aversion toward aestheticism, especially as it 
was embodied in Swinburne’s work, he nonetheless has some sympathy with 
aestheticism’s faith in the truths of the senses. Leighton comments:  
                                                
33 Tennyson, In Memoriam, 345. 
34 Ibid., 363. 
35 Ibid., 346. 
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It is possible … to read In Memoriam as deeply troubled, but also 
inspired by that Lucretian materialism which will become the basis 
of Victorian aestheticism … Materialism, for Pater and his 
contemporaries, is a philosophy based on the materiality of the 
body. For Tennyson too, the attempt to recover the body of 
Hallam, ‘sweet human hand and lips and eyes’, involves him a 
long, tormented drama of touch … 36 
 
In contrast to the anguished yearning for personal immortality that 
pervades In Memoriam, ‘Ilicet’ invokes the Olympian deities topos that was often 
used by Victorian sceptics as a means of critiquing Christian visions of 
transcendence and preoccupation with life after death. Louis has traced how the 
traditional image of the Olympian deities as perfect in their immortal beauty, and 
callous to or amused by human suffering, was often used by Victorian sceptics to 
identify Christianity with a chilly, far-fetched idealism.37 In this pattern, ‘Ilicet’ 
collapses the distinction between the Christian God and the ‘old unalterable gods’ 
(132) of Greek mythology, both of which are presented as impervious to human 
wishes and powerless to bestow life after death (characteristically, however, 
Swinburne saves this blacker indictments for the Christian God; the Olympian 
deities merely ‘laugh’ [131] at human life, while the Christian God is murderous: 
‘He hath slain them: shall he bid them live?’ [102]). Swinburne’s emphasis on the 
impotence of tears and his suggestion that the cries of a newborn infant epitomise 
the human condition (‘We are born with travail and strong crying,/And from the 
birth-day to the dying/The likeness of our life is thus’ [106-108]) resonate as an 
anti-sentimental rebuke to the famous passage of In Memoriam in which the 
speaker’s nightmare vision of a godless universe produces an access of despair: 
 
but what am I? 
An infant crying in the night: 
An infant crying for the light: 
And with no language but a cry. 
   (LIV.17-20)38 
 
                                                
36  Leighton, On Form, 69. 
37 Louis, Persephone, 24. 
38 Tennyson, In Memoriam, 396. 
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 Where Tennyson here imagines himself reduced to a prelinguistic state of 
terror and vulnerability by the prospect of an indifferent universe, Swinburne 
effectively allies himself with the Olympian perspective from which human 
suffering might be seen in conspectus and savoured as a pattern of reversals. The 
poem’s sets of feminine rhymes give its dramatic negations a faintly insouciant 
swing, even a hint of gleefulness: 
 
One girds himself to serve another  
Whose father was the dust, whose mother 
The little dead red worm therein; 
They find no fruit of things they cherish; 
The goodness of a man shall perish, 
It shall be one thing with his sin. 
   (109-114) 
 
It was doubtless such moments in Poems and Ballads, First Series, where 
the felicities of the rhyme and the quicksilver metre seem to enact the joy of idol-
smashing, that prompted Morley to describe Swinburne as the ‘vindictive apostle 
of a crushing and iron despair’.39 For ‘Ilicet’ does not merely attack Christian 
rituals of grief and hopes for immortality: it attacks the idea that melancholy is a 
profound response to the loss of such traditional structures of feeling.  
An explicitly anti-Christian attack on melancholy and grief is also at the 
centre of ‘Félise’.40 This poem frames itself as a homage to François Villon, 
taking as its epigraph his famous ubi sunt lament, ‘Mais ou sont les neiges 
d’antan?’ (but where are the snows of yesteryear?), from ‘Ballade des Dames du 
Temps Jadis’ (circa. 1461). ‘Felise’ is an ubi sunt lament in which the speaker’s 
cynicism toward grief at once compounds the bitterness of his loss and robs it of 
any profundity; throughout, Swinburne emphasises that grief always fails because 
it is just as ephemeral as that which it tries to mourn. ‘Felise’ operates through an 
analogy between sexual love and religious faith, both of which it exposes as 
illusions that cannot withstand the corruptions of time. In the first part of the 
poem, the speaker reflects on the fickleness of sexual love; in the second part, he 
                                                
39 Morley, ‘Swinburne’, 147. 
40 Swinburne, CPWI, 188-198. 
76 
 
extends an invocation of the ‘cruel’ Olympian deities into a long, Job-like 
complaint against religious hope: 
 
By many a name of many a creed 
We have called upon them, since the sands 
Fell through time’s hour-glass first, a seed 
Of life; and out of many lands 
Have we stretched hands. 
 
When have they heard us? who hath known 
Their faces, climbed unto their feet, 
Felt them and found them? Laugh or groan, 
Doth heaven remurmur and repeat 
Sad sounds or sweet? 
……….. 
Are the skies wet because we weep, 
Or fair because of any mirth? 
Cry out; they are gods; perchance they sleep; 
Cry; thou shalt know what prayers are worth, 
Thou dust and earth.   
………… 
The ghosts of words and dusty dreams, 
Old memories, faiths infirm and dead. 
Ye fools; for which among you deems 
His prayer can alter green to red 
Or stones to bread? 
  (201-210, 216-220, 241-245) 
 
The image of hands ‘stretched’ after faith calls to mind Tennyson’s 
speaker in In Memoriam: ‘I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope,/And gather 
dust and chaff, and call/To what I feel is Lord of all,/And faintly trust the larger 
hope’ (LV.17-20).41 Swinburne need only rework Tennyson’s dialectic between 
faith and doubt with a slightly different emphasis: in Tennyson’s lines, doubt 
coincides with a Christian posture of humility before God and is assimilated into a 
tentative affirmation of faith; in ‘Félise’, the same image of desperate prayer is 
cast as more abject than poignant, and as a revelation of the true bleakness of the 
human lot rather than of the testing nature of faith. Swinburne’s extensive 
appropriation of Biblical language (for instance, his image of stones being turned 
                                                
41 Tennyson, In Memoriam, 398. 
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to bread alludes to Christ’s temptation in the desert [Matthew 4:3]; the imperative 
‘thou shalt know what prayers are worth/thou dust and earth’ registers as a 
blasphemous addendum to the Ten Commandments), as well as of the dignified 
Tennysonian language of doubt, works to suggest that unbelief lurks within the 
folds of the language of belief, dessicating it from within. More precisely, the 
logic of the allusions implies that the more austere imagery and diction of the 
Bible discloses the absence of a benevolent God. For example, ‘O fools and blind, 
what seek ye there,/High up in the air?’ and ‘Ye fools and blind; for this is 
sure,/That all ye shall not live, but die’, turns the ‘ye fools and blind’ of Matthew 
23:17 and 19 into remonstrations not against worldly materialism but against 
Christian hopes for immortality. The speaker, who is constructed as a kind of self-
regarding immoralist and poète maudit (he brags at one point, ‘But there is 
nothing, nor shall shall be,/So sweet, so wicked, but my verse/Can dream of 
worse’ [163-165]) and whose lover is called ‘Félise’, hazily conjures associations 
with French libertinism. This is also the effect sought by the Villon epigraph. 
Swinburne translated Villon extensively and embraced him as an poetic precursor, 
partly because his life of crime and exile made it possible for Swinburne to 
imagine him as a proto-Romantic rebel (he christened Villon the ‘gallows-
nightingale’).42 As a whole, the poem circles obsessively around the carpe diem 
theme – ‘Ah, take the season and have done/Love well the hour and let it go’ 
(131-132) – and plays knowingly with the Victorian tendency to conflate atheism 
and sexual license, and displace both onto the putative excesses of French culture. 
In other words, Swinburne’s carpe diem poems often affirm the very dreads that 
atheism conventionally aroused in Victorian culture, and seek to transvalue those 
dreads as decadent glamour.  
 ‘Rococo’, which also takes a failed love affair for its subject, draws upon 
the same imaginative nexus.43 As is the case with many poems in Poems and 
Ballads, First Series, the title calls attention to the poem’s style rather than its 
                                                
42 For a discussion of Swinburne’s Romantic image of Villon as a ‘criminal hero’, see 
Jerome McGann, Swinburne: An Experiment in Criticism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1972), 88-91. 
43 Swinburne, CPWI, 115-117. 
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theme and reflects the foregrounding of formal choices which is characteristic of 
Swinburne’s aestheticism. This poem anticipates the fin de siècle fashion for 
poems that take the rococo as a point of reference for their ornamental style or as 
a vague synonym for French decadence.44 Although ‘Rococo’ does not appear to 
refer to a specific artwork, the poem also reflects the preoccupation with 
ekphrasis that runs through the volume, and the poem’s insouciant take on the 
vagaries of ‘light love’ (20) – particularly its alternations of ‘forget’ and 
‘remember’ and ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’ in the final two lines of each stanza, which 
suggest the formal switching of partners in a dance – evoke the concept of les 
fêtes galantes, or the amorous play of young aristocrats, which Jean-Antoine 
Watteau made the signature subject of rococo style in painting. Yet Ken Ireland 
finds this poem ‘too masochistic and bacchanalian’ to capture the ‘light’ spirit of 
eighteenth-century rococo.45 This is surely because Swinburne’s imagination of 
eighteenth-century French culture was coloured by his enthusiasm for the Marquis 
de Sade, and as Haynes points out in a note to this poem, the reference to 
‘Juliette’ seems to allude to the eponymous depraved heroine of Sade’s 1797 
novel.46 Like so many of Swinburne’s early poems, ‘Rococo’ aggrandises 
sadomasochistic, ‘light’ love as a formalisation of the inexorable truths of life’s 
transience and its alloy of pleasure and pain. Like lasting romantic love, Christian 
pieties are dismissed as deluded efforts to escape from the divisions of time: 
 
Dream that the lips once breathless,  
Might quicken if they would; 
Say that the soul is deathless; 
Dream that the gods are good; 
Say March may wed September,  
And time divorce regret; 
But not that you remember, 
And not that I forget. 
              (25-32) 
 
                                                
44 See Ken Ireland’s Cythera Regained? The Rococo Revival in European Literature and 
the Arts: 1830-1910 (Cranbury NJ: Rosemont Publishing, 2006), 136-157. 
45 Ibid., 67. 
46 Swinburne, notes to Poems and Ballads, ed. Haynes, 344. 
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 Similarly, in ‘Before Dawn’, ‘shame’, ‘sin’ and ‘virtue’ are cast off as 
redundancies (37-39).47 Yet such poems are not simply a series of iconoclastic 
negations; they seek not only to debunk Christian conceptions of morality and 
transcendence, but to affirm that the pleasurable pains of mortal life are more 
desirable than those ideals. Swinburne was highly conscious of the extent to 
which poems about ‘light love’ could serve to make secular temporality seem like 
a desirable predicament, and he believed that he was introducing a novel note to 
contemporary poetry by drawing this connection: ‘In an age where all other 
lyrists, from Tennyson to Rossetti, go in … for constancy and eternity of 
attachment and reunion in future lives, etc., etc., I limit love, honestly and 
candidly, to 24 hours, and quite enough too in all conscience’.48 ‘Quite enough 
too’ has a double resonance upon which many of Swinburne’s carpe diem poems 
rely: on the one hand, it sounds like the sentiment of a jaded libertine, over-
satiated even by a twenty-four hour tryst; on the other, it is a sentiment articulated 
very earnestly in countless Swinburne poems – that mortal time is in fact enough, 
that it is all that one should desire ‘in all conscience’. What is more, the 
repudiation of transcendental ideals and hopes for immortality in Swinburne’s 
carpe diem poems brings not simple melancholy or disillusionment but a 
masochistic enjoyment of transience itself, an enjoyment which Swinburne 
understands as a wiser kind of idealism. Thus for the speaker of ‘Before Dawn’, 
pleasure and its loss blur into a single experience which is ‘beyond regret’ (20). 
He transforms the apparently cynical insight that ‘love has no abiding/But dies 
before the kiss’ (71-72) into a gnomic affirmation of mortal life, which also 
‘seem[s] worth living’ (19) despite the fact that it will be lost: 
 
So hath it been, so be it; 
For who shall live and flee it? 
But look that no man see it 
Or hear it unaware; 
Lest all who love him and choose him 
See Love, and so refuse him; 
                                                
47 Swinburne, CPWI, 151-153. 




For all who find him lose him, 
But all have found him fair. 
   (73-80) 
 
 In this sense, Swinburne’s sadomasochistic poetics are not merely 
symptoms of a personal quirk, nor merely a game of dares with Victorian 
propriety: they are often part of an endeavour to find a rhetoric adequate to 
affirming both the joys and pains of a wholly immanent conception of life, purged 
of all desire for transcendence. And for this reason, the libertine speakers of such 
poems often cast their devotion to worldly pleasure as a form of spiritual 
asceticism: steeled against the temptations of metaphysical desire, they accept that 
pleasure is transient and do not allow themselves to want anything higher or 
better. (Swinburne actually regarded de Sade as an ascetic libertine in this sense, 
characterising him as a Simeon Stylites in an ‘inverted posture’.)49 
 ‘Anima Anceps’, ‘Before Dawn’, ‘Félise’, ‘Ilicet’ and ‘Rococo’ are the 
sort of bijoux pieces for which Swinburne and other ‘aesthetic’ or ‘decadent’ 
poets were disparaged as bards of ‘days of wine and roses’ by many modernist 
writers and twentieth-century critics.50 Throughout his career, Swinburne 
certainly produced a vast number of such minor, formally accomplished poems 
that exalt lightness of spirit and use the carpe diem topos as a means of lending 
atheism the character of an eternal verity. The critical neglect of such poems is 
perhaps understandable: for all that they present themselves as light exercises on 
the eternal themes of mortality and desire, they can seem dated and curiously 
alienating. They are perhaps best appreciated as a stylised shrugging off of the 
melancholia and moral earnestness that tended to characterise the discourse of 
Victorian religious doubt. In his book Heretics (1905), G. K. Chesterton decried 
this strain within Victorian aestheticism (epitomised for him not by Swinburne’s 
poems but by Edward Fitzgerald’s translation of the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam 
[1859] and Pater’s ‘Conclusion’), as exemplary of a modern ‘carpe diem 
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religion’.51 A committed Christian and eventually a Catholic convert, Chesterton 
found in aestheticism a far-reaching attack not only on Christian piety but on 
humanist models of the self: ‘the quarrel of the highest Christianity with [this 
‘carpe diem’ religion of the aesthetes] is not that the scepticism denies the 
existence of God; it is that it denies the existence of man’, and effaces ‘altogether 
the outlines of human personality and human will’.52 Maxwell has observed that 
Swinburne is perhaps more difficult to read than any other English-language poet 
of the nineteenth century, and this difficulty might be accounted for partly by way 
of Chesterton’s insight: in his effort to evade what he considered the ruses and 
illusions of Christianity, especially as they were encoded in the melancholy 
introspection of Victorian doubt, Swinburne’s poetry often denies us what we 
conventionally think of as ‘deep’ lyric interiority.53 Though there is a humanistic 
side to Swinburne’s vision that celebrates the grandeur of human potential (this is 
most pronounced in Songs Before Sunrise), particularised individual psychology 
is often bypassed or explicitly rejected in his poetry in favour of an ecstatic 
passivity towards what he enshrines as ‘fate’: namely, the inexorable forces of 
time, sexual love, and death. ‘Sestina’ (1872), which Swinburne claimed to have 
‘scribbled off in a morning’, is a good example of this genre of aesthetic poetry 
that does away with deep, particularised interiority and erects a carpe diem ethos 
and formal virtuosity in its place. 54 As its title suggests, the poem is primarily 
about its own pleasingly intricate form, though the envoi emphasises that 
mortality is the cost of aesthetic ‘delight’: 
 
Song, have thy day and take thy fill of light 
Before the night be fallen across thy way; 
Sing, while he may, man hath no long delight. 
    (37-39) 55  
    
                                                
51 G. K. Chesterton, Heretics (New York: Dover Publications, 2006), 55. 
52 Ibid., 54. 
53 Maxwell, Bearing Blindness, 196. 
54 Quoted in explanatory notes to Swinburne, Major Poems, ed. McGann and Sligh, 483. 
55 Swinburne, CPWI, 330-331. 
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Swinburne arrives at this carpe diem conclusion by reasoning that any 
dream of transcending the distinction between ‘night’ and ‘day’ in fact yields 
nothing ‘conclusive of delight’ (28), and would actually foreclose the possibility 
of ‘light’ and ‘song’. The demanding strictures of the sestina form also gesture at 
the idea that the most intense joys of life are won from embracing as a positive 
good its strictures, the paradoxically immutable laws of flux and impermanence. 
In other words, the elaborate forms in these minor aesthetic poems embody and 
seek to impart the lessons of the indivisibility of pleasure and pain, and of amor 
fati, or love of fate. That these poems are also ironic valedictions to Tennysonian 
melancholy and to Christian sorrow more generally is particularly clear in one of 
the loveliest of Swinburne’s roundels, ‘In Harbour’ (1883).56 F. W. H. Myers, the 
Victorian poet, critic and spiritualist, singled this poem out for praise in an 1893 
essay on poetry and the ‘meaning of life’, noting that the poem expresses a 
‘Lucretian satisfaction at liberation from the terrors of religion’ and comparing 
Tennyson’s perception that modern materialism represented an ‘abiding 
nightmare’ with Swinburne’s capacity to be ‘exultant’ about it.57 ‘In Harbour’ 
may be read as an oblique rewriting of Tennyson’s ‘The Lotos-Eaters’ (1832), a 
poem Swinburne considered typical of the ‘magnificent hashes and stews’ that 
Tennyson created when he brought his Christian commitments to bear on classical 
subjects.58 In Tennyson’s poem, the druggy paralysis that overcomes Ulysses and 
his men on the island of the lotos-eaters in Homer’s Odyssey suggests the vapidity 
of ancient Epicureanism: while apparently yielding to a life of pleasure, 
Tennyson’s mariners seem to experience only ‘mild-eyed melancholy’ (27) and 
conclude that there is ‘no joy but calm’ (68).59 The apathy of Tennyson’s mariners 
mirrors the apathy of the Epicurean gods they worship, who are entirely ‘careless 
of mankind’ (156). In Swinburne’s re-writing, the predicament is reversed: the 
problem is not that we are marooned on a demoralising island but that, 
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58 [Swinburne to Lord Houghton, March 31, 1864], Letters vol. 1, ed. Lang, 97. 
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metaphorically speaking, we have never left the harbour. ‘We have drunken of 
Lethe at length’ (8) registers as a self-borrowing from ‘Hymn to Proserpine’, 
where drinking of ‘things Lethean’ signifies falling under the deathly influence of 
Christianity; here, conflated with ‘lotos-eating’, drinking from Lethe appears to 
symbolise a blissful forgetting of the ‘dream’ and ‘dread’ of religion (10), as well, 
perhaps, of the Tennysonian fixation upon ‘mourning’ (5). The intricacy of 
roundel form lends an insinuating playfulness to the valediction; the poem 
attempts to enact the joyful spirit that it suggests awaits just ‘outside’ (15) the 
present age, which remains in ‘thrall’ (7) to religious gloom, while also gently 
ironising the valedictory and apocalyptic modes of rhetoric that dominated 
representations of the decline of Christianity.  
To the extent that Swinburne’s minor carpe diem poems are miniature ars 
poetica, allying aestheticism with an anti-transcendent worldliness, they actually 
carry a large polemical burden, even if they seem only to declare art’s freedom 
from all such burdens. This is best exemplified by another of Swinburne’s 
roundels, ‘A Singing Lesson’ (1883), which tells us that song must 
   
shine through the sound as it pierces 
Men’s hearts with possession of music unsought. 
For the bounties of song are no jealous god’s mercies, 
Far-fetched and dear-bought. 
(7-9)60 
 
While Swinburne seems only to celebrate the beautiful gratuitousness of 
‘song’, he is, as the poem’s title suggests, also teaching us a lesson, and 
prescribing an anti-transcendental model of art’s value. The poem both formally 
embodies and argues for a type of self-authenticating easefulness: those who 
imagine art is a gift of God or a tribute to a ‘far-fetched’ other world are identified 
with meretricious poetics (the transcendent is like an overpriced bibelot ‘ladies’ 
might buy [2]), whereas art which wants only its own secular ends has the 
simplicity of nature (it is like the ‘turn of a wave’ [4]). Yet Swinburne is also 
ironically undermining our expectations of such brief, self-consciously exquisite 
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poems: the roundel presents itself as a kind of child’s plaything or a feminine 
trinket (the title of this roundel also suggests the school room), but here its 
capacity to create an impression of a perfect formal consummation is identified 
not with artifice but rather with nature. In turn, this identification enables 
Swinuburne to cast his rejection of transcendence in terms of consummation 
rather than of loss. 
A framework for appreciating Swinburne’s carpe diem poems might be 
found in Pater’s essay on Joachim du Bellay in The Renaissance. This essay 
obliquely sets forth a poetics of aestheticism through its portrait of the group of 
sixteenth-century French poets known as the Pléiade school. Pater’s paradoxical 
ambition in this essay is to reveal the profundities of a style of poetry that appears 
merely to revel in its own inconsequence. He argues that consummate formal 
grace has serious value in itself because it captures the ephemerality of life, the 
value of the contingent and apparently trivial. For Pater, the virtue of this form of 
poetry lies precisely in its repression of grandeur and seriousness, and the essay 
itself seeks to embody the ‘silvery fineness of grace’ it vindicates in the Pléiade 
school. That Pater is also seeking to anatomise a modern poetics of aestheticism – 
and perhaps even thinking of Swinburne’s poetry – is discernible when he 
discusses the manner in which the Pléiade poets represented death:  
 
Like the people in Boccaccio’s ‘Decameron’, [the Pléiade poets] 
form a party who in an age of troubles, losses, anxieties, amuse 
themselves with art, poetry, intrigue; but they amuse themselves 
with wonderful elegance, and sometimes their gaiety becomes 
satiric, for as they play, real passions insinuate themselves, at least 
the reality of death; their dejection at the thought of leaving le beau 
sejour du commun jour is expressed by them with almost 
wearisome reiteration. But with this sentiment they too are able to 
trifle; the imagery of death serves for a delicate ornament, and they 
weave into the airy nothingness of their verses their trite reflections 
on the vanity of life … 61  
 
 Pater goes on to observe that the only form of consolation permitted 
within this mode of poetry is the ‘sentiment of the grandeur of nothingness, la 
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grandeur du rien’ and the ‘final regret of all human creatures for the familiar 
earth and limited sky’.62 He also calls attention to the precious, coterie atmosphere 
of Pléiade poetry, its eagerness to display its ‘refined voluptuousness’ and its 
familiarity with things ‘foreign’ or exotic.63 As a whole, the essay is a masterly 
exercise in the rhetorical ploy of concession. Pater acknowledges that such poetry 
might be found ‘distasteful’, ‘trite’, ‘jaded’ – but he then redefines these vices not 
merely as aesthetic virtues, but as qualities that enable a special eloquence about 
life’s ‘tenuity’.64 In effect, Pater projects the drama of the Victorian crisis of faith 
onto sixteenth-century French poets in order to imagine how this modern 
predicament might be imagined differently – indeed, not as a crisis at all, but as a 
‘dream[y]’, relishable condition that affords opportunities for aesthetic 
refinement.65 Swinburne’s minor carpe diem poems, which usually advertise 
themselves as either French or classical, or both, in inspiration, conjure a similar 
fantasy world, with the attendant ‘satiric’ edge that Pater detects in this mode of 
poetry. Swinburne’s self-consciously flippant handling of the subjects of sex and 
death in these poems also tenders a similar argument about the possibility of 
discovering a kind of higher élan in a desacralised view of the world. The 
disconcerting gaiety of such poems seeks to effect a thoroughly secular 
reconciliation with death and with time; any loss can be recast as lightness of 
being, any suffering as a labour of love. Thus, for all their flamboyant cynicism, 
such poems manifest a strong impulse to find redemptive value in negativity, and 
strive to embody the paradox that life might mean more for seeming to mean less.  
 
‘The Darkness of These Beaches’: Tennyson’s In Memoriam, Swinburne’s 
‘By the North Sea’ and the Atheistic Sublime 
 
‘By the North Sea’ (1880) is one of Swinburne’s most deeply considered 
responses to Tennyson’s In Memoriam and to the culture of Victorian doubt more 
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broadly.66 This poem is now often cited as a counterexample to the old critical 
orthodoxy that slighted all of Swinburne’s ‘Putney’ poems – that is, the vast body 
of poetry he produced after 1878, when, following an alcoholic breakdown, he 
retreated to a semi-reclusive life in Putney under the care of his friend, Theodore 
Watts-Dunton, a now largely forgotten but then-respected man of letters. It was 
once often speculated that Watts-Dunton monitored not only Swinburne’s 
drinking and socialising but his writing, and that under the Putney regime, 
Swinburne’s iconoclastic impulses flamed out and he produced ever more 
decorous and turgid poems. Yet, as Riede has noted, if Watts-Dunton sought to 
impose respectability on Swinburne’s poetry as narrowly as legend has it, he must 
have been ‘exceedingly imperceptive to think [‘By the North Sea’] the best poem 
Swinburne had ever written’, since the ‘not terribly safe subject of the poem is 
Swinburne’s vehement anti-Christianity’.67 Since its critical rehabilitation in the 
1970s, ‘By the North Sea’ has primarily been read as an engagement with the 
nexus between Christianity and the Romantic tradition, and specifically as an anti-
theistic critique of Wordsworthian nature.68 Yet by 1880, a Wordsworthian vision 
of a benevolent nature imbued with divine purpose had been made to seem 
problematic even to many Christian minds by the revelations of Victorian science 
and, perhaps more importantly in terms of understanding Swinburne’s work, had 
been undermined by Tennyson’s In Memoriam. When Swinburne attempts to 
write an anti-theistic nature poem such as ‘By the North Sea’, he is preoccupied 
less with confident Christian belief or with Wordsworthian naturalism than with 
the cultural resonance of Tennyson’s ‘honest doubt’ and with Tennyson’s Gothic 
and apocalyptic visions of a godless nature. More broadly, ‘By the North Sea’ is a 
complex negotiation of the problem that, as a poetic topic, atheism had been 
imaginatively colonised by an older and culturally influential generation of 
doubters and agnostics like Tennyson, J. A. Froude, Clough, and Arnold, all of 
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whom identified it with nihilism, melancholia, and moral degeneration. The 
ambition of ‘By the North Sea’ is to cast atheism in affirmative terms, as a 
refinement rather than an emptying out of meaning and as an empowerment rather 
than a negation of the human. To this end, Swinburne attempts to formulate an 
atheistic sublime: a vision that incorporates the vertiginous terror that doubters 
and agnostics often associated with atheism, but which ultimately transfigures that 
terror into rapture. 
‘By the North Sea’ was inspired by the ruins on the Dunwich coast in 
Suffolk.  Swinburne clearly found the site an apt symbol of his conviction that 
Christianity was moribund. Dunwich had been a flourishing port and cathedral 
city in the Middle Ages, but over centuries, much of the city was destroyed by 
coastal erosion, and by the time of Swinburne’s visit in 1875, its cathedral as well 
as its six churches and their graveyards were in the process of toppling into the 
sea. Swinburne was not the only nineteenth-century observer to find in Dunwich a 
Gothic literalisation of the potentially disintegrating effect of scientific knowledge 
upon providential understandings of the world. The ruins are also accorded a 
brooding passage in Charles Lyell’s The Principles of Geology (1830-33) that 
serves as a suggestive gloss on Swinburne’s poem: 
 
On the verge of a cliff, which the sea has undermined, are 
represented the unshaken tower and western end of an abbey. The 
eastern aisle is gone, and the pillars of the cloister are soon to 
follow. The waves have almost isolated the promontory, and 
invaded the cemetery, where they have made sport with the mortal 
relics, and thrown up a skull upon the beach. In the foreground is 
seen a broken tombstone, erected, as its legend tells, ‘to perpetuate 
the memory’ of one whose name is obliterated, as is that of the 
county for which he was ‘Custos Rotulorum’. A cormorant is 
perched on the monument, defiling it, as if to remind some 
moraliser like Hamlet of ‘the base uses’ to which things sacred 
may be turned. Had this excellent artist desired to satirise certain 
popular theories of geology, he might have inscribed the stone to 
the memory of some philosopher who taught ‘the permanency of 
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existing continents’—‘the era of repose’—‘the impotence of 
modern causes’.69 
 
Although there is no evidence that Swinburne read Lyell, the centrality 
of Lyellian geology to the literature of the Victorian crisis of faith and as an 
intertext within In Memoriam is well known, and the association of geology with 
the spectre of atheism certainly would have been familiar to Swinburne.70 As is 
often rehearsed, Tennyson’s grief over Hallam was exacerbated by his reading of 
scientific texts, perhaps most notably Lyell’s Principles of Geology and Robert 
Chambers’s Vestiges of Creation (1844), which unsettled his faith (or perhaps 
only deepened his doubts) in natural theology.71 This branch of theology, which 
was given a popular and very influential testament at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century with William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802), attempted to 
enfold empiricism within Christianity by postulating that evidence of a divine 
ordering logic could be found in natural phenomena. Prior to the advent of 
Darwinian science, Lyell’s ‘uniformitarian’ theory of the earth posed one of the 
most alarming challenges to the Biblical account of creation and to natural 
theology by introducing a vision of a world constituted by non-teleological flux. 
Lyell presented evidence for the extinction of species and claimed that even the 
most monumental natural formations were created over aeons by earthly, 
observable forces such as wind, water erosion, and volcanic activity. While Lyell 
sought to evade religious controversy, his dissemination of a concept of ‘deep 
time’ played an important role in popularising within the Victorian imagination a 
vision of the natural world intimidating in its indifference to human values and in 
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which the only principle of stability inhered, ironically, in the forces of change.72 
Tennyson’s In Memoriam frames some of its most famous moments of religious 
despair with Lyellian geology. For instance, as Virginia Zimmerman points out, 
lyric XXXV ‘clearly evokes a Lyellian view of landscape shaped by water; over 
the “long result of time” continents erode to nothing more than dust’:73  
 
The moanings of the homeless sea, 
The sound of streams that swift or slow 
Draw down Ӕonian hills, and sow 
The dust of continents to be; 
 
And Love would answer with a sigh, 
‘The sound of that forgetful shore 
Will change my sweetness more and more, 
Half-dead to know that I shall die’. 
                                          (9-16)74 
 
The image of a coast eroded by the sea assails not only the speaker’s 
hopes of immortality but his belief in Love, which seems to refer to a desire to 
believe in divine love as the motive force within nature as well his desire to 
believe in love as the motive force within humanity. Though apparently lamenting 
the loss of an anthropocentric understanding of nature, Tennyson’s language 
remains strikingly anthropomorphic: the sea is in mourning for its homelessness 
just as its erosion of the coastline makes the speaker mourn his homelessness 
within nature; the shoreline is ‘forgetful’ of itself, or insensible to human needs, 
just as a confrontation with such an insensible nature may cause humanity to 
forget its highest ideals. In one of the poem’s most cited passages, the fossil 
record and ‘deep’ geological time provoke the speaker to imagine less an 
indifferent nature than a redoubtable mother nature who has – like a Medea or 
Lady MacBeth – unsexed herself by repressing her own compassionate feelings: 
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Are God and Nature then at strife, 
That Nature lends such evil dreams? 
So careful of the type she seems, 
So careless of the single life; 
………… 
‘So careful of the type?’ but no. 
From scarpèd cliff and quarried stone 
She cries, ‘A thousand types are gone; 
I care for nothing, all shall go’.  
……… 
Man, her last work, who seemed so fair 
Such splendid purpose in his eyes, 
Who rolled the psalm to wintry skies, 
Who built him fanes of fruitless prayer, 
 
Who trusted God was love indeed 
And love Creation’s final law – 
Though Nature, red in tooth and claw 
With ravine, shrieked against his creed – 
                                         (LV. 5-8, LVI.1-4, 9-16) 75 
 
As James Eli Adams remarks of these lyrics, ‘[Nature] mysteriously 
withdraws the care the poet has come to expect, leaving him baffled, abandoned, 
and fearful: clearly this Nature incarnates that strangely tenacious and central 
theme of nineteenth-century literature and art, the demonic woman. In Tennyson’s 
personification … the male observer is held in thrall when a feminine Nature, 
formerly beautiful and benign, discloses an unexpected and terrifying enigma of 
violent purpose’.76 Adams suggests that this moment of almost Gothic misogyny, 
which retains the archetypal understanding of nature as a mother but recasts her as 
a negligent or murderous one, reflects the speaker’s psychic resistance to the 
distressing scientific knowledge whose implications he is unwilling fully to 
contemplate: ‘Tennyson’s trope … can be viewed as a desperate effort to 
humanise the results of science by envisioning nature even in its bleakest aspects 
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as a conscious, designing being, however perverse’.77 The tension between the 
speaker’s sense of intellectual awe at geological time and his emotional resistance 
to imagining its implications for human life can also be felt in lyric CXXIII: 
 
There rolls the deep where grew the tree. 
O earth, what changes hast thou seen! 
There where the long street roars, hath been 
The stillness of the central sea. 
 
The hills are shadows, and they flow 
From form to form, and nothing stands; 
They melt like mist, the solid lands, 
Like clouds they shape themselves and go. 
 
But in my spirit will I dwell, 
And dream my dream, and hold it true; 
For though my lips may breathe adieu, 
I cannot think the thing farewell. 
                                           (1-12) 78  
 
Geological science here furnishes Tennyson with a dazzling metaphor for 
the dissolution of Christian belief it threatens to induce: where once stood ‘the 
tree’ (which doubles as a metonym for familiar, solid land and as a reference to 
the tree of life, a Jewish symbol that often represents Christ within the Christian 
tradition), now there is only abyssal scepticism, or terrifying vistas of ceaseless, 
purposeless fluidity. Yet Tennyson’s identification of religious doubt with an 
incoherent vista of ever-forming and fleeing shadows, oceans, and clouds is not 
simply an enactment of the slippery slope between scientific knowledge and 
unbelief. As Daniel Cook has pointed out, unbelief within the Christian 
theological tradition is ‘not often represented as a position, but as no position at 
all, a utopia in the most etymologically pure sense of that word’ (emphasis in 
original) and the troping of unbelief as phantasmal or self-consuming pervades 
Victorian crisis of faith literature.79 Cook writes: 
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Images of the unreal sceptic in his vacant world … crop up 
everywhere in Victorian narratives of lost faith … the world of the 
sceptic is figured as an ocean, … a flat surface where nothing 
stands in relief because nothing has any ontological or 
epistemological priority to anything else … This is only one set of 
images that links a phantom selfhood with speculation and the 
annihilating aporia to which speculation apparently leads.  At other 
times the sceptic is in (or becomes) a wilderness, and in a third set 
of metaphors, the sceptic’s mind is figured as the shadow cast by a 
cloud … For Arnold as for Froude, the sceptic’s self is a kind of 
blank slate which cannot internalise or structure experience – 
especially intellectual experience – in a meaningful way.80  
 
Swinburne’s ‘By the North Sea’ is an attempt to revise the ‘through 
science to despair’ topos that animates some of the most poignant lyrics of In 
Memoriam, as well as the association between unbelief and all-dissolving nihilism 
that haunted the Victorian imaginary. Swinburne was certainly preoccupied with 
Tennyson’s poetic career around the time he composed the poem: the following 
year, he published a long, largely admiring essay in the Fortnightly Review 
comparing Tennyson to Alfred du Musset, while in November of the same year, 
after having read Tennyson’s poem ‘Despair: A Dramatic Monologue’ in the The 
Nineteenth Century, he wrote an acerbic parody of Tennyson’s religious politics 
entitled ‘Disgust: A Dramatic Monologue’.81 His essay on Tennyson and de 
Musset includes an ambivalent attack on In Memoriam, which Swinburne 
characterises as an extraordinary poem marred by its hypocritical sermonising and 
‘pretentiously unpretentious philosophy’:82 
  
 Mr. Tennyson is so ostentatious of his modesty, so unsparing in his 
reserve, so incessant and obtrusive in his disclaimer of all ambition 
to rank as a thinker or a teacher, while returning again and yet 
again to the charge as an ethical apostle or a sentimental 
theosophist … it is hardly reasonable to touch repeatedly and with 
obvious earnestness on the gravest and the deepest questions of life 
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and death, of human affection and moral bereavement – to pour 
forth page upon page of passionate speculation, of love and fear 
and hope and doubt and belief, and then to turn around … with the 
surely astonishing protest that it does not pretend to grapple with 
the questions on which it harps and the mysteries of which it treats 
… But the possession of a book so wholly noble and so profoundly 
beautiful in itself is more precious than the most coherent essay 
towards the solution of any less insoluble problem.83  
 
 It was also Tennyson’s tendency to assume the role of ‘sentimental 
theosophist’ that led Swinburne to deride his alarmist representations of atheism 
in poems such as ‘Despair’. Tennyson makes the premise of ‘Despair’ plain in a 
headnote to the poem: ‘A man and his wife, having lost faith in a God, and hope 
of a life to come, and being utterly miserable in this, resolve to end themselves by 
drowning. The woman is drowned, but the man is rescued by a minister of the 
sect he had abandoned’.84 Although purporting to be a dramatic poem, ‘Despair’ 
makes little effort to endow its speaker with a convincing persona, and the poem 
is essentially a jeremiad against ‘horrible infidel writings’ and what Tennyson 
called ‘this terrible age of unfaith’:85 
 
Have I crazed myself over their horrible infidel writings? O yes, 
For these are the new dark ages, you see, of the popular press, 
When the bat comes out of his cave, and the owls are whooping at noon, 
And Doubt is the lord of this dunghill and crows to the sun and the moon, 
Till the Sun and the Moon of our science are both of them turn’d into  
blood, 
And Hope will have broken her heart, running after a shadow of good: 
For their knowing and know-nothing books are scattered from hand to 
hand – 
We have knelt in your know-all chapel too looking over the sand. 
                                                                      (88-95)86 
 
As McSweeney suggests, the reference to infidel writings is perhaps a 
veiled swipe at Swinburne, though it also surely refers to the popular secularist 
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movements that were gathering force in the 1870s. 87 Elsewhere in the poem, the 
speaker’s conviction that world is ‘a fatherless hell’ (57) is linked to his bitter 
perception of the transience of love and his desire to drown at sea, which certainly 
registers as an attack on trademark Swinburne themes.88 McSweeney observes 
that ‘Despair’ also rehearses in a shriller key one of the axioms of In Memoriam: 
loss of belief in divine love entails the degradation of human love. The speaker’s 
capacity to believe in human love also hinges upon immortality: for in a godless 
world, in which death ‘were seen/at first as Death’, love would be ‘mere 
fellowship of sluggish moods’, or assume ‘the coarsest Satyr-shape’ (XXXV.18-
19, 21-22).89 
In ‘Disgust’, Swinburne satirises the astronomical imagery used to convey 
the abyssal nature of atheism in ‘Despair’, suggesting that Tennyson’s fears of an 
incoherent cosmos are spectres conjured by his addled logic and ponderous style: 
 
And the infinitesimal sources of Infinite Unideality 
Curve into the central abyss of a sort of a queer Personality 
Whose refraction is felt in the nebulae strewn in the pathway of Mars 
Like the parings of nails Æonian – clippings and snippings of stars – 
Shavings of suns that revolve and evolve and involve – and at times 
Give a sweet astronomical twang to remarkably hobbling rhymes. 
        (33-38)90  
  
This is also a satire on In Memoriam, where astronomical speculation is as 
crucial as meditations on geology to the speaker’s intellectualised doubts. The 
continuity between Swinburne’s parodic energies and more serious efforts to 
engage with the Victorian culture of doubt is perceptible if we place ‘Despair’ 
alongside ‘By the North Sea’.91 The first section of the poem is a critique of the 
Gothic or decadent excesses in which the human imagination indulges when 
confronted with an indifferent nature. As every critic notes, the first stanza of the 
poem offers a vision of nature almost hallucinatory in its desolation. What has 
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been overlooked – perhaps because of a still-persistent tendency to suspect that 
Swinburne’s use of extravagant effects is generally motiveless – is the very 
deliberate hyperbole in the first section of the poem, which aims to dramatise the 
irrational cast of a modern consciousness that, because divested of faith in a 
divinely created and ordered cosmos, perceives the natural world only in terms of 
nightmarish absences and negations: 
 
A land that is lonelier than ruin; 
A sea that is stranger than death: 
Far fields that a rose never blew in, 
Wan waste where the winds lack breath; 
Waste endless and boundless and flowerless 
But of marsh-blossoms fruitless as free; 
Where earth lies exhausted, as powerless 
To strive with the sea. 
                                                    (1-8) 
 
The profusion of sibilants, including five repetitions of the suffix ‘-less’, 
in the final four lines, hints that there is something excessive or even histrionic in 
apprehending this landscape through such a via negativa. This rhetoric of 
negation pervades In Memoriam; for instance, as David W. Shaw notes, the first 
seven sections of the poem use ‘various grammatical forms of the word ‘no’ 
(including the prefixes ‘in’ and ‘un’ and the suffix ‘less’ eighteen times’.92 In the 
following stanza, Swinburne gestures at the proximity between such a gloomy 
view of nature and superstitious belief: the grass is said to be as ‘thick woven as 
the weft of a witch is/Round the heart of a thrall that hath sinned’ (13-14). The 
poem provides a kind of etiology of Christian belief: the spectacle of a place like 
Dunwich, a stark rebuke to human effort, gives rise to a superstitious dread of 
nature, and in turn to the polarity of a frightening Old Testament God and a 
merciful Christ, figures which are attacked as consolatory fictions in part vi of the 
poem. Yet the poem takes seriously even as it parodies the human tendency to 
experience nature’s indifference as Gothic malignity or decadent perversion. For 
instance, we might detect a parody of Tennyson’s more portentous 
personifications of nature in In Memoriam when Swinburne personifies the 
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process of erosion as a ‘converse of desolate speech’ between two ‘lords’, death 
and the sea (26-40); yet Swinburne also aims to reveal the deeper roots of such 
anthropomorphic fantasies. He suggests that at the core of our superstitious dread 
of nature is a dread of sexuality, which is implicated in nature’s relentless process 
of destruction and renewal: 
 
And her waters are haggard and yellow 
And crass with the scurf on the beach: 
And his garments are grey as the hoary 
Wan sky where the day lies dim; 
And his power is to her, and his glory, 
As hers unto him.  
……………………………………………… 
And year upon year dawns living, 
And age upon age drops dead: 
And his hand is not weary of giving, 
And the thirst of his heart is not fed: 
And the hunger that moans in her passion, 
And the rage in her hunger that roars, 
As a wolf’s that the winter lays lash on, 
Still calls and implores. 
                                (27-32, 41-48) 
   
This Baudelairean image of nature as a decrepit, sadomasochistic sexuality 
dramatises the extent to which the flux of natural processes can appear almost 
willfully to defile our moral and aesthetic distinctions. The anaphoric list 
underlines not merely the vast time-scale and unremitting force of such natural 
processes, but calls attention to the distortions such an idea wreaks upon the 
imagination, which cannot tolerate nature’s ambivalence, its convergence of 
creation and destruction (or, in Swinburne’s metaphor, sex and death) and so 
experiences it melodramatically, as horror piled on horror, and imputes to it a 
baleful agency. Once again appearing to parody Tennyson’s visions of a rapacious 
mother nature, Swinburne imagines a sea as a kind of ogress who has ‘slain by the 
thousand’ and whose ‘reefs the bloodguiltiest of murder’ by shipwreck still pale 
in comparison to the destruction wrought by ‘her’ sandbanks (51-53). Shipwreck 
is a key motif in In Memoriam, symbolic of the speaker’s loss of spiritual 
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moorings (he drifts ‘within a helmless bark’ [IV.3]) but also of God’s apparent 
incapacity or unwillingness to protect human life: 93 
 
O mother, praying God will save 
Thy sailor – while thy head is bowed, 
His heavy-shotted hammock-shroud 
Drops in his vast and wandering grave. 
                                        (VI. 13-16)94 
  
Elsewhere in In Memoriam, death at sea symbolises the desacralisation of 
death implied by a godless account of nature. Through a startling compression of 
ideas, the loss of faith in immortality not only renders the loss of Hallam literally 
as well as spiritually unredeemable – his body will be anonymously engulfed by 
the elements – but suggests his descent to a primeval order of creation: 
 
………………………… O to us, 
The fools of habit, sweeter seems 
To rest beneath the clover sod, 
That takes the sunshine and the rains, 
Or where the kneeling hamlet drains 
The chalice of the grapes of God; 
 
Than if with thee the roaring wells 
Should gulf him fathom-deep in brine; 
And hands so often clasped in mine 
Should toss with tangle and with shells. 
                                         (X.11-20)95 
 
The sea seems to lie outside God’s creation: where a consecrated burial in 
the soil would confirm the ‘chalice of the grapes of God’, death at sea is an 
exposure to the desecrating elements. This association of atheism with drowning 
in an abyssal sea, coupled with the hint that such drowning is also a return to 
primeval chaos, is revisited at the moment of the speaker’s epiphany of faith:  
 
If e’er when faith had fallen asleep, 
I heard a voice ‘believe no more’ 
And heard an ever-breaking shore 
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That tumbled in the Godless deep; 
                     (CXXIV. 9-12)96 
 
The ruins at Dunwich provided Swinburne with a grotesque literalisation 
of these imaginative links between the loss of Christian belief, death-by-
drowning, and the desecration of corpses. Like Lyell, Swinburne was struck by 
the way the ‘waves’ had ‘made sport with the mortal relics’ at Dunwich; in a 
letter to Lord Houghton, he claimed that all of his representation of the ‘dead 
cathedral city’ in the poem was taken ‘from life – salt marshes, ruins, and bones 
protruding seawards through the soil of the crumbling sandbanks’.97 Clearly, 
however, Swinburne’s evocation of Dunwich is not simple naturalistic description 
but an ironic threnody to Christianity that fully exploits all the Grand Guignol 
possibilities of the scene. Throughout the poem, the sea embodies the very 
transgressive qualities that many Victorian readers, including Tennyson, 
associated with Swinburne himself: the sea is decadent, morbid, and sexually 
voracious; it ‘scoff[s]’ at Christian sentiment; it ‘shakes’ time-honoured 
conventions and flouts the rules of decorum (it ‘gives not thanks’ [453-460]). In 
this sense, ‘By the North Sea’ might be understood as obliquely self-reflexive, a 
meditation on Swinburne’s own disruptive role within Victorian culture; more 
precisely, it might be understood as a meditation on why his own poetics were 
often received as acts of desecration. As Louis notes, in the Songs of the 
Springtides and Studies in Song phase of his career (both volumes appeared in 
1880; ‘By the North Sea’ was published in the latter), Swinburne frequently uses 
the sea as an image for the ‘amorality of the creative power’.98 The distinction 
that ‘By the North Sea’ asks us to make between the reality of an amoral nature 
and our more Gothic fantasies of a depraved nature is the same distinction that, 
since ‘Notes on Poems and Reviews’, Swinburne had been asking his readers to 
make between aestheticism and immoralism, or between the representation of 
unpalatable truths in art and an immoral author. Nature in ‘By the North Sea’ may 
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be taken in part as an image for the disaffiliated aesthete, who does not seek to 
desecrate ordinary moral values so much as to stand apart from them. Swinburne 
seeks to reveal the superstitious dimension of the imaginative slippage between 
the prospect of a godless or amoral nature and fearful sexual depravity that is 
often enacted in In Memoriam and which was a standard trope within the 
Victorian debate over Darwinian science. For Swinburne as for many Victorian 
readers and subsequent critics, Tennyson and Darwin were imaginatively 
associated, and the despairing sections of In Memoriam seemed an uncannily 
proleptic vision of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. In a parody 
of the Francis Bacon-Shakespeare authorship controversy, Swinburne adduced 
points of similarity between Tennyson’s poem and Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species and joked that Darwin was in fact the author not only of In Memoriam, 
but of Tennyson’s entire oeuvre.99 Yet, as Dawson has shown, Darwinian science 
was also frequently identified with Swinburne’s poetry and with aestheticism 
more broadly.100 Dawson is largely silent on the question of how far this was an 
accurate representation of Swinburne’s intentions, no doubt because Swinburne 
seldom engages explicitly with contemporary science in his poetry, critical 
writings or letters. Nonetheless, Dawson shows that explicit espousal of 
Darwinism or materialism was unnecessary for readers to draw such connections: 
critics simply inferred Swinburne’s complicity with modern science from his anti-
Christian polemics and the frequent use of the word ‘fleshly’ in his early 
poems.101 Building on Dawson’s work, Jason Rudy suggests that contemporary 
critics were right to draw such an inference.102 Rudy cites a letter in which 
Swinburne reports his admiration for John Tyndall’s 1874 Belfast address to the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science (a speech notorious for its 
defense of materialism) and ventures a rare reflection upon the relationship 
between art and science: 
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Science so enlarged and harmonized gives me a sense as much 
of rest as of light … Even my technical ignorance does not 
impair, I think, my power to see accurately and seize firmly 
the first thread of the great clue, because my habit of mind is 
not (I hope) unscientific, though my work lies in the field of 
art instead of science, and when seen and seized even that first 
perception gives me an indescribable sense as of music and 
repose. It is Theism which to me seems to introduce an 
element – happily a factitious element – of doubt, discord and 
disorder. 103 
 
It is worth emphasising that Swinburne conceives of the points of 
convergence between his poetry and science as arising from his Romantic 
intuitions about the ‘great clue’ rather than hard knowledge or conscious design; 
we might also recall that his ‘Despair’ mocks not simply Tennyson’s theological 
speculations but his efforts to import scientific technicalities into poetry. While it 
is certainly true that Swinburne ‘does not shy from what others decried as 
“materialism”’ and I will discuss Swinburne’s Tristram of Lyonesse using the 
term, he resists being situated in the context of Victorian science in an important 
sense.104 The touchstones for Swinburne’s critiques of Christianity are an eclectic 
cast ranging to Lucretius to Villon to de Sade to Hugo to Blake to Shelley, but the 
common denominator is that Swinburne principally understands his atheistic or 
heretical heroes as artists, and he rarely explicitly draws upon modern science to 
justify his rejection of Christianity. It thus seems strange to indict Swinburne  –  
as John Holmes has done – for his failure to be rigorously Darwinian in his 
representations of human progress in poems such as ‘Hertha’; Swinburne never 
sought an intellectual warrant for his art in modern science, Darwinian or 
otherwise.105 In Under the Microscope, Swinburne evinces a telling ambivalence 
toward the cultural authority of science: while he rejoices in its capacity to ‘clear 
the air of mythologic malaria’ and ‘religious pestilence’, he also mocks its 
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pretensions to sovereignty as a form of knowledge.106 Swinburne’s anxiety about 
the diminishing cultural prestige of his own, largely literary stock of knowledge 
can be felt beneath the essay’s exuberant satire, and actually makes him sound 
quite like the many Victorian religious thinkers who insisted that something 
essential necessarily eluded the grasp of science:  
 
We live in an age when not to be scientific is to be nothing … It is 
vain to reply, while admitting that truth cannot be reached by men 
who take no due account of facts, that each fact is not all the truth, 
each limb is not all the body, each thought is not all the mind; and 
that even men (if such there be) ignorant of everything but what 
other men have written may possibly not be ignorant of everything 
worth knowledge, destitute of every capacity worth exercise. One 
study alone, and one form of study is worthy of the time and the 
respect of men who would escape the contempt of their kind.107 
 
If Swinburne used ‘fleshly’ as a provocative synonym for materialism in his 
early poetry, his later work tends to frame the same position in more elevated and 
quasi-spiritual terms. A critics often note, the phrase ‘spirit of sense’, as well as 
variations upon it such as ‘soul of sense’, are ubiquitous in Swinburne’s poetry 
and reflect his apprehension of a seamless identity between matter and spirit, 
body and soul – an idea that perhaps receives its most lucid statement in ‘Hymn 
of Man’, which celebrates ‘indivisible spirit and blood, indiscernible body from 
soul’ (50).108 As Jerome McGann points out, Swinburne clearly uses his ‘spirit of 
sense’ topos to counter the traditional Christian elevation of spirit over flesh.109 
Nonetheless, the fact that he makes this gesture not by deploying scientific 
concepts in his poetry but by turning religious language against itself is an 
important feature of his secularism, since it enables him to posit secularism not as 
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an effect of modern intellectual discoveries but as a primordial intuition which 
religion never managed to occlude.  
 Where Tennyson’s speaker in In Memoriam is dismayed by his vision of a 
nature ‘so careless of the single life’, Swinburne makes the Lucretian point that 
there is little to regret in nature’s indifference since in death we attain to the same 
state of indifference: 
 
A multitude noteless of numbers, 
As wild weeds cast on a heap: 
And sounder than sleep are their slumbers, 
And softer than song is their sleep; 
And sweeter than all things and stranger 
The sense, if perchance it may be, 
That the wind is divested of danger 
And scatheless the sea. 
                                    (65-72)  
 
Swinburne’s vision of the dead as ‘a multitude of noteless numbers/as 
wild weed cast on a heap’ chimes as a rejoinder to the anxious hopes of 
Tennyson’s speaker: 
 
That nothing walks with aimless feet; 
That not one life shall be destroyed, 
Or cast as rubbish to the void, 
When God has made the pile complete; 
                                    (LIV.5-8)110 
 
Although Swinburne emphatically rejects such hopes for a benevolent 
plan underwriting nature’s processes, he strives to recast the dreads of Tennyson’s 
speaker in consolatory terms. At the end of section i, Swinburne claims that 
dissolution within nature’s flux is a consummation devoutly to be wished: the 
‘doom of death’ is ‘more tender’ than a God of ‘judgment, the sword, and the 
rod’, and the ‘seal’ of death’s ‘slumber’ ‘sweeter’ than can be conceived, for, 
paradoxically, we are then preserved in the eternity of nature’s changefulness 
(110-120). In section iii, Swinburne suggests that though the scene seems to 
epitomise the cruelty of nature, ‘slowly, gladly full of peace and wonder/grows 
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his heart who journeys here alone’ (151-152), and the rest of the poem is an effort 
to give a felt quality to this paradox. His first move is simple: he emphasises that 
his lugubrious evocation of the erosion at Dunwich only represents one pole of 
the human response to nature; we are just as often impressed by a sense of 
nature’s harmony and beauty (89-96). However, Swinburne’s effort at consolation 
goes beyond an attempt to recast oblivion as a desirable fate or to celebrate the 
duality of our relationship to nature. The crux of his solution is elaborated in part 
iv of the poem. Discussing this section, McSweeney argues that Swinburne 
demands that we adopt a more ‘objective’ view of nature and renounce our desire 
for transcendence: ‘death [is] the final end, absolute and without memorial, and 
that consequently man must learn to accept the circumstances of his life – 
symbolised by the bleak landscape – as sufficient to sustain and fulfill him’.111 
Yet the philosophical stance advocated in the poem is more riddling and more 
idealistic than this formulation allows. ‘By the North Sea’ is unusual though not 
unique among Swinburne’s poems insofar as it accords dignity to the desire for 
transcendence. The poem suggests that it is in fact impossible emotionally to 
‘accept’ the realities of the human lot and the indifference of nature, and ennobles 
this incapacity as the definition of the human. The urge to transcend the ‘iron’ 
(265) circumstances of life is itself the highest form of transcendence; ‘song’ 
(which critics of this poem have tended to identify with poetry only, but may be 
interpreted to mean human creativity or endeavour more broadly, including 
religion), always at core a protest against mortality, is itself the redemption of 
mortality. Another way to put this is to say that religious longings fulfill 
themselves by way of their futility, or succeed by way of their failure. Rather than 
advocating an ‘objective’ attitude toward nature or stoicism in the face of life’s 
harshness, Swinburne identifies the human spirit with the restlessness of the wind, 
and proposes that we find a paradoxical satisfaction in this very dissatisfaction, 
since it is the only ‘lordship’ over nature or fate (both identified with the sea) 
available and is in any case the only kind worth wanting: 
But nor satisfied ever nor weary 
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Is ever the wind. 
 
The delight that he takes but in living 
Is more than of all things that live: 
For the world that has all things for giving 
Has nothing so goodly to give: 
But more than delight his desire is, 
For the goal where his pinions would be 
Is immortal as air or as fire is 
Immense as the sea.  
……… 
For these have the toil and the guerdon 
That the wind has eternally: these 
Have part in the boon and the burden 
Of the sleepless unsatisfied breeze, 
That finds not, but seeking rejoices 
That possession can work him no wrong: 
And the voice at the heart of their voice is 
The sense of his song. 
 
For the wind’s is their doom and their blessing; 
To desire, and have always above 
A possession beyond their possessing, 
A love beyond reach of their love. 
Green earth has her sons and her daughters, 
And these have their guerdons; but we 
Are the wind’s and the sun’s and the water’s, 
Elect of the sea. 
(281-290, 339-354) 
   
Human aspiration, then, is better than the horizon it hallucinates; the real 
immortality or eternity is the ‘pinions’ of the imagination that conceives of it. A 
paradox of Swinburne’s anti-theism is that he was as apt to admire as to deplore 
what, quoting Schelling, Louis calls the ‘God-positing potencies of man’, and the 
stanzas quoted above reveal some of the logic behind this paradox.112 The human 
desire for transcendence or for a ‘possession beyond [its] possessing’ inspires 
sublime awe because of the ingenuity of its misrecognition of itself, which keeps 
it in the cycle of painful desire that is its secret aim.  
‘By the North Sea’ additionally may be read as an effort to counter the 
pessimism of Arnold’s ‘Dover Beach’, which also takes geological erosion as its 
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figure for the inexorability of the retreat of Christianity; ‘the grating roar/Of 
pebbles which the waves draw back’ (9-10) portends the ebbing of ‘the Sea of 
Faith’ (21), which in turn threatens to afflict humanity with an austerely 
materialistic vision of nature, or to expose ‘the naked shingles of the world’ 
(28).113 The second stanza of part iv of ‘By the North Sea’ resonates as an echo of 
Arnold’s despairing prophecy of a world which ‘hath really neither joy, nor love, 
nor light,/Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain’ (33-34) and where ‘ignorant 
armies clash by night’ (37): 
 
What houses and woodlands that nestle 
Safe inland to lee of the hill 
As it slopes from the headlands that wrestle 
And succumb to the strong sea’s will? 
Truce is not, nor respite, nor pity, 
For the battle is waged not of hands 
Where the grave of a city 
The ghost of it stands. 
                        (243-250) 
 
Swinburne also seems to have Arnold in mind in his invocation of 
Hellenism in part iii of the poem. Yisrael Levin and Thaïs Morgan have 
emphasised Swinburne’s philhellenism, specifically his recuperation of the myth 
of Apollo, in his quest for spiritual alternatives to Christianity, yet ‘By the North 
Sea’ interestingly suggests that Hellenism is also an inadequate response to the 
spectacle of an indifferent nature.114 Swinburne uses Odysseus’s encounter with 
his mother Anticleia in the underworld in book xi of Homer’s Odyssey to 
emblematise the idea that the ancient Greek world was as preoccupied by the 
yearning for life after death as medieval Christianity (symbolised by the city of 
Dunwich). The scene at Dunwich is like Hades ‘dispeopled’ of ghosts and 
visions:  
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All too sweet such men’s Hellenic speech is, 
All too fain they lived of light to see, 
Once to see the darkness of these beaches, 
Once to sing this Hades found of me 
Ghostless, all its gulfs and creeks and reaches, 
Sky, and shore, and cloud, and waste, and the sea. 
                                                 (229-234) 
 
In other words, Hellenism is of little use to the modern poet troubled by the 
cruelty of nature; ancient Greece was at once too invested in an ideal of 
‘sweetness’ and ‘light’ and too superstitious, credulous of ‘ghosts’ and ‘visions’. 
Arnold popularised the idea that ancient Greece embodied ‘sweetness and light’ 
in Culture and Anarchy (1869).115  There, Arnold posits Hellenism as a free-
floating, ahistorical paradigm that prioritises freedom, rationality, and aesthetic 
beauty; in contrast to what he calls  ‘Hebraism’, the contending cultural paradigm 
of strict moral conscience, Hellenism aims ‘to see things as they are’ and 
embodies ‘aerial ease, clearness and radiancy’.116 Swinburne’s suggestion that 
Hellenic culture is too ‘sweet’ and ‘light’ to provide answers to the predicament 
of this poem may be taken to mean that an Arnoldian faith in high culture, ideal 
beauty and reason rings hollow in the face of the ‘darkness of these beaches’, or 
as a solution to a modern, sceptical crisis in the perception of nature. Where the 
Arnold of ‘Dover Beach’ takes comfort in the notion that Sophocles also knew the 
‘turbid ebb and flow of human misery’ (17-18), Homer possesses no such 
talismanic power in ‘By the North Sea’.  
Swinburne warmly praises ‘Dover Beach’ in his essay on Arnold’s poems: 
‘it has a grand choral cadence as of steady surges, regular in resonance, not fitful 
or gusty but antiphonal and reverberate’.117 Yet he passes over the poem quickly 
and without discussing its theme, doubtless because ‘Dover Beach’ is obviously a 
poem that contradicts one of the premises of his passionate apology for Arnold’s 
poetry: namely, that Arnold transcended the age’s stultifying preoccupation with 
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the melancholia of doubt and lost faith. With an implicit sneer at In Memoriam, 
Swinburne extols Arnold’s poetry thus: ‘In his minor poems, Mr. Arnold has now 
and then given signs of that sad task of sweeping up dead leaves fallen from the 
dying tree of belief; but he has not wasted much time or strength on such sterile 
and stupid work. In [Empedocles], at all events, he has wasted none; here is no 
melodious whine of retrospective and regretful scepticism; here are no cobwebs 
of plea and counterplea, no jungles of argument and brakes of analysis’.118  Yet 
‘Dover Beach’ is undeniably a poem of ‘regretful scepticism’, and elsewhere in 
his essay, Swinburne acknowledges that Arnold occasionally reverts to grieving 
over lost faith.119 The remorselessness of Swinburne’s desire to attack not simply 
Christianity but the compensatory hope that melancholy might be a meaningful 
response to its loss seems to emerge from his perception that melancholic or 
elegiac sentiments are a furtive means of tarrying within the religious faith to 
which they appear to offer a requiem. Reflecting on Victorian poetry in general, 
John Schad makes this point eloquently: 
 
The Victorian poets, and Tennyson in particular, knew this well; 
elegy, their characteristic mood and mode, is not just testimony to 
the passing of belief in transcendence but also a last-gasp 
perpetuation of that same transcendence. Hence, for instance, 
Emily Bronte’s ‘divinest anguish’, Matthew Arnold’s 
preoccupation with the ‘nobleness of grief’, and Tennyson’s 
reference to ‘some divine despair’. Arnold, in fact, laments that the 
nobleness of grief is gone – and so contrives to grieve even for the 
departure of grief, thus illustrating elegy’s capacity to survive its 
own deconstruction. Arnold’s line, then, serves as a gloss to 
[Tennyson’s investment in] the ‘far-off interest of tears’.120 
 
Although I have followed other critics of ‘By the North Sea’ and referred 
straightforwardly to ‘a perceiving poet’ or simply ‘Swinburne’ as the 
consciousness apprehending the scene at Dunwich, the ‘I’ voice is radically 
attenuated: a first-person singular voice appears explicitly in only ten lines of a 
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524 line poem. A first-person plural voice appears at times (‘Our father is lord of 
the day’ [472]) but is also rare, and as a whole, the poem attempts to enact the 
ecstatic immersion of the self in the flux of nature that it celebrates: we read 
hundreds of lines of description of nature’s processes, the vast majority of which 
are untethered from any particularised consciousness. As I have noted, this stark 
contraction of what we conventionally understand by ‘deep’ lyric interiority is 
common in Swinburne’s poetry, but in the context of a poem about religious 
scepticism and the indifference of nature, it registers as a counterpoint to the 
plaintive confessional intimacy of the lyric voice of In Memoriam. As David 
Riede argues, the Romantic topos of melancholy self-division pervades Victorian 
poetry, but among Victorian poets, it was Tennyson who elaborated upon it most 
extensively and resonantly: it was his ‘characteristic mood and poetic mode’.121 
Though Swinburne’s indebtedness to a Romantic poetic tradition (for him 
consisting principally of a radical trinity of Shelley, Blake, and Hugo) is often 
remarked and he plausibly might be called a late Romantic, Swinburne’s 
originality as a poet could be said to inhere partly in the way a vast number of his 
poems reject Romantic melancholy, which became so closely associated with 
religious doubt that Swinburne swerved from it and sought alternative ways of 
imagining the human condition. Even a poem like ‘The Triumph of Time’ (1866), 
which takes a (possibly autobiographical) situation of unrequited or failed 
romantic love as its subject and might superficially seem a rather conventional 
instance of the melancholic or elegiac mood in Victorian poetry, ultimately 
affirms that loss is liberation, the chance for a joyous dissolution of the self.122 If 
the poem’s speaker is contemplating suicide, as critics sometimes suggest, then he 
imagines it as a peculiarly invigorating experience, richly providing the 
fulfillment that he could not find in love:123 
  
I will go back to the great sweet mother, 
 Mother and lover of men, the sea, 
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 I will go down to her, I and none other, 
 Close with her, kiss her and mix her with me; 
 Cling to her, strive with her, hold her fast; 
 O fair white mother, in days long past 
 Born without sister, born without brother, 
 Set free my soul as thy soul is free. 
   
 O fair green-girdled mother of mine, 
 Sea that art clothed with the sun and the rain, 
 Thy sweet hard kisses are strong like wine, 
 Thy large embraces are keen like pain. 
(257-268) 
 
In other words, Swinburne persistently invokes the sublime as a remedy to 
Victorian melancholy over doubt and lost faith (or, it could be said, turns one 
trope heavily associated with Romantic poetry against another). ‘By the North 
Sea’ recommends just such a sublime cure. It ends with a celebration of the 
demise of Christianity, which is now fully conflated with the Gothic imagery of 
the first section of the poem – ‘the Gods of the night/lie rotten/And their honour 
be taken away’ (501-502). In other words, the poem’s opening vision of nature-
as-nightmare is now explicitly identified as a symptom of Christianity in its death 
throes. In its stead, Swinburne apotheosises the life-giving aspects of the natural 
world, symbolised by the sun                                  (513-524). The evocation of 
wine, flowers, madness and music in the poem’s penultimate stanza is a homage 
to the Dionysian ecstasy that is one of the gifts of giving oneself over to sheer 
immanence and integration within the flux of the natural world. Yet even as he 
honours the creative and sensual aspects of nature, Swinburne keeps its more 
forbidding and destructive powers in view; Time, ‘haggard and changeful and 
hoary’, remains ‘master and God of the land’ (485-486), while the wind is again 
associated with human ‘dreams’ (we know from earlier in the poem that these 
‘dreams’ are the perennial longing for transcendence [523]). The complex 
network of imagery here attempts to reinscribe the Gothic Christian vision of the 
sea and earth as sadomasochistic sexuality at the beginning of the poem as an 
atheistic sublime: life consists of a perpetual cycle of creation and deconstruction, 
which Time at once ‘gives’ and ‘takes’; the only transcendent element amid this 
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natural economy is the human ‘song’ that bears witness to the ambivalence of our 
immersion within such flux. This celebration of ambivalence contrasts tellingly 
with the redemptive solution proposed in In Memoriam. Tennyson’s speaker 
jettisons the natural theology that provoked him to ‘ghastliest doubt[s]’ 
(CXXIV.2) in favour of a fideistic recovery of Christian belief: 124 
 
I found Him not in world or sun, 
Or eagle’s wing, or insect’s eye; 
Nor through the questions men may try, 
The petty cobwebs we have spun: 
……………………………………… 
A warmth within my breast would melt 
The freezing reason’s colder part, 
And like a man in wrath the heart 
Stood up and answered ‘I have felt’. 
(CXXIV.2, 5-8, 13-16)125 
 
As Michael Tomko has argued, faith is here recuperated at the expense of 
the earthly and corporeal: ‘a spiritualised inner life founded on the impassable 
barrier of soul and body, pearl and shell, has replaced any external basis of 
religion’.126 Tennyson’s fear that a faith grounded in reverence for nature tends 
inexorably toward a ‘secular abyss’ (LXXVI.6) leads him to posit ‘an absolute 
bifurcation of body and soul’ that can quarantine the value of the spiritual against 
the encroachments of modern science as well as against more his visceral 
epiphanies of nature’s cruelty.127 In other words, the sensuous materialism that 
Leighton finds suggestive of Tennyson’s affinities with aestheticism is decisively 
renounced, and the final sections of the poem celebrate, as Tomko vividly puts it, 
a ‘de-anatomised’ or ‘eviscerated’ faith.128 As I have been emphasising, 
Swinburne’s aestheticism aims at an unreserved affirmation of the sensuous and 
earthly, and ‘By the North Sea’ is an attempt to accommodate the darker 
implications of an atheistic materialism – so vividly imagined by Tennyson – 
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within a redemptive vision, and to avow that even the worst aspects of a 
desacralised nature can be greeted with ‘music and repose’. Though at the end of 
the poem Swinburne emphasises the humility of the poet’s role within the natural 
world, there is a certain grandiosity implicit: he calls attention to the idea that his 
poem overcomes an impasse within the conventional understandings of the 
relationship between humanity, religion and nature; his atheistic ‘thanksgiving’ 
toward nature has been ‘mute’ within humanity for too ‘long’ because of the 
melancholic, Tennysonian and Arnoldian perception that the loss of God would 
entail the loss of a perception of nature’s glory. (As Swinburne surely knew, his 
attempt to conceive of an atheistic sublime in poetry was not without precedent: 
though I have been highlighting the Victorian rather than the Romantic intertexts 
within ‘By the North Sea’, the use of geological erosion as the symbol for an 
atheistic sublime inevitably invites comparison with Shelley’s ‘Mont Blanc’ 
[1816].)  
Swinburne’s habitual reaching after paradox necessarily produces 
ambiguities within the thread of polemical secularism I have been tracing in his 
poetry. Thaïs Morgan analyses some of these ambiguities in her study of major 
Swinburne poems (including ‘By the North Sea’) that attempt to supplant the 
Christian God with a renewal of the myth of Apollo. Morgan finds Swinburne’s 
mythopoesis highly problematic and argues that his dependence on poetic 
conceits heavy with Christian connotation such as ‘God’, ‘Light’, ‘Lord’, and 
‘Heaven’ is symptomatic of a compulsive reversion to Christian habits of mind. 
Of ‘By the North Sea’, she writes: ‘The vacillation between agnosticism which 
informs parts i-iii and vi of the poem and the transcendent revelations claimed in 
parts iv and viii supports the point that Swinburne never completely settled on 
either side of the debate over faith and doubt, but continued instead to take refuge 
in the myth of Apollo as a supposedly aesthetic solution to an essentially religious 
problem’.129 She goes on to claim that the poem entangles itself in the 
‘fundamental contradiction of deism without a deity’.130 Yet ‘By the North Sea’ 
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never explicitly invokes Apollo (just as it keeps its invocation of Dionysius an 
implicit allusion) and Swinburne resists turning his apostrophe to the sun and his 
celebration of the power of art into a hymn to Apollo at the end of the poem; as 
noted, part iii of the poem actually rejects Hellenism as a possible remedy to the 
problem of a natural world that can seem unbearably cruel and death-ridden. 
Rather, ‘By the North Sea’ exalts only the sun and time as objects of reverence, or 
the processes of life and death – a move that seems less vulnerable to the charge 
of latent theism or Christianity than Morgan’s critique suggests. Morgan also 
identifies a problem not peculiar to Swinburne’s imagination but endemic to 
atheistic poetry: as Martin Priestman puts it, ‘how can a form dedicated to 
presenting a sublimely elevated view of nature and man’s place within it do so 
without borrowing from the religious imagery which in most cultures invests that 
position of elevation?’131 Swinburne often displays a keen awareness of the vexed 
nature of attempting to formulate new, liberatory creeds out of ideas or metaphors 
associated Christianity, or, as he puts it in ‘Before a Crucifix’ , ‘Let not thy tree of 
freedom be/Regrafted from that rotting tree’ (156).132 I would suggest that, rather 
an unreflective harkening after Christian paradigms, ‘By the North Sea’ is a self-
conscious effort to dissolve the polarity which underpins Morgan’s critique and 
which also structured the Victorian debate over faith and doubt: that is, the 
identification of longings for transcendence and consolation, as well of feelings of 
awe and reverence, with Christian piety on the one hand, and the identification of 
atheism with ‘freezing reason’ or annihilating emptiness on the other. In the same 
year ‘By the North Sea’ was published, Swinburne expressed his frustration with 
this polarity in a review of Hugo’s Religions et Religion (1880): 
  
 A creed which is based on deicide and sustained on theophagy is 
never more insupportably laughable … than when its advocates 
denounce or deride their antagonists as – of all opprobrious names 
on earth – materialists. The men of our own day are far indeed 
from being the first to remark on the incomparable drollery of such 
a term of reproach from lips which profess belief in the mortality 
of an immortal, in the interruption of an eternity; but no thinker or 
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reasoner of the past ever brought heavier or sharper weapons from 
the armoury of reason for the panoply of truth to bear upon the 
monstrous and murderous absurdities of his day than here has 
Victor Hugo in our own. … As all the pleading and reasoning 
powers of [Newman] in that most memorable argument were 
lavished on the demonstration of the fact or circulation of the 
fallacy that there is no sure refuge from the pelting storm of 
nihilistic dogmatism but in the bosom of a deicidal and 
theophagous Christianity, so here all the reasoning and pleading 
powers of a greater than he girt up to deny and dispute it … the 
direct aim of this book is … to answer those who contend that 
positive nihilism or nihilistic positivism is inevitable if Christianity 
as expressed in its creeds and embodied in its sacraments be 
incredible … 133 
 
Swinburne’s habit of defining Christianity in terms conventionally used to 
stigmatise atheism – nihilism, materialism – reflects his wider strategy of 
appropriating and transvaluing standard tropes within the Victorian literature of 
doubt. Behind this iconoclastic habit of appropriation lies a refusal to be 
‘impaled’ on ‘two long-horned and sharp-edged alternatives’, Christianity and 
nihilism. Morgan’s claim that Swinburne’s myth of Apollo represents an aesthetic 
evasion of an ‘essentially religious problem’ also overlooks the extent to which 
Swinburne sought to destabilise the ‘essential’ distinctions between the aesthetic 
and the religious (often explicitly at the expense of the latter), and to suggest that 
modes of feeling officially arrogated to religion belonged equally or more truly to 
the province of art.  
 
‘A Note of Rapture in the Tune of Life’: Arnold’s Tristram and Iseult, 
Tennyson’s ‘The Last Tournament’ and Swinburne’s Tristram of Lyonesse 
 
It is well known that Swinburne wrote Tristram of Lyonesse partly as a riposte to 
Tennyson’s rendering of the Tristram and Iseult legend in ‘The Last Tournament’ 
(1871) from Idylls of the King, but Swinburne’s critique of Tennyson had a 
special edge in this instance because the ‘The Last Tournament’ was itself quite 
                                                




plainly an indictment of Swinburne’s work.134 By 1871, Tennyson had apparently 
grown sensitive to the fact that he had a poetic rival in Swinburne, and in ‘The 
Last Tournament’, he dramatised his abhorrence for Swinburne’s ‘fleshly’ poetics 
and the materialist philosophy which underpinned them. To the extent that 
Swinburne’s poetry had given credence to the widespread suspicion that ‘atheism’ 
or ‘materialism’ were metonyms for all subversion – moral, political, sexual, and 
artistic – Tennyson’s critique of Swinburne in ‘The Last Tournament’ could not 
be said to falsify the implications of his poetry; if it demonised his work, it did so 
in ways that Swinburne had invited. Yet if Tennyson’s critique had its justice, it 
arguably repressed the most threatening aspect of Swinburne’s vision insofar as 
‘The Last Tournament’ depicted secular materialism as sterile and disenchanting. 
Unsurprisingly, it is on this very ground that Swinburne seeks to rehabilitate his 
own position in Tristram: his epic is a long paean to the higher ‘rapture’ (VIII. 
429) and ‘strenuous joy’ (VIII. 562) to be discovered both in erotic love and in a 
materialist view of the world.135 For Swinburne, this is as much an aesthetic 
contest as it is an argument about the nature of things: he poured vitriol on 
Tennyson’s Idylls because he felt that Tennyson’s Christian moralism had led him 
to produce a mean and jaundiced epic, one which deprived the ancient legends of 
their sublimity. 
‘The Last Tournament’ is arguably the bleakest poem in Tennyson’s richly 
pessimistic Idylls. Although Tennyson denied that the Idylls operated as a strict 
allegory, he conceded that it had a ‘an allegorical or perhaps parabolic drift’, and 
‘The Last Tournament’ is also one of the idylls in which his desire to make the 
legend of Arthur serve as a tragic parable of the Victorian crisis of faith is most 
legible.136 Within Tennyson’s overarching design, the story of Tristram and Iseult 
figures as part of an epidemic of adultery that is both symptom and cause of the 
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moral degeneration of Camelot and of its ultimate unraveling.137 Throughout the 
poem, sexual infidelity both produces and symbolises a universal faithlessness: 
Guinevere’s betrayal of King Arthur and love affair with Lancelot has a 
contagious effect in Camelot, precipitating not only other adulteries, but a fatal 
cynicism toward all abstract ideals and social bonds. While Tennyson’s allegory 
is certainly plangent with generalised forebodings about the foundations of the 
Victorian social order – patriarchy, monarchy, empire – the linguistic and 
imaginative link between sexual and religious ‘infidelity’ is the master trope of 
the poem, enabling the proliferation of other allegorical meanings. In effect, 
Tennyson returns to the concept of ‘infidelity’ in order to recuperate an earlier 
cultural moment when unbelief could be construed as a predominantly moral 
rather than an intellectual matter. As Colin Jager observes in a different context, 
‘fides (faith) carries with it the sense of trust in something or someone. For most 
of Christian history, therefore, an “infidel” was someone in a moral rather than an 
epistemological predicament; he hasn’t so much lost a “belief” as he has violated 
a relationship’.138 The imaginative force of this link is what gives substance to the 
key premise of Tennyson’s poem: knowledge of a sexual infidelity can destroy 
the possibility of faith for an entire society. The supposed co-implication of 
sexual and religious infidelity prompts Arthur to characterise Guinevere’s 
sexuality as if it were a pernicious new ideology, spreading with particular 
virulence among the young: 
 
Her station, taken everywhere for pure, 
She like a new disease, unknown to men, 
Creeps, no precaution used, among the crowd, 
Makes wicked lightnings of her eyes, and saps 
The fealty of our friends, and stirs the pulse 
With devil’s leaps, and poisons half the young. 
    (515-519)139 
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Scepticism is infectious because, as Tennyson emphasises, faith is a 
communal phenomenon. Throughout the poem, belief seems to depend upon 
one’s capacity to believe in the belief of others, and characters doubt or believe by 
example. Thus Lancelot says to Guinevere, ‘I may not well believe that you 
believe’ (1190); conversely, Galahad commits to the quest for the Holy Grail 
because he ‘believe[s] in [the] belief’ of a visionary nun (165).140 Yet if religious 
infidelity is demonised throughout the Idylls, faith is not idealised in any simple 
sense. In ‘The Holy Grail’ (1869) idyll, for instance, Tennyson casts suspicion on 
the legitimacy of mystical faith and on the possibility of miracles; the readiness of 
Percivale and the other knights to trust in the evidence of things unseen leads 
them to ‘follow wandering fires/Lost in the quagmire!’(887-888).141 Similarly, 
‘Pelleas and Ettarre’ (1869) is a dark fairy tale about the perils of credulity: 
Pelleas’s faith in Ettarre’s goodness makes him prey to a violent nihilism when he 
is disillusioned. As a whole, the Idylls dramatises a world in which belief and 
unbelief seem equally ruinous and often indistinguishable. Tennyson has the 
enchantress Vivien proclaim the dogmatic credo, ‘Unfaith in aught is want of 
faith in all’ (387) when she is seeking to beguile Merlin, and while Tennyson 
implicitly condemns such absolutist logic as sinister, the Idylls as a whole 
dramatises its irresistible force: Vivien observes that a ‘speck in garner’d fruit … 
slowly moulders all’ (393-394), and the fact that the rumour of an adultery serves 
to corrupt Camelot as a whole fully authenticates her insight.142  
Tennyson’s conflation of sexual and religious infidelity throughout the 
Idylls produces one of the poem’s most disconcerting effects: through the figure 
of Arthur, the reader is invited to imagine the Christian God as a cuckold. The 
analogy between the passive, pure, much betrayed Arthur and Christ always has 
this underlying strangeness because of the insistence with which Tennyson 
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constructs Guinevere’s sexual infidelity as a kind of metaphysical castration: it 
demystifies Arthur’s apparently otherworldly power and legitimacy in the eyes of 
all. And when Tennyson implies parallels between the decline of faith in Arthur 
among the knights of the Round Table and a dwindling faith in Christianity in the 
Victorian present in the epic’s final idyll, ‘The Passing of Arthur’ (1869), the 
overall effect is even more strange, since the analogy prompts the reader to feel 
the pathos of a God anguished not only by a collective collapse of belief in his 
powers, but by the fact that he has come to doubt himself, and is confronted with 
the prospect of his own demise: 
 
‘O Bedivere, for on my heart hath fall’n 
Confusion, till I know not what I am 
Nor whence I am, nor whether I be King. 
Behold, I seem but King among the dead. 
……… 
And well for thee, saying in my dark hour, 
When all the purport of my throne hath fail’d, 
That quick or dead thou holdest me for King. 
King am I, whatsoever be their cry; 
And one last act of knighthood shalt thou see 
Yet, ere I pass.’ 
  (143-146, 159-164)143 
 
 Yet soon after affirming that he will ‘worship’ Arthur ‘as King’ even after 
he has died, Bedivere’s faith wavers: ‘What record, or what relic of my 
lord/Should be to aftertime, but empty breath/And rumours of a doubt?’ (266-
268).144 And Arthur himself dies with his ‘mind … clouded with a doubt’ 
(426).145 As LaPorte has shown, Tennyson’s allegorical identifications of Arthur 
with Christ are charged with the unsettling implications of the Higher Criticism of 
the Bible; the dubiousness of ‘the weird legend’ (664) of Arthur’s legitimacy 
parallels very Victorian anxieties about the authenticity of the Scriptures and the 
divinity of the historical Christ.146 Yet the uncanny intensity of the Idylls surely 
hinges upon the way Tennyson’s allegory projects these dilemmas onto a 
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Christlike figure who himself suffers the agonies of religious doubt and bears 
witness to his own oblivion. The notion of Christ as the original Christian doubter 
has some Biblical justification in Christ’s utterance on the Cross: ‘My God, my 
God, why hast thou forsaken me?’(Mark 15:34). Tennyson underscores this when 
the dying Arthur echoes Christ’s agony of doubt: ‘My God, thou hast forgotten 
me in my death’ (27).147 While Arthur immediately then affirms his belief in his 
immortality, the epic’s final idyll is a despairing prophecy which draws its poetic 
power from a surreal conflation of ideas: Tennyson implies that the Victorian 
crisis of faith effectively serves to re-crucify Christ, and without possibility of 
Resurrection. (The underlying logic here is that of a pious Christian literalising 
the metaphor of the ‘death’ of God and conflating it with the crucifixion of Christ: 
Christ/God experiences his own ‘death’ by secularisation as a reenactment of 
humanity’s betrayal at the Crucifixion.) 
Catherine Bates Stevenson rightly detects a denunciation of aestheticism 
in general and of Swinburne in particular in the epic’s closing dedication ‘To the 
Queen’ (1873).148 Here Tennyson clarifies that his epic is a Christian allegory of 
the contest between materialism and idealism or ‘Sense at War with Soul’ (37), 
and he positions it as a corrective to ‘wordy trucklings to the transient hour,/And 
fierce or careless looseners of the faith’ (51-52).149 Fierce or careless seems 
especially evocative of Swinburne, whose secularism could be by turns aggressive 
and blasé, and sometimes both at once. In case we miss the allusion, Tennyson 
specifies that he is thinking of atheistic sensualists who make ‘Art with poisonous 
honey stol’n from France’ (56).150 As Stevenson suggests, such lines only seem to 
amplify the critique of Swinburne’s poetry embedded in ‘The Last Tournament’. 
This idyll dramatises an advanced stage in Camelot’s degeneration. At its 
opening, we learn that Pelleas has established a demonic parody of Camelot in the 
North, a Satanic kingdom in which lawlessness is law. Pelleas is himself 
testament to the depraving effects of adultery: once a romantic idealist, the 
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infidelity of a woman he loved has transformed him into an arch infidel, the ‘Red 
Knight’. Tennyson’s construction of the ‘last tournament’ in Camelot as the 
ceremony of ‘dead innocence’ (136) resonates as a nightmare vision of the kind of 
decadent literary culture Swinburne threatens to create, one in which poets strive 
to outdo one another in aestheticising sacrilege.151 Camelot’s knights compete 
over a prize that seems like a decadent objet d’art: the jewels of ‘dead innocence’, 
a ruby carcanet which was discovered around the neck of a foundling baby girl 
who died despite – or because of – Guinevere’s attempt at nurturance (Tristram 
later dreams that the ruby consists of frozen blood [19-30, 411-415]).152 We are 
perhaps meant to infer that Tristram is the most depraved of the knights from the 
fact that he is the victor in this competition. Certainly Tennyson implies that he is 
a kind of decadent anti-Orpheus: Dagonet, the fool, reproaches him for his sensual 
harp-music, quipping that he ‘harpest downward’, as if in an effort to serenade his 
wife down to hell [332, 328]).153 Yet on the whole Tennyson’s Tristram seems 
more fatuous than evil; he is depraved insofar as he is too shallow to hold 
anything sacred, and his harp-playing is not devil’s music so much as folly – he is 
fiddling while Rome burns. Tristram’s carpe diem ethic not only makes him both 
a casual unbeliever and republican (flaunting his ‘wit’, he questions whether 
Arthur is ‘King by courtesy, or King by right’ [340-341]), but renders his love for 
Isolt essentially frivolous; his ‘broken music’ only affirms ‘free love – free field – 
we love but while we may’ (259, 275).154 And Tennyson encourages us to feel 
that in Isolt, Tristram has the lover he deserves: to the degree that she makes her 
‘hate’ for Mark, her husband, the ‘measure’ of her love for Tristram (535-536), 
her love for him is only a species of hatred.155 
  Tennyson constructs Tristram as a debased empiricist, slave to his sense-
impressions and to what he derives from ‘the dirty nurse, Experience’ (317).156 
The fact that Tristram is ‘grown wild beast’ (632) hyperbolises the idea that his 
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empiricism is a self-fulfilling prophecy: he has in fact been reduced to the coarse 
physical realities to which he devotes himself.157 Like a grotesque Wordsworth, 
Tristram likes all the nasty details of unregenerate nature because they confirm his 
own identity: his ‘outer eye’ is ‘keen’ for ‘all that walk’d, or crept, or perch’d, or 
flew’, since they ‘re-collect the shape/Of one that in them sees himself, return’d’ 
(366-370).158 Amid the blighted natural world evoked in ‘The Last Tournament’, 
such naturalism seems at best a philosophy out of season, if not simply absurd; 
who can rejoice in the ‘death-dumb autumn-dripping gloom’ (750)?159 And when 
Tristram is ‘clove … thro’ the brain’ by Mark, Tennyson’s brutal choice of phrase 
enacts an ironic justice: an axe to the brain will disclose to Tristram once and for 
all the brutality of the ‘woodman of the woods’ ethos he so blithely espoused 
(748, 294).160 
  The vehemence of Swinburne’s attacks on Tennyson’s Idylls suggests that 
he was alive to the condemnation of his own work submerged in the poem. In 
Under the Microscope, Swinburne protested that Tennyson had rendered 
Arthurian legend both ludicrous and banal by imposing a crude moralism upon it:  
   
[Tennyson’s] very exaltation of his hero as something more than 
man he has left him in the end something less. The keystone of the 
whole building is removed, and in place of a tragic house of song 
where even sin had all the dignity and beauty that sin can retain, 
and without which it can afford no fit material for tragedy, we find 
an incongruous edifice of tradition and invention where even virtue 
is made to seem either imbecile or vile.161 
 
  Swinburne’s aestheticist argument here is more subtle than a sweeping call 
for the expulsion of moral concerns from art. Swinburne suggests that Tennyson’s 
tendency to draw stark moral distinctions has the paradoxical effect of effacing 
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such distinctions, since it effectively deprives them of their tragic complexity. 
Swinburne’s apparently aesthetic critique of Tennyson is mounted in heavily 
moralistic language: he declares that Tennyson has ‘lowered the note and 
deformed the outline of the Arthurian story’ through its ‘sordid’ and ‘vulgar’ 
representations of sexuality, and particularly deplores Tennyson’s Vivien, whom 
he pronounces ‘the most base and repulsive person ever set forth in serious 
literature’.162 To an extent, Swinburne is simply turning the tables on the laureate 
by claiming that the sexual immorality he finds so troubling is a figment of his 
imagination; Arthurian legend, treated aright, would yield only a lofty and 
romantic model of sexuality. The patrician cast of Swinburne’s aestheticism is 
noticeable here: he effectively accuses Tennyson of peddling hypocritical 
titillation to a ‘vulgar’ reading public, where a more ‘noble’ poet would 
demonstrate a profounder morality by being less narrowly moralistic and allowing 
himself to imagine the ‘dignity and beauty’ of ‘sin’.  Yet this is not simply an 
example of Swinburne’s playful, mock-patrician inversion of values, since it is 
fully in keeping with his conviction that Tennyson’s ‘halfway faith’ and 
commitment to middleclass propriety led him to produce an inhibited and 
disenchanted poetry. That Swinburne was at least partly in earnest in his attack on 
the Idylls is also suggested by his own version of the Tristram and Iseult legend, 
which strives to demonstrate that ‘infidelity’ – both sexual and religious – is in 
fact worthy of the most elevated poetic treatment. 
  Swinburne’s effort to critique Tennyson’s poetics of religious doubt in 
Tristram of Lyonesse is simultaneously an engagement with Arnold’s work. 
Swinburne knew Arnold’s Tristram and Isolt (1852) well. In his 1867 essay on 
Arnold’s poetry, he indicated that it was a poem he loved as a schoolboy.163 Yet 
in 1882, he claimed that he had been inspired to write his own version of the 
legend not only because Tennyson has ‘degraded and debased it’, but because 
Arnold ‘has transformed and recast’ it.164 For most of his career, Swinburne was 
disinclined to attack Arnold directly; the two maintained a friendly acquaintance 
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until Arnold’s death in 1888.165 As his 1867 essay makes clear, Swinburne wanted 
to admire Arnold as an essentially secular thinker who adhered to a heroic ‘creed 
of self-sufficience’, opposed to ‘any revelation of mystic or prophet or saint’.166 
As I have argued, Swinburne develops his own aestheticist position partly out of 
an effort to distinguish Arnold’s allegedly secular poetry from the ‘melodious 
regrets and tortuous returns’ of doubting Christian poets like Tennyson.167 Yet 
Swinburne cannot help but register that Arnold’s poetry manifests some 
reluctance to bid farewell to Christianity: ‘This alone I find profitless and painful 
in his work; his occasional habit of harking back and loitering in mind among 
sepulchers. Nothing is to be made by an artist out of scepticism, half-hearted or 
double-hearted doubts or creeds; nothing out of mere dejection and misty mental 
weather’.168 Swinburne’s aestheticism seeks to counter the equation of unbelief 
with melancholy and disenchantment that Arnold considered as self-evident as 
Tennyson did. Indeed, the fact that Swinburne was apparently irresistibly 
compelled to take up subjects that both Arnold and Tennyson had already made 
their own and inscribed with crisis-of-faith narratives attests to the extent to which 
his aestheticism is an effort to produce a robust alternative to their models of 
religious doubt. While Swinburne often presents his aestheticism as a 
straightforwardly rebellious, oppositional discourse in relation to Christianity, it is 
more truly a convoluted argument with the often ambiguous, median positions 
occupied by figures like Arnold and Tennyson in response to a perceived religious 
crisis.  
Like Tennyson, Arnold offered a remarkably austere rendering of the 
Tristram and Iseult legend in which romantic passion offers meagre gratification 
and is in any case overshadowed by the suffering it causes. As the Victorian critic 
Henry Hewlett remarked, Arnold’s version of the legend is ‘curiously tame and 
cold’; ‘for genuine sympathy with a … distinctively Christian art, [Arnold] seems 
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at this period to have been constitutionally indisposed, the spiritual conviction … 
being as yet wanting’.169 Anthony Harrison makes the same judgment in a modern 
idiom: it is, he says, a ‘poem about spiritual unfulfillment’, and it ‘implicitly 
adopts a stance of secular nihilism’. As Harrison also notes, Arnold wrote 
Tristram around the time he wrote ‘Dover Beach’, and his rendering of the legend 
is pervaded by the same sense of lost religious meaning as the more famous 
poem.170 For Arnold as for Tennyson, the infidelity of the couple symbolises the 
desolation of a world in which Christian belief has failed; where there is no 
religious faith, there can be no fulfillment in romantic love, not even of a fleeting 
kind. Yet where Tennyson makes the link between sexual and religious infidelity 
unmistakable and condemns both in moral terms, Arnold leaves the equivalence 
submerged, and its implications more ambiguous: in his telling, the infidelity 
seems to expose the lovers to an existential void, one which the poem does not 
construct as a moral punishment so much as an authentic confrontation with the 
inimical nature of things. Arnold’s narrator informs us that romantic passion is a 
useless struggle not only against a hostile cosmos, but against an essential 
numbness in ourselves:  
 
 … ‘tis the gradual furnace of the world, 
In whose hot air our spirits are upcurl’d 
Until they crumble, or else grow like steel - 
Which kills us in the bloom, the youth, the spring – 
Which leaves the fierce necessity to feel, 
But takes away the power – this can avail, 
By drying up our joy in everything 
To make our former pleasures all seem stale.  
This, or some tyrannous single thought, some fit  
Of passion, which subdues our souls to it 
Till for its sake alone we live and move 
                                                    (120-129)171 
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  As Harrison points out, Arnold’s Tristram is extraordinarily resistant to 
the legend’s status as a great tragic love story: ‘Love, variously idealised in 
medievalist discourse, is here denounced and repudiated altogether, presumably in 
favour of an emotional detachment from experience, a philosophical approach to 
life that Arnold promotes everywhere in his major poems and prose works’.172 
Indeed, Arnold goes so far as to construct erotic passion as an unnatural 
affliction, disturbing the stoic equilibrium which is the more proper condition of 
human beings; it is ‘a diseas’d unrest,/And an unnatural overheat at best’ (134-
135).173 And while erotic love is illusory and ephemeral, the suffering it causes is 
real and abiding: ‘All the spring-time of his love/ Is already gone and past,/And 
instead thereof is seen/Its winter, which endureth still’(173-176).174 As can be felt 
in these lines, the poem is preoccupied with retrospection, particularly with the 
capacity of regret to ruin experience ex post facto: Arnold dwells upon the figure 
of Tristram in his ‘waning time’ (70) rather than upon the original passion 
between the lovers, and thereby creates the impression that their love was always 
blighted by its ultimate disillusionment.175 Tristram’s illness, which Arnold also 
dwells upon, seems to attest not only to the etiolating effects of passion, but to a 
cosmos which is waning for lack of a purpose. The present of the poem takes 
place in a landscape leached of heat, energy and colour: Arnold insistently calls 
attention to the pallor of the lovers, and accumulates images of blanched lips, 
wasted fingers, haggard air, grey seas, sunken reefs, and feeble winds. The 
passion of the lovers actually seems to have accelerated a process of cosmic 
entropy; for instance, Iseult’s desire for Tristram ‘consume[s] her beauty like a 
flame,/And dim[s] it like the desert-blast’ (134-135).176 Yet there is scant pathos 
in love’s transience here; the narrator avers, ‘And yet, I swear, it angers me to 
see/How this fool passion gulls men potently’ (133-134).177 Arnold further 
restricts the pathos of the lovers’ predicament by channeling readerly sympathy 
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toward the ‘other’ Iseult – the Brittanic Iseult of the White Hands, Tristram’s 
betrayed wife. If, as Hewlett felt, Arnold’s poem seems devoid of ‘spiritual 
conviction’, it is not devoid of Christian sentiment. The key innovation that 
Arnold introduces to the legend is to make the Brittanic Iseult a central 
protagonist, and to suggest that her fidelity, both marital and religious (she is the 
‘sweetest Christian soul alive’ [54]), has greater emotional depth than the illicit 
passion.178 In effect, Arnold bestows the lustre of the myth’s traditional liebestod 
motif upon the figure of the longsuffering wife, whose pious ministrations to 
Tristram on his deathbed are exalted as the highest consummation of love. 
  Swinburne perceived that the prominence of religious doubt and Christian 
scepticism in Victorian poetry effectively left crucial parts of the religious 
tradition free for him to appropriate in secular terms. Indeed, Swinburne’s poetry 
everywhere avows that it can achieve by secular means precisely those varieties 
of religious experience – enthusiasm, rapture, inspiration, ‘large ecstasy’, ‘full 
souled’ reverence (VIII. 425-427) – that Arnold, Browning, Clough and Tennyson 
at once regarded with suspicion and lamented that the modern Christian found 
difficult to attain.179 (While it might seem obvious that Swinburne regarded such 
elevated experiences as part of the inheritance of a Romantic literary tradition and 
therefore as not exclusively religious, he did not in fact take this perception for 
granted; as I have been emphasising, the art-for-art’s-sake positions he adopts in 
his critical prose typically emerge as an part of an effort to assert the essentially 
secular nature of a literary tradition that was conventionally conflated with 
religion.) Tristram exemplifies the paradoxical effects of Swinburne’s desire to 
lay claim to what were often considered the affective prerogatives of religious 
faith, now apparently diminished or lost: Arnold and Tennyson’s pessimistic 
renderings of the same legend inspire Swinburne to write rapturously of the 
emotional fulfillment to be found in, as McSweeney puts it, ‘a wholly naturalistic 
vision of human existence’.180 Rosenberg registers some part of this paradoxical 
effect when he notes with surprise that the Tristram myth leads Swinburne to 
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produce ‘his healthiest poetry’.181 By this, Rosenberg means that Swinburne 
refrains from the more lurid sadomasochism that characterised his earlier 
depictions of erotic love. Swinburne’s vision of love actually remains 
sadomasochistic in Tristram insofar as he continues to emphasise the 
intertwinement of pleasure and pain, though Rosenberg is right to indicate that 
Swinburne here renders this theme more palatable by filtering out his fascination 
with cruelty. Swinburne’s restraint on this score is part of a larger polemical 
mission: his Tristram aims to demonstrate that a ‘wholly naturalistic vision of 
human existence’, as well as frank eroticism, are compatible with a traditionally 
sentimental and exalted conception of romantic love. In other words, the fact that 
both Tennyson and Arnold’s intimations of religion’s decline led them to imagine 
the debasement of romantic love ironically allows Swinburne to position himself 
as the staunch upholder of the courtly love tradition. Swinburne certainly 
savoured this irony; he believed that, in writing against Victorian religious and 
sexual proprieties, he was in fact being more faithful to the spirit of the Arthurian 
tradition than Tennyson or Arnold had been: ‘I want my version to be based on 
notorious facts, and to be acceptable for its orthodoxy and fidelity to the dear old 
story (and, one might add, its antagonism to current orthodoxies)’.182 If Tennyson 
and Arnold might both be said to have turned the Tristram legend into parables of 
spiritual despair at the expense of its more sentimental and idealistic possibilities 
as a love story, Swinburne seems to lose sight of the story’s traditional status as a 
tragedy in his effort to render it as a grand affirmation of the plenitude of erotic 
love and of a wholly naturalistic apprehension of existence. Joy, rapture, and 
gladness – all key words in his poem – predominate over any sense of anguish or 
doom, and Swinburne takes the liebestod motif as means of proposing an 
imaginative equivalence between accepting a radically deterministic naturalism 
and yielding to a compulsive, fatal love affair. 
  In 1893, Myers suggested that Swinburne’s Tristram was an effort to 
rewrite Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura for the late nineteenth century: analysing 
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the Lucretian echoes in Swinburne’s work, he remarks that Tristram constitutes 
‘the strict materialist synthesis clad in its most splendid colouring, and its most 
inexorable scorn of men’. (As ‘scorn’ here implies, Myers was sceptical of 
Swinburne’s efforts to suggest that one can rejoice in a non-theistic nature.)183 As 
McSweeney notes, the long invocation to ‘Love’ in the poem’s prologue clearly 
recalls Lucretius’s long invocation to Aphrodite in the first book of De Rerum 
Natura.184 More generally, Swinburne’s epic parallels Lucretius’s in its persistent 
identification of materialism with erotic love, as well as in its efforts to assure us 
that death is nothing to fear. I also suspect that Swinburne had Lucretius in mind 
when composing Tristram because he tended to imagine his rivalry with 
Tennyson as part of a transhistorical literary agon: he identified Tennyson with 
Virgil because they both composed their epics under the patronage of a sovereign, 
while implicitly identifying himself with a transgressive and anti-religious 
tradition of epoists which consisted of Lucretius and Shelley.185 (Swinburne’s 
contempt for Tennyson’s Idylls was partly a republican contempt for Tennyson’s 
office as laureate: he dubbed the poem the Morte d’Albert.)186 
Swinburne accepts the symbolic nexus between sexual and religious 
infidelity proposed in different ways by Arnold and Tennyson in their 
constructions of the Tristram legend, but as one might expect, he departs from his 
predecessors by glorifying the twofold infidelity and granting the lovers the epic 
stature which he felt they had been wrongly denied in Arnold and Tennyson’s 
versions. Swinburne does not simply suggest, as Arnold did, that the illicit 
passion exposes the lovers to ultimate cosmic truths, but that it illuminates for 
them the essential desirability of those truths.187 In this, Swinburne’s Tristram 
                                                
183 Myers, ‘Modern Poets’, 97-98. 
184 McSweeney, Romantic Naturalists, 165. 
185 Swinburne, A Study of Ben Jonson (London: Chatto & Windus, 1889), 24. Swinburne 
also links Shelley and Lucretius in his poem ‘For the Feast of Giordano Bruno’ (1878), in 
which Bruno and the two poets are celebrated as a freethinking trinity. See Swinburne, 
CPWI, 344-345. 
186 Swinburne, Swinburne Replies, 56. 
187 Laura Cooner Lambdin and Robert Thomas Lambdin note that the suggestion that the 
infidelity integrates the lovers with nature has no basis in the Arthurian tradition; it is 
‘ultimately Swinburne’s private mythology’. See their Camelot in the Nineteenth 
128 
 
attempts on a much grander scale what ‘By the North Sea’ attempted: to posit an 
atheistic sublime, or to suggest that a post-Darwinian apprehension of nature only 
demands more daring and complicated affirmations of nature’s grandeur. Like 
that poem, Tristram suggests that a sufficiently passionate surrender to ‘fate’ – 
Swinburne’s word for the radically deterministic materialism which undergirds 
the poem – is heroism of a kind; a heightened receptivity to the inexorable affords 
a blissful sense of freedom. The twist of logic here – one which is also key to 
Pater’s work, especially the ‘Conclusion’ to the Renaissance – is at least partly 
self-conscious: the mythic fatedness of the two lovers is resonant for Swinburne 
partly because it parallels the predicament of a materialist poet, faced with the 
task of making poetically and emotionally true what he takes to be inexorably 
true. Swinburne’s attraction to a radically deterministic materialism always 
created an incipient tension in his desire to posit secularism as the basis of human 
freedom and autonomy. On the one hand, Swinburne self-consciously goes one 
better than Protagoras’s ‘man is the measure of things’ and declares, ‘Glory to 
Man in the highest! For Man is the master of things’.188 On the other, he asserts 
that ‘we must submit … [and] live as the sons, not as the lords of nature’. This 
latter phrase is taken from Swinburne’s essay on Arnold, and is framed as a 
critique of Arnold’s excessively pessimistic stoicism, which prompts Swinburne 
to delineate his understanding of the scope for human self-determination: 
 
Man’s welfare – his highest sphere and state of spiritual well-doing 
and well-being – this indeed is his true aim; but not this is the aim 
of nature; the world has other work than this to do; and we, not it, 
must submit; submit, not by ceasing to attempt and achieve the 
best we can, but by ceasing to expect subservience to our ends 
from all forces and influences of existing things; it is no reason or 
excuse for living basely instead of nobly … 189 
 
In Tristram, however, Swinburne jettisons the concern with free will that 
was essential to his political secularism in Songs Before Sunrise and embroiders 
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upon the amor fati theme which is often given a self-consciously blithe treatment 
in his minor carpe diem poems. Tristram, in contrast, grants the theme full epic 
seriousness, and makes it the centre of a larger philosophical vision. Critics have 
sometimes doubted that Tristram is in fact an epic because its impetus is more 
lyrical than dramatic, though Harrison has demonstrated that the poem fulfills the 
traditional requirements of epic form.190 Swinburne avoids mythological 
machinery and simply calls upon ‘Love’ in the traditional epic invocation to the 
Muse in the poem’s prelude, though the full implications of this choice are only 
clarified in the poem’s final canto, ‘The Sailing of the Swan’. The opening 
twenty-two couplets of this canto repeat the rhymes of the opening twenty-two 
couplets of the ‘Prelude’, though now Swinburne hymns ‘Fate’, with the obvious 
implication that ‘Love’ and ‘Fate’ stand in chiastic relation to each other: to be 
passionately in love is to be awakened to cosmic realities, and to be awakened to 
such realities is to be passionately in love. In other words, Swinburne suggests 
that the fated love teaches Tristram and Iseult the desirability of a deterministic 
naturalism. Just as Iseult comes to feel that her love for Tristram is profound 
because it is not freely chosen (V.89-90), natural law elicits Tristram’s love 
because it makes him aware of his own sublime impotence:191 
   
  O strong sun! O sea! 
I bid not you, divine things! Comfort me, 
I stand not up to match you in your sight – 
Who hath said ye have mercy toward us, ye who have might? 
And though ye had mercy, I think I should not pray 
That ye should change your counsel or your way 
To make our life less bitter: if such power 
Be given the stars on one deciduous hour, 
And such might be in the planets to destroy 
Grief and rebuild, and break and build up joy, 
What man would stretch forth hand on them to make 
Fate mutable, God foolish, for his sake? 
For if in life or death be aught of trust, 
And if some unseen just God or unjust 
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Put soul into the body of natural things 
And in time’s pauseless feet and worldwide wings 
Some spirit of impulse and some sense of will 
That steers them through the seas of good and ill 
To some incognizable and actual end 
Be it just or unjust, foe to man or friend 
How should we make the stable spirit to swerve, 
How teach the strong soul of the world to serve, 
The imperious will in time and sense in space 
That gives man life turn back to give man place – 
The conscious law lose conscience of its way, 
The rule and reason fail from night and day, 
The streams flow backward toward whence the springs began, 
That less of thirst might sear the lips of man? 
Let that which is be, and sure strength stand sure, 
And evil or good and death or life endure 
Not alterable and rootless, but indeed 
A very stem born of a very seed. 
   (III.120-151)192 
  The radicalism of Swinburne’s determinism here is precisely measured 
when he has Tristram ask: ‘How should we make the stable spirit to swerve …?’ 
Lucretius famously tells us that Epicurus allows for contingency and thus free will 
within his materialistic system through his concept of the ‘swerve’ or clinamen: 
‘While atoms move by their own weight straight down/Through the empty void, 
at quite uncertain times/And uncertain places they swerve slightly from their 
course’ (1.217-219).193 Not only does Swinburne rule out such a possibility within 
the materialistic universe of Tristram, he strives to make even the desire for such 
a possibility appear mean-minded or nonsensical; who could ask for anything 
more than to be subject to natural processes? Here as throughout the poem, 
Swinburne insists that the concept of an anthropocentric cosmos is untenable even 
as a desire: the way things are is more truly desirable than the world of human 
wish fulfillment we putatively desire. Thus Tristram’s is a paradoxical prayer: in 
effect, he beseeches the cosmos to maintain its indifference, and to fulfill his 
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desires by denying them. As the passage quoted above suggests, philosophical 
arguments are often elaborated in single sentences which are strung across more 
than a dozen lines of verse in Tristram. By this, Swinburne seeks to give an 
irrefutable force to his logic: one can no more meaningfully wish to unravel the 
chains of cause and effect in nature, Swinburne implies, than one can 
meaningfully isolate any one line or couplet in his branching hypotaxis as an 
autonomous unit of meaning. As McGann points out, Swinburne’s ‘delight in 
suspending the grammatical completion of a statement’ is observable throughout 
Tristram, and often works to overwhelm the reader, who is discouraged from 
following closely the chain of logic by which his or her assent to a final idea or 
impression is apparently secured.194 In this case, the chain of reasoning resolves 
itself into the tautological injunction ‘let that which is be’ – an aphorism, 
reminiscent of Pope’s ‘Whatever is, is Right’ (294), which compacts the 
passage’s effort to dissolve ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and to conflate naturalistic 
determinism (i.e., events arise from their antecedents) with a more mystical 
fatalism, which unconditionally embraces whatever is as something inevitable and 
beautiful.195  
  Swimming is one of Swinburne’s favourite tropes for the freedom to be 
discovered through succumbing to one’s ‘fate’ as a constituent of natural 
processes, and in Tristram, he deploys it twice in order to underscore this 
freedom-within-determinism paradox. Julia Saville has recently written of 
Swinburne’s ‘immersive’ imagination and his use of swimming as a paradoxical 
trope which encodes both the struggle for political and religious freedom and a 
blissful submission to ‘fate’, and while she notes that this trope marks a 
complication in Swinburne’s thinking, she downplays the extent to which the 
trope enables Swinburne to perform a sleight-of-hand: liberation from the 
bondage of Christianity and authoritarian political systems is to be sought because 
we are then able to ‘choose’ the better bondage of ‘fate’ or natural processes, 
though of course Swinburne conceives of this latter bondage as ineluctable 
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anyway, conditioning all regardless of what we believe.196 Swimming is a useful 
trope for this paradox since it can be imagined as at once active and passive, and 
it enables Swinburne to suggest that immersion in natural process, while 
ineluctable, can nevertheless be made heroic if one plunges into its implications 
without ambivalence. This double logic is powerfully at work in the gender codes 
evoked in the depiction of Tristram’s second swim: the swim is at once a 
submissive, erotic yielding to a maternal principle (‘he sprang,/As toward 
mother’s where his head might rest/Her child rejoicing, toward the strong sea’s 
breast’ [VIII, 478-480]), and an assertion of martial masculinity, contending 
dauntlessly against the elements (‘strong-spirited for the chance and cheer of 
fight,/[He] donned his arms again, and felt the might/In all his limbs rejoice for 
strength …’ [VIII, 529-531]).197 Here ecstatic submission to the laws of nature 
seems to involve an active struggle against those laws. Elsewhere Swinburne 
apparently flinches from the fatalistic vision the poem generally endorses, and 
suggests that natural law is ‘lord and God’ of all things except ‘the soul of man’ – 
though even here he asserts the priority of that law, which has been ‘lord and God 
since body and soul began’ (IX.11-12).198 And on the whole, Swinburne seems so 
eager to present Tristram and Iseult’s conversion away from Christianity and 
toward a kind of pagan naturalism as a series of rapturous epiphanies that he is 
willing to check his usual desire to characterise rebellion against Christianity in 
terms of heroic agency. The word ‘rapture’ appears eleven times in the poem, and 
is often used as means of conveying the irresistible, intuitive force of a naturalistic 
vision of humanity as opposed to Christian one, with the additional implication 
that Tristram and Iseult experience through an unconditional receptivity to nature 
the overmastering joy that Christianity promises in transcendental terms.   
  As the two swimming set-pieces suggest, Swinburne’s Tristram seeks to 
affirm the profundity of pleasure – not simply sexual pleasure, but the diverse 
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pleasures of embodiment.199 In Tristram, physical pleasure is never trivial, nor is 
it merely self-indulgent or private; it attests to the porousness of the boundaries of 
the self, and is figured as the basis for a properly reverent dissolution the self 
within both romantic love and the natural world. By awakening one another to 
erotic pleasure, Tristram and Iseult become receptive to cosmic wisdom; they 
recognise that their highest purpose is to be ‘a note of rapture in the tune of life’ 
(VIII. 506).200 (As Saville has argued, Tristram attests powerfully to the influence 
of Whitman upon Swinburne.)201 The natural world often has a paradisiacal 
radiance in Tristram, and Swinburne casts his lovers as a pair of primordial 
innocents whose wonder at each other and at the splendours of nature inevitably 
calls to mind Adam and Eve. Swinburne had already attempted to write a 
secularist version of the Biblical creation story in ‘Genesis’ (1871), but as is the 
case with most of the poems in Songs Before Sunrise, that poem has no 
protagonists and exalts only an abstract humanity, whereas Tristram attempts to 
give the same cosmic vision the contours of a love story. Swinburne’s unstinting 
idealisation of Tristram and Iseult – particularly his emphasis upon the ‘sinless’ 
(IX. 548) nature of their infidelity – strives to propose a countermyth not simply 
to the Fall, but to the melancholic crisis-of-faith narratives Tennyson and Arnold 
embedded in the Tristram legend.202 Tennyson and Arnold quite literally stripped 
the legend of its enchantment: Arnold does not really dwell upon the magic 
philtre that causes Tristram and Iseult to fall in love (104, 136-150), while 
Tennyson omits this traditional element altogether in order to underscore the 
moral culpability of the lovers.203 Ironically, Swinburne’s effort to demonstrate 
that a purely naturalistic understanding of life is sufficiently rich in enchantment 
depends upon the supernatural element – the magic potion – which Arnold and 
Tennyson suppress in their efforts to show the barrenness of a world without faith. 
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   The magic potion is crucial to Swinburne because it enables him to 
imagine the sexual passion between the lovers as at once entirely uninhibited and 
entirely innocent. It simultaneously allows him to construct their religious 
infidelity as an inevitable outgrowth of their passion, and, by extension, to 
construct their conversion to a kind of secular naturalism as an emotional and 
embodied insight, analogous to a rapturous religious conversion, rather than as a 
form of disillusionment wrought by intellectual analysis. As McSweeney argues, 
Swinburne presents Tristram and Iseult’s love affair as a force which impels them 
beyond Christian frameworks and toward an inchoate recognition that they are 
subject only to natural laws.204 This process begins even before the lovers drink 
the love potion: conversation with Tristram prompts Iseult to wonder why God 
seems so cruel by human standards (I.403-413), and this prepares the ground for 
Iseult’s anti-theistic monologue in the ‘Iseult at Tintagel’ canto.205 Swinburne 
initially casts Iseult as a rather sweet infidel, more perplexed than rebellious; she 
begins by expressing guilt at the fact that her love for God pales by comparison to 
her love for Tristram. Nevertheless, her rhetoric soon rises to defiance, and she 
becomes a more familiar Swinburnean type, a heroic anti-theist (or, to use the 
more correct term, a misotheist): Iseult proclaims that her ‘transgression’ is 
‘perfect’, and dares God to ‘slay’ her (V. 83-89).206 Nonetheless, Iseult remains a 
remarkably sunny figure even at this moment, since her rebellion inheres in her 
conviction that she has been not only more happy on earth with Tristram than she 
could ever be in heaven, but that her happiness was so intense, and so contingent 
upon her mortality, as to surpass anything an immortal God could fathom. In 
proclaiming herself more ‘happy’ and ‘glad’ than ‘God above’ (V.148), 
Swinburne’s Iseult makes a more radical claim than any of the jealous contention 
against God Swinburne ascribes to Sappho in ‘Anactoria’, superficially the more 
scandalous poem.207 Iseult sees no point in abasing herself before God because he 
cannot or will not give her what she wants, which is not immortality but more 
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mortal life; she wishes only to be ‘clothed with [her] mortal body’ so that she may 
feel ‘love’s arms’, and to be given the chance to re-experience ‘one amorous hour 
of mingling breath’ (V. 230-242).208  
  Iseult’s lusty affirmation of ‘Life palpable, compact of blood and 
breath,/Visible, present, naked, very death’ because she cannot ‘touch the time to 
be’ nor ‘strain insensual eyes toward increate light’ amplifies an argument 
Swinburne embeds in the poem’s prelude (V. 214-223).209 There Swinburne 
critiques the Christian idealisation of transcendent, eternal love as superior to 
temporal love and suggests that such an ideal produces an enervated, melancholy 
poetics: to transcend nature, embodiment and change would be to inhabit a ‘pale 
poor world too deep for sun or star’, populated by ‘forms without form, a piteous 
people and blind,/Men and no men’ with ‘featureless heads discrowned of hate 
and love’ (Prelude, 157-183).210 Swinburne’s imagery strives to convince us that 
eternal, spiritual love is an oxymoronic ideal; to pine for the eternal or spiritual is 
to conjure vague fantasies of death-in-life. The ostensible target of the critique 
here is Dante, whose poetry attempts the perverse feat of illuminating ‘all time for 
all men with the shadow of it’ (Prelude, 188).211 Yet Swinburne’s image of ‘men 
and no men’ recalls his jeering assessment of Tennyson’s emasculated image of 
Arthur in the Idylls: ‘[Tennyson’s] very exaltation of his hero as something more 
than man he has left him in the end something less’. Swinburne’s images of an 
anemic otherworld also recall his critique of Arnold’s ‘fleshless’ poetics, and 
reflect his desire to idealise by contrast a thoroughly temporal, eroticised and 
earthly model of love. In Swinburne’s rendering of the legend, the desire for 
transcendence is not merely devitalising but corrupting. Countering Arnold’s 
portrayal of the love triangle, in which the pious Iseult of the White Hands 
represents a higher, more virtuous ideal of love than the adulterous couple, 
Swinburne casts the same character as at an once abject and villainous figure: her 
appeals to a vengeful Old Testament God are depicted as the symptoms of a 
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thwarted erotic desire which seeks release in violent fantasy.212 In other words, 
Swinburne’s version of the story schematically aligns sexual and religious 
infidelity on the one hand, and unrequited love and Christian faith on the other: 
where sexual fulfillment makes happy pagans of Tristram and Iseult – they both 
begin to find ‘God’ in the sun and the sea, and to reject the Christian God as at 
once too punitive and too abstract – sexual frustration makes a morbid fanatic of 
Iseult of the White Hands. 
  For the sake of simplicity I have thus far followed Myers’s 
characterisation of Tristram as a poem informed by a Lucretian materialism, as 
well as McSweeney’s assessment of the poem as a celebration of a ‘wholly 
naturalistic’ conception of life.213 Yet Rikky Rooksby is right to question whether 
‘materialism’ is in fact an adequate term for Swinburne’s vision in Tristram; as he 
writes, the poem ‘goes beyond materialism without violating Swinburne’s 
implacable anti-theism and his general agnosticism’.214 The poem’s materialism 
often seems slanted toward a form of panpsychism, the view that some degree of 
sentience or capacity for experience pervades all things, both animate and 
inanimate. While the poem maintains some distance from Tristram and Iseult’s 
pantheistic impulse to designate nature ‘God’, it certainly endorses their 
perception that even the rocks are instinct with a sensual proto-awareness: 
  
For all the radiant rocks from depth to height 
Burn with vast bloom of glories blossom-bright 
As though the sun’s own hand had thrilled them through with light 
And stained them through with splendor; yet from thence 
Such awe strikes rapture through the spirit of sense 
From all the inaccessible sea-wall’s girth, 
That exultation, bright at heart as mirth, 
Bows deeper down before the beauty of earth 
Than fear may bow down ever … 
The splendour of the moist rock’s fervent light, 
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Fresh as from dew of birth when time was born 
Out of the world-conceiving womb of morn. 
     (VIII. 239-265)215 
 
 As Maxwell has argued, such personifications reach beyond the 
conventions of the pathetic fallacy and suggest that ‘feeling resides both in nature 
and its beholders and they are thus co-involved and reinforce each other’.216 And 
more boldly still, Swinburne asserts that this ‘feeling’ ought to be defined as joy: 
the burden of the lines quoted above is not simply that nature, justly appraised, is 
more beautiful than fearful, but the rather astonishing claim that ‘Joy’ is ‘the 
gospel graven of life’s most heavenly law’ (VIII. 230-231).217 In other words, 
Swinburne’s efforts to celebrate life in its immanence, the more-than-enough 
beauty of the world, lead him to suggest that all matter participates in a kind of 
cosmic joie de vivre. The poem’s panpsychist vision sweetens its stern rejections 
of anthropocentrism, as well as its insistence that we submit to ‘fate’ or natural 
law: while the universe may have no regard for our desires, it nevertheless 
pulsates with something akin to those desires. This suggestion pulls against 
Swinburne’s critiques of Christian anthropomorphism in poems like ‘By the 
North Sea’ and recuperates a Romantic perception of a benevolent intelligence at 
work in nature, a view which Swinburne elsewhere often seeks to dismantle.218 In 
other words, Swinburne’s wish to affirm the plenitude of earthly, mortal life leads 
him in two potentially contradictory directions – on the one hand, he critiques the 
religious desire for an anthropocentric nature; on the other, he affirms that the 
earth is so fully our home that it is replete with a human-like sentience. In the case 
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of Tristram, which articulates both perspectives, the incipient tension seems at 
least partly an effect of Swinburne’s desire to make Tennyson and Arnold’s 
images of a spiritually defunct nature in their ‘Tristram’ poems seem myopic. In 
his version of the story, Swinburne does not entirely ignore the problem of 
suffering, nor expunge a sense of the tragic, but he clearly presses his 
sadomasochistic imagination into the service of a grand cosmic ‘yes’: although 
Tristram and Iseult are traditionally imagined as sorrowful figures, his lovers 
experience only ‘honeyhearted pain’ (‘Prelude’, 204), or ‘rapturous pulse[s] of 
pain’ (III. 315) – that is, pain which gives texture to their pleasure and makes their 
endorsements of life a form of heroism.219 
  Stephanie Kuduk Weiner has argued that Swinburne’s late nature poems 
abide by empiricist precepts more rigorously than has been recognised, and by 
extension, that he is more of an Enlightenment thinker than critics who simply 
define him as a late Romantic have acknowledged.220 Weiner rightly emphasises 
that such poems celebrate the ‘scope of sense experience rather than its limits’ 
and often explicitly repudiate transcendental aspirations, though I would suggest 
that Swinburne’s anti-transcendentalist position emerges less from a firm sense of 
the ‘inaccessibility of extrasensory knowledge’ than from a belief that such 
aspirations constitute a betrayal of life in this world, to borrow Taylor’s phrase.221 
The panpsychist tendencies of Tristram suggest that Swinburne was more 
concerned with advancing beyond the identification of the secular with 
disenchantment and loss than he was with observing the strictures of empiricism. 
Indeed, Swinburne’s aestheticist position can be understood as an attempt to 
obviate the possibility that a commitment to secularism would mean that he would 
have to curtail his Romantic sense of the visionary powers of the imagination and 
to occupy himself only with the world as it can be known by science. By 
extension, his assertions that art must be liberated from religious imperatives in 
order to fulfill its potential should also be understood in part as efforts to refute 
the idea that, in renouncing religion, he was renouncing poetry’s magic ingredient 
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– an idea that must have been difficult to repress entirely in a culture which took 
the filiation between religion and poetry as axiomatic, even if the definitions of 
‘poetry’ and ‘religion’ in Victorian understandings of this equation were fluid.222 
(Indeed, devout critics often suggested that the example of Swinburne actually 
proved the inextricable relationship between poetry and religion because his 
poems were reliant upon the religious feelings that they apparently denigrated.)223   
  Although the poems in Songs Before Sunrise often propose that secularism 
demands a purification and reconstruction of our ways of understanding, 
Swinburne does not seem to have thought that it entailed any radical 
reconsideration of aesthetics. He was on the whole insouciant about the extent to 
which a secularised art could be created out of the received literary tradition: 
apparently religiously-inflected paradigms such as the sublime or courtly love did 
not need to be abandoned or painstakingly secularised, but simply liberated into 
their true secular significance. In other words, Swinburne’s aestheticism was a 
means of asserting that secular art does not need to relinquish anything apparently 
religious that it happens to find beautiful: his poems freely expropriate ostensibly 
religious forms, tropes and concepts as elements in a fully useable literary 
tradition and thereby evade having to acknowledge any schism or loss. For 
instance, the word ‘spirit’ appears fifty-five times in Tristram, and while 
Swinburne is generally eager to specify that ‘spirit’ is indistinct from ‘sense’ or 
‘body’ so that the effect is to suggest only a poeticised empiricism or materialism, 
he clearly finds the word indispensable to his effort to ennoble the lovers’ 
infidelity.224 If Swinburne’s retention of such words and concepts attests to an 
underlying ambivalence in his efforts to marry art and secularism, or to a 
lingering sense of the temptations of the religious, it is an ambivalence that his 
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poetry also strenuously denies. Tristram, with its unqualified celebrations of the 
joys of this world, is the epitome of Swinburne’s counter-elegiac secularism: it 
strives to imagine the secular as an intoxicating love affair, and thereby to 
dissolve the identification of poetry with religious doubt, intellectual 
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Chapter Three: ‘A Secular, a Rebellious Spirit Often Betrays Itself’: Pater’s 
Early Aestheticism  
 
‘Without the Sound of Axe or Hammer’: Pater’s ‘Diaphaneitè’, Carlyle’s 
The French Revolution, and Secular Aesthetics 
 
Pater’s desire to explore what a purely secular aesthetics might entail is 
submerged in ‘Diaphaneitè’ (1864), his earliest extant essay.1 Pater delivered this 
essay, which was never published in his lifetime, to the Old Mortality society at 
Oxford, an exclusive student discussion club known for its liberal sensibility. As 
Monsman explains in his monograph on the club, its membership was on the 
whole ‘fiercely dedicated to social amelioration, liberty of thought, and the 
ultimate validity of human reason in things secular and sacred’.2 Nonetheless, 
even oblique expressions of atheism could fissure the collective commitment to 
the free play of ideas. In February 1864, a few weeks after he had been elected a 
Fellow of Brasenose, Pater presented an essay on Fichte’s ideal of self-culture 
that caused some of the more devout members of his audience to regard him as 
‘thoroughly infidel’.3 While no copy of the essay has been discovered, it is clear 
from the diary of S. R. Brooke, a fellow club member, that the source of the 
controversy was Pater’s attempt to finesse the doctrine of immortality into a 
secular aesthetic ideal. What particularly incensed Brooke was Pater’s attempt to 
make unbelief sound ennobling and beautiful: 
 
Pater’s Essay this evening was one of the most thoroughly infidel 
productions it has ever been our pain to listen to. The writer in fact 
made no secret of his ideas. He advocated ‘self-culture’ upon 
eminently selfish principles, and for what to us appeared, a most 
unsatisfactory end. To sit in one’s study all [day?] and contemplate 
the beautiful is not useful even if it is an agreeable occupation; but 
if it were both useful and agreeable, it would hardly be worthwhile 
to spend so much trouble upon what may at any time be wrested 
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from you. If a future existence is to be disbelieved the motto ‘Let 
us eat and drink for to-morrow we die’, is infinitely preferable.4 
 
 Brooke’s conviction that the possible meanings of disbelief in immortality 
are exhausted by a ‘motto’ from St. Paul – the passage in Corinthians to which he 
alludes reads in full,  ‘If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at 
Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? Let us eat and drink; for 
tomorrow we die’ [1 Corinthians 15:32] – anticipates a strong current of 
negativity in the reception of The Renaissance. Like Brooke, many critics would 
interpret Pater’s aestheticism as prettified atheism, or, in Margaret Oliphant’s 
phrase, ‘elegant materialism’.5 In her astringent review of The Renaissance, 
Oliphant reached after the same motto and dismissed the book as ‘rococo from 
beginning to the end, – in its new version of that coarse old refrain of the 
Epicureans’ gay despair, “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die”’.6 Oliphant 
was at once indignant at Pater’s atheistic interpretations of art and culture, which 
she condemned as tendentious and fanciful, and anxious to point out the banality 
of such interpretations – The Renaissance just embroiders pretentiously around a 
worn theme. Brooke also suggests that Pater’s iconoclasm is a symptom of his 
mediocrity: ‘If a man cannot make an original remark, if he cannot cut out a new 
figure he will hack and carve the old ones. Pater seldom makes what may be 
considered a really original remark, but he is fond of criticising original remarks, 
and drawing fine distinctions between identical conceptions’.7 The ‘fine 
distinction’ that Brooke particularly deplores is Pater’s phrase ‘subjective 
immortality’, which Brooke understands as a euphemism for ‘annihilation’ 
without an afterlife. As Monsman notes, Brook almost certainly caught Pater’s 
meaning and was probably right to understand ‘subjective immortality’ (a 
Comtean phrase) as something of a mystification; nonetheless, Brooke’s hostility 
to Pater’s attempt to find a beautiful nuance within a materialistic view of death 
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prefigures common Victorian responses to Pater’s aestheticism.8 Similarly, both 
Brooke and Oliphant complain that Pater’s ‘infidelism’ is somehow at once 
flagrant and surreptitious, both exposed and masked by the fineness of his style. 
For Brooke, Pater’s ‘fine distinctions’ ‘hack’ and ‘carve’ at pieties, while 
Oliphant is keen to demystify the ‘curious trick’ by which Pater lures readers into 
finding anti-Christian meanings in Botticelli’s paintings, even as she declares that 
she is ‘not afraid’ that Pater’s ‘elegant materialism will strike many minds as a 
desirable view of life’.9 For Brooke and Oliphant, Pater’s aestheticism is a mask 
discourse that aims to reduce human life to its starkest elements; Pater’s fixations 
on beauty, happiness, and refinement paradoxically disclose the ‘coarse’, 
despairing nature of his vision. Ironically, Brooke and Oliphant both engage in 
strikingly Paterian hermeneutics in their response to him: just as Pater does with 
diverse artists, thinkers, and historical periods, they insist that a ‘rebellious, a 
secular spirit’ is both the unmistakable and cryptic burden of his work, manifest in 
its aesthetic surfaces but also in its secret core.10   
 It is often forgotten that The Renaissance not only caused a minor scandal, 
but that it was written in the wake of one. Monsman has pieced together the 
narrative of how Brooke ensured that news of Pater’s ‘infidelism’ and the putative 
atheistic tendency of the club percolated through Oxford circles and beyond. For 
instance, William Bright, who would become Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical 
History and canon of Christ Church four years later, noted in his journal in 1864: 
‘Pater, now of B. N. C., at his essay society in Brooke’s hearing averred his 
unbelief in a future state and that Conington got up to rebuke him’, while H. P 
Liddon wrote a letter to the Bishop of Salisbury informing him of the ‘notoriety’ 
of a ‘junior fellow’ of Brasenose college who used the Old Mortality as a forum 
for ‘propagating sheer unbelief’.11 Here, as in the case of The Renaissance, the 
extent to which Pater intended to provoke controversy is mysterious. Given the 
liberal atmosphere of the club and the taste of many of its members for more 
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radical forms of speculation – Swinburne was among its founders – it is plausible 
that he only expected to generate an admiring frisson. Nonetheless, the open 
secret status of atheism in the 1860s – its proximity to or dispersal within many 
intellectual discourses on the one hand, and its tendency to arouse ad hominem 
abuse and moral panic even within intellectual circles on the other – would have 
been freshly vivid to Pater when, six months after he presented his Fichte essay, 
he composed ‘Diaphaneitè’.  
 ‘Diaphaneitè’ is a fantasy about an ideal figure who is above the fray of all 
ideological conflict, yet nonetheless the conduit of a revolutionary ethos. 
Paradoxically, the figure is radical because he represents the almost bland or 
‘colourless’ distillation of the dominant ideas circulating in his culture. Where the 
‘speculative thinker’ has to suffer his ideas being ‘confused, jarred, disintegrated 
in the world’ – just as Pater’s musings on ‘subjective immortality’ and Fichtean 
self-culture recently had been – the ‘diaphaneitè’ figure simply incarnates 
contentious ideas, and, like an artist, integrates them into a concordia discors.12 
While Pater concedes (perhaps thinking of his own reputation as an infidel) that 
‘there is a violence, an impossibility about men who have ideas’ and that 
‘revolution is often impious’, the risks of ‘speculative’ ideas are ‘softened, 
harmonised’ within this ideal personality.13 ‘Diaphaneitè’ seems to express both 
Pater’s uncertainty about how far he wished to construct himself as a 
controversialist at this early stage of his career, and his sense of the fissiparous 
intellectual climate of 1860s Oxford, where critiques of Christianity were by turns 
incendiary and common coin. Four years earlier, a group of Oxford Broad 
Churchmen (six of whom were ordained clergymen) had published Essays and 
Reviews, a collection of theological essays arguing for a liberalised Christianity 
willing to confront the challenges posed by the Higher Criticism and modern 
science. A furore ensued: the essayists were branded as infidels (memorably, they 
were dubbed the ‘Seven Against Christ’) by high churchmen and evangelicals, 
two of the contributors were brought before the Court of Arches on charges of 
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heresy, and the book was condemned by the Synod of the Church of England in 
1864. One of the most supposedly provocative essays in the collection, ‘On the 
Interpretation of Scripture’, which claimed that the Bible should be interpreted 
‘like any other book’, was written by Jowett, Pater’s undergraduate tutor.14 This 
controversy initially overshadowed the near-contemporaneous controversy that 
followed the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, and must have 
impressed on Pater that challenges to orthodox Christianity were at once woven 
into the fabric of the Oxford establishment and liable to generate scandal.15 
Critics often suggest that Pater grew more circumspect in his expression of 
irreligious sentiments in the wake of the publication of The Renaissance, and 
while this is incontestable, it overlooks the extent to which he turned the 
equivocal status of atheism – the fact that it seemed to be everywhere yet 
nowhere, prestigious yet dangerous – into a principle of his style from the 
beginning of his career. Oliphant and Brooke were right to suggest that Pater’s 
distinctive style continuously exploits the transgressive charge of atheism at the 
level of subtext, and that this is key to his quest to find ‘novel’ perspectives on the 
history of Western art and culture. At the same time, however, Pater’s work seeks 
to project a utopian space beyond contemporary religious controversies, where 
ideas about religion can be explored without the necessity of binding choice or 
public self-positioning. Like Swinburne, Pater persistently identifies aestheticism 
with the rebellious and the transgressive even as he characterises it as a realm of 
neutrality and disinterestedness. Thus their aestheticism is ‘secular’ in two 
contradictory senses: it posits an autonomous sphere, free of religious partisanship 
and controversy; and it re-inscribes the very conflicts from which it apparently 
frees itself by using this space to polemicise for the secular in a more radical 
sense – that is, as a desire for the worldly ‘for its own sake’. Moreover, both Pater 
and Swinburne persistently identify the aesthetic with the very conflicts they have 
apparently banished from the realm of art – with both disputes internal to 
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Christianity, and with their shared sense of an exciting tension between the 
religious and the secular.  
‘Diaphaneitè’ gives modern readers, as it likely did its original audience, 
the impression of being covertly transgressive; its rhetoric seems to skirt taboo 
even as its thesis remains obscure. Recent critics have responded to the essay’s 
elusive quality by suggesting that it is a coded celebration of homosexual desire 
and even a proleptic attempt to formulate a modern queer aesthetics.16 Yet Pater’s 
need to encrypt his investment in homosexual desire is often inseparable from his 
parallel need to encrypt his investment in the possibilities of secular 
consciousness. In Pater’s early work, homosexuality and infidelity are often 
twinned as occluded modes of subjectivity that nonetheless may be explored and 
legitimised through the manipulation of an array of culturally prestigious 
discourses. An obvious example of such a legitimating discourse is Hellenism, 
which, in Victorian Oxford, could serve as a code for either or both 
homosexuality and infidelity. Richard Dellamora and Linda Dowling suggest that 
‘Diaphaneitè’ exemplifies how Oxonian Hellenism could operate as a homosexual 
counterdiscourse.17 Yet the transgressive undercurrent that critics have sensed in 
the essay stems not only from its hints of homoeroticism, but the fact that the 
essay is a paean to a Christlike figure that never directly invokes Christ. Instead, it 
systematically turns many of the standard tropes of Christology into secular 
poeticisms. While critics have suggested a plethora of sources for this essay – in 
particular, they have emphasised the essay’s debts to German Romanticism, and 
variously suggested that Fichte, Goethe, Hegel, Schiller, or Winckelmann 
underwrite it –  the extent to which Pater’s diaphaneitè type has Christ-like 
qualities has perhaps been too self-evident to be remarked.18 To point out only the 
                                                
16 See Michael F. Davis’s ‘Walter Pater’s “Latent Intelligence” and the Conception of 
Queer “Theory”’, in Walter Pater: Transparencies of Desire, eds. Laurel Brake, Lesley 
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18 See James Eli Adams, Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Masculinity 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 157-160; Kit Andrews, ‘Walter Pater and Walter 
Benjamin: The Diaphanous Collector and the Angel of History’, in Transparencies, 
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most obvious of these qualities, the diaphaneitè type is associated with mystical 
light as well with purifying flame (he is ‘that fine edge of light, where the 
elements of our moral nature refine themselves to the burning point’); he is 
preternaturally innocent and mild, though also ‘hero[ic]’ and the bearer of a 
mysterious and ‘revolution[ary]’ message; he is a ‘victim’ or martyr figure, whom 
humanity might choose to ‘send into the grave’ as a propitiation; he is beautiful 
yet chaste, and androgynous insofar as he unites masculine and feminine qualities 
within himself; and he has salvific powers – if his type became a ‘majority’, it 
would be ‘the regeneration of the world’.19 As a whole, ‘Diaphaneitè’ seeks to 
reorient Christian models of revelation and salvation toward an ideal of secular 
aestheticism. However, at the same time, the essay is intricately self-reflexive; it 
meditates on the risks and complications of its own effort to secularise Christian 
tropes.  
Although the diaphaneitè figure seems Christ-like, Pater defines his figure 
against Christianity early in the essay. This occurs indirectly when Pater asserts 
that his figure attains ‘perfect life by a happy gift of nature, without any struggle 
at all’.20 The word ‘struggle’ refers back to an earlier sentence where Pater quotes 
Thomas à Kempis in relation to ‘the long struggle of the Imitatio Christi’.21  
Casting aside a Christian ideal of the self that valorises sacrifice and suffering 
after the example of Christ, Pater instead praises a figure who possesses ‘repose 
and simplicity, coming as it were in order of grace … by some happy gift, or 
accident of birth’.22 Pater’s diaphaneitè figure is morally admirable, then, not by 
virtue of conscious effort but because he is the recipient of good ‘moral luck’. 
Pater conceives of his figure in terms of the idea, often explored in ancient Greek 
philosophy and literature though incompatible with most Christian conceptions of 
morality and free will, that our moral natures are determined by contingencies 
                                                                                                                                
Library Borrowings and Literary References, 1858-1873 (New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1981),  74-76; Monsman, Pater, 34-35, and Anne Varty, ‘The Crystal Man: 
A Study of ‘Diaphaneitè’’, in Pater in the 1990s, eds. Brake and Small, 205-215. 
19 Pater, Renaissance, 138-140. 
20 Ibid., 137.  
21 Ibid., 136. 
22 Ibid., 137. 
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beyond our control.23 Pater often identifies the beautiful with the ‘accidental play 
of sunlight and shadow’ in human life, with what is ‘laid open by accident’ in 
history or within the individual consciousness, and this effort to aestheticise what 
many Victorians considered one of the most disturbing implications of a loss of 
belief in divine providence is a crucial part of his early poetics.24 Consider, for 
example, this approving comment on Wordsworth’s poetry:  
 
Human life, indeed is, for him, at first, only an additional, 
accidental grace on this expressive landscape … The close 
connexion of man with natural objects … has sometimes seemed to 
degrade those who are subject to its influence, as if it did but 
reinforce that physical connexion of our nature with the actual lime 
and clay of the soil, which is always drawing us nearer to our end. 
But for Wordsworth, these influences tended to the dignity of 
human nature …he subdues man to the level of nature, and gives 
him thereby a certain breadth and coolness and solemnity.25 
  
 In ‘Diaphaneitè’, Pater attempts to perform the very capacity to maintain 
a contemplative serenity in the face of troubling ideas that he praises in his ideal 
figure. Repose, simplicity, calmness, geniality, naturalness, blitheness: these are 
all key virtues for Pater, and they carry a polemical charge in his work. This 
cluster of associated words designate the lightness of being he identifies with 
Hellenism, and he frequently uses this idealising idiom as a means of 
underscoring what he finds repressive and melancholic in Christianity, and of 
fantasising about the possibility of an easeful reconciliation with the bodily and 
the worldly. 
The puzzling diacritical mark on  ‘diaphaneitè’ – the word only appears in 
the essay’s title – suggests that Pater had in mind something other than the 
English ‘diaphaneity’ (‘the quality of being freely pervious to light; transparency’ 
[OED]). Monsman and Ann Varty both think the word is an eccentric 
                                                
23 On ‘moral luck’ and classical Greek philosophy and literature, see Martha Nussbaum, 
The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
24 Pater, Renaissance, 123 and 138. 
25 Pater, Appreciations (London: Macmillan, 1890), 47.  
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transliteration of an ancient Greek verb.26 Monsman renders this verb as ‘you will 
cause [something] to appear’ or ‘You will allow [something] to shine through 
you’, and suggests that the diacritical mark was Pater’s reminder to himself to 
sound the ‘e’ as one sounds an ‘è’ in French.27 Pater often uses etymology as way 
of thinking through concepts, and his either or both Hellenised and Frenchified 
version of ‘diaphaneity’, with its common suggestion of receptivity to light, 
indicates that he was attempting to think about the roots of ideas of revelation, 
illumination, and epiphany as they appear in religion and art. Pater’s claim that 
his ‘diaphaneitè’ figure enacts a kind of unveiling, which recurs in the essay when 
he distinguishes his figure from the ‘dim blackguardism’ of the sort of hero 
celebrated by Thomas Carlyle and suggests, paradoxically, that the ‘veil’ of his 
diaphaneitè figure is an ‘entire transparency of nature’, carries a potent symbolic 
resonance.28 As Kevin Mills explains, ‘unveiling is the founding trope of the 
Apocalypse’, since the Greek word from which it derives, apokalypsis, means 
uncovering or unveiling.29 Pater’s essay is simultaneously preoccupied with the 
continuum between art and revelation, and, more elliptically, with the violent and 
cataclysmic associations of the idea of revelation within Christian eschatology. 
Significantly, Pater’s engagement with Christian eschatology in this essay is 
mediated by Victorian sage discourse, and, in particular, by his reading of Carlyle, 
a writer famous for having abandoned orthodox Christianity but who nonetheless 
glorified faith (and reviled unbelief) with evangelical urgency. 
As is well known, ‘Victorian sage discourse’ is a critical label for an 
oracular tradition of nineteenth-century prose, particularly social criticism, that is 
generally thought to have been inaugurated by Carlyle and which is also 
associated with Arnold, Eliot, and Ruskin. In George P. Landow’s definition, sage 
writing is: 
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… a form of nonfiction that adapts the techniques of the Victorian 
sermon, neoclassical satire, classical rhetoric, and Old Testament 
prophecy to create credibility for the interpretations of 
contemporary phenomena, the sage, who stands apart from his 
audience and society . The Victorian sage is, above all else, an 
interpreter, an exegete, who can read the Signs of the Times. His 
essential, defining claim is that he understands matters that others 
do not – and that his understanding is of crucial value to those who 
see with duller eyes.30 
 
According to Landow, the sage’s claim to superior vision is authenticated 
through his or her virtuosic acts of interpretation, which are akin to the feats of 
scriptural exegesis often performed by Victorian preachers. Yet such claims to 
vision tend to be unstable in sage discourse, since it is a genre that operates as 
both symptom and remedy in relation to a perception that religious discourse is 
losing authority. In other words, secular sage discourse has a circular relationship 
with religious discourse – it borrows its authority from religious discourse in its 
endeavour to compensate for a perceived crisis in the authority of religion. 
Landow argues that sage writing follows the pattern of Old Testament 
prophecy insofar as the sage writer condemns the present social order, warns of 
the doom that the ‘signs of the times’ portend, and proposes redemptive change. 
In other words, sage writing sows both pessimism and hope, or blends, in 
Landow’s phrase ‘visionary threats with visionary promises’.31 This alloy of 
pessimism and hope also reflects the imaginative cues sage writing draws from 
New Testament apocalyptics, particularly the Apocalypse of John, in which 
spectacular destruction and suffering are the birth pangs of a blessed new age of 
prosperity and peace, and ultimately prefigure the end of the world and the 
establishment of a New Jerusalem. Landow notes that sage writing tends to build 
toward a moment of ‘prophetic closure’, in which invocations of an ascent to 
heaven or the dawning of a new day are common.32 ‘Diaphaneitè’ ends on just 
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such a ‘crescendo of visionary hope’: ‘… the type must be discontented with 
society as it is. The nature here indicated alone is worthy to be this type. A 
majority of such would be the regeneration of the world’.33  
There are other suggestions that Pater conceived of this essay as an 
experiment in the prophetic mode: he twice refers to his ‘diaphaneitè’ figure as a 
‘prophecy’ and also characterises the figure as ‘he who is ever looking for the 
breaking of a light he knows not whence about him [and] notes with a strange 
heedfulness the faintest paleness in the sky’.34 Yet Pater refrains from the 
admonitory social critique that usually prepares the ground for such visionary 
hope within sage writing. In fact, Pater quite explicitly disclaims the role of 
pessimistic prophet: the world ‘is patient of doctrinaires of every degree of 
littleness. As if dimly conscious of some great sickness and weariness of heart in 
itself, it turns readily to those who theorise about its unsoundness’.35 Here Pater 
appears to be disavowing not only the pessimism and grandiosity that often 
marked sage discourse, but the imperative toward direct social critique that often 
drove it. In this, ‘Diaphaneitè’ foreshadows the self-conscious abstention from 
explicit political engagement that would define Pater’s aestheticism; clearly, he 
never had any ambition to write works of crusading social criticism like Carlyle’s 
Past and Present (1843). Yet ‘Diaphaneitè’ is also clearly fascinated by the 
phenomenon of radical political change, and throughout the essay, Pater gestures, 
persistently if evasively, toward an underlying affinity between revolution and art. 
Pater’s diaphanous figure is defined by his irenic revolutionism: he ‘loves the 
lords of change’ and, like an Enlightenment philosophe, can ‘value’ nothing he 
has encountered by ‘accident, or usage, or convention’, yet he retains an essential 
quietism – his is ‘the revolutionism of one who has slept a hundred years’.36 
Critics have often understood Pater’s ‘diaphaneitè’ type as a figure for the 
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autonomy of art, its separation from the unbeautiful realities of political praxis.37 
Yet Pater’s emphasis on the quietism of his ideal figure has a more specific 
objective than a generalised wish to quarantine art from politics. ‘Diaphaneitè’ 
seeks to circumvent the Victorian tendency to conflate the questioning of 
orthodoxy with violence; more precisely, it fantasies about how secular 
utopianism might be redeemed of its association with the ‘axe and the hammer’ of 
the Reign of Terror. 
Critics often remark upon the two direct references to Carlyle in 
‘Diaphaneitè’. As Varty notes, Pater’s description of the diaphaneitè figure as 
possessed of ‘a clear crystal nature’ echoes Carlyle’s representation of Madame 
Roland de la Platrière, whom he praises for her ‘clear crystal nature’.38 However, 
it seems likely that Pater’s ‘diaphaneitè’ figure is more generally inspired by the 
Homeric epithets that Carlyle gives the key revolutionaries in his self-consciously 
epic history. Many of these epithets evoke not the physical characteristics of the 
given revolutionary but the mystical aura that Carlyle imagines that the figure 
diffuses. Carlyle represents these auras according to a Manichean schema of 
smoky darkness and dazzling light, although he gives some revolutionaries 
epithets suggestive of both qualities. Pater cites two of Carlyle’s aura epithets in 
his essay. He firstly confuses (and misquotes) Carlyle’s description of Camille 
Desmoulins with his description of Georges Danton. This is perhaps willful 
misquotation, since Pater’s emphasis on Danton’s ‘dim blackguardism’ (sic) 
enables him to define his ‘diaphaneitè’ figure against Carlyle’s Danton, where 
quoting faithfully and at greater length would reveal similarity rather than 
difference: 
 
Then that other, his slight-built comrade … he with the long 
curling locks; with the face of dingy blackguardism, wondrously 
irradiated with genius, as if a naphtha-lamp burnt within it … One 
of the sprightliest, clearest souls in these millions. Thou poor 
Camille, say of thee what they may, it were but falsehood to 
                                                
37 See for example Benjamin Morgan, ‘Aesthetic Freedom: Walter Pater and the Politics 
of Autonomy’, ELH 77.3 (2010), 734-736. 
38 Varty, ‘Crystal Man’, 207. 
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pretend one did not almost love thee, thou headlong lightly 
sparkling man!39 
 




The thing that Camille touches, he with his light finger adorns: 
brightness plays, gentle, unexpected, amid horrible confusions … 
Questionable Camille, how thou glitterest when fallen, rebellious, 
yet still semi-celestial light; as is the starlight on the brow of 
Lucifer! Son of the Morning, into what times and what lands art 
thou fallen!40 
 
 Carlyle’s curiously tender, admiring invocation of Desmoulins surely 
would have appealed to Pater, who would go on to make the archetype of the 
gifted yet doomed young man one of his major topoi. Carlyle similarly depicts 
Charlotte Corday as a fallen angel, which is perhaps why Pater associated these 
two passages in The French Revolution and alluded to them both in ‘Diaphaneitè’. 
However, Pater was not simply struck by a cluster of Carlylean images; his 
allusions are polemically motivated. 
 John Rosenberg remarks that Carlyle writes of the French Revolution ‘as 
if he were a witness-survivor of the Apocalypse’.41 Carlyle portrays the 
Revolution as a kind of modern baccahanal or ‘Sorcerer’s Sabbath’, and his 
narrative voice lurches so abruptly between ironic and prophetic registers that the 
reader is often left disoriented.42 Key to the book’s power is Carlyle’s capacity to 
sustain an intense ambivalence about the meaning of the Revolution across 
hundreds of pages: 
 
So dies Sansculottism … Its ragged Pythian Carmagnole-dance has 
transformed into a Pyrrhic, into a dance of Cabarus Balls … And 
yet a meaning lay in it: Sanscluttoism verily was alive, a New-
Birth of Time: nay it still lives, and is not dead but changed. The 
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soul of it still lives; still works far and wide, though one bodily 
shape into another less amorphous, as is the way of cunning Time 
with his New Births: — till, in some perfected shape, it embrace 
the whole circuit of the world!43 
 
Carlyle’s paradoxical vision of the French Revolution as an unholy 
conflagration that nonetheless purged a historical epoch of ‘IMPOSTURE’ and 
ushered in a ‘New-birth of Time’ clearly draws upon the ambivalent status of 
apocalypse within the Christian imaginary, its association with violent calamity 
and retributive judgment as well as with hopes of renewal and salvation.44 Yet 
despite his dependence upon apocalyptic rhetoric, Carlyle’s vision of history was 
not premised on Christian eschatology but rather upon a belief in inevitable, 
recurrent cycles of decay and regeneration. As Rosenberg suggests, Carlyle’s 
cyclical conception of history leads him to view the Revolution as a natural 
phenomenon like an earthquake or volcano, a sublime eruption that essentially 
confounds moral judgment and political partisanship.45 In this, his view of history 
has some affinities with Pater’s own renderings of cycles of cultural renaissance 
and decadence. Unlike Carlyle, however, Pater never adopts the posture of Old 
Testament prophet, nor does he invoke the apocalyptic sublime in his figurations 
of historical change. As Sharon Bassett observes, Pater uses the concept of 
‘renaissance’ as an ‘alternative to the Carlylean notion of apocalypse as a means 
of characterising historical change and possibility’.46 
Ingram Bywater, one of Pater’s close friends, recalled that he ‘devoured’ 
Carlyle in his undergraduate years, although Billie Inman’s study of his reading 
only confirms that Pater read The French Revolution in 1859 and it is uncertain 
how well Pater knew the rest of Carlyle’s oeuvre.47 Dellamora and Adams both 
suggest that ‘Diaphaneitè’ responds to Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship and 
the Heroic in History (1841), though Pater would have been well acquainted with 
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Carlyle’s reverence for the figure of charismatic, world-changing individual if he 
had only read The French Revolution.48 Certainly, Carlyle’s description of the 
hero figure in that book as ‘a flowing light-fountain … of native original insight, 
of manhood and heroic nobleness; – in whose radiance all souls feel that it is well 
with them’ seems close to the imagery of apotheosis in Pater’s essay, and Pater is 
perhaps thinking of Carlyle’s admiring portrait of Luther in On Heroes when he 
identifies Luther as a type antithetical to his own diaphaneitè figure.49 Dellamora 
and Adams convincingly argue that Pater’s androgynous diaphaneitè figure is a 
critique of the strenuously masculine ideal of heroism celebrated in On Heroes, 
though it is worth emphasising that Pater’s critique of Carlylean ideals of 
masculinity actually appropriates part of its vision of androgyny from Carlyle, 
specifically from Carlyle’s portraits of Desmoulins and Corday. Pater departs 
from Carlyle most crucially by filtering out from his own model of the heroic 
personality Carlyle’s tendency to mystify violence and zeal as male creative 
principles. 
The French Revolution is, as Marcus Wood says, ‘an ecstatically violent 
book. Mass, murder, death, torture, dismemberment, decapitation, confusion, 
madness, war, conflagration and anarchy lead the prose from one delighted 
climax to another’.50 While some of Carlyle’s hyperbolic representation of 
violence stemmed from his fear that the anarchic energies that erupted in 
revolutionary France might also erupt in contemporary England, it also stemmed 
from an amoral fascination with the figure of the charismatic hero who is 
seemingly able to transform society by sheer force of conviction and will. 
Circularly, Carlyle’s reverence for such figures was one consequence of his 
conviction that reverence and conviction were primordial virtues in themselves, 
and necessary remedies to the dire state of ‘unbelief’ into which civilisation had 
fallen in the eighteenth-century. As I have noted, for many Victorians, ‘unbelief’, 
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‘atheism’ and ‘scepticism’ do not simply signify lack of belief in God or the 
questioning of particular tenets of Christianity, but conjure images of a vortex 
which funnels away the integrity of the self and the familiarity of the world. This 
is particularly true of Carlyle. Witness, for example, this famous moment in 
Sartor Resartus (1833-34), where Carlyle’s semi-autobiographical protagonist, 
Teufelsdröckh, imagines himself crushed – or perhaps crucified – by a godless, 
mechanistic cosmos: 
 
… but in our age of Downpulling and Disbelief, the very Devil has 
been pulled down, you cannot so much as believe in a Devil. To 
me the Universe was void of Life, of Purpose, of Volition, even of 
Hostility: it was one huge, dead, immeasurable Steam-engine, 
rolling on in its dead indifference, to grind me limb from limb. O 
the vast, gloomy, solitary Golgotha, and Mill of Death!51  
 
While the religious vision of Sartor Resartus is not precisely Christian but 
an idiosyncratic transcendentalism inspired by Carlyle’s reading of Goethe, Kant, 
Hegel, and Schiller, the metaphysical speculations, moral philosophy and 
rhetorical textures of the novel are saturated with the Calvinism of Carlyle’s 
childhood. As A. Abbott Ikeler remarks, ‘The world picture he paints there is as 
stern and ‘everlasting’ in its contrasts as any that Knox or Calvin devised; 
transcendentalism may have determined the general philosophy of the novel, but 
its frequent dichotomies are reminiscent not so much of Kant’s speculations as of 
Puritan sermonising’.52 Pater shared Carlyle’s interest in German philosophy – he 
actually gained his fellowship at Brasenose on account of his expertise in it – but 
throughout his career, he was suspicious of metaphysical idealism and tended to 
pathologise its proponents as cold-blooded and obsessed with abstraction.53 In 
‘Coleridge’s Writings’, which appeared anonymously in The Westminster Review 
two years after ‘Diaphaneitè’ was delivered to the Old Mortality, Pater declared 
that ‘A transcendentalism that makes what is abstract more excellent than what is 
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concrete has nothing akin to the leading philosophies of the world’.54 It is possible 
to derive an impression of Pater’s likely estimation of Carlyle’s effort to use 
German idealism as a salvation from modern scepticism from his portrait of 
Coleridge, whose comparable sympathy with the ‘long pleading of German 
culture for things “behind the veil”’ Pater treats as an intellectual cul-de-sac and a 
form of neurosis.55   
Carlyle’s conviction that either divine truth lies behind the veil of 
appearances or we inhabit a fallen world also determines his portrait of the French 
Revolution: 
 
We hail the French Revolution, as ship-wrecked mariners might 
the sternest rock, in a world otherwise all of baseless sea and 
waves. A true apocalypse, though a terrible one, to this false 
withered artificial time; testifying once more that Nature is 
preternatural; if not divine, then diabolic; that Semblance is not 
Reality; that is has to become Reality, or the world will take fire 
under it, - burn it into what it is, namely Nothing!56 
 
In such passages, the instabilities of Victorian sage discourse are palpable. 
Carlyle continually reaches for the metaphor of the apocalypse in his 
representation of the Revolution in order to hyperbolise the evils of secularism, 
yet he secularises the concept of ‘apocalypse’ by continually deploying it as a 
metaphor for a modern historical event. Peter Allan Dale observes that Carlyle 
continually returned to the idea that the ‘unbelieving society dies not quietly and 
naturally but with a vast retributive conflagration produced by the release of 
irrational forces held in check only by religion’.57 Of course, the most dramatic 
example of this paradigm is The French Revolution, in which Carlyle reviles 
Enlightenment philosophy in general and religious scepticism in particular as the 
‘cardinal symptom of the widespread malady’ afflicting revolutionary France.58 
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Carlyle repeats the association of secularism with nihilism and baleful vacuity he 
makes in Sartor Resartus: 
 
Faith is gone out; Scepticism is come in. Evil abounds and 
accumulates; no man has Faith to withstand it, to amend it … 
While hollow languor and vacuity is the lot of the Upper, and want 
and stagnation of the Lower, and universal misery is very certain, 
what other thing is certain? That a Lie cannot be believed! 
Philosophism knows only this: her other belief is mainly, that in 
spiritual supersensual matters no Belief is possible … The five 
unsatiated Senses will remain, the sixth insatiable Sense (of 
vanity); the whole dæmonic nature of man will remain – hurled 
forth to rage blindly without rule or rein; savage itself, yet with all 
the tools and weapons of civilization; a spectacle new in History.59 
 
For Carlyle, a perception of the withering of Christian faith – which is 
often imagined, as in the passage above, as inexorable and in its way impressive, 
even sublime – only exacerbates a sense of the necessity of the anti-carnal 
dualisms of Christianity. Central to Pater’s aestheticism is an attempt to undo this 
association of the sensuous with the depraved side of human nature – an 
association which, in his early work, he generally considers a dark legacy of 
Christianity – and revive what he conceived of as a serene, Hellenic appreciation 
of the identity of sense and intellect, materiality and spirituality. The seeds of this 
project can be discerned in ‘Diaphaneitè’, where the ‘the higher intellectual life’ 
is synonymous with ‘a beautiful way of handling everything that appeals to the 
senses’.60  
Kit Andrews notes that the concepts of apocalypse and revolution are 
invoked only to be suspended in ‘Diaphaneitè’: ‘virtually every assertion of 
revolutionary transformation is caught in and held motionless in the thick web of 
Pater’s qualifications’.61 For example, in the ‘diaphaneitè’ type, revolutionary 
energies are said to be ‘softened, harmonised, subdued as by distance’; his is ‘the 
revolutionism of one who has slept a hundred years’.62 The latter conceit perhaps 
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has its origin in the ‘Epimenides’ chapter of Carlyle’s French Revolution, which, 
like ‘Diaphaneitè’’, meditates on the unconscious processes that generate 
historical change. Throughout the chapter, Carlyle draws on the legends of 
Epimenides, Peter Klaus, and Rip Van Winkle as allegorical figures for how 
social transformation is wrought while individual agents remain oblivious of their 
roles within it. However, in revolutionary periods, such ‘sleepers’ are startled into 
self-awareness, and recognise their power to shape history.63  In ‘Diaphaneitè’, 
Pater denatures Carlyle’s sleeping revolutionist motif so that the fairytale sleep is 
a symbol not of insensibility to the movements of history but rather a special, 
pacific wisdom. Pater’s image of his revolutionist as a kind of enchanted 
anachronism reinforces passages earlier in the essay when he suggests his 
diaphaneitè figure is ‘like a relic from a classical age, laid open by accident to our 
alien modern atmosphere’ or like ‘the reminiscence of a forgotten culture that 
once adorned the mind’.64 This too has a parallel in Carlyle, who at one point 
characterises the revolutionary energies released across Europe by the French 
Revolution as a quasi-miraculous awakening of the Hellenic spirit:  
 
The Jacobins are buried: but their work is not; it continues, 
“making a tour of the world”, as it can. It might be seen lately, for 
instance, with bared bosom and death-defiant eye, as far on as 
Greek Missolonghi; strange enough, old slumbering Hellas was 
resuscitated, into somnambulism which will become clear 
wakefulness, by a voice from the Rue St. Honore!’65  
 
As such comparisons suggest, a Carlylean sense of visionary wonder at 
historical change pervades ‘Diaphaneitè’, as well as Pater’s oeuvre as a whole. 
Yet in ‘Diaphaneitè’, Pater sifts out the sense of horror and portent that freights 
such wonder in Carlyle’s The French Revolution; Pater’s diaphaneitè figure 
accomplishes revolution ‘without the noise of axe or hammer’.66 (This phrase also 
seems to echo Carlyle; Carlyle often refers to the guillotine as ‘the axe’ – surely 
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160 
 
preferring the earthiness of the English word to the mechanistic neologism – and 
he persistently uses ‘the axe’ as a metonym for the savagery of the Revolution.)67  
In Plato and Platonism, Pater deprecates in passing ‘the ‘“infinite”, those 
eternities, infinitudes, abysses that Carlyle invokes for us so often’.68 In context, 
Carlyle is being invoked as a representative of the type of modern thinker who 
perpetuates a pernicious ancient tendency to privilege the infinite and the abstract 
over the finite, tangible, and earthly. Tellingly, Pater does not discuss any of 
Carlyle’s avowed philosophical positions, but rather objects to Carlyle’s 
aesthetics, and in particular, to his predilection for the sublime. While 
‘Diaphaneitè’ could be said to participate in the discourse of the sublime insofar 
as Pater secularises Christian tropes in order to generate a sense of ineffability 
around his ideal figure, the sense of terror and confusion that is typically 
associated with the sublime is absent. Instead, Pater’s essay at once praises and 
seeks to illustrate the value of a poetics of the oblique and subdued: his 
diaphaneitè figure is ‘delicate’, ‘a fine edge of light’, or ‘an evanescent shade’.69 
Similarly, the essay strives after a muted sage discourse as a counterpoint to 
Carlyle’s tumultuous rhetoric: Pater’s diaphaneitè figure does not claim an 
authoritative capacity to read the signs of the times, but rather ‘notes with strange 
heedfulness the faintest paleness in the sky’. Implicit in ‘Diaphaneitè’, then, is a 
thesis about the relationship between secularism and aesthetics. For Pater, a 
properly secular poetics involves a renunciation or at least a winnowing of certain 
rhetorical effects. While it is not necessary to forfeit a visionary ‘wistfulness’ or 
wonder in the face of history, such a poetics must repudiate some of the authority 
and grandeur of the high prophetic mode. However, Pater promises that the loss in 
rhetorical drama is compensated for by gains in subtlety of perception and in the 
capacity to appreciate what ‘fill[s] up the blanks’ between customary categories, 
such as his diaphaneitè figure.70 This call for an authentically secular poetics is 
articulated more boldly in ‘Coleridge’s Writings’, where Pater suggests that, since 
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many have ‘passed out of Christianity’ and ‘religious belief may have been 
refined out of our hearts’, it is necessary to cultivate a new, more supple prose 
style, one which does not rely on eternal fixities but rather registers the vision of 
minute, evanescing particulars revealed by modern science:71 
 
The truth of these relations experience gives us; not the truth of 
eternal outlines effected once for all, but a world of fine gradations 
and subtly linked conditions, shifting intricately as we ourselves 
change; and bids us by constant clearing of the organs of 
observation and perfecting of analysis to make what we can of 
these. To the intellect, to the critical spirit, these subtleties of effect 
are more precious than anything else. What is lost in precision of 
form is gained in intricacy of expression.72 
 
Pater’s desire to purge the idea of revolutionary change of its associations 
with zeal, violence, and apocalypse in ‘Diaphaneitè’ has led some critics to claim 
that the essay reflects the essentially conservative or apolitical character of Pater’s 
aestheticism.73 Yet Pater insists that it is only in the light of crude categories that 
his ‘diaphaneitè’ figure will appear guilty of ‘indifferentism’, and at the end of 
essay, he specifies that his ‘diaphaneitè’ figure can no more be ‘conservative’ 
than ‘anything rash or irreverent’.74 In this sense, critics who find the essay 
apolitical or conservative fall prey to the logic that the essay aims to critique: 
namely, the belief that radical change inevitably culminates in or can only be 
accomplished by violence. Pater’s diaphaneitè figure embodies the paradox that 
the authentically revolutionary figure could not be perceived as such, since this 
figure would by definition at once elude and transform established modes of 
perception, including the concept of ‘revolution’ itself.  
‘Diaphaneitè’ adroitly skirts around a key obstacle to Pater’s wish to 
polemicise for his ideal of the secular: secularism and the horrors of the French 
Revolution remained soldered together in the Victorian cultural imagination (and 
the memory of the Revolution itself had been rekindled by the revolutionary 
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upheaval in France and across Europe in 1848). Twenty-seven years earlier, 
Carlyle had also done much to rekindle and popularise a sense of the co-
implication of secularism and revolution for the English reading public, and in 
this respect, it is telling that Pater slights Carlyle’s ‘type’ of hero as ‘too popular 
for the true interest of art’.75 It is easy to hear the elitist accent of Pater’s 
aestheticism here, and to caricature it as part of his celebration of an entirely 
passive hero, too pure for the ‘adulterated’ world.76 Yet Pater emphasises that 
‘over and over again the world has been surprised by the heroism, the insight, the 
passion’ of his diaphaneitè figure; clearly, the value of the ideal hinges not upon 
its solipsistic withdrawal, but upon its power to ‘surprise’ the world out of 
conventional habits of thought.77 Similiarly, Pater asserts that ‘a magnificent 
intellectual force is latent’ in the diaphaneitè figure, who may appear merely 
concerned with trivial matters of ‘taste’.78 Pater’s emphasis throughout the essay 
on the unsuspected ‘force’ of nuance and the ‘latent’ intellectual power of beauty 
encodes his ambitions for a new kind of critical prose, one whose sheer beauty 
and grace allows it to explore radical ideas with impunity. However, as was the 
case with Swinburne and later with Wilde, Pater’s habit of handling controversial 
subjects with the air of urbane serenity he associated with ancient Greece would 
itself become a source of scandal.79 
 
‘Neither for God nor for his Enemies’: Heresy and Disinterestedness in the 
Critical Essays of Arnold and Pater 
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In 1871, an anonymous writer published an article on ‘Standards of Heresy’ in the 
Saturday Review. Noting that, at its etymological root, ‘heresy’ simply means a 
deliberate choice or preference (‘I choose for myself’) and surveying both the 
bloody history of persecution for heresy in England and the sheer motley of 
Christian sects and beliefs that have fallen or could fall under its shifting purview, 
the writer concluded: 
 
It is equally difficult to define and easy to transgress the invisible 
boundary which separates heresy from orthodox or innocuous 
belief … Aristotle says that the man who has many friends has no 
friend, and when every other divine is denounced as a heretic, a 
suspicion is suggested that the genuine article is non-existent, or 
has become extinct.80  
 
‘Standards of Heresy’ was occasioned by the Voysey case, the latest in a 
cluster of mid-Victorian cases in which a clergyman was tried for heresy. Charles 
Voysey, a Yorkshire clergyman, had imagined that the anti-climactic outcome of 
the heresy trials of two of the contributors to Essays and Reviews – in 1864, the 
Privy Council overturned the guilty verdicts handed down to Rowland Williams 
and H.B. Wilson by the Court of Arches –  heralded a new climate of theological 
liberalism. Emboldened by the precedent, Voysey began publishing a series of 
sermons under the title The Sling and the Stone, wherein he questioned the 
divinity of Christ and the Inspiration of the Scriptures, and declared the doctrines 
of eternal punishment and the Atonement immoral.81 In 1871, he was treated to 
the professional martyrdom many felt he had been courting: he was convicted of 
heresy at the chancellor’s court of the diocese of York and stripped of his living 
(in this instance, the Privy Council upheld the verdict upon appeal).  
The paradoxical conclusions of the anonymous writer in The Saturday 
Review – first, that the freedom with which people accuse one another of heresy 
shows only that it is a word without a proper referent; and second, that the 
frequency with which modern clergymen are prosecuted for it confirms its 
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obsolescence – are instructive, for they suggest how the apparent vitality and 
pervasiveness of ‘heresy’ in the mid-Victorian period could engender cynicism 
about the category. An ironic perception of the tendency of yesterday’s heresy to 
become today’s orthodoxy was surely especially acute in this period because of 
the ongoing transformation of the cultural status of religious doubt: by the 1860s, 
religious doubt had been at least partially cleansed of its associations with sin and 
transgression, and it was increasingly common to find doubt recast not simply as a 
marker of intellectual and moral integrity, but as a measure of the quality of one’s 
faith.82 Yet, as Leslie Stephen remarked of the word ‘atheism’, ‘heresy’ no doubt 
retained ‘a certain flavour of the stake in this world and hell-fire in the next’; 
moreover, it retained a few concrete worldly penalties. 83 Unlike blasphemy, 
which was considered a crime against the State, heresy was a clergyman’s 
offence, and could only be tried in an ecclesiastical court (although secular courts 
could quash convictions of heresy, and provoked controversy among Anglicans 
when they did so.)84 Where the men tried for blasphemy in the period were 
working-class radicals and militant secularists, those prosecuted for heresy were 
often earnest Broadchurchmen such as the Essayists and Reviewers, Bishop 
Colenso, and Voysey, who had presumed too far upon the latitudinarianism of the 
Anglican Church. The fact that Victorian clergyman heretics lost only their 
livings and not their lives was sometimes underscored ironically and taken as an 
emblem of the essentially staid and tolerant temper of the age.85 Yet defenders of 
orthodoxy could also be anxious about the extent to which an aura of romance, 
even of holiness, clung to the archetype of the persecuted heretic – an aura hard to 
expunge entirely because of the obvious imaginative associations not only with 
early Christian, Catholic and Protestant martyrs, but with Christ himself (an 
image of Christ as a religious heretic was particularly encouraged by Ernest 
Renan, whose best-selling La Vie de Jésus [1863; trans. 1863] forms a key 
                                                
82 See Lane, Doubt, 123-158. 
83 Stephen, ‘An Agnostic’s Apology’, Fortnightly Review19.114 (1876), 840. 
84 See W. Blake Odgers, ‘The Law Relating to Heresy and Blasphemy’, Modern Review 
(July 1883): 587-608. 
85 See anonymous, ‘Mr. Voysey and Mr. Purchas’, Fraser’s Magazine 3.16 (1871), 457. 
165 
 
context for these Victorian heresy trials).86 The perverse glamour which could 
attach to the figure of the clergyman heretic is suggested by the fantasy life of a 
schoolboy Oscar Wilde, who – intrigued by the heresy case of the Reverend W. J. 
E. Bennett, vicar of Frome Selwood, who was convicted for espousing the 
Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence in 1870 – proclaimed to his friends that he 
planned to be a clergyman heretic himself and to ‘go down to posterity as the 
defendant in such a case as Regina versus Wilde’.87 
In an essay he wrote toward the end of his life, Pater observed that Pascal 
‘creates in us a feeling that, however orthodox one’s intention, it is scarcely 
possible to speak of the matters then so abundantly discussed by religious people 
without heresy at some unguarded point’.88 If the fact that one could commit 
heresies inadvertently, while imagining that one was conforming to orthodoxy – 
or even, as Pater suggests in relation to Pascal, one necessarily strayed into heresy 
if one discussed religion at any length – is central to the fascination of the subject 
for Pater, so is the inverse possibility: namely, that heretical ideas could be 
sanctified if one fitted them closely enough to the contours of orthodoxy. As I 
noted, Swinburne’s formulation of his aestheticism in William Blake hinges upon 
the concept of heresy: Swinburne’s desire to assimilate Blake to his ideal of a 
Romanticism essentially opposed to Christian orthodoxy leads him to insist that 
Blake’s ‘earnestly heretical’ beliefs were the source of his creative genius. Pater 
also uses the concept of heresy to render the Christian past available to a 
secularising hermeneutic, and, like Swinburne, he is always alive to the fact that 
such a hermeneutic itself partakes of heresy; after all, a heresy is simply a 
wayward or idiosyncratic interpretation, an assertion of interpretive will over an 
authoritative body of interpretations. Yet, where Swinburne tends to use the 
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concept of heresy as a means of assimilating ostensibly Christian art and culture 
to his own anti-Christian position, Pater tends to tarry with the indeterminacies 
embedded within the concept. This is not because Pater always differs markedly 
from Swinburne in his stance toward Christianity: at least at this early stage of his 
career, Pater is, like Swinburne, an apologist for a ‘secular, rebellious spirit’.89 
The key difference is that where Swinburne attacks the ambiguities of the 
discourses of religious doubt, Pater perceives the extent to which it is possible to 
critique this inheritance and advance beyond it by working within its terms. 
‘Aucassin and Nicolette’, ‘Sandro Botticelli’ and ‘Pico della Mirandola’, the three 
essays I will discuss here, bear the influence not only of Swinburne’s 
identification of aestheticism with heresy, but of the critical prose of Arnold, 
whose emphasis upon the necessity of drawing fine distinctions in relation to the 
subject of religion Pater turns to self-consciously heretical ends. This 
appropriation has its ironic dimensions, since, as I will show, Arnold championed 
a literary concept of nuance precisely as a means of countering the tendency of 
conservative believers to detect heresy in efforts to modernise Christianity.  In 
other words, Pater’s aestheticism – like Swinburne’s – can often be understood as 
retrograde: it seeks to resuscitate the very associations of religious questioning 
with heresy, transgression and sin which Arnold sought to finesse into innocuous 
subtleties. I will focus here on one of the earliest of Arnold’s controversial 
interventions on the subject: his essay on the heresy of Bishop Colenso, ‘The 
Bishop and the Philosopher’ (1863). This essay is important not only because 
Arnold returned to the subject of Colenso repeatedly and the controversy over the 
original essay influenced the reception of his subsequent religious writings, but 
because it reveals the extent to which Arnold’s model of cultural criticism was 
evolved as a means of distinguishing between literary nuance and heresy.90  
 
Arnold, Colenso and the Pious Fraud Tradition 
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At the core of the controversy over ‘The Bishop and the Philosopher’ was the fact 
that Arnold here seemed to invoke what I will call the ‘pious fraud’ tradition. I 
borrow the phrase from Sarah Ellenzweig, whose recent book addresses the fact 
that the conventional identification of the Enlightenment with attacks on religious 
orthodoxy applies far better to eighteenth-century France than to England, which 
(at least arguably) produced few literary figures whose anti-clericalism or sheer 
irreverence seems comparable to that of Diderot or Baron d’Holbach or Voltaire. 
Ellenzweig argues that the elusiveness of Enlightenment atheism in England can 
be accounted for partly by the fact that English sceptics tended to regard religion 
as a salutary fiction which undergirded the stability of the social order and the 
authority of the state. Writers including Aphra Behn, Alexander Pope, Jonathan 
Swift and John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester drew upon precedents in classical 
sources to evolve the ‘pious fraud’ or ‘two-fold’ philosophy, which is at once 
obliquely sceptical and profoundly conservative: while elite thinkers may be 
privately incredulous toward the supernatural claims of Christianity, so the 
argument runs, they should nevertheless commit to a ‘beliefless orthodoxy’91 in 
the name of civic duty. Ellenzweig traces how an impulse to demystify religion in 
subtle or coded ways coalesces with a countervailing imperative to sustain the 
political utility of religion in such works, and suggests that this tradition gave 
English literary freethought a distinctly conservative and elitist accent. 
Joseph Carroll has noted that Arnold was deeply influenced by Swift and 
Pope, and partly inherited from them his controversial mixture of scepticism 
toward the supernatural elements of Christianity and profound investment in the 
social and moral utility of religion.92 Yet whenever the sediments of this legacy 
rose to the surface of Arnold’s prose, he tended to alienate his contemporaries. To 
a bourgeois and increasingly democratic age that had been in many ways shaped 
by Evangelical Protestantism, Arnold’s seeming valorisation of a double standard 
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in religious belief – faith for the multitude, freethinking for a caste of educated 
sophisticates, and outward conformity to the Anglican Church for all – had a bad 
odour of priestcraft on the one hand and aristocratic hauteur on the other. Thus, 
for example, in 1863 the Christian Socialist F. D. Maurice sounds not just 
offended but shocked at what he takes to be Arnold’s suggestion that in matters of 
religion, ‘edification is for the herd’ while ‘information [is] for men of literary 
culture’. Maurice claims that the reading public will not only be ‘sorely puzzled’ 
but ‘suspect their countryman [i.e., Arnold] of a pious fraud – which [surely] he 
would look upon as fit only for priests’.93  In a similar vein, W. R. Greg, himself a 
sceptic, professed bewilderment at the way that Arnold blended the dogmatism of 
a ‘Catholic divine’ with the ‘naked’ irreverence of a ‘Pagan philosopher’.94 These 
expressions of shock are rhetorical ploys, intended to highlight the egregiousness 
of Arnold’s elitism; yet Maurice and Greg’s conviction that there is something un-
English and un-Protestant about Arnold’s thinking on religion is surely indicative 
of just how alien the pious fraud tradition had come to seem by the mid-
nineteenth century, despite its English and at least partly Protestant lineage.95 As 
Frank Turner has argued, Evangelical religion crucially shaped the Victorian 
model of religious scepticism, which, at least on an emotional level, was often the 
ironic product of the Evangelical emphasis upon perfect sincerity and self-
consistency: if one cannot believe utterly, one must follow one’s conscience, 
whatever the cost.96  
Maurice and Greg’s ‘priestcraft’ slurs were prompted by ‘The Bishop and 
the Philosopher’, an essay which is worth examining in detail not only because 
Arnold’s affiliation with the pious fraud tradition is more perceptible here than 
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anywhere else in his critical writings, but also because the core assumptions of 
this essay re-appear in modulated form in Arnold’s much more famous essay, 
‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’ (1865), a document still often 
treated as the seminal statement of the mission of modern literary criticism. ‘The 
Bishop and the Philosopher’ is a critique of John Colenso’s The Pentateuch and 
the Book of Joshua Critically Examined (1862), a work which had turned into a 
somewhat improbable bestseller and cause célèbre. Colenso was the Bishop of 
Natal and his experience of missionary work had convinced him that it was 
necessary for the Anglican Church to acknowledge that the Bible was not the 
revealed word of God.97 Colenso’s book questioned the assumption of Mosaic 
authorship and sought to expose the errors and incongruities of the Pentateuch, 
often through statistics and mathematical demonstrations; it led to Colenso’s 
vilification in the British periodical press, a clerical campaign to have him 
excommunicated, and ultimately to his being found guilty of heresy by the Bishop 
of Cape Town. Yet in Arnold’s view, Colenso should be condemned not for 
heresy, but for labouring the obvious; Colenso’s effort to prove that the Old 
Testament cannot bear literal reading makes Colenso himself guilty of a literal-
mindedness that would be risible if it were not so dangerous. As Jeff Guy has 
pointed out, literary critics tend to reproduce Arnold’s assessment of Colenso, 
who is often travestied in passing as a buffoon whose belief crumbled when he 
found that the Old Testament literally failed to add up.98 Yet if Colenso’s 
assumptions were naïve, the reception of his book – including the fact that Arnold 
was moved to such a contradictory assault on it – indicate that such naïveté about 
the Bible had its subversive dimensions in 1862. 
Arnold’s opening strategy is to suggest that Colenso’s book is not 
scandalous but a national embarrassment. He opens his essay with a lament for 
the backwardness of English scholarship on the Bible and English theological 
speculation more generally, which risk provoking ‘a titter from educated 
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Europe’.99 Arnold’s perception of the belatedness of the English assimilation of 
the insights of the Higher Criticism of the Bible is accurate. As LaPorte notes, 
‘Colenso … had no concept of the state of Continental scholarship, and his 
[English] readers found high drama in conclusions that Strauss’s first audience 
had taken for granted’.100 Yet the tendency to treat critiques of traditional 
Christianity both as high drama and as a set of familiar, even banal ideas recycled 
from classical sources, from exploded eighteenth-century paradigms, or from 
suspect Continental thinkers is one of the salient features of English cultural life 
in the 1860s. This cultural disjunction is not simply a matter of the contrast 
between cosmopolitan readers au fait with Strauss versus a naïve general 
readership which could be startled by Colenso, since intellectuals like Arnold who 
wished to protect Christianity from certain varieties of critique often mobilised 
this disjunction as a strategy of containment. Thus Colenso is doubly damned by 
Arnold, first for telling general readers what they should already know, and 
second for telling them truths that they cannot handle. Arnold obscures this illogic 
by claiming that works on the subject of religion may be valid either because they 
‘enlighten’ the ‘much-instructed few’ or they ‘edify’ the ‘little-instructed 
many’.101 The implications of this argument become clear when it emerges that 
‘enlighten’ and ‘edify’ are not synonyms: ‘enlighten’ refers to the rational 
understanding of religion that a sophisticated reader derives from a philosopher 
like Spinoza, while ‘edify’ refers to the beneficial reinforcement of piety that a 
less educated reader best gleans from more simplistic religious books. Colenso’s 
book ‘cannot justify itself for existing’ because it destabilises the religious beliefs 
of the many without paving the way toward a more rational understanding of 
religion for the benefit of the few.102 
Arnold counterpoints his attack on Colenso with a paean to the religious 
thought of Spinoza, whose work had been largely neglected in England because, 
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as Arnold notes, he was still generally regarded as a heretic.103 Although Arnold 
strenuously argues for Spinoza’s piety, the fact that he lauds a seventeenth-
century Dutch Jewish philosopher known as a ‘great heretic’ but little read in 
England in order to condemn a contemporary Bishop whose ‘heretical’ book ‘all 
England is now reading’ sends a number of provocative ambiguities rippling 
through the essay.104 Aside from the perversity of exonerating one heretic for the 
purposes of condemning another, the strategy calls attention to the historical 
fluidity of the categories of heresy and piety. Arnold’s continual appeals to 
‘literary criticism’ rather than to Christian orthodoxy and explicit desire to 
prosecute Colenso not ‘before a Court of Arches, but before the Republic of 
Letters’ also generates the impression that the distinction between the two might 
be a matter of literary taste, or at least that literary critics possess an alternative, 
esoteric model of piety.105 Yet the most troubling instability in the essay arises – 
as Maurice and Greg’s reactions attest – from its oddly stark exposure of the logic 
of the pious fraud tradition. Arnold begins his celebration of Spinoza by noting 
that Spinoza wrote in Latin, ‘the language of the instructed few’, and cites with 
approval Coleridge’s opinion that all ‘novel speculations about religion’ should be 
written in that language.106 After his careful exposition of Spinoza’s Biblical 
hermeneutics, Arnold declares that:  
 
Theology demands perfect obedience, Philosophy perfect 
knowledge: the obedience demanded by Theology and the 
knowledge demanded by Philosophy are alike saving. As 
speculative opinions about God, Theology requires only such as 
are indispensable to the reality of this obedience; the belief that 
God is, that He is a rewarder of them that seek Him, and that the 
proof of seeking Him is a good life. These are the fundamentals of 
Faith, and they are so clear and simple that none of the 
inaccuracies provable in the Bible narrative the least affect them, 
and they have indisputably come to us uncorrupted … Nay, 
beyond these fundamentals, speculative opinions are pious or 
impious, not as they are true or false, but as they confirm or shake 
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the believer in the practice of obedience. The truest speculative 
opinion about the nature of God is impious if it makes its holder 
rebellious; the falsest speculative opinion is pious if it makes him 
obedient. Governments should never render themselves the tools of 
ecclesiastical ambition by promulgating as fundamentals of the 
national Church’s faith more than these, and should concede the 
fullest liberty of speculation.107 
 
Although the paragraph ends with an affirmation of liberty, Arnold leaves 
open the possibility that both the government and the Church would be justified in 
prosecuting Colenso, since his book risks ‘shak[ing] the believer in the practice of 
obedience’ (and Arnold later specifies that he thinks that clergyman have no right 
to liberty of speculation).108 More startling is how Arnold’s will to aphorism leads 
him to lay bare the ‘pious fraud’ or ‘two-fold’ doctrine: on the one hand, there is 
the baldly authoritarian reduction of religious truth to whatever elicits pious 
obedience, while on the other, he gestures at a special, but restricted, scope for 
‘liberty of speculation’. This liberty seems reserved for instances of ‘heresy’ such 
as Spinoza’s – a philosopher whom, at the ‘tribunal’ of literary criticism, Arnold 
finds to be pious, and whose piety seems authenticated at least in part by the fact 
that he published only reluctantly, and then only in Latin.109 Yet immediately 
following this passage, Arnold specifies exactly those ideas about religion which 
apparently necessitate such careful limits upon freedom of expression. Arnold 
acknowledges the minimalist character of his own Christianity: he rejects the 
possibility of miracles and holds that the Christian scriptures are a discontinuous 
assemblage of myths and poetry, rather than a factual record or the inspired word 
of God.110 He then contrasts his non-metaphysical, Spinozan faith with the 
irrational, passionate faith of the ‘multitude’, and his emphasis upon the radical 
simplicity of his own belief rubs against the grain of his overarching concern with 
distinguishing between the kinds of religious knowledge that ought to be 
disclosed to educated and uneducated readers. The two arguments produce a 
contradiction: the truths of religion must be carefully protected since they are too 
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simple for most people to understand; in its irrationalism, the multitude will only 
exchange crude belief for crude unbelief. Simplicity in religious belief is a 
conspicuously mobile concept throughout the essay – salutary and sophisticated 
when it attaches to the minimalist religion of Spinoza and Arnold himself, 
dangerous and coarse when it issues in the miracle-mongering or facts-and-figures 
literalism of the multitude. Yet for all his anxiety about the democratisation of 
religious scepticism, Arnold expresses fatalism about this phenomenon by the 
essay’s end: here he affirms – rather sarcastically –  the inevitability of the spread 
of scepticism (‘speculation is to be made popular, all reticence is to be abandoned, 
every difficulty is to be canvassed publicly, every doubt is to be proclaimed ...’), 
and hails the new age of ‘heresy’ in spite of himself, since he hopes it may signal 
the birth pangs of a new age of the ‘strong thought of Spinoza!’111 
Although Arnold maintained that he felt nothing but ‘sincere impenitence’ 
about having published ‘The Bishop and the Philosopher’, the fact that he 
repeatedly returned to the subject of Colenso and sought to reframe his original 
argument suggests that he was disturbed by the accusations of illiberalism and 
‘pious fraud’ which the essay provoked.112 Indeed, judging by his subsequent and 
more substantial forays into the Higher Criticism of the Bible – St. Paul and 
Protestantism (1870), Literature and Dogma (1873) and God and the Bible 
(1875) – Arnold learnt his lesson: these later works are in the reforming spirit of 
the peroration to Spinoza in ‘The Bishop and the Philosopher’ rather than 
extensions of the pious fraud philosophy also articulated in that essay. In other 
words, Arnold came to accept the democratisation of religious doubt and sought 
to channel it toward a rational religion which renounced dogmatic bibliolatry in 
favour of an appreciation of the poetic nature of the Bible’s truths and which 
eschewed the finer points of theology and doctrine while preserving Christian 
morality and sentiment. Arnold’s conviction that if things are to stay the same, 
then everything must change – that is, if the Anglican Church is to remain viable 
and the essentials of Christianity are to be preserved, then religion must be 
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radically redefined – was pithily satirised by Wilde in ‘The Decay of Lying’ 
(1889) as an effort to ‘carry on the business of the old firm under the new 
name’.113 Yet arguably Wilde got his aphorism backward in this case: in many 
respects Arnold inaugurated a radically new enterprise under venerable names. 
The centrality of concepts of the ‘literary’ and the ‘poetic’ to Arnold’s 
conservative yet radical project is extremely well-charted critical territory, yet 
whether his overall achievement was to secularise religion, to sacralise Literature, 
or to create an imponderable hybrid remains a point of ambiguity in contemporary 
literary criticism. It attests to the ambiguities in Arnold’s perception of the 
relationship between the two phenomena – and in particular, to the extent to 
which he used the concept of the ‘literary’ to alternately collapse and fine-tune the 
distinction between belief and unbelief – that it is common to encounter critics 
who suggest that Arnold literally ‘replace[d] religion with poetry’ as well as 
critics who suppose that he simply celebrated the affinity of religion and 
literature, an affinity founded on their common use of metaphorical language to 
elicit sublime emotion.114 The first commonplace tends to posit Arnold as an 
agent (witting or otherwise) of secularisation, transferring the aura of a 
superannuated religion to a new cult of Literature, while the second tends to 
imagine him as the pioneer of a modernist Christianity and only up-dating the 
early Victorian ‘art as the handmaiden of religion’ axiom so that it might be 
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relevant to an age of the higher criticism and scientific advancement. Put more 
simply, there is no critical consensus on whether Arnold elevated literature at the 
expense of religion, or saved religion under the aegis of literature. There is 
probably a feedback loop at work here: if Arnold has been as influential as many 
scholars think in at once shaping the categories of the secular and the religious 
within literary studies and endowing the discipline with a quasi-religious sense of 
its mission, then literary critics are likely to be using his slippery distinctions 
between literature, religion and the secular as tools with which to analyse the 
nature of his position and his legacy.115 Another problem is that specialists in 
Victorian literature often use Arnold as a short-hand not only for the nexus 
between literature and religion in the Victorian age, but for the secularisation 
thesis: Arnold’s tendency to proffer literature and culture as panaceas to religious 
conflicts and anxieties has often seemed a telltale sign of an essentially – if 
reluctantly – secular sensibility, and this sensibility has in turn been taken as 
emblematic of an increasingly secular age.116 As McKelvy observes, scholarly 
efforts to appraise the emergence of a quasi-religious cult of literature in the 
nineteenth century may be divided into ‘constructionist’ and ‘declinist’ accounts: 
where ‘declinists’ imagine that a quasi-sacral cult of Literature occupied a 
vacancy created by the attenuation or demise of faith, constructionists imagine a 
more harmonious and equitable dance between the two, with literature drawing its 
power from its proximity to religion while helping religion to negotiate the 
challenges that it faces in a modern context.117 And even McKelvy’s distinction 
only yields a further question: if religion transfers its authority or qualities to 
literature, how do we conceptualise this transference? Does secularisation 
represent the emergence of something distinctive and new, or is the secular 
essentially constituted by the religious paradigms which it has disavowed?118  
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How a given critic interprets Arnold’s conflation of literature and religion 
usually depends upon whether he or she thinks that Arnold was an ostensibly 
secular figure who was ‘really’ religious at core or an ostensibly religious figure 
who was ‘really’ secular at core, a question which – as Ruth apRoberts notes – 
partly hinges on whether ‘one allows nonsupernatural Christianity as possible’.119 
Another complicating factor is that critics are often responding to the fact that 
Arnold effectively split his ambivalence toward religion and parceled it out 
between his poetry and his prose: crudely, where the austere melancholy of the 
poetry seems to tell the inward story and has often been taken as a testament to 
the spiritual anguish of the age and the declining fortunes of Christianity, the 
prose presents the smiling public man, and his famously playful, ironic, and 
sanguine prose persona everywhere affirms that the age’s religious crises are 
opportunities for Christianity to rejuvenate itself.120  
I noted that a tempered version of the pious fraud argument re-appears in 
‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’. Despite his protestations to the 
contrary, Arnold here seems chastened by the hostile reaction to ‘The Bishop and 
the Philosopher’, since he abstains from reproducing his earlier distinction 
between the kinds of religious speculation to which the many and the few should 
be exposed. Yet Colenso remains a troubling figure for Arnold; indeed, there is a 
sense in which Colenso embodies the problem that Arnold develops his model of 
cultural criticism to solve. As in the earlier essay, Arnold laments the fact that 
English intellectual culture has not digested the insights of the higher criticism, 
though now he pits Colenso against Renan rather than against Spinoza.121 The 
new comparison alters the substance of the argument, for Renan’s La Vie de Jésus 
was widely read in England and constituted a popularisation of the higher 
criticism rather than a work of groundbreaking scholarship.122 Thus Arnold no 
longer seeks to impugn Colenso for popularising scepticism about the Bible per se 
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but only impugns the quality of the scepticism Colenso has purveyed. Arnold 
notes that Frances Power Cobbe had bracketed Colenso and Renan together in a 
recent journal article on the state of religion in Europe, and he claims that her 
failure to draw a distinction between them is symptomatic of the impoverished 
state of the ‘critical spirit’ in England.123 Arnold unfolds his own ideal of cultural 
criticism as a means of drawing such a distinction between Colenso (who is oddly 
conflated with Voltaire) and Renan: 
 
M. Renan’s attempt is, for criticism, of the most real interest and 
importance, since, with all its difficulty, a fresh synthesis of the 
New Testament data, – not making a war upon them, in Voltaire’s 
fashion, not a leaving them out of mind, in the world’s fashion, but 
putting a new construction upon them, the taking them from under 
the old, traditional, conventional point of view and placing them 
under a new one,  – is the very essence of the religious problem, as 
now presented; and only by efforts in this direction can it receive a 
solution.124 
 
 In other words, Arnold’s ideal cultural criticism is a method for 
distinguishing between good and bad kinds of religious scepticism: where the 
former seeks to modernise or ‘put a new construction’ upon Christianity, the latter 
critiques without reconstructing and thus threatens Christianity’s survival. Arnold 
then adds a caveat: it is the ‘duty of criticism’ to endorse new ‘constructions’ 
upon Christianity only as far as they tend to preserve ‘historic Christianity’; more 
radical projects which beckon toward a ‘religion of the future’ also ‘fall short’ of 
criticism’s ‘high and perfect ideal’.125 Aside from the inadvertent comedy of 
Arnold’s effort to use ‘cultural criticism’ as a kind of Goldilocks principle which 
enables one to tell when religious scepticism is just right, his valorisation of 
Renan – like his valorisation of Spinoza – produces ambiguities.  Remarking upon 
the aesthetic and emotional appeal of Renan’s La Vie de Jésus had rapidly 
become an overdetermined cliché in England, and was at the core of the 
controversy which surrounded the book: whether Renan’s stylistic grace and 
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sympathetic evocation of the humanity of Christ compensated for the fact that the 
book denied Christ’s divinity and idealised Christianity only in humanist terms 
was a question which divided readers.126 While some devout English critics 
simply pronounced Renan an infidel in sheep’s clothing, others found that his 
literary gifts and nostalgic tenderness toward Christianity made his book 
palatable, even passably devout.127  
Arnold knew the risk of seeming to make a cult of subtlety: as he noted in 
‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’, ‘it will be said that it is a very 
subtle and indirect action which I am thus prescribing for criticism, and that by 
embracing in this manner of the Indian virtue of detachment and abandoning the 
sphere of practical life, it condemns itself to slow and obscure work.’128 Yet 
Arnold suggests that if his ideal of criticism errs on the side of quietism or 
obscurantism, this should be understood as a social tonic, since the real evil of the 
age is that there is no scope for ‘the free play of the mind’; all intellectual inquiry 
finds itself mired in religious controversy or party politics before it can come to 
fruition.129 As becomes apparent in the following passage, Arnold is thinking of 
the drubbing he received in the press for ‘The Bishop and the Philosopher’. 
Ironically, the ideal of intellectual freedom famously celebrated in ‘The Function 
of Criticism at the Present Time’ was at least partly forged as a defense of his 
previous, incendiary attempt to define the limits of intellectual freedom. Arnold 
characterises the outcry over his attack on Colenso as an example of the kind of 
partisan group-think which his ideal cultural criticism will transcend: where he 
was vilified for pointing out the shortcomings of ‘a brother liberal’ (i.e., Colenso), 
a more civilised culture would recognise the value of his maverick position, his 
commitment to the critic’s ‘duty to refuse or … at least cry with Obermann: 
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Périssons en résistant’.130 The circularity of Arnold’s argument – he wishes to be 
honoured as a liberal maverick for having denounced another liberal for 
presuming to be a maverick – returns us to the pious fraud logic submerged in the 
essay: Arnold at once reserves the right to critique religion in his preferred, 
oblique style, and the right to anathematise any critique of religion which 
threatens the stability of the social order because of its blunt language or reductive 
logic.  
Leslie Stephen was exasperated by Arnold’s conflations of religion and 
literature. From Stephen’s perspective, Arnold’s stylish proselytising on behalf of 
a Broad Church Anglicanism opened yet another front in the war between secular 
and religious opinion.131 In 1872, implicitly in reaction to Arnold’s St. Paul and 
Protestantism and Literature and Dogma, Stephen attacked what he regarded as a 
new tendency to construe ‘religious truth as merely a variety of artistic truth’ and 
subject doctrine to the ‘test of imaginative harmony, instead of the scrutiny of the 
verifying faculty’.132 Stephen labeled this liberal form of Christianity ‘religion as 
fine art’, and insisted that its palatability told against it, since it merely reflected 
an ‘effeminate dislike of all that is severe and melancholy in the old creeds’.133 
Stephen concluded: 
 
One may manufacture a dilettante religion; something which to 
professors of aesthetics will appear to be exceedingly graceful and 
pretty, but which will fail really to touch the hearts and 
consciences of mankind. But surely it is better … to look our 
perplexities in the face; to give up this feeble attempt at vamping 
old dogmas to look as good as new.134  
   
 Stephen’s distaste for ‘religion as fine art’ prompted him to question the 
continuing viability of art itself. If art and religion were as close as the new 
Christianity claimed, he reasoned, the two were then locked in a deadly embrace: 
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art and religion were sure to infect each other with self-consciousness and 
insincerity. An artistic culture that is so ‘parasitical’ upon the ‘decorative’ aspects 
of a deed creed was, Stephen prophesied, doomed to decay into mere 
antiquarianism.135 Published the year before Pater’s Renaissance, Stephen’s 
critique is prescient insofar as it captures part of the logic behind the decadent 
strain within aestheticism: the idea that art can only be ornamental, perverse, or 
self-conscious because it depends on a decaying creed for its effects. As I will 
suggest in relation to ‘Pico della Mirandola’, Pater sometimes positions his 
aestheticism as ‘decadent’ in this sense: it is a means of keeping religion ‘alive in 
the grave’ as an ironic aesthetic experience. Yet this is less than half the story. 
Pater’s early aestheticism also tries to pass beyond the terms of such critique by 
suggesting that art derives its power not from religion but from a primordial 
enchantment with the secular. 
 
‘Room for a Noble Antinomianism’: Arnold, Heresy, and Pater’s 
Renaissance 
 
Damon Franke has drawn attention to the way in which the concept of ‘heresy’ 
underwrites Pater’s work, although his analysis produces a contradiction which is 
worth prying apart. Franke’s book as a whole emphasises the primacy of the 
‘synthetic’ or ‘syncretic’ type of heresy in Victorian and modernist literature: 
flouting Christ’s prohibition against putting new wine in old bottles, many writers 
pursued self-consciously ‘heretical’ projects which sought to fuse the ancient and 
the modern, the Christian and the non-Christian.136 Pater is Franke’s key example 
of a Victorian synthesiser, and he argues that Pater sought to reconcile the 
Christian and the pagan at the level of both aesthetics and values. Yet much of 
Franke’s discussion of Pater pulls against the idea of ‘reconciliation’ insofar as he 
focuses overwhelmingly on Pater’s efforts to critique Christianity and frequently 
registers the extent to which Pater ‘yokes together [the] two terms to privilege … 
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paganism’.137 Franke’s contradictory reading is in fact faithful to Pater’s early 
work, which frequently deploys an Arnoldian rhetoric of reconciliation in a way 
that is clearly skewed toward the pagan and the secular, concepts which Pater 
conflates. (Pater attempts a more even-handed treatment of Christianity and 
paganism in Marius, but ‘reconciliation’ is perhaps an inadequate term for 
characterising the elaborately wrought ambiguities of that novel.) In the three 
essays I examine here, Pater’s preoccupation with the concept of heresy stems not 
from a commitment to the synthesis of paganism and Christianity but from a bid 
to locate and glorify moments of secular rupture within Christian culture and art.  
Along with the book’s actual ‘Preface’, ‘Aucassin and Nicolette’ is a kind 
of prolegomenon to The Renaissance: it introduces not only the preoccupations of 
the book, but the logic behind Pater’s idiosyncratic method as a critic. Pater 
famously begins not with the Renaissance as it was conventionally conceived – as 
a moment of cultural efflorescence in fifteenth-century Italy – but with the grand 
pronouncement that the Renaissance is in fact a trans-historical imperative in 
human life. Pater loosens the ‘Renaissance’ not only from its temporal and 
geographical moorings – he chooses medieval France as his example – but from 
its association with the West’s classical inheritance. The recovery of antiquity is 
‘but one element or symptom’ of what Pater takes to be a much more sweeping 
and primordial phenomenon: namely, a secular eudaemonism which is as basic to 
human nature as sexual desire and which re-asserts itself perennially, even as it 
meets with persecution and is forced to conceal itself ‘under all sorts of 
disguises’.138 In other words, for Pater, the word ‘Renaissance’ names an always 
resurgent, if often repressed, endeavour to prioritise the desire for happiness in the 
here and now, and by definition, this must be an emotional, sensuous and present-
oriented project rather than a merely scholastic or backward-looking one. The 
most striking feature of ‘Aucassin and Nicolette’ is its incantatory accumulation 
and repetition of simple words which call on the pleasure principle, often in such 
a way as to elide intellectual and sexual seduction, or artistic creativity and 
                                                
137 Ibid., 146. 
138 Pater, Renaissance, 9 and 16. 
182 
 
procreation: for example, in a brief essay which runs to only nine pages, 
‘pleasure’, ‘pleasurable’, or ‘pleasant’, appear eight times, ‘passion’ or 
‘passionate’ appear seven times, and ‘sweet’ or ‘sweetness’ appear five times, 
often in charged proximity to each other. Pater harps on the hedonic not simply to 
enact a kind of seduction of the reader, but to convey the kind of propulsive 
energy required for a Renaissance or ‘outbreak of the human spirit’ to take place, 
and to measure the force of the repressions it must overcome.139 The repetitions of 
‘enjoyment’, ‘desire’, ‘sweetness’, ‘prompting’, ‘sources’, ‘new’, and ‘revival’ try 
to approximate in prose the mesmeric effects of the repetitive, often circular 
forms of medieval Provençal poetry. Pater’s repetition of hedonic catch words 
also seeks to mime the way new ideas circulate and fructify, with one core idea – 
‘a more liberal and comely way of life’ – reproducing itself into a brood of 
associated ideas. Meanwhile, Pater’s emphasis upon fertility – upon the ‘seeds’ 
and ‘sources’ of renewal – literalises the metaphor of a ‘Renaissance’ in order to 
push us to a recognition of what he takes to be its logical implication: namely, that 
such moments of cultural and intellectual re-birth have sexual desire at their 
origins. 
As David DeLaura has noted, Pater’s valorisation of ‘sweetness’ is an 
appropriation of Arnold’s advocacy of Hellenic ‘sweetness and light’.140 As an 
appropriation, it borders on abuse, since Arnold recommended Hellenic 
‘sweetness and light’ not as a supreme good in itself, but as a regulative 
principle.141 Arnold imagined that what he called ‘Hebraism’ – a combination of 
moral zeal and the mystical dimensions of religion – was oppressively 
predominant in Victorian culture, and that Hellenism was required to civilise it. 
His endorsement of ‘sweetness and light’ was an injunction not to individualistic 
pleasure but to rational enquiry; insofar as it is a Hellenic ideal, it is a decidedly 
Apollonian one, aspiring toward clarity and objectivity, and its ‘sweetness’ names 
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not a pleasure principle but a code of intellectual civility.142 Both sides of 
Arnold’s dichotomy imply self-renunciation: for the sake of Hebraism, we submit 
to a moral law, and relinquish some freedom; for the sake of Hellenism, we 
submit to an intellectual law, and relinquish some (religious) imagination. When 
Arnold effects a reconciliation, he does so by combining these self-renunciations, 
and enjoining humanity to serve two exacting masters, reason and religion: we 
must make ‘reason and the will of God prevail’.143  
Pater unpicks the logic of Arnold’s Hellenism/Hebraism dichotomy by 
suggesting that ‘reason’ was never divorced from imagination in the first place. In 
Pater’s definition, a Renaissance is ‘an outbreak of the reason and the 
imagination’, ‘an assertion of the liberty of the heart’, and a ‘search after the 
pleasures of the senses and the imagination’.144 In effect, Pater here seizes upon 
the association of Enlightenment reason with the validation of ordinary, sensuous 
experience as the pathway to knowledge, and takes it as a means of conflating 
intellectual inquiry with erotic desire. Pater’s ‘reason’ thus requires not self-
renunciation, but self-discovery; not a sober effort to ‘see things as they really 
are’ but an emancipated, sensuous imagination. Yet Richard Dellamora creates 
artificial distance between Arnold and Pater when he suggests that Pater’s ideal of 
the Renaissance simply counters Arnold’s ‘authoritarian’ and ‘erotophobic’ 
Hellenism/Hebraism dichotomy.145 It is precisely because the rigidities of 
Arnold’s schemas often only reveal themselves to an extremely conscientious 
reader, and his own hedonic catchphrases – ‘sweetness and light’, ‘pleasure of the 
free disinterested play of the mind’, ‘the desire after the things of the mind simply 
for their own sakes and for the pleasure of seeing them as they are’ – have such 
resonance that his work was susceptible to Pater’s appropriation.146 Arnold was 
himself accused of merely promoting a ‘refined eudaemonism’ in his cultural 
criticism, and his efforts to redeem aesthetic and intellectual pleasure, coupled 
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with his conflations of religion and literature, were to a great extent always open 
to being read as codes for the aestheticist project that Pater explicitly 
undertook.147 It also worth noting that when Pater and Swinburne rose to 
prominence, Arnold was himself scrutinised through the lens of aestheticism by 
critics who suspected him of pursuing an anti-religious agenda by stealth: for 
example, in 1867, Peter Bayne, an Evangelical Scots journalist, claimed that 
Arnold was merely more surreptitious than Swinburne when heaping ‘disdain 
upon all who persist in accepting Christianity as Divine’, and denounced them 
both as proponents of a demoralising secularism which ‘throw[s] the wisdom of 
Tennyson and Browning into the shade’.148 
It is the concept of heresy that enables Pater to posit a Renaissance ‘within 
the limits of the middle age’, and, by extension, discover ‘a secular, a rebellious 
spirit’ within the limits of the Golden Age of faith. 149 Like Swinburne, Pater was 
alert to the extent to which the notion that Christianity was in decline hinged upon 
the perception that there was a pre-modern golden age in which piety was stable 
and universal. The question of the depth and reach of medieval Christianity 
remains one of the vexed issues in modern debates over the secularisation thesis, 
since the postulation of a decline in religion obviously demands a point of vitality 
against which decline can be measured, and the idea of a Golden Age of faith, 
with all of its suspicious allure as a narrative about a prelapsarian past and a fallen 
present, is now often rejected by historians as a myth.150 Yet the idealisation of 
the medieval period as the age of pure faith was at the core of much nineteenth-
century medieval revivalism, from the Anglo-Catholic and Oxford movements to 
Ruskin and Tennyson’s varieties of Romantic medievalism; it was also, albeit 
ambiguously, implicit in some of the medievalist productions of the pre-
Raphaelite circle. A considerable part of Swinburne’s oeuvre is devoted to 
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contesting this glorification of the medieval period as a lost paradise of 
Christianity while sustaining a Romantic investment in the period as the site of a 
more authentic and passionate form of life. It is from Swinburne that Pater learns 
how the concept of heresy enables one to retain a full-blown Romantic vision of 
an enchanted medieval past while repudiating the Christian nostalgia which 
conventionally inflected such a discourse in the Victorian period. As Donald Hill 
points out, ‘Aucassin and Nicolette’ was inspired by Swinburne’s William Blake, 
which also takes heresy – specifically the Albigensian crusades – as a means of 
reading the medieval period against the Victorian grain.151 This is also one of the 
most forceful of Swinburne’s early articulations of his aestheticist philosophy: 
 
Take the medieval period in its broadest sense; not to speak of the 
notably heretical and immoral Albigeois with their exquisite school 
of heathenish verse … see by such poems as Chaucer’s Court of 
Love, absolutely one in tone and handling as it is with the old 
Albigensian Aucassin and all its paganism, how the poets of the 
time, with their eager nascent worship of beautiful form and 
external nature, dealt with established opinion and the incarnate 
moralities of church or household. It is easy to see why the Church 
on its own principle found it (as in the Albigensian case) a matter 
of the gravest necessity to have such schools of art and thought cut 
down or burnt out. Priest and poet, all those times through, were 
proverbially on terms of reciprocal biting and striking. That 
magnificent invention of making ‘Art the handmaid of Religion’ 
had not been stumbled upon in the darkness of those days. Neither 
minstrel nor monk would have been caught up the idea with any 
rapture. As indeed they would have been unwise to do: for the 
thing is impossible.152 
 
Swinburne idealises the Middle Ages as a period in which art and religion 
were engaged in an honest agon, rather than forced into the sorts of ambiguous 
reconciliations he finds so dissatisfying in Victorian culture. A casual reader 
might infer from Swinburne’s argument that the Albigensians were an avowedly 
pagan sect, and this distortion is of course willed. (Although little is known of the 
details of Albigensian theology, they espoused a radical dualism akin to 
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Manichaeism, and regarded matter as evil; their heresy consisted in accusing 
orthodox Christianity of having confounded the spiritual and the material.)153 
Swinburne’s aestheticism is here a flamboyantly tendentious way of reading 
Christian history in secularising terms, although Swinburne, unlike Pater, is eager 
to justify his logic: 
 
Observe especially in Chaucer’s most beautiful of young poems 
that appalling passage, where, turning the favourite edgetool of 
religious menace back with point inverted upon those who forged 
it, the poet represents men and women of religious habit or life as 
punished in the next world, beholding afar off with jealous regret 
the salvation and happiness of Venus and all her servants … 
expressly punished, these monks and nuns, for their continence and 
holiness of life, and compelled after death to an eternity of fruitless 
repentance for having willfully missed of pleasure and made light 
of indulgence in this world: which is perfect Albigeois. Compare 
the famous speech in Aucassin et Nicolette, where the typical hero 
weighs in a judicial manner the respective attractions of heaven 
and hell; deciding of course dead against the former on account of 
the deplorably bad company kept there: priests, hermits, saints and 
such-like, in lieu of knights and ladies, painters and poets.154 
 
As can be felt here, Swinburne enjoys radical oppositions between Heaven 
and Hell, the spirit and the flesh, since he thinks that they make the superiority of 
worldly things unmistakable – a superiority affirmed by the fact that Aucassin 
would rather love Nicolette in Hell than suffer the tedious company of the pious 
in Heaven. When Pater appropriates Swinburne’s anti-Christian reading of 
Aucassin et Nicolette and the Albigensian heresy, there is no such clarification of 
his logic. He also muddies the water by linking the Albigensian heresy to the 
Antinomian heresy (although he uses ‘antinomian’ in a loose, metaphorical 
sense): 
 
One of the strongest characteristics of that outbreak of the reason 
and the imagination … which I have termed a medieval 
Renaissance, was its antinomianism, its spirit of rebellion and 
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revolt against the moral and religious ideas of the age. In their 
search after the pleasures of the senses and the imagination, in their 
care for beauty, in their worship of the body, people were impelled 
beyond the bounds of the primitive Christian ideal; and their love 
became a strange idolatry, a strange rival religion … The 
perfection of culture is not rebellion but peace; yet on the way to 
that end there is room for a noble antinomianism. This element in 
the middle age, so often ignored by those writers on it, who have 
said so much of the ‘Ages of Faith’, this rebellious and antinomian 
element … is found alike in the history of Abelard and the legend 
of Tannhäuser … The Albigensian movement, connected so 
strangely with the history of Provençal poetry, is [also] deeply 
tinged with it.155 
 
Immediately following this passage, Pater supplies a long, untranslated 
quotation from Aucassin’s speech about his preference for a beautiful Hell over a 
vapid paradise. Pater registers the decadent, proto-Baudelairean quality of 
Aucassin’s speech by noting that the antinomian imperative has its ‘sinister’ 
aspect, but this is the only critical remark that he makes about his medieval 
Renaissance throughout the essay. Indeed, aside from this one ambiguous 
qualification – within the decadent idiom that Pater was starting to cultivate, 
‘sinister’ could serve as a term of aesthetic appreciation – Pater’s medieval 
Renaissance is a wholly idealised phenomenon: it is a glorious affirmation of all 
that is most vital in human nature. Pater’s ambition here is nothing less than to 
essentialise and universalise the ‘secular spirit’ by identifying it with a libidinal 
life-force that is always affirmed in art, even where it is apparently condemned or 
disavowed. Positing a Renaissance in the Middle Ages also enables Pater to 
detach secularism from its associations with modern scientific reason and imagine 
it in terms of a rigged competition between Christ and Venus, or between ascetic 
self-denial and eros. Pater had already played with this idea in his 1868 review of 
William Morris’s poetry, an essay which was also formed the basis of the 
‘Conclusion’ to the Renaissance. Here Pater claimed that one of the striking 
novelties of Morris’s poetry was, paradoxically, Morris’s revival of Arthurian 
legends, and in particular, his use of those legends to explore the antagonism 
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between Christianity and ‘sensuous love,’ an antagonism dramatised as the 
‘strange suggestion of a deliberate choice between Christ and a rival lover’.156 
Pater argues that Morris’s work clarifies the extent to which medieval Provençal 
poets never really found it hard to choose between the two. Deploying the same 
logic that Swinburne applied to the Albigensian heresy, Pater asserts that 
Christian asceticism, pushed to any pitch of intensity, always betrays its ‘secret’ 
wishes and rebounds into sensuous passion: 
 
That religion shades into sensuous love, and sensuous love into 
religion, has been often seen … Only by the inflaming influence of 
such idols can any religion compete with the presence of the 
fleshly lover. And so in these imaginative loves, in their highest 
expression the Provençal poetry, it is a rival religion with a new 
rival cultus that see. Coloured through and through with Christian 
sentiment, they are rebels against it … The jealousy of that other 
lover, for who these words and images and strange ways of 
sentiment were first devised, is the secret here of a triumphant 
colour and heat. It is the mood of the cloister taking a new 
direction, and winning so a later space of life that it never 
anticipated. Who knows whether, when the simple belief in them 
has faded away, the most cherished sacred writings may not for the 
first time exercise their highest influence as the most delicate 
amorous poetry in the world?157 
 
Here is a secular way of appropriating all the Christian past: to read sacred 
writings as ‘amorous poetry’ from a modern, secular perspective does not 
rationalise them or betray their spirit, but actually restores them to their original 
meaning, since religion could only compete with ‘fleshly lover[s]’ through a 
transvaluation of the amorous in the first place. And like Swinburne, Pater insists 
that the more a given artifact of culture seems ‘coloured through and through with 
Christian sentiment’, the more one can perceive that it actually exceeds and 
‘rebels’ against such sentiment. Pater goes on to argue that Morris’s use of 
Hellenism in The Life and Death of Jason (1867) represents a radical advance on 
such medieval conflicts between flesh and spirit, an awakening to ‘a better 
daylight’ metaphorically akin to the Renaissance or the Enlightenment; it shows 
                                                
156 Pater, ‘Poems By William Morris’, Westminster Review 34.2 (1868), 301. 
157 Ibid., 301-302. 
189 
 
the embodied nature of human experience released from the Christian burden of 
sin, and celebrated in purely secular terms: ‘Desire here is towards the body of 
nature for its own sake, not because a soul is divined through it’.158 At this stage 
of his career, Pater, like Swinburne, will not rest content with simply celebrating 
the carnal; he must specify its thoroughly secular nature, the absence of any 
religious or metaphysical extension to it.  
Pater also inherits from Swinburne the tendency to stage confrontations 
between Christianity and a secular eudaemonism, where the latter force is both 
doomed to repression and destined for an ultimate victory. This motif of victory-
in-defeat can be found in Pater’s portrait of Abelard, whom he chooses as a key 
representative for his theory of a medieval Renaissance in ‘Aucassin and 
Nicolette’. Asserting that ‘everyone knows the legend of Abelard’, Pater supplies 
only a few suggestive facts and arranges these in a paratactic fashion which 
prompts the reader to infer the missing connections.159 Abelard is used to 
exemplify Pater’s thesis that great moments of intellectual awakening are 
traceable to moments of sexual awakening: Abelard’s forbidden love for Héloïse 
is inseparable from the fact that they ‘refine’ upon the ‘nature of abstract ideas’ in 
their lessons together, with the implication that their intellectual discourse draws 
them out of the ‘shadowy’ abstractions of theology and toward an apprehension of 
the sensuous, embodied character of knowledge.160 Pater specifies that Abelard’s 
very facility with abstract ideas meant that he did not over-estimate their value, 
and this in turn led him to ‘relax’ the restraints of Christian sexual morality.161 
The focus here is entirely upon Abelard as the archetypal ‘great lover’ and upon 
the correlation between sexual and intellectual discovery.162 With typically 
charged diffidence, Pater neglects to mention that Abelard was grotesquely 
punished for wandering ‘beyond the bounds of the primitive Christian ideal’: 
when Héloïse’s uncle learnt of her affair with Abelard, he ordered Abelard’s 
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castration.163 He also fails to clarify that Abelard’s rebelliousness extended 
beyond his love affair: his career was marked by theological controversy and he 
was twice convicted of heresy, once at the council of Soissons in 1121 for his 
heterodox interpretation of the Trinity, and again at the council of Sens in 1140, 
for his treatise Theologia Christiana. Instead, Pater uses a quotation from 
Michelet to gesture at the persecution Abelard faced: 
 
At the foot of that early Gothic tower, which the next generation 
raised to grace the precincts of Abelard’s school on the ‘mountain’ 
of Saint Genevieve, the historian Michelet sees in thought ‘a 
terrible assembly; not the hearers of Abelard alone, fifty bishops, 
twenty cardinals, two popes, the whole body of scholastic 
philosophy: not only the learned Héloïse, the teaching of languages 
and the Renaissance, but Arnold of Brescia – that it to say, the 
revolution’.164 
 
Michelet presented Abelard as an agent of secularisation who unwittingly 
dismantled medieval theology by virtue of his sheer intellectual brio: ‘He treated 
religion courteously and handled her gently, but she melted away in his hands. 
Nothing embarrassed the fluent speaker: he reduced religion to philosophy, and 
morality to humanity’.165 Michelet’s interpretation breathes through Pater’s vision 
of Abelard as the ideal type of humanist freethinker, for whom there is a 
necessary relation between the ‘free play of human intelligence’ and the embrace 
of ‘earthly passion’.166 Michelet’s vatic pronouncement that Abelard is father not 
only to the Reformation, but to the French Revolution, also dovetails with Pater’s 
desire to posit the Renaissance as a trans-historical phenomenon, always latent 
where it is not manifest.167 (Arnold of Brescia was Abelard’s protégé and is often 
read as a proto-Protestant heretic because of his crusade against ecclesiastical 
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corruption; he was executed in 1155 for his pivotal role in the Commune of 
Rome.) Pater’s choice of quotation here thus enables him to conceive of Abelard 
as triumphant, his ‘spirit going abroad’ even if he was persecuted in his lifetime. 
In this way, Pater suppresses the negative elements in the Abelard story in order 
to produce a utopian fable about the lure of sexual desire and heretical ideas, 
which will always radiate from literature whenever they are repressed by social 
authority (Pater suggests that Abelard’s legacy ‘penetrated the early literature of 
Italy and finds an echo in Dante’), and which will in any case win the longer 
historical game.168 
As DeLaura has suggested, Pater’s celebration of Abelard as the heroic 
agent of modern intellectual liberty is perhaps a response to Arnold’s tentative 
inclusion of Abelard within his pantheon of men who might be considered 
exemplars of ‘sweetness and light’ in Culture and Anarchy.169Arnold invokes 
Abelard in the context of a discussion about the essentially democratic character 
of past golden ages of culture and celebrates him as an ‘apostle of equality’ who 
disseminated his work as widely as possible; to this extent, his characterisation of 
Abelard dovetails with Pater’s.170 Yet Arnold only praises Abelard in qualified 
terms, noting his ‘many imperfections’ (one assumes this refers to his illicit love 
affair, but it may also refer to his heresies – as we have seen, Arnold has little 
sympathy for figures who court theological controversy). Arnold ultimately 
subsumes Abelard under the category of men who ‘diffuse sweetness and light, to 
make reason and the will of God prevail’: such men manifest a critical, Hellenic 
spirit not to contend against religion, but to perfect and rationalise it.171 Arnold’s 
wider concern is to emphasise that democracy need not have a coarsening effect 
on culture, for periods of cultural renaissance are instigated by the transmission of 
elite values – ‘the best that is known and thought in the world’ – to the mass of 
humanity.172Aside from the fact that Pater clearly gives an erotic and secular gloss 
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to cultural enlightenment where Arnold absorbs it into his ideal of a reasonable 
Christianity, Pater is simply less anxious than Arnold about the process by which 
enlightenment passes from intellectuals to the multitude: where Arnold pleads for 
rationality and moderation, Pater freely rhapsodises about rebellion. As Linda 
Dowling has argued, Pater often appears remarkably insouciant about the 
possibilities of what she calls ‘aesthetic democracy’ – that is, the belief that the 
democratisation of high culture and aesthetic taste can underwrite liberal progress. 
Dowling shows that where other partisans of aesthetic democracy such as Arnold 
were wary of how this ideal might be perverted and thus framed it in restrictive 
terms, Pater tended to espouse it blithely, without concern for its thornier 
implications or how it might actually work within the social fabric of Victorian 
England.173 
Ironically, however, Pater found in Arnold’s work a sanction for this  
tendency to gesture grandly at the utopian vistas revealed by art without particular 
concern for their practical ramifications. As I have noted, ‘The Function of 
Criticism at the Present Time’ sanctifies cultural criticism as a space in which 
ideas may be explored with special freedom, and without their practical 
implications – particularly their political and religious implications – foreclosing 
the ‘play of the mind’. I suggested that this ideal retains traces of the pious fraud 
tradition; it is inscribed with Arnold’s qualms about the spread of religious doubt, 
and with his desire to make fine distinctions between Renan and Colenso, or 
between types of scepticism which seem only to recast religion, and those which 
endanger it. Yet Arnold’s solution – he rendered the capacity to make fine 
distinctions and to be alive to the literary subtleties of religious questions as the 
cardinal virtues of cultural criticism – could easily be appropriated by a secular 
sensibility such as Pater’s, which had no interest in making the types of 
distinction Arnold had in mind. Moreover, insofar as Arnold’s effort to carve out 
a space for the free play of ideas seemed to depend upon a quasi-aristocratic ideal 
of fine sensibility, it made room – in Pater’s phrase – for a ‘noble antinomianism’: 
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it could generate the impression that to the cultural critic, all things are pure, and 
any sentiment or subject, including a far more radical kind of secularism, may be 
rendered permissible if it is handled with sufficient finesse. In other words, Pater 
makes explicit the element of ‘noble antinomianism’ always implicit in Arnold’s 
use of cultural criticism as a means of differentiating between types of religious 
scepticism; he appropriates the idea that scepticism is a prestigious, quasi-
aristocratic secret that demands sensitive handling, but he evinces none of 
Arnold’s fear that its dissemination might have ill effects on the social order. By 
registering this difference, we can bridge the apparent gap between Dowling’s 
influential account of Pater’s aestheticism as essentially egalitarian in its 
assumptions, and the older view of Pater as the high priest of a cult of rarefied 
sensibility who sought to address only ‘an elite band of Oxonian souls’.174 Like 
Arnold, Pater often seems to associate religious scepticism with the ‘delicacies of 
the higher morality of the few’, but unlike Arnold, Pater rarely makes caveats 
about the ‘many’, and his invocations of the few thus often seem to have a 
democratic aimlessness: while he clearly cherishes the association between 






‘Our Antagonist is Our Helper’: Pater, Arnold, and the Cult of Nuance 
 
Pater’s ‘Aucassin and Nicolette’ is clearly written in a Swinburnean rather than an 
Arnoldian key – its fervent rhetoric and bold juxtapositions between asceticism 
and eros strive to make medieval Christianity confess to being secular after all, in 
love with the sensuous, material world  no matter how much it affected to have 
other priorities. Yet in the following two essays in the Renaissance – ‘Pico della 
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Mirandola’ and ‘Botticelli’ – Pater explores heresy in a more mellow, Arnoldian 
tone, attending to fine distinctions and apparently subjecting his polemical 
tendencies to the discipline of reserve and detachment. Nonetheless, Pater 
practices the Arnoldian virtue of disinterestedness here in order to pursue the kind 
of radical secularism that Arnold evolved his model of cultural criticism to 
contain. 
When critics compare Arnold and Pater, they conventionally present 
Arnold as the architect of an impersonal, objective, and – by some accounts – 
authoritarian mode of criticism which Pater appropriated and turned to 
impressionistic, subjectivist or even narcissistic ends.176 What this commonplace 
fails to capture is the extent to which Pater often makes explicit the element of 
projection and fantasy involved in appreciating a work of art or literature in order 
to dramatise the problematics of interpreting the West’s cultural inheritance 
through a secular optic. This problematic often surfaces in The Renaissance, but it 
receives its most complex treatment in ‘Botticelli’. Here, as in the case of 
‘Aucassin and Nicolette’, Pater seems to evolve his own position in dialogue with 
Swinburne and Arnold: it is well established that Pater drew upon Swinburne’s 
‘Notes on Designs of the Old Masters at Florence’ (1868) for this essay, and it is 
also an attempt to use Arnoldian disinterestedness as a means of reading sacred 
art in secular terms.  
Pater is not content to project his own secularising imperatives onto 
Botticelli’s paintings in an avowedly fanciful, anachronistic way. Instead, he 
argues that Botticelli’s paintings on sacred themes are only superficially religious; 
their real theme is the desire to be relieved of the burdens of religion, and the 
longing for a joyful, unmediated habitation of this world. As I noted, it was 
Pater’s interpretations of Botticelli that Oliphant chose as her prime example of 
his perversity as a critic. Even John Addington Symonds, himself a sceptic and an 
aesthete, thought that Pater assigned to Botticelli ‘a far greater amount of 
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skeptical self-consciousness than he was at all likely to have possessed’ and noted 
that what Pater took as evidence of Botticelli’s peculiar ‘antagonism’ toward 
Catholicism was just pro forma workmanship.177 While such objections are 
reasonable, they overlook the sly self-reflexivity of Pater’s essay. In particular, 
they overlook the nature of the secularism which Pater ascribes to Botticelli: 
rather than simply suggesting that his sacred paintings have a secular 
undercurrent, he claims such paintings allegorise Botticelli’s desire to break free 
of the Christian frameworks that were imposed upon him. In other words, Pater 
makes the desire to dispense with an alien burden of meaning the very substance 
of Botticelli’s supposed secular impulse, and thus installs the obvious objection to 
his own methodology – that is, that he is merely imposing his own agenda upon 
Botticelli – at the centre of what he alleges to find in Botticelli’s art. 
 As in the case of ‘Aucassin and Nicolette’, Pater here uses heresy as a 
point of departure for his own heretical mode of interpretation. Pater derives from 
Vasari the story that Botticelli was accused of heresy because of a painting of the 
Assumption (a painting which was in fact by Fransesco Botticini, but Pater 
follows Vasari’s false attribution). Pater suggests that the origin of the heresy lay 
with the commissioner of the painting, Matteo Palmieri: he was the author of a 
theological poem called ‘La Città Divina’ which ‘represented the human race as 
an incarnation of those angels who, in the revolt of Lucifer, were neither for God 
nor for his enemies’.178 While allowing that the story may be apocryphal, Pater 
nonetheless freely embroiders it, arguing not only that Botticelli’s most 
representative work is imbued with this ‘wayward dream of Palmieri’, but that 
Palmieri’s assessment of humanity – it is angelic in its very neutrality and lack of 
loyalty to God – is an apt metaphor for the autonomy of art, and particularly for 
art’s disaffiliation from religious concerns.179 Pater audaciously uses Dante, who 
would seem such a prestigious and incontestable example of the unity of religion 
and art in Western culture, as a means of identifying orthodox faith with prosiness 
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and artistic failure: in contrast to Botticelli’s alleged heresies, Dante’s 
‘conventional orthodoxy’, particularly his reduction of ‘all human action to the 
easy formula of purgatory, heaven, and hell … leaves an insoluble element of 
prose in the depths of his poetry’.180 It is worth noting how Pater deploys 
metaphors of surface and depth to disturb the conventional identification of 
religion with art: just as Dante’s theological commitments embed prose in the 
‘depths’ of his poetry, with the implication that the surface religious content 
creates mysterious, subterranean imperfections, Botticelli’s genius inheres in the 
fact that, while he painted religious subjects, he ‘painted them with an under-
current of original sentiment which touches you as the real matter of the picture 
through the veil of its ostensible subject’.181 In other words, Pater’s secular ideal 
is itself an occult phenomenon insofar as it has to be sifted from the theological 
sediment in the depths or discerned through the veils of religion, despite the fact 
that its value supposedly inheres in the fact that it ‘touches’ one as what is most 
immediate and forcibly ‘real’. 
Pater boldly applies Palmieri’s heresy to his reading of Botticelli’s 
Madonnas: as rendered by Botticelli, the Madonna is ‘one of those who are 
neither for God nor for his enemies, and her choice is on her face’.182 This 
suggestion of a conspicuous choice is a crucial hinge in the essay. The first time 
Pater glosses the ‘neither for God nor for his enemies’ idea in relation to 
Botticelli, he makes it sound like a pacific abstention from choice, and then 
celebrates this non-committal attitude as the supreme desideratum of art: 
 
Just what Dante scorns as unworthy alike of heaven and hell, 
Botticelli accepts, that middle world in which men take no side in 
great conflicts, and decide no great causes, and make great 
refusals. He thus sets for himself the limits within which art, 
undisturbed by any moral ambition, does it most sincere and surest 
work.183 
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 Yet in the ensuing discussion, not choosing between God and Lucifer, or 
adhering to an aestheticist ideal, turns out to be a distinctive choice: it implies not 
neutrality but the choice of a secular sensibility over a religious one. And this 
secular sensibility is not simply indifferent to religion; rather, it seems to entail an 
active iconoclasm. As Paul Tucker has shown, Pater’s ekphrasis systematically 
de-sacralises the figure of the Madonna.184 Pater’s suggestion that Botticelli 
represents the Madonna as a figure coerced into a theological drama from which 
she would rather ‘shrink’ and who just desires secular, mortal life, or ‘a warmer, 
lower humanity’, clearly encodes Pater’s perception that while art may be coerced 
into religious aims, it always betrays a wish to be free from such obligations and 
to dedicate itself wholly to the things of this world.185 Pater urges the intuitiveness 
of his own secularising logic by presenting it in terms of what is everywhere and 
plain to see if we would only look: the real choice of Botticelli’s Madonna, the 
fact that the ‘high cold words’ of Christianity ‘have no meaning for her’, is quite 
simply ‘on her face’.186 (Pater articulates his sense that a secular orientation is 
always written ‘on the face’ of art even more forcefully in his ‘Winckelmann’ 
essay, where he announces, ‘For a time art dealt with Christian subjects as its 
patrons required; but its true freedom was in the life of the senses and the blood – 
blood no longer dropping from the hands in sacrifice, as with Angelico, but, as 
with Titian, burning in the face for desire and love’.)187 Yet if Pater’s suggestion 
that Botticelli’s Madonnas are ‘peevish-looking’ because they resent having been 
co-opted by Christianity strikes us as scandalous or counter-intuitive, Pater 
implies that he is only mirroring Botticelli’s own wayward imagination:188 
 
The genius of which Botticelli is the type usurps the data before it 
as the exponent of ideas, moods, visions of its own; with this 
interest it plays fast and loose with those data, rejecting some and 
isolating others, and always combining them anew. To him, as to 
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Dante, the scene, the colour, the outward image or gesture, comes 
with all its decisive and importunate reality; but awakes in him, 
moreover, by some subtle structure of his own, a mood which it 
awakes in no one else, of which it is the double or repetition, and 
which it clothes, that all may share it, with sensuous 
circumstances.189 
 
 In this twisting sentence, we are invited to lose track of the referent of the 
pronouns, and to perceive that Pater is insinuating himself as a ‘double or 
repetition’ of Botticelli: like Botticelli himself, Pater plays ‘fast and loose’ with 
the religious content of Botticelli’s paintings to locate within them a sensuous 
‘mood’ of his own – and yet, Pater suggests, he is only being true to Botticelli’s 
art by ‘usurp[ing]’ its ‘data’ in this fashion.   
 Pater derived part of his heretical reading of Botticelli from Swinburne, 
who also found a ‘love of soft hints and veiled meaning’ in Botticelli’s art, and 
who proposed that a ‘suppressed leaning to grotesque invention and a hunger after 
heathen liberty … break out whenever [Botticelli] is released from the mill-horse 
round of mythologic virginity and sacred childhood’.190 Although Swinburne’s 
language is blunter, Pater goes further than he in attributing anti-Christian 
intentions to Botticelli; where Swinburne only claims to detect a repressed 
paganism in Botticelli’s paintings, Pater claims to find elaborate allegories of 
secular aestheticism hidden within them. It is thus surprising that John Coates 
thinks that Pater’s ‘Botticelli’ essay is a critique of the ‘rhetoric of anti-Christian 
rebellion and sexual unorthodoxy’ that Swinburne projected onto Botticelli.191 
Coates arrives at this argument partly by overlooking what Oliphant and Symonds 
found so flagrant in Pater’s essay, yet the fact that it is susceptible to Coates’s 
reading is itself revealing. Coates elevates Pater above Swinburne by suggesting 
that Swinburne’s anti-Christian position propels him to a perverse and tendentious 
reading of Botticelli, while Pater’s mode of criticism, through its ‘reticence, 
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restraint and self-conscious detachment’, permits Pater a more subtle perception 
of the ‘interfusion’ of pagan and Christian elements in Botticelli, and of the 
necessary balance between flesh and spirit.192 While this seems to me a 
misreading – Pater’s interpretation of Botticelli is, if anything, more tendentious 
than Swinburne’s – it is nonetheless an illuminating misreading, since it is 
produced by praising Pater in such signally Arnoldian terms: Pater is detached, 
nuanced, urbane and discriminating because he resists Swinburne’s strongly anti-
Christian stance.193 In effect, Coates responds to the affinity between Pater’s 
‘neither for God nor his enemies’ ideal of aestheticism and the Arnoldian ideal of 
critical disinterestedness, even if Coates misses the extent to which Pater’s ideal is 
loaded with the secularising logic that Arnold was trying to mitigate. 
 Arnold’s ideal of ‘disinterestedness’ can be concisely defined by 
reproducing his choice of epigraph to Essays in Criticism, which is a quotation 
from Edmund Burke: 
 
Our antagonist is our helper. This amicable conflict with difficulty 
obliges us to an intimate acquaintance with our object, and 
compels us to consider it in all its relations. It will not suffer us to 
be superficial.194 
 
 As this suggests, Arnold’s ideal of disinterestedness was never an 
aspiration toward an absolute objectivity, but rather a method for refining one’s 
perspective by exposing it to the rigours of contending points of view. To this 
extent, Arnold valorises something akin to John Stuart Mill’s model of liberalism, 
in which open and dynamic conflict of opinion is necessary for good ideas to 
flourish; yet Arnold explicitly wishes for his own form of ‘amicable conflict’ to 
be a refuge from practical politics, and at times it can seem to be a fantasy of a 
serene perspective from which one can survey all opinion without endangering 
one’s own.195 Arnold’s contemporaries were certainly alive to this, and often 
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bristled at the ‘Olympian’ aloofness and complacency he was felt to manifest 
when venturing onto controversial territory, particularly religion.196 Pater thought 
that the ideal of critical disinterestedness was actually a surrogate for a lost 
religious transcendence: 
 
The spiritualities of the Christian life have often drawn men on, 
little by little, into the broader spiritualities of systems opposed to 
it … Many in our own generation, through religion, have become 
dead to religion. How often do we look for some feature of the 
ancient religious life, not in a modern saint, but in a modern artist 
or philosopher! For those who have passed out of Christianity, 
perhaps its most precious souvenir is the ideal of a transcendental 
disinterestedness.197 
 
Pater’s sensitivity to the extent to which the ideal of ‘disinterestedness’ 
retains a spiritual ambience even when it marks a critical distance from Christian 
belief is also clear in his essay on ‘Botticelli’, where the aestheticist ideal of being 
‘neither for God nor for his enemies’ self-consciously imagines secularism in 
terms of an angelic transcendence of conflict. And as Pater seems to calculate, the 
fact that he is using the ideal of disinterestedness to suggest indifference or apathy 
toward religious claims to transcendence does not entirely disperse the 
transcendental aura of the ideal. 
Arnold’s essay ‘Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment’ (1864) is a 
good place to observe how his ideal of disinterestedness functions in relation to 
religion. It is also, as DeLaura has shown, a crucial text for appraising the 
relationship between Pater and Arnold: Pater probably heard Arnold deliver the 
essay in Oxford in 1864, and some of its catchphrases are deployed in 
‘Winckelmann’, as well as in ‘Aucassin and Nicolette’.198 Arnold here posits 
‘disinterestedness’ as a stance which enables an impartial weighing of the merits 
of medieval Christianity and paganism: he declares, ‘I wish to decide nothing as 
of my own authority; the great art of criticism is to get oneself out of the way and 
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to let humanity decide’.199 Yet Arnold’s Victorian audience would broadly take 
the superiority of the Christian to the pagan sentiment as a cultural given, and 
Arnold’s disinterestedness thus only requires some effort to give paganism, the 
conventionally subordinate term of the opposition, more generous consideration 
than usual. In this respect, ‘disinterestedness’ does not demand any real 
renouncement of loyalty to one’s position; it is rather a calculated self-resistance 
which allows one to experiment with an alternative view, so that one may 
assimilate its virtues and inhabit one’s own position more richly. The real 
opposition which underpins this essay is not between paganism and medieval 
Christianity, but between ‘the acrid tone and temper of the fanatic’ – that is, an 
anxious Christianity which needs to hyperbolise the evils of non-Christian 
perspectives – and Arnold’s own ideal of a civilised Christianity, which can allow 
itself to feel the temptation of some such perspectives without defensiveness.200 
This essay is also instructive insofar as it clarifies the way in which the 
pious fraud tradition survives in a denatured form within Arnold’s ideal of 
disinterestedness. Arnold identifies paganism as a ‘religion of pleasure’ which, 
while it has ‘grace and beauty’, is nonetheless a ‘manifest failure’ because the 
human lot is defined not by pleasure but by suffering; thus medieval Christianity, 
a ‘religion of sorrow’, answers more fully to human needs.201 Yet Arnold does not 
claim an absolute superiority for Christianity, since his disinterestedness prompts 
him to be tactically disloyal to own his commitments; he makes a universal 
judgment on behalf of the mass of humanity, but also concedes that some 
exceptional individuals might escape the terms of his distinction: 
 
One man in many millions, a Heine, may console himself, and 
keep himself erect in suffering, by a colossal irony of this sort, by 
covering himself and the universe with the red fire of this sinister 
mockery; but the many millions cannot, - cannot if they would. 
That is where the sentiment of a religion of sorrow has such a vast 
advantage over the sentiment of a religion of pleasure; in its power 
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to be a general, popular religious sentiment, a stay for the mass of 
mankind, whose lives are full of hardship.202 
 
As DeLaura notes, the ‘religious appeal to the multitude becomes the 
essay’s criterion of religious authenticity’.203 The fact that Arnold has recourse to 
the concept of the multitude to decide in favour of the ‘religion of sorrow’ makes 
the essay sound like a more compassionate iteration of the pious fraud argument; 
while Arnold emphasises the consolations of religion rather than the dangers of 
scepticism spreading from the few to the many, his emphasis remains upon the 
collective utility of religion, while his effort to claim a disinterested position 
creates the impression of a sceptical distance from Christian belief.  Although 
Arnold’s portrait of Heine as an example of an exceptional individual who 
manages to sustain a preference for the ‘religion of pleasure’ through self-
lacerating feats of irony is meant to be damning, it nonetheless opens up the 
possibility that the question of paganism versus Christianity might tell differently 
when assessed from a subjective, literary or elite perspective rather than 
abstracted into a thesis about the multitude. 
Arnold’s assessment of paganism and the medieval Christianity is 
constructed on the model of an ancient agon, and while Christianity seems the 
sure victor through most of the essay, Arnold ultimately imagines paganism 
besting Christianity in literary terms: after supplying a translation from 
Sophocles, Arnold proclaims, ‘Let St. Francis – or Luther, either – beat that!’204 
In other words, Arnold’s concern with adjudicating the claims of paganism and 
Christianity in relation to the multitude recedes, and the question of their relative 
aesthetic value becomes paramount. Arnold’s aesthetic preference for paganism is 
carefully tethered to the fact that he has already reconciled the terms for himself: 
Christian mysticism and morality can be fused with the sensuousness and 
rationality of paganism to produce his ideal of ‘imaginative reason’.205 
Nonetheless, the fact that the argument culminates in a glorification of paganism 
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at the expense of Luther and St. Francis reflects how Arnoldian disinterestedness 
allows, even demands, continuous flirtation with transgressive ideas. This is also 
clear in the essay on Marcus Aurelius in the same volume. Here Arnold displays a 
remarkable degree of estrangement from his own apparent sympathies: his vivid 
capacity to imagine just how distasteful early Christianity must have seemed to 
any civilised onlooker leads him to exonerate Aurelius almost completely for his 
persecution of Christians.206 At such moments, Arnold’s ‘my antagonist is my 
helper’ axiom seems to extend into a kind of nonchalant sympathy with the devil, 
and the principle of disinterestedness to be a means by which the apparently 
Christian critic constructs himself as a connoisseur of anti-Christian ideas. 
(Donald Stone even suggests that Arnold’s ‘Socratic impudence in tone and 
manner’ resembles Nietzsche’s.)207 At the very least, Arnold’s continuous efforts 
to ‘return … upon himself’ – the quality he admired in Burke – serve not to 
suspend the reader’s suspicion about Arnold’s real investments in his subject 
matter but rather to tease the reader with the spiraling complexity of those 
investments.208 
The desire to rend the veil of Arnold’s disinterestedness and find personal 
agendas in his ‘sinuous, easy, unpolemical mode of proceeding’ was not first felt 
by politically vigilant late twentieth-century critics, but rather marked the 
reception of his work from the start of his career.209 The ‘neither for God nor for 
his enemies’ credo of Pater’s ‘Botticelli’ essay re-inscribes the concept of heresy 
within Arnold’s ideal of disinterestedness and playfully reveals the extent to 
which an apparently angelic non-position has its choice ‘on its face’. Yet the core 
preoccupation of Pater’s self-reflexive essay is perhaps so not much with catching 
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the secular within the religious or the interested within the disinterested, but with 
demonstrating how smoothly a traditional reverence for the mysteries represented 
in sacred art can be transmuted into an irreverent fascination with the enigma of 
an artist’s intentions.  
 
‘Homer Must be Made to Speak Agreeably to Moses’: Pater, Arnold, and the 
Ideal of Reconciliation 
 
Although Pater is sometimes counted with Arnold as one of the Victorian 
‘reconcilers’ who sought to syncretise pagan and Christian ideas or to balance 
religion and scepticism, Pater’s early work often cast suspicion on ‘reconciliation’ 
as an intellectual ideal.210 This can be strongly felt in his first published essay, 
‘Coleridge’s Writings’, in which he dismisses Coleridge’s efforts to ‘reconcile’ 
the conflict between faith and reason as ‘insipid’ and ‘factitious’. 211 In ‘Pico della 
Mirandola’, this kind of asperity has been diluted, but Pater honours Pico’s 
attempt to wed the pagan and the Christian as a poignant failure rather than as a 
viable tradition: 
 
… with this flood of erudition came the generous hope, so often 
disabused, of reconciling the philosophers with each other, and all 
alike with the Church … Like some knight-errant of philosophy, 
[Pico] offered to defend nine hundred bold paradoxes drawn from 
the most opposite sources, against all comers. But the Pontifical 
Court was led to suspect the orthodoxy of some of the 
propositions, and even the reading of the book which contained 
them was forbidden by the Pope … [He is] an early instance of 
those who, after following the vain hope of an impossible 
reconciliation from system to system, have at last fallen back 
unsatisfied on the simplicities of their childhood’s belief.212  
 
As Franke notes, Pater’s Pico is a touchingly naïve heretic, so 
magnanimous he failed to notice that he was hazarding the impossible, or that he 
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risked being burned at the stake (Pico ultimately saved himself by withdrawing 
his theses and consenting to work in a Dominican order.)213 Yet despite Pater’s 
sympathy with Pico’s project – particularly Pico’s effort to ‘help man onward to 
that reassertion of himself, [the] rehabilitation of human nature, the body, the 
senses, the heart, the intelligence’ – he emphasises the ‘false basis’ of Pico’s 
syncretism, and persistently inserts caveats that make it clear that he will only 
acquiesce in the rhetoric of reconciliation insofar as it flatters the pagan at the 
expense of the Christian.214 This is observable in the opening paragraph, in which 
a genial, Arnoldian emphasis upon the possibilities of reconciliation modulates 
swiftly into a more combative and Swinburnean emphasis upon an essential 
‘rivalry’ between Christ and Hellas.215 That Pater has Arnold in his sights here is 
also suggested by his invocation of ‘many-sided intellectual culture’: ‘many-
sidedness’, a type of disinterested receptivity to diverse influences, was the 
Hellenic (and Goethean) virtue that Arnold posited as the goal of bildung and the 
means of social regeneration in Culture and Anarchy.216 Yet, as DeLaura 
observes, Pater adopts a ‘conciliatory’, Arnoldian tone only to privilege paganism 
over Christianity.217 As a whole, the essay celebrates paganism as the lifeblood of 
Renaissance humanism, and marginalises Christianity as the medieval legacy 
which hobbled the modern, optimistic programme: although Pico made valiant 
efforts to assert ‘the dignity of human nature, the greatness of man’, he was 
contending against the ‘tendency of medieval religion to depreciate man’s nature, 
to sacrifice this or that element in it, to make it ashamed of itself …’218 Although 
Pater acknowledges that Pico partly derived his perception of the ‘dignity of man’ 
from Christianity, he emphasises that this perception was dependent upon a false 
cosmology, and he underscores the differences between this ‘childish dream’ of 
the cosmic importance of humanity and modern apprehensions of nature, which 
elicit ‘strange new awe and superstition’ precisely because they displace the 
                                                
213 Franke, Heresies, 155. 
214 Pater, Renaissance, 24. 
215 Ibid., 18. 
216 Ibid., 18; and Arnold, CPWV, 185. 
217 DeLaura, Hebrew and Hellene, 233-234. 
218 Pater, Renaissance, 18. 
206 
 
human from a God-given centrality.219 When Pater makes more ecumenical 
gestures, they serve not to reconcile paganism and Christianity but to subject both 
to a secularising reduction in which all religions are to be appreciated as 
perishable human artifacts: ‘the basis of the reconciliation of the religions of the 
world would thus be the inexhaustible activity and creativeness of the human 
mind itself, in which all religious alike have their root, and in which all alike are 
laid to rest’.220 
Carolyn Williams argues that ‘Pico della Mirandola’ is a self-reflexive 
meditation on allegorical reading: throughout, Pater contrasts the ‘quaint’ 
allegorical hermeneutics Pico deployed in order to harmonise Christianity and 
paganism with his own more sophisticated aesthetic historicism.221 I would 
suggest that Pater’s essay itself solicits an ironic allegorical reading. Although 
Pater treats the effort to reconcile paganism and Christianity as a beguiling 
curiosity from a less enlightened age, the reconciliation ideal actually had a strong 
grip on the Victorian imagination, and – as Pater was certainly aware – not all 
such ‘reconciliation’ projects were as secular and demystifying in orientation as 
his distinctions between Renaissance humanism and modern historicism imply. 
As Louis notes, a Romantic impulse to reconcile paganism and Christianity 
persisted in Victorian culture long after the establishment of comparative 
mythology as a secular academic discipline.222 Perhaps the most proximate 
example of this Romantic strain of mythography in relation to Pater’s essay is 
Ruskin’s Queen of the Air (1869). Although Ruskin does not explicitly seek to 
syncretise Christianity and paganism, he emphasises the anti-materialistic and 
ethereal dimensions of Greek myths, and his tone is, as Dinah Birch remarks, 
‘pervasively biblical and hortatory’; he hoped that the book would be received as 
‘a religious work’.223 The late 1860s and early 1870s saw other attempts to align 
pagan and Christian spirituality. In 1869, William Ewart Gladstone published 
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Juventus Mundi: The Gods and Men of the Heroic Age, a follow up to his earlier 
Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age (1858), and a work inspired by the 
conviction that elements of the ‘Olympian religion’ correlate ‘with the Hebraic 
traditions, as conveyed in the books of Holy Scripture’.224 And in 1871, Jowett 
published his Dialogues of Plato Translated into English with Analyses and 
Introductions, which, Turner has shown, posited Plato’s idealism as an antidote to 
secular materialism and stressed the congruence between Platonic and Christian 
ethics.225 
In the introduction to ‘Pico della Mirandola’, it is possible to find an 
allegory of Victorian intellectual culture embedded within Pater’s account of 
Renaissance humanism. Pater’s contrast between an early phase of humanism 
which regarded the classical past as an archive of pleasing images and poetic 
conceits and a later phase which perceived the vital and transformative power of 
that legacy has an obvious, if loose, parallel with the modern classical revival in 
England: an initiatory, Augustan investment in the perfection of classical 
aesthetics expands into more ‘ardent and serious’ endeavour to reclaim antiquity 
as a ground of authentic spiritual experience. Although Pater is himself very much 
part of this endeavour and would later venture his own form of Romantic 
mythography in the essays which are gathered together in Greek Studies (1895), 
here he sets secular limits upon his enthusiasm for such a Romantic 
spiritualisation of antiquity.226 He stipulates that for the ‘modern scholar’, the 
‘question of the reconciliation of the religion of antiquity with the religion of 
Christ’ is an anthropological pursuit which regards ‘all religions … as natural 
products’ and seeks to find the ‘common laws’ which govern their ‘growth and 
decay’.227 There is also an implicit condescension toward reconciliation projects 
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such as Arnold’s, which resist the ‘organic’ life-and-death cycles of religions and 
are engaged in an endeavour as artificial as Pico’s: 
 
In their attempts to reconcile the religions of the world they were 
thus thrown back on the quicksand of allegorical interpretation. 
The religions of the world were to be reconciled, not as successive 
stages in a gradual development of the religious sense, but as 
subsisting side by side, and substantially in agreement with each 
other. And here the first necessity was to misrepresent the 
language, the conceptions, the sentiments, it was proposed to 
compare and reconcile. Plato and Homer must be made to speak 
agreeably to Moses. Set side by side, the mere surfaces could never 
unite in any harmony of design. Therefore one must go below the 
surface, and bring up the supposed secondary or still more remote 
meaning, that diviner signification held in reserve … 228 
 
Although Arnold’s method for reconciling Christianity with Hellenism 
was dialectical rather than allegorical and he certainly subscribed to a 
developmental theory of religion, it is possible to detect a critique of Arnold’s 
efforts to make Homer ‘speak agreeably’ to Moses here. Pater’s critique of Pico’s 
over-ingenious interpretations and reliance upon ‘every sort of figure and 
analogy, on the double meanings of words, the symbols of the Jewish ritual, the 
secondary meanings of obscure stories’ seems to double as a critique of Arnold’s 
Biblical hermeneutics in St. Paul and Protestantism (1869).229 In that work, 
Arnold reaffirmed his intention to reconcile Hebraism and Hellenism, but this 
time he explicitly applied this search for a higher synthesis to Biblical criticism 
and to an apologia for the Anglican Church.230 Anticipating the argument of his 
more famous Literature and Dogma, Arnold sought to demonstrate that the 
doctrines which led the dissenting sects to reject the Anglican Church largely 
stemmed from a failure of ‘critical tact’ in reading St. Paul, and in particular, from 
a failure to appreciate the figurative nature of Paul’s language.231 While Arnold’s 
chief aim is to undercut particular dissenting doctrines such as the Calvinist 
doctrine of predestination, he also construes in anti-metaphysical and 
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metaphorical terms more mainstream tenets of Christianity, such as the 
Resurrection.232 Arnold relies upon a distinction between primary and secondary 
orders of meaning and divides Paul’s writing into two styles: at his best, Paul 
‘Orientalises’ – that is, uses richly figurative language; at his worst, he ‘Judaises’ 
– that is, treats language in an ‘arbitrary and uncritical fashion’, as if it were 
invested with ‘talismanic’ powers.233 Arnold emphasises that neither the primary, 
poetic Paul, nor the secondary, Judaising Paul ought to be understood literally or 
resolved into metaphysical dogma. Arnold’s ambitious reconstruction of 
Christianity was predictably greeted with alarm and irritation by many critics, and 
even reviewers who were broadly sympathetic to his project often felt that his 
interpretations were dubiously belletristic.234 Yet even his sharpest critics often 
praised him as a stylist in order to castigate him for his audacities as an amateur 
theologian: thus, for example, Edith Simcox asserts that Arnold’s reading of St. 
Paul has ‘enough eloquence to make it a favourable example of the literary chaos 
in which we shall be plunged when everybody has all his faculties cultivated at 
once’.235 When Pater writes of Pico that ‘he will not let one go; he wins one on in 
spite of oneself … although we know already that the actual solution proposed in 
them will satisfy us as little as perhaps it satisfied him’, the judgment is very close 
to contemporary attitudes to Arnold’s efforts to reconcile Christianity and modern 
thought, which were often found compelling as exercises in literary style and 
unconvincing as theological argument. 236  It is also easy to perceive how 
Arnold’s emphasis upon the irreducibly literary nature of the Bible and of 
Christian belief can modulate into Pater’s aestheticist desire to elevate the 
‘figured style’ or sensuous surfaces of works of art or literature over their putative 
religious content with only a minor alteration of the terms.237 
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Despite the fact that Pater treats the ideal of reconciliation with wry 
detachment throughout, ‘Pico della Mirandola’ covertly performs a reconciliation 
of its own. Although Pater adopts a self-consciously modern, rationalistic 
perspective on religion, he also seeks to sustain an investment in it as a source of 
imaginative vitality and a means of conferring profound value upon art.238 This is 
clear when Pater emphasises that the ‘impassioned’ religiosity of fifteenth-century 
Italy was paradoxically what stimulated some to revere the classical legacy as a 
viable alternative to Christianity. (When Pater notes that it was also this religious 
sincerity which drove Renaissance culture to ‘consecrate’ art objects almost 
indiscriminately, the implied parallel with his own age seems unmistakable.)239 
While Pater emphasises that Pico’s quest for reconciliation has negligible 
intellectual worth, he nevertheless prizes the imaginative heat generated by the 
effort. Pater sets up an analogy between Pico and himself: just as Pico sought to 
‘renew what time had made dim’ and to revivify a dead religion, so Pater seeks to 
recuperate Pico’s work as an aesthetic experience.240 If Pater’s aestheticisation of 
Pico’s endeavour seems ironic and detached – he savours its ‘quaint conceits’ and 
‘picturesque union of contrasts’ – there is also an unabashed admiration for Pico’s 
religious sincerity, his ‘deep and passionate emotion’ and ‘the glow and 
vehemence in his words’.241 In case we miss the dual character of Pater’s 
perspective, his desire to at once take his rational distance from and to sustain the 
imaginative and emotional potencies of religion (at least insofar as these serve to 
consecrate art or to fuel a serious passion for antiquity), he twice affirms that 
‘nothing which has ever interested the human mind can wholly lose its vitality’.242 
Pater’s determination to have it both ways – to insist that Pico’s dream of 
reconciliation is at once intellectually dead and aesthetically alive – culminates in 
the Gothic epiphany of Pico as one ‘alive in the grave … with that sanguine clear 
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skin … as with the light of morning upon it’.243 As Jeffrey Wallen notes, the 
metaphor here is of vampirism, an idea that Pater foreshadows through his 
interpolation of an extract from Heine’s ‘Gods in Exile’ (1853) toward the 
beginning of ‘Pico della Mirandola’.244 Heine’s essay fantasises that the Greek 
gods were forced to take up alternative employment ‘under all sorts of disguises’ 
when Christianity vanquished paganism; we learn that Apollo so bewitched some 
Austrian villagers that even after they had executed him, they felt compelled to 
‘drag him from the grave again, that a stake might be driven through his body, in 
the belief he had been a vampire’.245 Pater relishes Heine’s fable because it 
affirms paganism as an ineradicable if shadowy presence in Western culture, 
though he is also clearly invoking vampirism to underscore an element of the 
uncanny in the process by which the ‘dreams of a dead religion’ are resurrected in 
order to nourish an apparently living one.246 The sense of something perverse in 
this process is also registered when Pater returns to his earlier, rationalistic 
account of religion as a form of organic growth and recasts the metaphor so that 
the Western tradition reappears as a lush hybrid: 
 
When the ship-load of sacred earth from the soil of Jerusalem was 
mingled with the common clay in the Campo Santo of Pisa, a new 
flower grew up from it, unlike any flower men had seen before, the 
anemone with its concentric rings of strangely blended colour … 
Just such a strange flower was the mythology of the Italian 
Renaissance which grew up from the mixture of two traditions, 
two sentiments, the sacred and the profane.247 
 
Here Pater segues from his apparently cool, anthropological estimate of 
religion into a richly coloured aestheticisation of religion as a principle of cultural 
vitality. The imagery of vampires and strange flowers courts the charge of 
decadence, and certainly Pater here seems to hint that his secular aestheticism 
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effectively keeps religion, like Pico’s work, ‘alive in the grave’, preserving its 
exotic ‘qualities’ while slighting its aspirations to ‘actual knowledge’.248  
The notion that Pater’s aestheticism has a vampiric relation to religion is a 
familiar one, and while Pater himself seems to entertain this idea at times, to a 
large extent the cliché takes as self-evident an assumption that Pater’s work often 
sets out to contest: the primacy of religion, and the secondariness both of art and 
of secular imperatives. Some of the terms of this argument can be found in 
embryo in ‘Pico della Mirandola’, where Pater suggests that the aesthetic power 
of Pico’s work should be attributed not to his mystical tendencies but to the 
simple inspiration of mortality.249 Pater is clearly averse to Pico’s Christian 
Platonism; he notes with disappointment that  Pico ultimately succumbed to ‘the 
chilling touch of that abstract disembodied beauty which the Platonists profess to 
long for …’250 Pater’s scepticism about the extent to which anyone has ever 
desired ‘abstract beauty’, and his suggestion that such passions really take their 
‘glow’ from the conditions of mortal life, clearly resonate with the argument of 
the ‘Conclusion’, his most famous statement of the logic behind his aestheticism, 
and the focus of the final section of this chapter. 
Throughout the Renaissance, Pater calls attention to the fact that his 
chosen artists and thinkers were heretics who had ‘the credit or discredit of 
attracting some shadow of ecclesiastical censure’ or, in the more ambiguous cases 
of Michelangelo, Leonardo and Winckelmann, were men who only temporised 
with religious authority in a worldly fashion.251 Overall, the book forms a series 
of anti-hagiographies, with its subjects honoured as secular saints for choosing 
worldly pleasure over asceticism, or art over orthodoxy. Yet – and this is a 
difference between the aristocratic Swinburne, free to valorise transgression 
without worrying overmuch about its personal consequences, and Pater the lower-
middle-class don, beholden to Oxford University – the figure of the subversive 
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insider, bound to critique orthodoxy from within prescribed limits, finds special 
favour in Pater’s work. In this context, it is worth noting that Pater was unable to 
take holy orders because his close friend, John McQueen, was scandalised by his 
suggestion that it would be amusing to be ordained without believing ‘a single 
word of what you are saying’; McQueen wrote to the Bishop of London to warn 
of Pater’s infidelity, and thereby kept Pater from the priesthood.252 Pater actually 
seems to admire Winckelmann partly because of the ‘insincerity of his religious 
profession’; he does not simply condone the fact that Winckelmann converted to 
Catholicism for expediency, and ‘entered Rome … with the works of Voltaire in 
his possession’, but implies, by quoting a rather repulsive remark of Goethe’s, 
that such dissimulation gives piquancy to Winckelmann’s work:253 
 
[Goethe] speaks of the doubtful charm of renegadism as something 
like that which belongs to a divorced woman, or to ‘Wildbret mit 
einer kleinen Andeutung von Fäulniss’ [i.e. ‘meat with a little 
touch of rottenness].254 
 
By contrast to ‘apostasy’ or ‘infidelity’, ‘heresy’ is by definition an 
intramural affair, or, as Valentine Cunningham puts it, a form of ‘insider trading’: 
one can be a heretic only by professing to question a tradition intimately, as a true 
believer. Surveying the history of Christian heresy, Cunningham observes that 
heresies are frequently such ‘close kin to the orthodoxies they shadow as to make 
you wonder how their various proponents kept their fine distinction in mind’.255 It 
is often noted that Pater’s aestheticism is in some sense a heretical reading of 
Arnold’s criticism: as DeLaura puts it, ‘the terms were in Arnold, but when they 
reappear [in Pater’s work] they are “the same yet different”. Arnold is a father of 
Aestheticism but only in an oblique and problematical way’; or, as Stefano 
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Evangelista puts it, Pater’s work ‘perverts’ rather than ‘subverts’ Arnold’s.256 
Such judgments are only more moderate versions of T. S. Eliot’s damning 
assessment: Arnold beat Christian belief to an airy thinness by conflating it with 
literature and high culture, and Pater’s work is so many pages torn from Arnold’s 
heretical prophecy.257 Yet efforts to account for the fine distinctions between 
Arnold and Pater are always inevitably entangled in the fact that Arnold’s most 
provocative and ambiguous legacy to Pater is his emphasis upon ‘fine 
difference[s], of nuances or proportion in things’.258 Like Arnold, though perhaps 
more insistently, Pater is also self-conscious about the extent to which a style 
devoted to fine differences has the power both to court and to deflect suspicions 
of heresy: 
 
Pascal’s charges are those which seem to lie ready to hand against 
all who study theology, a looseness of thought and language, that 
would pass nowhere else, in making what are professedly very fine 
distinctions; the insincerity with which terms are carefully chosen 
to cover opposite meanings; the fatuity with which opposite 
meanings revolve into one another, in the strange vacuous 
atmosphere generated by professional divines.259 
 
‘Experience Itself is the End’: John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Aestheticism 
in Pater’s  ‘Coleridge’s Writings’ and the ‘Conclusion’ to the Renaissance 
 
In its original incarnation, the ‘Conclusion’ formed the final paragraphs of Pater’s 
‘Poems By William Morris’. Here, we recall, Pater celebrates the idea that ‘the 
earlier, more ancient life of the senses’ always inhabited the transcendentalism of 
medieval Christianity and subverted it from within. Yet, like Swinburne, Pater 
prizes the friction between Christianity and the ‘ancient life of the senses’ because 
it throws the glories of sensation into vivid relief. He elaborates what might be 
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called his secular felix culpa trope: the fall from a transcendental, two-worlds 
perspective into a purely secular, materialistic one at least temporarily grants an 
enchanted perception and makes the world seem paradisiacal: 
 
Just so the monk in his cloister, through the ‘open vision’, open 
only to the spirit, divined, aspired to and at last apprehended a 
better daylight, but earthly, open only to the senses. Complex and 
subtle interests, which the mind spins for itself may occupy art and 
poetry or our spirits for a time; but sooner or later they come back 
with a sharp rebound to the simple elementary passions … and 
what corresponds to them in the sensuous world … This reaction 
from dreamlight to daylight gives, as always happens, a strange 
power in dealing with morning and things of the morning … 
Everywhere there is an impression of surprise, as of people first 
waking from the golden age, at fire, snow, wine, the touch of water 
as one swims, the salt taste of the sea. And this simplicity at first 
hand is a strange contrast to the sought-out simplicity of 
Wordsworth. Desire here is towards the body of nature for its own 
sake, not because a soul is divined through it.260 
  
By contrast to the ‘simplicity’ of Wordsworth, who loves the natural 
because the divine is immanent within it, Pater’s ideal ‘simplicity’ is ‘strange’ 
because it remembers that it has disavowed the divine and so finds it exotic to 
love ‘the body of nature’ for ‘its own sake’. Pater’s evocation of strange ‘things of 
the morning’ is a submerged allusion to Lucifer – ‘How art thou fallen from 
heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! [Isaiah 14:12] – though the suggestion of 
evil is neutralised by his emphasis upon a kind of primordial innocence attained 
by such a fall into a secularised nature. Nevertheless, Pater’s monk can discern 
the ‘better daylight’ of an ‘earthly’ perspective only by contrast with the 
spirituality he has forfeited; the new daylight retains a magic vestige of the 
‘dreamlight’, and takes its paradisiacal radiance from the Christian imaginary it 
renounces.  
For Pater, secular enlightenment is an uncanny reminiscence in another 
sense: even as he emphasises that it grants a childlike sense of novelty, he also 
insists that there is nothing new under the sun – it is only a return to the ‘ancient 
life of the senses’, a rediscovery of the ‘one law of the life of the human spirit, 
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and of which what we call the Renaissance is only a supreme instance’.261 In other 
words, an ‘earthly’ or secular perspective, while initially rendering the world 
‘strange’, is really only a ‘sharp rebound’ to what is most elemental, and thus 
comes as a flash of déjà vu. In a similar way, Pater often seeks to reassure us that 
‘materialism’ only returns us to what we knew all along; thus, for the hero of 
Marius the Epicurean, Epicureanism is at once an exciting novelty and a 
confirmation of ‘the deep original materialism or earthliness of human nature 
itself, bound so intensely to the sensuous world …’262 Likewise, for Pater’s 
Winckelmann, secular materialism is not a radical departure but a homecoming; 
he is emancipated not by modern ideas but by embracing what he always intuited: 
 
How facile and direct, it seems to say, is this life of the senses and 
the understanding when once we have apprehended it! That is the 
more liberal life we have been seeking for so long, so near to us all 
the while. How mistaken and roundabout have been our efforts to 
reach it by mystic passion and religious reverie; how they have 
deflowered the flesh; how little they have emancipated us! … 
There, is an instance of Winckelmann’s tendency to escape from 
abstract theory to intuition, to the exercise of sight and touch.263 
 
Pater’s tendency to posit secular materialism as an intuitive, poetic and 
ancient insight rather than as a legacy of the Enlightenment, of scientific 
discovery, or of the demystified Bible of the higher critics, has been the source of 
some critical confusion about his work. Like Swinburne, Pater tends to draw on 
modern science tacitly rather than explicitly, rather preferring to invoke Lucretius, 
Epicurus and Heraclitus than Tyndall, Huxley, or Darwin. This often leads 
scholars to suggest that Pater’s aestheticism is an attempt to create an imaginative 
refuge from scientific materialism. For example, Robert and Janice O’Keefe claim 
that Pater’s ‘Conclusion’ ‘paints the frighteningly secular, post-Christian world 
that must be transformed through the hierophantic act of criticism … If there is 
salvation from Pater’s modernist hell, it is only possible through an even greater 
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concentration of vision than that required of the scientist’.264 According to Billie 
Inman, the ‘Conclusion’ advocates ‘intense aesthetic consciousness’ as a 
‘compensation’ for the fact that both modern science and philosophy leave us 
‘equally disillusioned, because neither gives us any basis for metaphysical 
certainty’.265 Also in reference to the ‘Conclusion’, Denis Donoghue asserts that 
Pater is not ‘endorsing the scientist’s account of what we call life’ but only 
‘tempting himself with the vertigo of an alien vocabulary’, and experimentally 
‘supposing himself a materialist or an objectivist and letting modern science have 
its destructive way’.266 Even Dawson, the scholar who has done most to 
demonstrate the extent to which scientific materialism underpins Pater’s thinking, 
assumes that Pater championed ‘aesthetic experience’ as a palliative for the ‘stark 
version of human existence predicated by recent scientific and philosophical 
discoveries’; he finds the ‘Conclusion’ ‘ruthlessly cold-blooded in [its] terse 
acceptance of mortality’.267 
Seeking imaginative alternatives to a ‘destructive’ or even ‘hellish’ 
scientific materialism was not a controversial enterprise in Victorian culture. If 
Pater’s ‘Conclusion’ were In Memoriam in prose, it would have been read from 
pulpits rather than denounced from them.268 Even the commonplace that the 
‘Conclusion’ caused a scandal because it was thought to advocate libertinism or 
sensual self-indulgence is slightly puzzling on inspection. Like John Stuart Mill, 
Pater frames the hedonic principle in rather refined, even chaste terms: its highest 
instantiation is the pursuit of art or intellectual inquiry, and, again like Mill, Pater 
leaves open the possibility that his hedonism might be compatible with Christian 
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sentiment (we can attain Paterian ‘ecstasy’ through ‘religious enthusiasm’).269 
Dawson persuasively accounts for part of the scandal by demonstrating the 
overdetermined nature of the connection between scientific materialism and 
sexual immorality in Victorian culture.270 Yet I would add that a large part of the 
provocation of the ‘Conclusion’ lay in its sheer exuberance, its will to wrest 
pleasure and enchantment from the ‘modern thought’ which Pater’s 
contemporaries often found unbearably bleak. I have noted that a considerable 
part of Swinburne’s oeuvre is an effort to critique the ways in which melancholy 
over religious scepticism had been assimilated into Christian belief in mid-
Victorian culture. Pater pursues a similar critique more gently on the whole, 
wistfully suggesting that ‘perhaps one day we may come to forget the horizon, 
with full knowledge to be content with what is here and now’. 271 Even so, his 
contemporaries certainly caught – and in some cases thrilled to – the hortatory 
tenor of the ‘Conclusion’, which William Buckler aptly calls ‘a vocalisation of the 
“good news” of aestheticism’.272 Pater’s contemporaries also grasped the 
implication of such an ardent ode to mortality: namely, that belief in immortality 
was savourless, a form of sleeping before evening. As Susan Naverrette notes, 
Pater manipulates Biblical cadences – for example, the paratactic distillation of 
human existence into ‘birth and gesture and death and the springing of violets 
from the grave’ – in order to lend grandeur to his secular sermon (though the final 
flourish here – the image of flowers growing from a grave, which seems to 
symbolise a kind of poetic resurrection for materialists – depends not on the Bible 
but on an allusion to Shakespeare’s Hamlet).273 Like one of Swinburne’s minor 
carpe diem poems, the ‘Conclusion’ strives to embody the evanescence it 
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celebrates: in its very brevity and its impatient-seeming effort to compress the 
insights of modern science and philosophy into crisp images – ‘it rusts iron and 
ripens corn’; ‘this short day of frost and sun’ – the essay dramatises the quest to 
get as much as possible into the ‘given time’. The ‘Conclusion’ is also akin to 
Swinburne’s carpe diem poems insofar as it seeks to construct a wholly 
materialistic view of death not as bad tidings from ‘modern thought’ but as an 
eternal verity. As the closing flourish to the Renaissance, the ‘Conclusion’ 
implies that the precepts of modern science and philosophy need not dishearten 
unduly because they essentially reinforce the core truths of the ‘pagan spirit’, and 
thus should be recognised as a return to ancient wisdom rather than bemoaned as 
an unprecedented rupture. In its original incarnation, the ‘Conclusion’ was 
preceded by this paragraph: 
 
One characteristic of the pagan spirit these new poems have which 
is on their surface – the continual suggestion, pensive or 
passionate, of the shortness of life; this is contrasted with the 
bloom of the world and gives new seduction to it; the sense of 
death and the desire of beauty; the desire of beauty quickened by 
the sense of death. ‘Arriéré!’ you say, ‘here in a tangible form we 
have the defect of all poetry like this. The modern world is in 
possession of truths; what but a passing smile can it have for a kind 
of poetry which, assuming artistic beauty of form to be an end in 
itself, passes by those truths … to spend a thousand cares in telling 
once more these pagan fables as if it had but to choose between a 
more and less beautiful shadow?’ It is a strange transition from the 
earthly paradise to the sad-coloured world of abstract philosophy. 
But let us accept the challenge; let us see what modern philosophy, 
when it is sincere, really does say about human life and the truth 
we can attain in it, and the relation of this to the desire for 
beauty.274  
 
The refusal to be fazed by the purportedly ‘modern’ is a keynote of Pater’s 
work. Using metaphors akin to those of the ‘Conclusion’, he declares in Plato and 
Platonism, ‘the seemingly new is old also, a palimpsest, a tapestry of which the 
actual threads have served before, or, like the animal frame itself, every particle of 
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which has already lived and died many times over’.275 Elsewhere he asserts that 
‘the germs of almost all philosophical enquiry were unfolded in the mind of 
antiquity’.276 Pater’s use of a quotation from Heraclitus as an epigraph for the 
‘Conclusion’ (‘[All] things are in motion and nothing at rest’) similarly gestures at 
the idea that ‘modern thought’ is not so very modern. In effect, Pater brandishes 
antiquity as a kind of apotropaic device against the threat that modern science and 
philosophy seem to pose to the value of art and the imagination: he seeks not an 
‘alternative stance’ but rather to find comfort in the idea that we have been here 
before, or more grandly, things were ever thus.  Nonetheless, Pater is clearly 
somewhat anxious about the fate of art in a world of scientific truths, and his 
‘Conclusion’ is an effort to demonstrate that art, far from being an anachronistic 
hankering after a realm of ‘beautiful shadows’, is sister to science insofar as it 
‘rouses us to sharp and eager observation’ and reveals a world of dazzling colour 
and kineticism.277 Instead of protesting that modern thought is disillusioning, 
Pater’s solution is to claim that art has always answered to the most crucial insight 
of science (as well as of modern philosophy): all things are in motion and nothing 
at rest. In this, the ‘Conclusion’ repeats a maneuver that Pater had already made in 
‘Coleridge’s Writings’, where he similarly valorises art and science as 
manifestations of the modern, ‘relative spirit’, and contrasts both to the paralysis 
of theology and idealist philosophy, which seek ‘something fixed where all is 
moving’.278 
That the ‘Conclusion’ was an effort to counter the perception that a secular 
materialism entails anguish and disenchantment is clearer in its original form in 
‘Poems By William Morris’, which included this bridging paragraph: 
 
Such thoughts seem desolate at first; at times all the bitterness of 
life seems concentrated in them. They bring the image of one 
washed out beyond the bar in a sea at ebb, losing even his 
personality, as the elements of which he is composed pass into new 
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combinations. Struggling, as he must, to save himself, it is himself 
that he loses at every moment.279 
 
‘Seem’ and ‘at first’ are crucial qualifications here. This passage appears 
between Pater’s delineation of the axioms of ‘modern thought’ – the relativity and 
subjectivity of human knowledge and the material basis of identity – and the 
heady closing paragraphs of the ‘Conclusion’, which enjoin us to enrich our sense 
of life’s value by ‘quickening’ our awareness of mortality. The image of the 
stable, unified self as an ideal lost at sea is perhaps taken from Tennyson’s In 
Memoriam, which, as I have noted, frequently figures scientific materialism both 
as a death-by-drowning and as an organic process of dissolution at sea. Like 
Tennyson, Pater conflates these concepts, so that the imagined figure is somehow 
drowning and decomposing simultaneously, as if materialism dealt a double 
death, and produced a dying corpse. Yet in the context of the previous paragraphs, 
in which Pater observes that the body is in a constant process of death and 
renewal – in particular, he notes the ‘waste and repairing of the lenses of the eye’ 
– the image of a body that is at once drowning and decomposing implies no 
surreal telescoping of time: the drowning body is a process of decomposition and 
re-composition, and by extension, the self that one would save is constituted by 
the forces from which one would save it.280  In the final paragraphs of the 
‘Conclusion’, Pater attempts to counter the perception that this is simply a 
‘desolate’ insight, not by denying that ‘all the bitterness of life is concentrated’ in 
it, but by underscoring that all the beauty of life is concentrated in it also. 
 Pater’s effort to persuade us that we are, or else should be, in love with 
mortality is given a small but telling amplification in the revised, 1888 version of 
the ‘Conclusion’. Where in the first version he wrote of Rousseau,  ‘An 
undefinable taint of death had clung always about him, and now in early manhood 
he believed himself stricken by mortal disease’, in the later version, he changes 
‘stricken’ to ‘smitten’.281 As is so often the case, Pater uses etymology to put his 
finger on a paradox: ‘smitten’ here registers in both its Biblical sense – to be 
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struck or afflicted, often as a punishment by God – and in the poetic sense of 
being enamoured (this latter use has been common in English since the 
seventeenth century [OED]). Pater also implies that Rousseau’s morbidity is a 
kind of vivacity when he characterises it as a ‘mortal’ rather than as a ‘fatal’ 
disease: Rousseau’s superstitious sense of ‘taint’ is also an ‘awakening’ to the 
human condition, and, by extension, to his vocation as a writer.282 (Pater quotes 
Victor Hugo to the same effect: a prisoner who faces a death sentence only 
experiences an exaggerated version of a universal predicament). Yet instead of 
suggesting that art provides a compensatory sense of permanence or an intimation 
of immortality – or even sagely noting ars longa, vita brevis – Pater bids us turn 
to art in order to exacerbate our awareness of this double bind (that is, the 
interpretation of life and death, passion and morbidity, desire and loss), and 
thereby savour it as a kind of seductive paradox. It follows that art cannot serve as 
any kind of remedy or compensation for mortality in the ‘Conclusion’, since its 
very function is to make us hyperaware of our mortality, or, more precisely, to 
sensitise us to the extent to which the ‘splendour of life’ is insolubly tied to its 
‘awful brevity’.283 And hyperawareness of mortality is both cure and disease: 
rather like an addiction, it allows ‘ecstatic’ experience, but only at the price of 
quickening the need for such ecstasy. This circularity inheres in the word 
‘quicken’, which appears twice in the final paragraphs of the essay. On an 
obvious level, Pater means that the only way to make the most of life is to acquire 
a vivified consciousness, but since ‘quicken’ suggests acceleration as well as 
vivification, his solution is really a restatement of the original problem: his ideal 
consciousness is principally characterised by – indeed, derives its capacity to 
move ‘swiftly from point to point’ and ‘maintain its ecstasy’ from – its 
‘desperate’ recognition of life’s brevity. Sensing this circularity, contemporary 
critics often echo Pater’s Victorian detractors in finding the ‘Conclusion’ morbid 
or overwhelmingly melancholic. We may well be unconvinced by Pater’s bid to 
beautify materialism; we might feel the poignancy more than the excitement, and 
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suspect Pater is in mourning for a lost metaphysical certainty. Nonetheless, we 
muffle what seemed distinctly provocative about the ‘Conclusion’ – and about 
Pater’s early aestheticism more broadly – if we assimilate it too quickly into a 
conventional identification of secularisation with melancholy and 
disenchantment; indeed, we fold it into the Victorian paradigm it was seeking to 
contest.  
J. B. Bullen rightly situates the ‘Conclusion’ in the context of a 
philosophical dispute between Henry Longueville Mansel and John Stuart Mill 
which loomed large on the Victorian intellectual scene in the late 1850s and 
throughout the 1860s.284 It seems fair to assume that Pater, as a young philosophy 
don, took at least a passing interest in the controversy, which gathered cultural 
resonance as it began to intersect with the controversies over Colenso, Essays and 
Reviews, and On the Origin of Species.285 The argument between the two men, 
which unfolded across several books and much-discussed lectures, held the 
attention of the Victorian intellectual world partly because it reverberated as a 
kulturkampf between the forces of conservative politics and orthodox theology 
and the forces of liberalism and secular humanism, though the ways in which 
these ideological stakes mapped onto the contending philosophical positions were 
far from straightforward.286 Mansel, the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical 
Philosophy at Oxford, and from 1868, the dean of St. Paul’s, appropriated Kantian 
frameworks in an effort to indemnify Christianity against sceptical attack.  Mansel 
argued that God and the attributes conventionally associated with him – the 
Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Infinite – cannot be grasped by reason, since the 
mind can apprehend only the relative and the phenomenal, not things in 
themselves; thus Christianity ‘leads us ultimately to rest not on Reason but on 
Faith; appeals, not to our knowledge, but to our ignorance ... as there are real 
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temptations to sin which nevertheless do not abrogate the duty of right conduct, so 
there are real temptations to doubt, which nevertheless do not abrogate the duty of 
belief’.287 Mansel was regarded as a sparkling orator and writer, and his 
expositions of his thought, particularly his Bampton lectures in 1858, reportedly 
captivated many (Pater would have also been aware of Mansel’s reputation as one 
of the most charismatic tutors of undergraduates at Oxford).288 Mansel’s pious 
affirmation of human nescience in relation to God was one of the key matrices of 
Victorian agnosticism, and for this reason, he has a role in the next chapter; here, I 
will focus on Mill’s reaction to Mansel. 
 Mill was appalled by the way Mansel laid down sceptical arguments to 
buttress dogmatic faith, and he set out to wrest the doctrine of the ‘relativity of 
human knowledge’ away from the mystifications of theology, a task he undertook 
principally via a critique of the work of Mansel’s acknowledged precursor, Sir 
William Hamilton. Mill’s exhaustive An Examination of the Sir William 
Hamilton’s Philosophy (1865) was widely read and reviewed; it received much 
more attention upon its first publication than either the now-more-famous System 
of Logic (1843) or On Liberty, and it ultimately ran to four editions, each updated 
with Mill’s replies to his critics.289 Mill charged Hamilton with having buried the 
radical implications of his own insight – that is, the relativity of human 
knowledge, or, in Hamilton’s own famous phrase, ‘to think is to condition’ – and 
cycled back to the premise that the mind can in fact glimpse things in themselves 
via its innate intuitions, a retreat which, in Mill’s view, paved the way for 
Mansel’s irrationalism. Mill’s animus toward any postulation of innate ideas 
stemmed partly from his conviction that such philosophy poured concrete over 
human nature and placed it beyond the reach of political reform; as Christopher 
Herbert notes, Mill imagined that his assault on Hamilton and Mansel in the 
Examination were of a piece with the libertarianism he advocated in On Liberty 
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(1859). Herbert remarks, ‘[Mill’s] antagonism toward Hamilton and Mansel is 
clearly proportionate to his sense of their betrayal of their own potentially 
liberating discoveries out of servitude to what he took to be the very worst of the 
agencies of mental subjugation, Christian religion … The Absolute is for Mill just 
a euphemism, finally, for that dire category, “authority”, and relativity is its 
philosophical antithesis’.290 It was Mansel’s insistence that we revere and obey an 
incognisable Absolute that provoked Mill to his famous non serviam: 
 
If in ascribing goodness to God I do not mean what I mean by 
goodness, what do I mean by calling it goodness? And what reason 
have I for venerating it? … Whatever power such a being may 
have over me, there is one thing that he shall not do: he shall not 
compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not 
what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow creatures; and 
if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to 
hell I will go.291 
 
As Bullen notes, placing the ‘Conclusion’ in the context of the Mill and 
Mansel controversy helps to explain why Pater’s essay, which makes only passing 
and apparently innocuous reference to religion, was seized upon as if it were a 
subversive intervention in a theological debate.292 Nonetheless, Bullen somewhat 
over-simplifies the nature of the controversy when he implies that it was a contest 
between Mill’s atheistic relativism and Mansel’s absolutist theology, or even a 
confrontation between materialist and idealist philosophies.293 Certainly, Mill’s 
‘to hell I will go’ pronouncement led some conservative journals to clamour over 
his ‘Satanic’ attitude and ‘repellent … Atheism’.294 But for other believers, 
particularly Broad Church men such as Kingsley and F. D. Maurice, Mill was on 
the side of the angels, defending human reason and the possibility of a knowable 
and moral God against Mansel’s avant-garde obscurantism.295 And at key points 
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in the Examination, Mill specifies that his arguments do not entail atheism.296 
(The degree to which Mill’s positions could be construed as sympathetic to 
Christianity would become clearer with the posthumous publication of his Three 
Essays on Religion [1874]). On the other hand, the empiricism Mill expounded in 
the Examination might seem as much an affront to common sense or to the scope 
of reason as Mansel’s agnostic theology insofar as Mill denied that we have 
knowledge of the reality of matter or of an external world. Bullen quotes Mansel 
declaring that ‘Mr. Mill is one of the most distinguished representatives of that 
school of Materialism which Sir W. Hamilton denounced as virtual atheism’, but 
‘materialism’ is here an aspersion that should not be taken on trust.297 Strictly 
speaking, Mill’s ‘sensationalism’ or ‘phenomenalism’ was not materialist but in 
the tradition of Bishop Berkeley’s immaterialist empiricism, and in the 
Examination, he famously averred that ‘Matter … may be defined, a Permanent 
Possibility of Sensation’.298  
Mill’s scepticism about the existence of matter is crucial for Pater’s 
‘Conclusion’. In the second and third paragraphs of the essay, Pater traces the 
way in which a strict empiricist epistemology such as Mill’s, which admits only 
the testimony of sense experience, can unfurl into an idealist position that renders 
the self a phantasmagoria of fleeting impressions and vaporises the reality of the 
world. Pater’s point is that empiricism – often caricatured in Victorian culture as a 
kind of Gradgrindish fixation on hard facts, scientific objectivity, and the palpably 
material at the expense of the mysteries of faith or imagination – can have the 
ironic effect of etherealising our perception of ourselves and of the world.299 
Thus, although the empiricist’s appeal to ‘experience’ initially seems to tether us 
to ‘sharp importunate reality’, it ultimately leaves us floating in a ‘dream of a 
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world’, haunted by the question of what might be ‘real’ (Pater’s italic).300 Critics 
often assume that Pater is invoking Hume in these passages rather than his own 
age’s most energetic exponent of empiricism, presumably because Mill’s name is 
associated with a kind of stout common sense rather with the kinds of phantasmal 
images of the self that Pater conjures in the ‘Conclusion’.301 Certainly in the 
Examination, Mill does present his phenomenalism as if it were robustly 
commonsensical – or as if he rather wished to play Dr. Johnson kicking the stone 
even as he defends a Berkeleian position: 
 
Matter, then, may be defined as a Permanent Possibility of 
Sensation. If I am asked, whether I believe in matter, I ask whether 
the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, then I believe 
in matter: and so do all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this, I 
do not. But I affirm with confidence, that this conception of Matter 
includes the whole meaning attached to it by the common world, 
apart from philosophical, and sometimes from theological, theories 
… It is hardly necessary … to mention Dr. Johnson, or any one 
else who resorts to the argumentum baculinum of knocking a stick 
against the ground.302  
 
Nonetheless, it is likely that Pater was aware that the more counterintuitive 
and recondite implications of a rigorously pursued empiricism had been given 
fresh currency by Mill in his efforts to undercut the arguments of Hamilton and 
Mansel. Critics tend to dwell upon the more proto-modernist and Gothic nuances 
in Pater’s imagery in these paragraphs, particularly his suggestion that an 
empiricist and/or idealist epistemology immures the self in solipsism, or reduces it 
to a welter of ghostly sensations.303 Yet Pater’s evocation of both empiricist and 
idealist epistemologies – in short, his evocation of a Millian phenomenalism – is 
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not simply fearful, and his emphasis is not upon the agonies of fragmentation. 
Indeed, Pater is clearly quite taken with the at once purely sensuous and 
dematerialised model of the self apparently mandated by such logic. Just as in the 
opening paragraph of the ‘Conclusion’ Pater strives to find beauty and 
enchantment in a materialist model of the self, here he showcases his capacity to 
aestheticise an immaterialist one. He characterises the apparent dissolution of the 
self not in terms of loss or terror but as ‘a trick of magic’, and imagines it as a 
process of rarefication whereby the self becomes gossamer-like, ‘a tremulous 
wisp constantly reforming itself on the stream’ or a ‘strange, perpetual’ process of 
‘weaving and unweaving’.304 The passages gain an exhilarated, almost ecstatic 
momentum as the self loses its solidity and attains to a kind of pure receptivity, 
with the implication that ‘modern thought’ achieves a sort of mystic kenosis by 
other means. The fact that the ‘Conclusion’ implicitly enthrones the aesthetic 
consciousness – that is, the appreciator or connoisseur of art – above the creative 
imagination of the artist means that the traditional problem of a Millian 
empiricism, its postulation of a passively receptive self, is not really a problem for 
Pater; indeed, an empiricist logic licenses his wish to construct passive receptivity 
not as an alarming predicament but as aesthetic rapture. It is also worth recalling 
that these passages were originally composed as part of an argument about the 
undiminished vitality of art, particularly of a type of neo-pagan poetry, in an age 
of science: their purpose is not to lament the incapacitating effects of empiricism 
but to underscore the extent to which empiricists dwell among ‘beautiful 
shadows’ just as lovers of poetry do.  
In the second half of the essay, Pater does not disavow empiricism but 
simply appeals to it in its more reassuring guise as an epistemology which 
validates ‘sharp and eager observation’ and makes ‘experience itself’ the measure 
of things. Likewise, the materialist model of the self that was depicted in the 
opening paragraph of the essay reappears here not as an inexorable truth but as a 
desirable condition that we should maximise by paying rapt attention to it.305 
                                                




Pater swerves from description into prescription: the self as posited by modern 
thought – an apparently passive confluence of material forces or a private 
chamber of flickering sensations – is now advocated as a modus vivendi and an 
aesthetic ideal. Jesse Matz captures this leap of logic when he observes that Pater 
has ‘snuck empirical fact into proof of aesthetic quality’ and turned the ‘Humean 
impression [into] an Epicurean passion, and a bridge from the scepticism of 
mechanistic science to the pleasures of love and art’.306 Yet Pater would not have 
regarded his conjunction of modern empiricism and Epicureanism as novel or 
strange, and insofar as he wished to make empiricism the ground of a 
rehabilitation of pleasure which reserved a special place for aesthetic 
contemplation, he had the example of Mill’s utilitarianism as a contemporary 
touchstone. 
At first sight, drawing a link between Mill’s utilitarianism and Pater’s 
aestheticism seems counterintuitive.  As an affirmation of the glorious uselessness 
of art, ‘aestheticism’ is frequently imagined to be in polemical opposition to 
‘utilitarianism’, at least in the popular sense of that word. Yet for Pater’s 
contemporaries, who were more attuned to the nexus between utilitarianism and 
Epicureanism, the extent to which Pater was an idiosyncratic student of Bentham 
and both James and John Stuart Mill seemed more obvious. Reviewing Marius, 
Pater’s friend Mrs Humphry Ward observed: ‘Marius’ carries on the train of 
reflection begun by the ‘Studies’ [i.e., the Renaissance], and the upshot of the 
whole so far is a utilitarian or Epicurean theory of morals. For, stripped of its 
poetic dress, the ethical argument of ‘Marius’ is essentially utilitarian’.307 Of 
course, Pater’s prose cannot be ‘stripped of its poetic dress’: the fact that his 
engagements with philosophy are notoriously unsystematic and imagistic is a key 
to his aestheticism, rather than a door blocking the way to its hidden meaning. 
Nonetheless, utilitarianism has a clear affinity with Pater’s aestheticism insofar as 
it represented an effort to legitimate pleasure and happiness as the supreme human 
objectives, and it did so within an explicitly secular frame. And if Mill’s 
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utilitarianism was often depicted as a coldly mechanical form of reasoning, it had 
the opposite connotation for Pater, who describes Mill in his ‘Wordsworth’ essay 
as one who ‘meditated very profoundly on the true relation of means to ends in 
life, and on the distinction between what is desirable in itself and what is desirable 
only as machinery’. (Pater is praising Mill for having recognised that the world 
would still need poetry after the ‘battle which he and his friends were waging had 
been won’).308 
Timothy Weiss simply defines Pater as an ‘aesthetic utilitarian’, and he 
finds suggestive echoes of both Bentham and Mill in the ‘Conclusion’. Weiss 
hears a cunning reformulation of Bentham’s felicific calculus or ‘greatest 
happiness for the greatest number’ principle in Pater’s fetishisation of the 
quantitative and the maximal, his invocations of a ‘counted number of pulses’, the 
‘greatest number of vital forces’, ‘as many pulsations as possible’ and a 
‘multiplied consciousness’: Pater effectively turns Bentham’s calculus from 
‘collectivity to subjectivity, and from commonweal to consciousness’.309 Weiss 
also argues that Pater’s emphasis upon momentary, ecstatic pleasure and his 
famous image of a ‘hard, gem-like flame’ may be traced to this passage in Mill’s 
‘Utilitarianism’: 
 
A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments, or in some cases, 
and with some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional 
brilliant flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of 
this the philosophers who have taught us that happiness is the end 
of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them. The happiness 
which they meant was not a life of rapture; but moments of such in 
an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and 
various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over 
the passive … 310 
 
Weiss rightly observes that Pater ‘shifts the utilitarian focus … from 
society to psyche’.311 Yet he misses the fact that in making such a transformation 
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and distilling it into a carpe diem imperative, Pater delivers utilitarianism back 
into the hands of its critics. In ‘Utilitarianism’, Mill refines upon Bentham’s work 
by drawing a distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures: where Bentham 
notoriously averred that ‘pushpin is as good as poetry’, Mill elevates aesthetic and 
intellectual pursuits over frivolous and purely physical pleasures.312 In this, Mill 
was explicit about the fact that he sought to cleanse utilitarianism of the sordid 
reputation it shared with Epicureanism: that is, as an ‘eat, drink and be merry’ 
doctrine, a gospel for gluttons and voluptuaries. However, instead of trying to 
dissociate utilitarianism from the taint of Epicureanism, Mill sought to rehabilitate 
Epicureanism by pointing out that it too advocated moderation and 
contemplativeness as the ideal means of securing pleasure and avoiding pain.313 
As I noted, Pater seems to follow Mill’s lead when he valorises intellectual and 
aesthetic pleasure above other kinds. Yet Pater departs from Mill’s efforts to 
make ‘pleasure’ a respectable ideal in that he does demand a ‘life of rapture’: the 
‘Conclusion’ calls not for the rational management of pleasures, but for 
‘enthusiasm’ and ‘ecstasy’ fuelled by a consciousness of the proximity of death. 
(In this, the ‘Conclusion’ is also unfaithful to Epicureanism, which tried to free its 
adherents of anxiety about death and prized self-mastery and ataraxia [i.e., 
tranquility], not passion or incessant stimulation.) In ‘Utilitarianism’, Mill has 
nothing to say about the relationship between pleasure and mortality, presumably 
because the traditional equation of Epicureanism with a carpe diem ethic is 
precisely what he seeks to neutralise. In other words, Pater’s ‘Conclusion’ 
releases the genie that Mill laboured so hard to put in the bottle: Pater takes 
ancient, discredited ideas which Mill sought to reframe as rational, moral, and 
civic-minded, and recasts them in such a way as to confirm the worst suspicions 
of many Victorians about the real thrust of secular thought.  
Pater found Mill attractive because he satisfied his ideal of the Montaigne-
like sceptic who takes the question of happiness seriously and maintains an 
optimistic view of human nature. In Plato and Platonism, Pater extols the 
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‘wholesome scepticism of Hume and Mill’ for its ‘appeal … to the authority of 
the senses’ and its capacity to disperse the ‘insane speculative figments’ of 
rationalist and transcendental philosophies.314 Pater shared Mill’s antipathy 
toward the concept of the Absolute; as Inman notes, Pater had ‘the peculiar habit 
of assuming that a hard, renunciatory attitude accompanied the tendency to seek 
Absolute truth’.315 And in ‘Coleridge’s Writings’, Pater endorsed the 
countervailing ‘relative spirit’ – or as he construed it in his own version of 
Hamilton’s dictum, ‘nothing is or can be rightly known except relatively under 
conditions’ – as wholly benevolent and emancipatory.316 ‘Coleridge’s Writings’ 
has not found favour with Pater’s modern critics; the few who have discussed it in 
detail seem to consider its attacks on metaphysics, and its efforts to align art with 
science, callow and abrasive in their triumphalism.317 Certainly there is some 
irony in the way in which Pater seizes upon the ‘relative’ as the key to all the 
mythologies, the absolute axiom which will dethrone the Absolute at last; and this 
line of thinking is connected to Pater’s early tendency to essentialise the secular 
as an intuitive and perennial core of human nature that will be revealed once the 
encrustations of religion have been cleared away. Yet the fact that Pater embarks 
on his publishing career by proclaiming that art will march onward under the 
banner of positivism rather than religion usefully reveals the assumptions which 
underlay his early thinking, particularly since he would never again explicate his 
position so candidly and in such crystalline prose. By the time he composed 
‘Poems By William Morris’, Pater had already begun to position himself more 
cagily with respect to established models of secularism; thus, the ‘Conclusion’ 
warns us not only against Hegel’s idealism, but against Comte’s positivism, 
contemning them both as ‘facile orthodoxy’ (Mill was a leading English 
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proponent of Comte’s religion of humanity).318 One wonders which English 
philosophical paradigm Pater is alluding to when he also warns us against 
submitting to any orthodoxy ‘of our own’; Franke suggests that Christianity is the 
implicit target, but it could be Mill’s positivism, which Pater may have regarded 
as one of the orthodoxies at Oxford in the 1860s.319 As Dale notes, ‘by the time 
Pater came up to Oxford in 1858 and in the ensuing years when he was an 
undergraduate and young Fellow, Mill’s thought and the empiricist outlook in 
general had begun to penetrate University intellectual life, and the curriculum, to 
an unprecedented extent’. Yet, as Dale goes on to argue, Pater’s aestheticism is 
not a simple revolt against Mill’s positivism: ‘Pater’s intellectual tone was set at 
least as much by Mill and the positivist thought of the day as by those other more 
obviously aesthetic and antipositivist sources such as Winckelmann, Goethe, 
Hegel, Heine, Ruskin, and T. Gautier’.320  Yet, like Swinburne, Pater often 
evolves his own aestheticist position out of dissatisfaction with the concessions 
made by a previous generation of secular thinkers such as Mill, as well as in 
reaction to the paradigm of regretful religious doubt.  
The ardent positivism of ‘Coleridge’s Writings’ was perhaps inspired by 
Mill’s 1840 essay on Coleridge, which compares Bentham’s utilitarianism to 
Coleridge’s mixture of German idealism and Anglican orthodoxy. While, like 
Pater, Mill makes it plain that he has little intellectual sympathy with Coleridge, 
he is more respectful toward Coleridge’s legacy than is Pater, and as a whole, the 
essay calls for a truce in the ‘bellum internecinum’, the contest between empiricist 
and transcendentalist philosophies; indeed, the essay is sometimes thought to 
reflect Mill’s desire to arrive at a kind of Romantic utilitarianism, one which can 
yield to the imaginative power of Coleridge’s vision even as it remains faithful to 
Bentham’s principles.321 The purpose of Mill’s essay is thus reconciliation, not 
iconoclasm: he graciously suggests that ‘whoever could master the premises and 
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combine the methods’ of Bentham and Coleridge ‘would possess the entire 
English philosophy of his age’.322 Nonetheless, Mill regarded what he dubbed the 
‘Germano-Coleridgian’ school of transcendentalism as a threat to his own 
programme, and he bluntly declares his loyalties: the ‘truth’ lies with ‘Locke and 
Bentham’; ‘we see no ground for believing that anything can be the objects of our 
knowledge except our experience, and what can be inferred from our experience 
by the analogies of experience itself’.323 Over two decades later, Pater’s essay 
takes up the cudgels for empiricism and against Coleridge with enthusiasm, and 
he rehearses many of the complaints against transcendentalism which Mill tenders 
with seeming reluctance (the possibility that Mill’s essay informs Pater’s is also 
suggested by the fact that, like Mill, Pater repeatedly compares Coleridge to 
Bentham).324 Yet if in his ‘Coleridge’ essay Mill in fact aimed to borrow some of 
the affective magic of Coleridge’s Romanticism for his own cause, it is in Pater’s 
essay on Coleridge that the rhetoric equal to such a task is to be found: Pater 
disparages Coleridge’s mysticism in unblushingly Romantic terms, demanding to 
know ‘who would change the colour or curve of a roseleaf’ for the sake of what is 
‘colourless, formless, intangible’?325 Unlike Mill, Pater refuses to cede the 
trophies of sentiment and imagination to Coleridge’s transcendentalism. Part of 
Pater’s reasoning is that secular spirits need not go to Coleridge for solace 
because they can always just read Wordsworth, who Pater depicts as a contented 
naturalist, more or less innocent of metaphysics.326 By contrast, Coleridge’s quest 
for the absolute ‘congeal[s]’ his thought and clings ‘like some contagious damp to 
all his writings’; it renders his language ‘greyer and greyer’ and ‘his thoughts 
outré, exaggerated, a kind of credulity or superstition exercised upon abstract 
words’; he is like a ‘born Epicurean, who by some strange wrong has passed the 
best of his days in a prison’.327 Pater’s insistence that Coleridge’s 
transcendentalism is not just mistaken but morbid, ‘ennuyant, depressing’, reflects 
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his determination to pry apart what Romanticism had apparently soldered together 
even for secular thinkers like Mill: the associations between transcendental ideals, 
emotional fulfillment, and aesthetic pleasure.328 Pater does not think that 
secularism needs to make any very costly concessions: 
 
What chains men to a religion is not its claim on their reason … 
but the glow it affords to the world, its ‘beau ideal’ … There are 
aspects of the religious character which have an artistic worth 
distinct from their religious import. Longing, a chastened temper, 
spiritual joy, are precious states of mind, not because … God has 
commanded them, still less because they are means of obtaining a 
reward, but because like culture itself they are remote, refined, 
intense … If there is no other world, art in its own interest must 
cherish such characteristics as beautiful spectacles. Stephen’s face, 
‘like the face of an angel’, has a worth of its own, even if the 
opened heaven is but a dream.329 
 
As Dowling remarks, Pater ‘continually describe[s] all ... transcendental 
ambitions in his chosen vocabulary of reproach, persistently associating 
transcendentalism and abstraction with words like dry, cold, freezing, 
inaccessible, colourless’.330 And the corollary of this tendency – the identification 
of the secular with heat, colour, and kineticism – is also observable throughout 
Pater’s work, though it issues most famously in his construction of the carpe diem 
imperative as an effort ‘to burn always with a hard, gemlike flame’.331 The 
‘Conclusion’ embodies Pater’s conviction that nobody can be wooed by reason 
alone; if a secular view of reality is to compete with a religious one, it can only do 
so by the strength of the ‘glow it affords to the world, its ‘beau ideal’’.   
There is some irony in the fact that the ‘Conclusion’, often considered the 
manifesto of the Aesthetic Movement and therefore an apotheosis of art, actually 
seeks in an important sense to clip the wings of art. For Pater, the value of art 
inheres in the fact that it inculcates vigilance toward the limits of secular 
temporality; it ‘comes to you professing frankly to give nothing but the highest 
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quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ sake’.332 
Rather than offering a foretaste of transcendence or providing imaginative 
moments purified of time, art only returns mortality to us in vivified form; it gives 
us ‘the highest quality’ to our moments as they pass by concentrating our 
awareness on the fact that they are passing, and the likelihood that we will protest 
that this is not much of a gift is acknowledged in the first part of the clause (art 
comes to us ‘professing frankly to give nothing’.) For Pater as for Swinburne, 
aestheticism was not an assertion of the transcendent powers of art, but rather, an 
assertion of art’s capacity to inspire a strenuously affirmative attitude toward the 
triumph of time.333 The fact that Pater glosses the ‘art for art’s sake’ slogan as an 
affirmation of a carpe diem ethic in the final sentence of the ‘Conclusion’ reflects 
the extent to which arguments for the autotelism of art could double as arguments 
for the autotelism of life: that is, as arguments for life’s immediate, intrinsic 
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Chapter Four: ‘Inheriting its Strange Web of Belief and Unbelief’: George 
Eliot’s Romola, Pater’s Marius the Epicurean, and the Aura of Agnosticism 
 
‘What Face is Behind it?’: Pater’s Marius, Art, and Agnosticism 
‘Writing in old age, [Euripides] is in that subdued mood, a mood 
not necessarily sordid, in which (the shudder at the nearer 
approach of the unknown world coming over him more frequently 
than of old) accustomed ideas, conformable to a sort of common 
sense regarding the unseen, oftentimes regain what they may have 
lost in a man’s allegiance. It is a sort of madness, he begins to 
think, to differ from the received opinions thereon. Not that he is 
insincere or ironical, but that he tends, in the sum of probabilities, 
to dwell on their more peaceful side; to sit quiet, for the short 
remaining time, in the reflexion of the more cheerfully lighted side 
of things; and what is accustomed … comes to seem the whole 
essence of wisdom, on all subjects; and the well-known delineation 
of the vague country, in Homer or Hesiod, one’s best attainable 
mental outfit, for the journey thither … Euripides has said, or 
seemed to say, many things concerning Greek religion, at variance 
with received opinion; and now, in the end of life, he desires to 
make his peace – what shall at any rate be peace with men. He is in 
the mood for acquiescence, or even for a palinode; and this takes 
the direction, partly of mere submission to, partly of a refining 
upon, the authorised religious tradition; he calmly sophisticates 
this or that element of it which had now seemed grotesque; and 
has, like any modern writer, a theory of how myths were made, 
and how in lapse of time their first signification gets to be obscured 
among mortals; and what he submits to, that he will also adorn 
fondly, by his genius for words’.1 
 
Pater’s characterisation of Euripides’ The Bacchae (circa. 404 BC) as the work of 
an iconoclast mellowed by age and reconciled to ‘accustomed ideas’ regarding 
religion will likely strike readers who turn from The Renaissance to Marius the 
Epicurean as one of many moments of thinly veiled self-portraiture in Pater’s 
writing.2 The passage belongs to the introduction of an essay that Pater published 
                                                
1 Pater, ‘The Bacchanals of Euripides’, Macmillan’s Magazine 60: 355 (1889), 63. 
Reprinted in Greek Studies (1895). 
2 Monsman is the key proponent for reading Pater’s works as experiments in 
autobiography. See Monsman, Walter Pater’s Art of Autobiography (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980).  
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in Macmillan’s in 1889 but which was probably written around 1878  – about two 
years before he began the four-year labour of composing Marius.3 It is revealing 
that Pater was at this moment brooding over the implications of a rapprochement 
with religious orthodoxy and, by extension, considering the kinds of rhetorical 
complexity that a late, palinodic style might afford. Significantly, Pater invites us 
to wonder if Euripides made peace with the gods or with his culture. While he 
suggests that Euripides became more afraid of death in old age, he also implies 
Euripides did not so much change his religious beliefs (or lack of them) as change 
his ‘mood’ about the beliefs of others; he came to approve of the communal 
dimensions of religion, and craved the ‘peace’ of affirming a consensus view. 
Pater does not really probe the question of how far Euripides inwardly assented to 
the truth of orthodoxy; he is more engaged by what he takes to be Euripides’s 
enjoyment of the ‘quiet’ pleasures of social conformity, won by his belated 
recognition of the futility of contesting conventional wisdom on matters which 
can only be considered a ‘vague country’. Yet Pater also emphasises that there is 
no getting back to the garden, no simple recuperation of lost belief; a late convert 
to orthodoxy is also an apostate from apostasy, and is likely to appear ‘ironical’, 
‘insincere’, even ‘sordid’. This kind of questionable, even corrupt double 
consciousness in relation to religious belief is precisely what Pater increasingly 
comes to link with aestheticism in his post-Renaissance work. This association of 
aestheticism with the atheist who has ‘second thoughts’ is explicit in Pater’s 
discussion of Euripides, where Pater comes close to suggesting that Euripides 
shifted ‘allegiance’ because it allowed him a peculiarly  flexible rhetorical 
position  – on the one hand, his former detachment from orthodoxy allows him to 
‘sophisticate’ the undesired elements of religion, and, like a decadent artist in the 
pattern of Baudelaire or Swinburne, thus beautify the ‘grotesque’; on the other, 
his new willingness to ‘submit’ is also a creative stimulant, since he must find 
                                                
3 Although the essay was published in 1889 in Macmillan’s, Pater’s friend and editor 
Charles L. Shadwell claimed that Pater composed it around 1878 and intended to include 
it in a volume that he subsequently abandoned; it appeared posthumously in Greek 
Studies. See Shadwell’s Preface to Greek Studies (London: Macmillan, 1927), 2-3. Pater 
began research for Marius in the spring of 1881; see Monsman, Pater, 81. 
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ways to ‘adorn fondly’ what he is glad to accept in conventional piety.4 As is 
often the case with Pater’s constructions of both pagan and Christian religion in 
Marius, there is also an obvious framing irony in the above quoted passage that 
qualifies Pater’s apparently sympathetic imagining of Euripides’ late religious 
turn. The notion of an ancient Greek playwright embracing traditional religion 
because he has come to revere tradition as such is of course ironic from the 
perspective of a much later age that inherits and values that religion largely as an 
element within a literary tradition; the idea of Euripides deferring to Homer or 
Hesiod as authorities on theology only underscores the kind of historical 
relativism which unsettles any such hopes of locating a point of fixity in ‘common 
sense regarding the unseen’. 
 So far, I have largely bracketed the problem of the two Paters – that is, the 
interpretive quandaries created by the fact that Pater became a far more 
circumspect writer in the wake of the scandal caused by the Renaissance, and 
increasingly censored his earlier, irreligious statements, most famously by 
removing the ‘Conclusion’ from the second, 1877 edition (it was restored, with 
some revisions, in the 1888 edition), and by bowdlerising essays such as 
‘Coleridge’s Writings’ and ‘Poems By William Morris’ when they were reprinted 
under different titles in Appreciations (1889).5 The problem is thorny because a 
simple distinction between a youthful, firebrand Pater and a late, penitent Pater 
does not obtain as neatly as this process of self-censorship might imply. As I have 
indicated, Pater’s early, secular aestheticism was often pursued under the 
ambiguous sign of ‘heresy’, rather than straightforward iconoclasm; it works both 
through and against the ambiguities of the forms and modalities of Victorian 
doubt. Thus, distinguishing between the ambiguities of the early, heretical Pater 
and those of the late, palinodic Pater is a tortuous undertaking, even if the late 
prose style is appreciably more difficult and evasive than the early one: as 
                                                
4 ‘Second thoughts’ is the title of a chapter in Marius; see 167. 
5 ‘Coleridge’s Writings’ was revised and republished as ‘Coleridge’ and ‘Poems By 
William Morris’ revised and republished as ‘Aesthetic Poetry’, though Pater came to 
regret even the revised version of the latter essay and omitted it from the second, 1890 
edition of Appreciations. 
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Williams puts it, ‘all Pater is late Pater’, insofar as the self-cancelling gestures of 
the late Pater can be found in the early Pater too.6 At stake in these distinctions is 
the question of how far Pater moved toward Christian belief in his later life, a 
question which has been best answered by Shuter, who argues that, insofar as 
Pater did turn toward Christianity, he turned toward it using the very language, 
tropes, and arguments that he had previously used to reject it.7 Yet this apparently 
perverse logic was not just an idiosyncrasy of Pater’s: it reflects the extent to 
which his aestheticism was always a close commentary on the paradoxes of 
Victorian religious doubt. The difference between the provocations of The 
Renaissance and the evasions of Marius can be traced at least partly to the fact 
that those paradoxes had become even more culturally salient in the late 1870s 
than they had been in the 1860s.  
In this chapter, I argue that Marius meditates on the implications of the 
integration of religious doubt and agnosticism into the mainstream of cultural life 
in the 1870s and early 1880s. As is in the case of his earlier work, Pater uses 
aestheticism as a means of revitalising debates about religious doubt which he felt 
had become stale and conventionalised. However, where in his early career Pater 
exploited ambiguities within the discourses of Victorian doubt in order to 
polemicise for a utopian, quasi-pagan vision of the secular, one which he 
imagines to be ‘heretical’ or rebellious,  from the late 1870s, as religious doubt 
attained new philosophical prestige and social acceptability with the 
popularisation of ‘agnosticism’, Pater apparently felt less impetus to construct 
aestheticism as a radical discourse, and more free to posit it as a natural extension 
of a prevailing cultural mood. Nonetheless, I will suggest that Pater remained 
resistant to the melancholic, apocalyptic, and strongly moralistic models of 
unbelief he critiqued in his earlier work, and his aestheticism continues to 
advertise itself as religious doubt with a difference – that is, as an especially 
subtle and imaginatively liberated way of engaging with the faith-and-doubt 
question. Pater also continues to present aestheticism as a neutral realm beyond 
                                                
6 Carolyn Williams, ‘On Pater’s Late Style’, Nineteenth Century Prose, 24.2 (1997), 144. 
7 Shuter, Pater, 39-60. 
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all religious controversy; however, where claims of impartiality or 
disinterestedness in Pater’s early work are aligned with a secularising agenda, the 
extraordinarily dense, convoluted and ambiguous character of Marius aims to 
render entirely illegible Pater’s own position in relation to religious belief: the 
novel everywhere invites and frustrates readerly attempts to discover the 
commitments of its author. 8 
 Pater’s perception that religious doubt had been exhausted as a literary 
theme is apparent in his review of Mrs Humphry Ward’s Robert Elsmere (1888). 
While Pater is generous in his praise of the novel – he and Ward moved in the 
same Oxford circles – a note of impatience is detectable when he analyses Ward’s 
handling of religious doubt. Observing that ‘the sorts of doubts which troubled 
Robert Elsmere are no novelty in literature’, he complains that Ward’s 
understanding of the debate is passé: where Ward’s clergyman hero is so troubled 
by doubts about the literal truth of Christianity that he abandons the Church, Pater 
avers that the debate has ‘advanced’ beyond questions of evidence of the kind 
raised by Renan and onto a more philosophical plane.9 Pater points out that a ‘a 
large class’ of Christians regard ‘philosophic uncertainty’ as compatible with faith 
– Pater even expresses irritation with the self-consciously modern type of liberal 
clergyman who ‘dwell[s] on nothing else but the difficulties of faith and the 
                                                
8 For an overview of the contemporary reception of the novel, see Franklin Court’s ‘The 
Critical Reception of Pater’s Marius’, ELT 27.2 (1984): 124-139. For readings which 
argue that Marius is a Christian novel or reflects Pater’s own re-conversion to 
Christianity, see for example Hanson, Decadence, 210-217; Monsman, Pater, 71-104; 
James Russell Perkin, Theology and the Victorian Novel (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2009), 196-224; and Martha Salmon Vogeler, ‘The Religious Meaning 
of Marius the Epicurean’, Nineteenth-Century Fiction 19.3 (1964): 287-299. For critical 
interpretations which challenge or complicate the Christian reading of the novel, see for 
example Joseph Carroll, Evolution and Literary Theory (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1995), 323-347; Gowan Dawson, ‘Walter Pater’s Marius the Epicurean 
and the Discourse of Science in Macmillan’s Magazine: ‘“A Creature of the Nineteenth 
Century”, English Literature in Transition 48.1 (2005):38-54; U. C. Knoepflmacher, 
Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel: George Eliot, Walter Pater and Samuel 
Butler (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), 189-223; and Maureen Moran, 
‘Pater’s Great Change: Marius the Epicurean as Historical Conversion Romance’, in 
Transparencies, ed. Brake et al.,170-188. 
9 Pater, ‘Robert Elsmere’, Essays From ‘The Guardian’ (London: Macmillan, 1906), 66. 
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propriety of concession to the opposite force’ – and argues that if Elsmere had 
possessed a more ‘philosophical or scientific temper,’ he would have ‘hesitated’ 
before he repudiated Christianity.10 Although he does not use the word ‘agnostic’, 
Pater is clearly gesturing at the tendency of many late Victorian intellectuals, both 
committed Christians and secularists, to emphasise the limits of knowledge and 
situate themselves along an agnostic continuum when defining the nature of their 
belief. Pater suggests that at least in sophisticated circles, the ‘religious question’ 
has paradoxically been settled – there are no longer ‘unconquerable differences’ 
between believers and unbelievers – because the enlightened have arrived at a 
consensus about its insolubility.11   
Critics sometimes cite Pater’s review of Robert Elsmere in order to 
demonstrate his shift toward Christianity in this period in his life, and certainly he 
sounds more like a committed Christian here than anywhere in his published 
work.12 This may be partly because the (unsigned) review was written for the 
Anglican Guardian; Pater’s use of an editorial plural voice that posits a Christian 
reader – ‘to us, the belief in God, in goodness at all, in the story of Bethlehem, 
does not rest on evidence so diverse in character and force as Mrs. Ward suggests’ 
– indicates his self-consciousness about his audience. Pater’s sympathy with 
Christianity is couched in agnostic terms – he writes of ‘mak[ing] an allowance’ 
for ‘a great possibility’ – but, in a direct inversion of his position in his early 
essays and The Renaissance, he elevates Christianity above secular humanism on 
aesthetic grounds.13 Perhaps the most telling part of the review is where he 
observes, ‘At his death Elsmere has started what to us would be a most 
unattractive place of worship, where he preaches an admirable sermon on the 
purely human aspect of the life of Christ’, but then questions the aesthetic value 
of any creed which dispenses with a sense of the ‘infinite’ nature of Christ, since 
it must then also renounce the poetry of ‘all such sayings as that ‘though He was 
                                                
10 Ibid., 66-68. 
11 Ibid., 69.  
12 See for example Vogeler, ‘Religious Meaning’, 290. 
13 Ibid., 68-69. 
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rich, for our sakes He became poor’.14 There is perhaps a snobbish subtext here: 
the audience to whom Elsmere preaches in his ‘unattractive place of worship’ 
consists largely of lower-class secularists (though Ward’s own aversion to this 
vulgar type of unbelief is palpable in this section of the novel).15 Nonetheless, 
Pater’s choice of quotation from Saint Paul would be jarring to even a casual 
reader of Robert Elsmere, since it creates the impression that what he thinks is 
lacking in Elsmere’s creed is commitment to love or charity, but Ward’s novel 
earnestly constructs Elsmere as a Christlike martyr to the cause of a secular 
humanitarianism – Elsmere devotes his life more heroically to the poor because of 
his apostasy. Arguably, Pater’s distinction here is aesthetic (and latently political), 
not moral or religious: he is not suggesting that that Elsmere’s humanitarianism 
fails by the lights of Christ’s identification with the poor, but that it fails by the 
lights of Paul’s poetic rendering of that identification. Pater’s sense of the 
aesthetic crudity of Elsmere’s secular church mirrors his sense of the intellectual 
crudity of Ward’s supposition that the ‘religion question’ turns on empirical 
evidence. The thread of logic in this critique, which seems to swerve so abruptly 
from a protest against Elsmere’s lack of ‘philosophic’ rigour to a protest against 
the aesthetic deficiencies of his creed, is the same as that which is woven through 
Marius: once it is widely acknowledged that the ‘religion question’ is a 
philosophical crux, it yields to being understood as a personal choice in which 
one’s ‘class of mind’, especially one’s aesthetic sensibility, is the decisive 
consideration.16 In other words, the undecidability of truth claims about religion – 
the fact that philosophy gives us no firm ground on which to either accept or 
reject it – now licenses the individual to ask of Christianity, mutatis mutandis, the 
same self-consciously bold question that he famously enjoins us to ask in the 
‘Preface’ to The Renaissance: ‘What is this song or picture, this engaging 
personality presented in life or in a book, to me? What effect does it really 
produce on me? Does it give me pleasure? And if so, what sort or degree of 
                                                
14 Ibid., 69. 
15 For a discussion of the refined doubt/coarse atheism binary that structures Ward’s 
novel, see Marsh, Word Crimes, 167-8. 
16 Pater, ‘Elsmere’, 68. 
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pleasure? How is my nature modified by its presence, and under its influence?’17 
Yet – as is often the case in Marius – Pater adds a jarring note which renders his 
position obscure. In the midst of making the case for remaining receptive to 
Christianity, he approvingly quotes a remark of Ward’s which asserts a gulf 
between Christianity and modern enlightenment and elevates the latter over the 
former: there are ‘two estimates of life – the estimate which is the offspring of the 
scientific spirit, and which is forever making the visible world fairer and more 
desirable in mortal eyes; and the estimate of Saint Augustine’.18 
 The popularisation of T. H. Huxley’s coinage, ‘agnosticism’, and in 
particular, its protean life in the Victorian periodical press in the 1870s and 1880s, 
is a crucial context for the enigmatic impression that Marius generally leaves on 
readers. From the moment of Huxley’s invention of the word in 1869, ‘agnostic’ 
did not simply name a conciliatory, intermediate position but introduced a 
slippery signifier which contaminated commonsense distinctions between belief 
and atheism, particularly since – like ‘doubt’ – it rapidly came to occlude the 
possibility of the latter. It was widely understood that Huxley and other 
spokesmen of natural science proselytised on behalf of ‘agnosticism’ partly in a 
bid to cleanse natural science of its besmirching associations with atheism and 
materialism.19 However, whether ‘agnosticism’ represented a transparent modus 
vivendi between natural science and established religion, or a means by which the 
partisans of science pursued a secularist agenda by stealth, was a confusing and 
contested issue. As George Levine observes, the desire to reconcile science with 
religion, or to believe in ‘something like ‘non-overlapping magisteria’’, was 
frequently claimed by both sides of bitter disputes over the proper authority of 
each in the Victorian period, and this in turn made both sides suspicious of 
apparently conciliatory terms such as ‘agnosticism’.20 
                                                
17 Pater, Renaissance, 3. 
18 Pater, ‘Elsmere’, 69. 
19 Dawson, Darwin, 18-21. 
20 George Levine, Realism, Ethics, and Secularism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 54. 
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The tendency of most late Victorian advocates of natural science to 
disclaim ‘atheism’ and ‘materialism’ while many advanced views which often 
seemed to the public indistinguishable from conventional definitions of those 
terms could serve to render atheists and materialists a spectral group at the very 
moment they were widely imagined to be making dramatic encroachments upon 
the cultural life of the nation.21 As Edward Plumptre, Dean of Wells, drily 
remarked in 1881, ‘Though many men of science hold premises which logically 
lead to Atheism, no one, I suppose, except the junior member for Northampton 
[i.e., Bradlaugh] is an Atheist’.22 The fact that the devout generally invoked 
‘atheism’ more freely than anyone whose views actually approximated to the term 
meant that to a large extent the word retained its ancient character as an insult or 
an accusation, rather than an avowable identity, throughout the late Victorian 
period. Huxley’s coinage actually created schism within the organised secularist 
movement, with many members refashioning themselves as ‘agnostics’ while 
Bradlaugh cleaved to the word ‘atheist’ as a form of political resistance.23 By 
Huxley’s own account, he coined the term because it seemed 
 
a fit antithesis to gnostic – the gnostics being those ancient heretics 
who professed to know nothing – Agnostic therefore in the sense 
of a philosophical system is senseless: its import lies in being a 
confession of ignorance – a warning set up against philosophical 
and theological phantasms which was never more needed than at 
the present time when the ghost of the ‘Absolute’ slain by my 
masters Hume and Hamilton is making its appearance in broad 
daylight.24  
 
Huxley’s studied humility in the face of the unknown, his suggestion that 
‘agnosticism’ is allied with righteous Christianity against the heretical 
                                                
21 For an account of the tendency of late Victorian scientific naturalists to disavow 
‘atheism’ and ‘materialism’, see Bernard Lightman, The Origins of Agnosticism: 
Victorian Unbelief and the Limits of Knowledge (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1987), 16-18 and 22-26. 
22 E. H. Plumptre, ‘The Fields of Conflict Between Faith and Unbelief’, Contemporary 
Review 40 (August 1881), 170. 
23 See Edward Royle, Radicals, Secularists, and Republicans: Popular Freethought in 
Britain, 1886-1915 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 116-119. 
24 Quoted in Lightman, Agnosticism,13.   
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‘gnosticism’ of Christian theology, and his name-checking of Hamilton (balanced 
with a bow to Hamilton’s sceptical compatriot, Hume), all typify the way 
Victorian agnostics appropriated Christian discourses to ambiguous ends. Bernard 
Lightman, who has written the most comprehensive intellectual history of 
Victorian agnosticism, accentuates the distinctly religious and Kantian valences of 
the term and demonstrates the fact that its key proponents, Huxley, Herbert 
Spencer, and Stephen, were self-conscious about the degree to which their shared 
emphasis upon the ineluctable limits of human knowledge dovetailed with 
theological (and Kantian) arguments mounted by Hamilton and Mansel.25 Like 
some Victorian commentators, Lightman also dwells on the slippage between 
agnosticism and religiosity in Spencer’s concept of the ‘Unknowable’, which – to 
the displeasure of some secularists, such as Frederic Harrison – could sound 
tellingly reminiscent of the agnostos theos or ‘hidden God’ of the New Testament 
(Acts 17:23).26 (The agnostos theos of Saint Paul was rumoured to have inspired 
Huxley’s coinage, though Huxley himself denied this.)27  
The fact that the Victorian agnostic could seem like the uncanny double of 
the orthodox believer inevitably bestowed an equivocal value upon the term. On 
the one hand, it could make ‘agnosticism’ seem like an olive branch extended to 
the devout, or even a viable philosophy for the committed Christian; on the other, 
it furnished  secularists with an instrument for subjecting Christianity to an 
immanent critique. The latter phenomenon is epitomised by Stephen’s influential 
essay, ‘An Agnostic’s Apology’ (1876), in which ‘agnosticism’ could scarcely be 
taken for a conciliatory or quasi-religious position: while Stephen claims that the 
term is an ‘advance in the courtesies of controversy’, he clearly conceives of it as 
a trenchant method for exposing the vacuity of theological speculation, and his 
‘agnostic’ attacks on Christian belief were well known for their remorseless logic 
and confrontational style.28 Huxley, Spencer, and Stephens all savoured turning 
                                                
25 Ibid., 32-67. 
26 Ibid., 68-90. Harrison expresses qualms about Spencer’s Unknowable in ‘Agnostic 
Metaphysics’, Nineteenth Century 16.91 (1884), 353-378.  
27 Lightman, Agnosticim, 12. 
28 Stephen, ‘Agnostic’s Apology’, 840. 
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theological arguments against Christian believers by suggesting that they were 
actually impious in their anthropomorphic fantasies about an unknowable deity, 
or by pointing out that the fideistic tradition within Christianity could leave 
theologians vulnerable to the charge of ‘scepticism’ they usually leveled at 
supposed atheists.29 By the early 1880s, the devout had grown wise to this 
‘agnostic’ habit of using theology or scripture to fashion anti-theological 
arguments and some began to claim that ‘agnosticism’ was – just as prominent 
agnostics liked to imply – entirely indistinguishable from Christian belief. For 
instance, H. G. Curteis asserted that ‘no religious man need shrink from saying, 
‘“I am a Christian Agnostic. I hold firmly by the doctrine of St. Paul, who 
exclaims, in sheer despair of fathoming the unfathomable, ‘O the depth of God! 
How unsearchable are His judgments, and inscrutable His ways!’ … And in so 
holding, I am in full accord with the Church”’.30 (Curteis had noticed the 
continuities between Spencer’s Unknowable and apophatic theology.)31 In 1887, 
William Fremantle, then a Canon of Canterbury, caused a scandal when he 
claimed in the Fortnightly that the Anglican church was undergoing a ‘new 
reformation’ under the aegis of agnosticism: in his view, the resolution ‘we must 
be content henceforward to be Christian Agnostics’ epitomised modern 
theological thought, even for theologians ‘not insensible to a reputation for 
orthodoxy’.32 Fremantle’s judgment received a cautious vindication when, in 
1892, William Sanday, professor of divinity and canon of Christ Church, Oxford, 
revealed in the Contemporary Review that he considered himself ‘something of an 
                                                
29 Lightman, 113-115. See also Stephen, ‘The Scepticism of Believers’, Fortnightly 
Review 22.129 (1877): 355-376. 
30 H. G. Curteis, ‘Christian Agnosticism’, Nineteenth Century 15.84 (1884), 337. 
31 Ibid., 338. 
32 W. H. Fremantle, ‘The New Reformation’, Fortnightly Review 41.243 (1887), 442. 
According to S. J. D. Green, this essay was ‘denounced from the university pulpit’ and 
Fremantle was subsequently ‘debarred from lecturing on the English Reformation as one 
of the official theology faculty lecturers, and even forbidden by the rural dean of Oxford 
from holding an informal conference of theological tutors to promote religion among the 
undergraduates’. See Green, ‘W. H. Fremantle’ in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004). 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy2.library.usyd.edu.au/view/article/53896?docPos=3 
(accessed November 18 2011). 
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agnostic’ and suggested (apparently in earnest) that Huxley ought to be respected 
as a theologian.33  
Lightman isolates a passage from Huxley’s Hume (1878) as a compact 
definition of Victorian agnosticism: ‘the limitation of all knowledge of reality to 
the world of phenomena revealed to us by experience’.34 Yet as the origin of this 
quotation in a discussion about Hume suggests and as Lightman himself concedes 
in a footnote, one could conceive of a more Humean and less distinctly religious 
genealogy for agnosticism than he pursues. 35 The fact that both Huxley and 
Stephens frequently claimed Hume – whose scepticism was often construed as 
godless and materialistic – as the father of modern agnosticism certainly suggests 
that, to informed readers, the assumptions behind ‘agnosticism’ would have 
seemed less clearly affiliated with Kant or with Anglican orthodoxy than 
Lightman sometimes implies.36 While Lightman’s emphasis upon the points of 
convergence between agnosticism and Christian theology underpins my reading 
of Marius, I will emphasise that ‘agnosticism’ had a less certain philosophical 
pedigree and a more Janus-faced life in late Victorian culture than his intellectual 
history seeks to unearth. ‘Agnosticism’ not only provided a short-hand for 
epistemological problems in relation to religious faith, but also produced such 
problems insofar as it could make the distinction between belief and unbelief 
appear esoteric or arbitrary.   
If on a philosophical level ‘agnosticism’ could claim kinship with 
theology and some liberal theologians embraced it, on a semantic level it was 
more usually treated as a euphemism for atheism, and, unsurprisingly, it was the 
euphemistic possibilities of the word that often exercised more conservative 
religious thinkers. The idea that defining oneself as an ‘agnostic’ rather than an 
‘atheist’ or ‘unbeliever’ is a fashionable distinction-without-a-difference is a 
commonplace in the periodical press in the 1870s and 1880s, where Huxley’s 
                                                
33 W. Sanday, ‘Professor Huxley as a Theologian’, Contemporary Review 62 
(September1892), 340. 
34 Quoted in Lightman, Agnosticism, 14. 
35 Ibid., 193. 
36 For Hume’s Victorian reputation, see Garratt, Empiricism, 43-71. 
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neologism is frequently characterised as a kind of parvenu admitted into society 
on the strength of false credentials. Some devout critics used the terms ‘atheist’ 
and ‘agnostic’ interchangeably for polemical purposes, or maintained that 
‘agnosticism’ was really more odious than atheism since its vaunted ‘neutrality’ 
amounted to ‘contemptuous indifference’; others worried that atheism would 
piggy-back on the respectability of ‘agnosticism’.37 For instance, in 1880 the 
Unitarian philosopher Charles Upton, indignant that Louisa S. Bevington had 
promulgated ‘practical Atheism’ in the pages of the Nineteenth Century, 
suggested that her audacity confirmed that ‘agnosticism’ was a slippery slope: 
 
It is evident that the Agnostic unintentionally helps the Atheist to a 
social recognition, which the latter could hardly otherwise obtain 
… So near, indeed, are the two, that the intellect of the majority of 
good people fails to distinguish clearly between them; and hence it 
comes to pass that since Agnosticism, as being the creed of so 
many eminent and popular savants and philosophers, is, of course, 
perfectly respectable, Atheism – its next-door neighbor on the 
negative side – gets the full benefit of this close association, and 
can now confidently show its face at the fashionable conversazione 
… without fear of being frowned upon as a disreputable intruder.38 
 
If ‘atheism’ and ‘agnosticism’ were often treated as fungible terms, the 
cachet of the new word ironically made the shadowy status of the older one more 
perceptible. For instance, a critic in the Saturday Review observed that it was a 
‘truism to say that in nine cases out of ten “Agnosticism” is but atheism writ 
large’ and suggested that widespread acceptance of Huxley’s coinage clarified the 
extent to which ‘atheist’ had always primarily constituted a calumny rather than a 
tenable subject position:39 
 
We suspect that the popular antipathy to atheism attaches as much 
to the name as to the thing named, though it is of course a further 
question how the name originally attracted to itself this evil 
connotation … Atheism was the favourite taunt hurled against the 
                                                
37 See for example Hutton, ‘The Atheistic View of Life’, Fraser’s 605 (May 1880), 653. 
For the ‘contemptuous indifference’ of agnostics, see Rev W. Anderson, ‘Agnosticism’, 
Leisure Hour (May 1881), 276. 
38 Charles Upton, ‘Fervent Atheism’, Modern Review 1 (January 1880), 98. 
39 Anonymous, ‘The Popular View of Atheism’, Saturday Review 49.1287 (1880), 819. 
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early Christians eighteen centuries ago by their Pagan persecutors, 
and re-echoed by the Jews, though it practically meant that they 
refused to worship idols; and the same charge had been brought 
five centuries before against Socrates by the Athenians … It is 
clear that for above two thousand years ‘atheist’ has been found a 
convenient label to attach to any class of religionists, or 
irreligionists – if the term may be allowed – who had specially 
outraged the national sentiment and thus incurred popular odium.40 
 
However, if ‘agnosticism’ prompted some to wonder if popular aversion 
to ‘atheism’ emanated more from its connotative aura than its strict denotation, 
the new word could also arouse fears that a more generalised linguistic scepticism 
would infest the subject of religious belief. In 1884, Agnes Lambert characterised 
agnosticism as a ‘false coin’ debasing the linguistic currency. Pointing out that 
‘agnosticism’ was used so promiscuously by advocates of science that a man’s 
belief in the ‘law of gravity will save him from the odium of atheism’, she 
asserted that defending the integrity of words was essential to defending faith:41 
 
Now these words nature, God, religion, in their old signification, it 
is most necessary to hold fast … Otherwise it will be impossible, 
in the maze in which we shall find ourselves, to appreciate fully 
the danger by which language is threatened and the subtle process 
by which its subversion is being effected: a process that Renan 
prepared for us when he patronisingly spoke of God, Providence, 
soul and immortality as ‘good old words; a little heavy perhaps, 
but which philosophy will interpret in senses more and more 
refined’.42 
 
As can be felt here, ‘agnosticism’ aroused suspicion not only about the 
nature of a person’s beliefs but about the sincerity of a person’s intentions. In this 
respect, many late Victorian proclamations and laments about the decline of 
Christianity or the spread of atheism can be understood in part as reactions not to 
an obvious triumph of secularism but to a widespread cultural hermeneutics of 
suspicion toward religious belief. A common theme in the Victorian periodical 
press in the 1870s and 1880s is that where once the distinction between belief and 
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42 Ibid., 952. 
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unbelief was transparent, now it is contaminated by all manner of intellectual 
dissimulations, rhetorical refinements, and undeclared agendas. Debates about 
whether ‘agnosticism’ was parasitic upon theology or atheism-in-the-raw and 
about the extent to which ‘agnostics’ should be counted as friends or enemies of 
Christianity meant that the term fed into an epistemological dilemma: how could 
one tell if a given avowal of religious belief or unbelief was really a covert or 
unwitting form of its opposite?43 Heather Morton, reflecting on Browning’s 
dramatic monologue ‘Bishop Bloughram’s Apology’ (1855), observes that the 
controversies surrounding Catholic conversion in the 1840s and 1850s 
persistently provoked questions about the distinctions between formal and inward 
beliefs and between theological reasoning and scepticism, with the effect of 
endowing public religious identity with a fascinating indeterminacy:  
 
The mystery of religious persuasion in the nineteenth century (like 
the mystery of sexual orientation in the twentieth) is what we want 
to know about the inner life of a public figure; what we think we 
can know through verbal testimony; but what, in the process of 
going public, shapes itself into the conventional form needed to 
register its authenticity. Gay or straight? Protestant or Catholic? 
The poverty of choices necessarily flattens the rich experience that 
constitutes sexual desire or religious conviction.44  
 
 ‘Agnosticism’ occupied a similiar structural position in the debates of the 
late Victorian period to that occupied by Anglo-Catholicism within the Catholic 
controversies of the 1840s and 1850s: as a tertium quid that destabilised binaries 
of religious identity, ‘agnosticism’ seemed to call into play other binaries, 
particularly those of sincerity versus insincerity and surface versus depth. 
 In 1884, the Catholic writer Wilfrid Ward argued that the tendency of 
positivist and agnostic writers to expropriate religious language and forms of 
feeling was producing a far-reaching cultural confusion of surface with depth. 
Using a clothes/body distinction as his organising metaphor, Ward condemned 
                                                
43 On the subject of whether the professed agnostic may be expected to maintain 
observance, see for example J. H. Clapperton, ‘The Agnostic at Church’, Nineteenth 
Century 11.62 (1882), 653-656. 
44 Heather Morton, ‘“A Church of Himself”: Liberal Scepticism and Consistent Character 
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what he saw as the tendency of agnostics and secularists to adopt the 
accoutrements of religion for rhetorical effect while denying religion’s ‘essence’ 
or ‘substance’.45 He claimed that such superficial fetishisation of religion was 
more despicable than simply declaring religion dead: ‘if, indeed, [secularists] 
think they have killed [religion], it would be more becoming in them to bury it 
clothes and all … than to keep its clothes as perquisites wherewith to array their 
own children’.46 Although Ward’s vitriol is directed at agnostics and positivists 
rather than aesthetes, his argument resonates with contemporary complaints 
against Pater’s work and aestheticism more broadly, both of which were also 
perceived as disingenuous attempts to enjoy the aesthetic and emotional perks of 
religion while forsaking its real essence or ‘body’.47 It is not surprising that Ward, 
loyal son and biographer of William Ward, who was a prominent figure in the 
Oxford Movement and eventually a Catholic convert, should be acutely sensitive 
to the appropriative energies of agnostics and secularists. As Fraser, Hanson and 
Maureen Moran have variously argued, late Victorian debates about the proper 
relation between aesthetics and faith often re-stage the drama of the Oxford 
Movement and of the Catholic conversion controversies which marked the early 
to mid Victorian decades. The felt antagonisms between institutional authority 
and individual conscience, aesthetic or ritual performance and sincere inward 
conviction, that the Oxford movement and the Catholic conversion controversies 
made so inflammatory, also played into the ‘crises of faith’ that gripped young 
men at Oxford and Cambridge in the same period. Early and mid-Victorian 
controversies over the distinctions between Protestantism and Catholicism and 
between religion and art were rhetorically overdetermined because both sides 
often imagined that ‘atheism’ was their real, if shadowy, opponent, and the terms 
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of such controversies thus easily extended into late Victorian debates about 
aesthetics and the secular/religious divide. 48 
The logical extension of Victorian anxieties about the sincerity and 
propriety of the professed beliefs of others is the question of whether one can 
know and control one’s own beliefs. The clothes/body distinction pursued by 
Ward – he re-published his essay as a book called The Clothes of Religion in 1886 
– everywhere insists that it is easy to render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and 
rigorously distinguish all that it is secular and rhetorical from all that is authentic 
and religious. Yet other, equally devout thinkers were alert to problematic 
slippages. Giving the same clothes/body distinction more complicated play (as 
well as a certain homoerotic quality), Mansel had warned in 1858 that sincere 
believers could stray into atheism entirely unawares, since the distinction between 
the forms and language of belief and the real thing could be subtle to the point of 
imperceptibility: 
 
A religious association may sometimes serve to disguise the real 
character of a line of thought which, without that association, 
would have little power to mislead. Speculations which end in 
unbelief are often commenced in a believing spirit. It is painful, 
but at the same time instructive, to trace the gradual process by 
which an unstable disciple often tears off strip by strip the wedding 
garment of his faith – scarce conscious the while of his own 
increasing nakedness – and to mark how the language of Christian 
belief may remain almost untouched, when the substance and the 
life have departed from it.49  
 
 By the late Victorian period, the once reassuring commonplace that 
posited art as the ‘mistress’ or ‘handmaiden’ of religion could seem to produce a 
comparable crisis of distinctions for religious believers. In 1888, the painter and 
writer Wyke Bayliss sought to reassert the harmonious relationship between 
religion and art by pointing out the elusiveness of the distinction between the two 
as they are experienced by the seriously committed: ‘Does the curate of a parish 
                                                
48 See Fraser, Beauty and Belief, 7-66 and 183-228; Hanson, Decadence; and Maureen 
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49 Mansel, Religious Thought, 70-71. 
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church quite know, in arranging the services, how far he is acting a priest, and 
how far an artist? Does the painter in the studio, dreaming of Art as the 
regenerator of the world, quite realise that Art has never accomplished anything 
great, except under religious inspiration of some kind?’50 Yet Bayliss soon spies 
the dangers of such logic and abruptly re-establishes a distinction: 
 
[Religion and art] should walk together, but not in masks. The 
objection to a mask, like the advantage of a mask, is that we cannot 
tell what face is behind it. But when we meet with religious Art, or 
aesthetic Religion, that is precisely the thing we most desire to 
know – what face is behind it? Is there anything behind it? Or are 
we, after all, face to face only with a simulacrum? Let us 
distinguish clearly between Art and Religion, and give to each its 
proper place in the economy of life.51 
 
Like agnosticism, aestheticism (or ‘aesthetic religion’) flattens distinctions 
and threatens to make mere surface of everything. When Bayliss laments that an 
improper conflation of religion with art deprives us of ‘what we most desire to 
know – what face is behind it?’, he is ostensibly referring to a loss of faith in the 
religious sincerity of the artist, yet his metaphor, with its faint Biblical echo (‘For 
now we see through a glass, darkly;  but then face to face: now I know in part; but 
then shall I know even as also I am known [Corinthians 13:12]), seems to conflate 
the insincere artist with an unknowable or vanished God, and to hint that belief in 
God is linked to one’s capacity to believe in the meaningful religious interiority of 
artists, a capacity now under threat. 
In the context of this late Victorian crisis over what counts as religious 
faith, the elaborately calibrated indeterminacy of Pater’s Marius reads less like a 
cryptic autobiographical confession and more like an incisive analysis of a 
cultural moment, and the futility (and, of course, the inevitability) of seeking to 
decipher its ultimate stance toward Christianity becomes clear. Likewise, Pater’s 
claim that Euripides’s late religious style is constituted by a desire to out-
sophisticate the accusations of irony or insincerity that will inevitably greet it has 
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a quality of luminous insight when placed in the context of a pervasive late 
Victorian hermeneutics of suspicion toward religious belief. The fact that 
‘agnosticism’ rose so swiftly to cultural prominence and was so often felt to be in 
need of ingenious exegesis or demystification is best explained not simply by the 
term’s quasi-religious aura, but rather by the disorienting chiasmatic effect it 
could have on the cultural valences of belief and scepticism. The agnostic’s 
profession of ‘learned ignorance’ in the face of religious questions could, on the 
one hand, grant the sceptic some of the venerable mystique of the theologian; on 
the other, it could grant the orthodox believer some of the ‘modern’ mystique of 
the sceptic.52 Marius everywhere plays with this chiasmus effect, which partly 
accounts for the novel’s capacity to produce radically divergent critical readings. 
Pater persistently characterises Marius’s Epicureanism in terms of mysticism or 
religion – Marius is said to be ‘a materialist, and with something of the humour of 
a devotee’; the narrator calls his Epicureanism a ‘rival religion, a rival religious 
service’ (Pater’s italics); Marius’s effort to ‘live days “lovely and pleasant” in 
themselves, here and now … independently of any faith, or hope that might be 
entertained, as to their ultimate tendency’ is said to be ‘a kind of religion – an 
inward, visionary, mystic piety or religion’.53 Later in the novel, Marius’s theistic 
epiphany (which, although transient, seems to prepare the ground for his later 
receptivity to Christianity) is the product of scrupulous, even dry, ratiocination: 
 
It was easier to conceive of the material fabric of the world around 
him as but an element in a world of thought – as thought in a mind 
– than of mind as an element, or accident, or passing condition, in 
a material order; because mind was really nearer to himself; it was 
an explanation of what was less known by what was known better 
… he felt a quiet hope and joy in the dawning of this doctrine upon 
him as an actually credible opinion …54 
 
Critics often find ‘actually credible opinion’ a tepid and hedging 
description of religious belief; for instance, Rosenberg writes that ‘Pater’s prose is 
                                                
52 For a discussion of the agnostic valorisation of ‘learned ignorance’, see Shaw, Lucid 
Veil, 142. 
53 Pater, Marius, 84, 32 and, 98. 
54 Ibid., 204. 
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hobbled because he cannot in conscience carry Marius further along the path to 
conversion than he himself could go’.55 Yet the suggestion that Marius’s rather 
cerebral epiphany just reflects Pater’s bad faith underestimates the extent to which 
figures like Mansel – whom Pater regarded as an ‘acute philosophical writer’ and 
an exquisite stylist – had succeeded in making philosophical scepticism available 
as a language of religious affirmation.56  By the end of the century, the historian 
Alfred William Benn could observe that, ‘In England, scepticism has become, 
under a modified form, the chief official weapon of Christianity’.57 Pater’s late 
writings everywhere attest to his fascination with the literary possibilities of the 
double cultural duty that ‘scepticism’ had begun to perform. 
One reason it is difficult to read Marius simply as a palinode to the 
Renaissance is that the secularist orientation of Pater’s early aestheticism is laid 
bare with more cogent polemical force in Marius than anywhere in Pater’s early 
work. Marius’s Epicureanism is constructed as an attempt to evolve an ideal of 
self-perfection from within a closed immanent frame, and Pater repeatedly 
suggests that such a conception of the good is the prerequisite to a joyous 
aesthetic vision: 
 
From that theory of Life as the end of life, followed, as a practical 
consequence, the desirableness of refining all the instruments of 
inward and outward intuition, of developing all their capacities, of 
testing and exercising oneself in them, till one’s whole nature 
should become a complex medium of reception, towards the vision 
– the beatific vision, if one really cared to make it such – of our 
actual experience in the world.58  
 
Pater enlarges on the same theme in the following chapter: 
 
Such a manner of life might itself even come to seem a kind of 
religion – an inward, visionary, mystic piety or religion – by virtue 
of its effort to live days “lovely and pleasant” in themselves, here 
and now, and with an all-sufficiency of well-being in the 
immediate sense of the object contemplated, independently of any 
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faith, or hope, that might be entertained as to their ultimate 
tendency. In this way, the true “aesthetic culture” would be 
realisable as a new form of the “contemplative life”, founding its 
claim on the essential “blessedness” of vision. One’s human 
nature, indeed, would fain reckon on an assured, unending future – 
on the vision of a final home, to be attained at some still distant 
date, yet with a conscious, delightful home-coming at last, as 
depicted in many an old poetic Elysium. But then, on the other 
hand, the world of perfected sensation, emotion, intelligence, is so 
close to us, that the most visionary can but paint that other distant 
home in colours really borrowed from it.59  
 
The words ‘actual’ and ‘actually’ appear a total of eighty-eight times in 
Marius, and acquire a complex polemical weight. Pater frequently uses these 
words as a means of conveying Marius’s aestheticised empiricism – that is, his 
hyper-receptivity to the vividness of the phenomenal world, coupled with his 
commitment to testing the philosophies he encounters against the ‘bar of an actual 
experience’.60 Clearly, however, Marius’s initial, purely immanent perspective is 
presented as a ‘religious’ attitude or kind of ‘mystic piety’ – a paradox captured 
when Pater later refers to Epicureanism as an ‘anti-metaphysical metaphysic’.61 
Invoking Pater in passing, Eagleton remarks that the fin de siècle is characterised 
by ‘a kind of mystical positivism, for which, after the endless lucubrations of high 
Victorian reason, that which simply, brutely, self-identically is, is the most 
alluring mystery of all. There is much of Whitman in this reverent espousal of the 
actual, but also a more general neurotic hankering for the very pith and texture of 
things …’62 Eagleton implies that the ‘mysticism’ of fin de siècle secularism is 
guilty and inadvertent, a return of the religious repressed; but Pater is both self-
conscious and untroubled about the extent to which his ‘reverent espousal of the 
actual’ is imbricated in religious language and modes of feeling. Pater carefully 
justifies his choice of ‘beatific vision’ – a phrase which specifically refers to the 
‘sight of the glories of heaven, esp. that first granted to a disembodied spirit’ 
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(OED) – as a means of conveying the rewards of a secular philosophy which 
treats ‘life as the end of life’. Pater asserts that the visionary ‘borrows’ its 
‘colours’ from sensation – in other words, invoking ‘beatific vision’ in relation to 
Marius’s philosophy only returns such apparently transcendent ideals to their 
home in the ‘actual’, that is, to their origin in embodied human experience. 
Paradoxically, a wholly secular perception of the material world has equal or even 
more legitimate claim on the language of the sacred than religious conceptions of 
the otherworldly or unseen. From the beginning of his career, Pater rejected the 
idea that secularism entailed an ascetic purging of the cultural and linguistic 
heritage associated with notions of the sacred: ‘Coleridge thinks that if we reject 
the supernatural, the spiritual element in life will evaporate also, that we shall 
have to accept a life with narrow horizons … harshly cut off from the spirits of 
life in the past. But what is this spiritual element? It is the passion for inward 
perfection with its sorrows, its aspirations, its joys’.63  
The fact that Pater devotes so much of Marius to celebrating the 
‘religious’ profundity of Epicureanism while only affirming Christianity in 
sceptical terms can create the impression that the novel really vindicates the 
premises of the ‘Conclusion’ and has only a vague  investment in Christianity. For 
instance, George Moore could without qualification compare Marius to Gautier’s 
Mademoiselle de Maupin (1835) and claim that it was suffused with the same 
‘glad worship of the visible world, and the same incurable belief that the beauty 
of material things is sufficient for all the needs of life’.64 Similarly, William 
Sharp, an acquaintance of Pater’s who reviewed Marius for The Athenaeum, 
construed it as an apology for Epicureanism, though he captured something of the 
novel’s elusiveness in his labour to make this point.65 In response Sharp’s review, 
which was probably solicited, Pater wrote: ‘I did mean [Marius] to be more anti-
Epicurean than it has struck you as being. In one way however I am glad that you 
have mistaken me a little on this point, as I had some fears that I might seem to be 
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pleading for a formal thesis, or ‘partis pris’’.66 It is significant that Pater’s corrects 
Sharp not for failing to perceive the extent to which the novel solicits a Christian 
reading, but for supposing that the novel is partis pris. Marius is an aestheticist 
novel not simply because of its preoccupation with the beauty of the visible 
world, but in its aspiration toward a pure impartiality on the question of religious 
belief and unbelief, and in its effort to keep the ‘personal opinions of the author’ 
inscrutable.  
 
‘Only the Thorough Sceptic Can Be the Perfect Saint’: Altruism and 
Epicureanism in Marius and Romola 
 
Pater had at least one prestigious contemporary model for his construction of a 
narratorial voice at once so sceptical and so sympathetic toward religion as to be 
opaque to the reading public. George Eliot died in December 1880, a few months 
before Pater began research for Marius. In his study of the obituaries of Eliot in 
the London religious press, K. K. Collins demonstrates the extent to which Eliot 
generated cultural confusion about what it meant to be a sceptic. Perhaps 
predictably, the desire of critics from range of denominational perspectives to 
honour Eliot as a moral sage and a de facto religious leader persistently 
culminated in the judgment, in Collins’ summation, that ‘since a non-believer 
cannot be a great moral teacher, either she must have been a believer after all or 
(what amounts to same thing) we need to re-examine what counts as belief’.67 The 
fact that Eliot carefully guarded her privacy, coupled with the fact that her novels 
often seemed to endorse religious traditions and feelings – so much so that her 
pseudonym was widely believed to belong to a clergyman before her true identity 
was revealed – left wide scope for uncertainty and wishful projection. Yet Collins 
shows that even critics who engaged with Eliot’s beliefs in a self-resisting manner 
were confounded. Aside from the protean nomenclature that plagues all attempts 
to affix an identity to someone who is apparently outside the Christian fold in the 
                                                
66 Quoted in ibid., 114. 
67 K. K. Collins, Identifying the Remains: George Eliot’s Death in the London Religious 
Press (Victoria BC: ELS Editions, 2006), 6. 
261 
 
period (Eliot is an ‘agnostic’, an ‘atheist’, a ‘positivist’, a ‘pagan’, a ‘humanist’, a 
‘materialist’, a ‘doubter’, an ‘unbeliever’), critics found it difficult to reconcile the 
translator of Strauss and Feuerbach with the author of Adam Bede (1859) and to 
distinguish Eliot’s moral insights from their (presumably) irreligious frameworks. 
There was also the problem that Eliot’s irreligion seemed present in the novels 
less as positive content than as a sin of omission; Eliot is – in the words of a 
journalist writing for the Anglican Church Quarterly Review – ‘neither an 
adherent nor an antagonist’ of Christianity.68 Although Collins does not comment 
upon this, another striking continuity across the sources he assembles is that while 
many critics were uncertain about the precise complexion of Eliot’s scepticism, 
most agreed it was a bleak creed: critics write of her ‘religion of despair’, her 
‘desolating negations’, her ‘speculative melancholy’ and the ‘shadowy abysses of 
philosophical thought’.69 While it is unsurprising to find the melancholy 
scepticism topos in the religious press, it is worth noting how often it is invoked 
in relation to Eliot, presumably as a means of compensating for the fact that the 
other traditional charge against atheism – its immorality – becomes unserviceable 
if Eliot is to be revered as a moral sage. In many of the obituaries there remains a 
tension between the desire to celebrate Eliot for her moral wisdom and the desire 
to condemn the nihilism implicit in her rejection of Christianity. 
Romola was Pater’s favourite among Eliot’s novels, and we know that he 
must have read it either when it was being serialised in the Cornhill in 1862 or 
soon after it was published in 1863, since he quotes from it in ‘Diaphaneitè’ 
(1864).70 That Romola should appeal to Pater is unsurprising: aside from the fact 
that it takes one of Pater’s touchstone periods and places for its setting, the 
densely erudite Romola fulfills perhaps more than any of Eliot’s novels Pater’s 
dictum that ‘the literary artist is of necessity a scholar, and in what he proposes to 
do will have in mind, first of all, the scholar and the scholarly conscience’.71 As 
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Nancy Henry observes, ‘Not only was [Romola] [Eliot’s] first major departure 
from works that drew on her recollections of rural English life, it was the first in 
which she seemed less interested in appealing to a broad audience than in 
communicating to a smaller group of readers educated enough to appreciate her 
aesthetic and scholarly accomplishments’.72 David DeLaura has argued that the 
influence of Romola on Pater’s career is extensive, shaping his references to 
Savonarola in The Renaissance and supplying Pater with a model for an ‘agnostic 
conversion’ novel in Marius.73 DeLaura helpfully outlines the similarities 
between the two novels: both Romola and Marius fall under the sway of a 
succession of philosophical and religious teachers and test the value of each new 
creed against their experience until they discover its inadequacies; both novels 
dramatise the intersections of paganism or secular humanism with Christianity at 
a pivotal historical juncture, and both novels allegorise the tensions between 
secular and religious ideologies in Victorian England.74 According to DeLaura, 
both Marius and Romola ultimately embrace a ‘creedless Christianity’; they 
endorse the ‘self-transcending ethic’ of Christianity but their quests remain 
‘resolutely secular in content’.75 He suggests that Pater found in Eliot’s ethic of 
altruism a means of adding a ‘self-transcending note of universal sympathy’ to 
Marius’s quest without having to affirm a fully-fledged Christianity; to his mind, 
the magpie borrowing from Christian morality in both novels reflects a ‘tragic 
personal inconsistency and lack of conviction’ on the part of their authors.76 
DeLaura notes that the premium Eliot places on self-renouncing altruism is only 
discernible in muted form in Marius, but he does not suggest that this amounts to 
a revealing difference between Eliot and Pater’s conceptions of the distinction 
between secular and Christian morality.  
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The fact that Marius and Romola, both of whom are presented as religious 
sceptics for a considerable part of their respective narratives, are both ultimately 
celebrated as exemplary Christians, even saints, by a Christian community – 
Marius’s death is deemed a martyrdom; Romola is increasingly received as a 
Madonna figure in Florence and taken for the actual Madonna in a plague-stricken 
village toward the novel’s end – could be thought to encode redemption fantasies 
on the part of authors whose reputations had been tarnished by their religious 
scepticism. (In Eliot’s case, this stigma was compounded the fact that she was 
known to be living in sin with a married man; it is hard to gauge how far 
homophobia contributed to the scandal over Pater’s Renaissance.)77 However, in 
both Romola and Marius, the construction of a protagonist who is celebrated as a 
paragon of Christian virtue but whose degree of belief is rendered nebulous by the 
narrator is more than an attempt to retain the uplift of Christian ethics while 
jettisoning transcendent faith. The fact that both Pater and Eliot create an ironic 
discrepancy between the interior lives of their protagonists, both of whom are 
perpetually self-questioning and vacillate between different belief systems, and 
the simplicity with which they are hailed as Christians by Christian communities, 
enables both writers to raise questions what it means to identify a person, a belief, 
or an act as Christian.   
In the proem to Romola, Eliot’s narrator reflects on the complexities of 
representing a remote historical epoch, chief among which is the task of 
disentangling belief from unbelief, official religion from the heterogeneity of 
individual experience. Eliot dramatises through the figure of an ordinary fifteenth-
century Florentine the extent to which the elusiveness of faith hampers her effort 
to conjure the world of the Renaissance, though her narrator intervenes abruptly 
to assert that her own perplexity only mirrors the Renaissance itself: 	  
 
Lucretius might be right – he was an ancient, and a great poet;  
Luigi Pulci, too, who was suspected of not believing anything from 
the roof upward … had very much the air of being right over the 
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supper-table, when the wine and jests were circulating fast, though 
he was only a poet in the vulgar tongue. There were even learned 
personages who maintained that Aristotle, wisest of men … was a 
thoroughly irreligious philosopher; and a liberal scholar must 
entertain all speculations. But the negatives might, after all, prove 
false; nay, seemed manifestly false, as the circling hours swept past 
him … For had not the world become Christian? Had he not been 
baptized in San Giovanni …? Our resuscitated Spirit was not a 
pagan philosopher, nor a philosophising pagan poet, but a man of 
the fifteenth century, inheriting its strange web of belief and 
unbelief; of Epicurean levity and fetischistic dread; of pedantic 
impossible ethics uttered by rote, and crude passions acted out with 
childish impulsiveness; of inclination toward a self-indulgent 
paganism, and inevitable subjection to that human conscience 
which … was filling the air with strange prophecies and 
presentiments.78 
 
Romola only partially makes good on the insight of its proem: while Eliot 
provides a complex gallery of Renaissance belief systems, the novel’s allegorical 
schema means that we have little difficulty identifying which thread of the 
‘strange web of belief and unbelief’ the characters are meant to represent. Tito, 
Romola’s treacherous, part-Greek husband, is persistently figured as Bacchus, and 
clearly incarnates ‘Epicurean levity’ and ‘self-indulgent paganism’; Bardo, 
Romola’s father, embodies the more stern, Stoic, and Roman branch of the 
classical legacy; Baldassarre, Tito’s nemesis, embodies a primitive pagan revenge 
ethic; the (historical) artist, Piero di Cosimo, embodies an earthy, sensuous 
humanism; Savonarola and Romola’s brother Dino represent the fanatical 
extremes of Christian asceticism and mysticism, though Savonarola is also 
portrayed more positively, as an exemplar of Christianity’s humanitarian ethic; 
and Tessa, the young peasant girl whom Tito seduces and Romola eventually 
saves, symbolises the ‘fetischistic dread’ and idolatry of a folk Catholicism. It is 
only Romola, who moves between pagan and Christian belief systems and 
eventually evolves a personal synthesis between them (a kind of Comtean religion 
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of humanity), who comprehends within herself the multifariousness of 
Renaissance Florence.79   
Marius fully takes up the burden of historical complexity outlined in 
Eliot’s proem insofar as it is much more difficult to provide an accurate summary 
of the philosophical and religious formations encountered by Marius. Like 
Romola, Marius is a kind of bricoleur, evolving a fresh synthesis out of diverse 
influences; but in Marius, Christian and pagan beliefs are systematically drained 
of their particularity and discreteness. This is not simply an effect of the polished 
monotony of Pater’s prose in Marius, but part of the novel’s design. The reader 
hesitates to call Marius a Christian not simply because, as in the case of Romola, 
the degree of his belief in a Christian deity is uncertain, but because in Marius 
Christianity shades into various pagan religions and philosophies. While this is 
partly because Marius is a portrait of an inchoate Christian church where Romola 
is a portrait of an emergent secular humanism and a proto-Reformation movement 
against the backdrop of the papacy, it also reflects a difference in Eliot and Pater’s 
understandings of the relationship between Christianity and secularism in the 
Victorian age. For Pater, the supreme virtue of the early church lies in its 
hospitality toward pagan culture, which adumbrates the syncretic inclusiveness of 
Renaissance humanism: ‘that church … had adopted many of the beauties of 
pagan feeling and pagan custom; … taking up, transforming, and accommodating 
still more closely to the human heart, what of right belonged to it … As if in 
anticipation of the sixteenth century, the church was becoming humanistic, in a 
best and earliest Renaissance’ (Pater’s italic).80 Here pagan wisdom is posited as 
humanity’s inalienable ‘right’, which the early church embraced and only 
rendered more congenial to sentiment or to the human ‘heart’. This seems an 
assertion of the primacy of the pagan, but the image of Christianity as an 
extraordinarily creative and fluid tradition, able to harmonise apparently dissonant 
elements within itself like a work of art, also seems to encode a perception that 
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the late Victorian church had aborbed into itself the challenges which had once 
seemed to threaten it.   
 Although it is often remarked that Pater emphasises the continuities 
between pagan rituals and aesthetics and the early Christian church, it is less often 
noticed that Christianity does not represent a radical break with pagan morality in 
Marius.81 In Christianity, Marius finds not so much a new moral dispensation as a 
‘renewal’ of what he ‘had valued most in the old world’.82 And Marius’s 
‘Christian’ moral sensibility seems fully formed before he comes into contact 
with Christianity – while in his exclusively Epicurean phase, he is willing to risk 
his life to minister to a plague-stricken friend (Flavian) and recoils from the 
cruelty of gladiatorial games. While such details may be read typologically, as 
signs of Marius’s incipient Christianity, they also underscore that Christianity 
only synthesises moral feelings that were available to him before he encountered 
it. Pater repeatedly suggests that temperament counts for more than professed 
creed in determining morality, and emphasises that Marius had attained moral 
perfection –  indeed, was, in a moral sense, wholly Christian – while an 
Epicurean.83 
As Felicia Bonaparte has argued, Romola’s bildungsroman is 
symbolically structured around a contest between Bacchus (represented by Tito) 
and Christ (represented by Savonarola).84 While Eliot’s depiction of this contest is 
subtly balanced – the worldly Tito is refined, intelligent, and sometimes tender-
hearted, while Savonarola’s messianism and desire for worldly power vitiate his 
capacity to do good – an underlying dichotomy remains stable throughout the 
novel: paganism is identified with worldly egotism, and Christianity with an 
otherworldly, other-regarding ethos. Romola eventually transcends the limits of 
both paradigms by conjoining the worldliness of paganism to the other-regarding 
ethic of Christianity. As Bonaparte observes, ‘As Bacchus appeals to [Romola’s] 
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passion for joy, so Christ finds in her a latent capacity for the moral imagination 
that was, in Eliot’s view, the unique legacy of Christianity’.85 Marius destabilises 
the idea that moral imagination is a unique legacy of Christianity, as well as the 
assumption that there is a necessary antagonism between Christianity and 
sensuous pleasure. Pater suggests there are in fact submerged affinities between 
Christianity and Epicureanism (or ‘Cyrenaicism’): 
 
… it may be thought that the saint, and the Cyrenaic lover of 
beauty, would at least understand each other better than either 
would understand the mere man of the world. Stretch them one 
point further, shift the terms a little, and they might actually 
touch.86 
 
Marius is a dizzying exercise in ‘shift[ing] the terms a little’. It is often 
noted that Pater  seeks to ‘reconcile’ the pagan and the Christian in Marius, but 
the idea of a ‘reconciliation’ does not do justice to the sleight-of-hand by which 
Pater makes Epicureanism and Christianity ‘touch’. Pater effectively represents 
Epicureanism and Christianity twice each: once, in terms of a noble, life-
affirming aestheticism, and again, in terms of decadent aestheticism. The overall 
effect is to imply that both Epicureanism and Christianity, as philosophies which 
make life beautiful in spite of the fact of mortality, can both just as easily be 
construed as life-affirming or morbid, as optimistic or pessimistic – the distinction 
is a trick of perspective, and aesthetics. 
One reason readers sometimes feel that Pater privileges the pagan and the 
secular over Christianity in Marius is the fact that his prose displays a marked 
allegiance to the ‘euphuistic’ literary style cultivated by Flavian, Marius’s 
Epicurean friend, who is said to incarnate ‘the spirit of unbelief’ and who writes a 
long ‘mystic’ poem, unmistakably akin to Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura, which 
celebrates ‘the vernal principle of life in things’.87 Pater’s introduction of the idea 
of ‘euphuism’ is typical of the novel’s disorienting mixture of anachronism and 
self-referentiality: while used by Pater to describe the literary ideal of Flavian, 
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‘euphuism’ was in fact an ornamental style of sixteenth-century English prose (it 
derives from John Lyly’s novel Euphues [1578]), and Pater clearly wants his 
readers to discern parallels between Flavian’s Lucretian poetry, sixteenth-century 
euphuism, and Victorian aestheticism, particularly Pater’s own literary style. The 
historical hall-of-mirrors effect is heightened by the fact that Flavian’s 
‘euphuistic’ style is itself characterised by anachronism: it is a self-conscious 
blend of ‘archaism’ and neology, and while his Lucretian poem is said to be a 
‘playful’, irreverent celebration of the life-force, its highly-wrought language 
anticipates the ‘sonorous organ-music of the medieval Latin, and therewithal 
something of its unction and mysticity of spirit’.88 In other words, Pater uses the 
figure of Flavian to define aestheticism not simply as the privileging of form over 
content or surface over depth, but more precisely as a literary style which has the 
power to cast an aura of religious solemnity over irreligious subject matter.  
The ‘Euphuism’ chapter reads like Pater’s manifesto for aesthetic style, 
not least because many of the stylistic principles developed by Flavian are close 
to those Pater propounded in his essay, ‘Style’ (1889) – for example, the open 
fetishisation of ‘words for their own sake’, the endorsement of linguistic 
eclecticism, and the suggestion that the author’s secret investments in the subject 
matter are what make for compelling prose.89 There is an argumentative force to 
the ‘Euphuism’ chapter as a whole; Pater pre-empts conventional objections to 
belle-lettrism – its affectation, self-consciousness, and lack of originality – and 
recasts these as complex virtues. Yet even as Pater vindicates Flavian’s euphuism, 
he casts doubt on Flavian’s goodness. Where Marius’s Epicureanism is presented 
in idealising terms, Flavian’s Epicureanism is said to signify his ‘corruption’.90 In 
effect, Flavian plays decadent twin to Marius; the moral stigma that attaches to 
Epicureanism is displaced onto Flavian, so that Marius’s Epicureanism may be 
ennobled with few qualifications. In this respect, the Flavian/Marius dyad seems 
like an conventional example of the ‘compensatory double-plot mechanism’ 
endemic to the Victorian novel, whereby two characters respectively symbolise 
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‘good’ and ‘bad’ instantiations of a similar transgression or threatening ideology, 
and are in turn rewarded and punished.91 Yet Pater deploys this convention 
subversively insofar as the differences between Marius and Flavian remain 
enigmatic. 
Just as Flavian’s literary style elevates form over content, Flavian’s 
physical beauty, or ‘perfection of form’, is said to conceal his ‘corruption’.92 Yet 
this inner ‘corruption’ is without determinate content, and seems itself an effect of 
his charismatic beauty. Flavian does not commit any immoral act, and his only 
vice seems to be the minor one of desiring literary fame; if his Epicureanism 
differs substantively from Marius’s, we never learn how. It is likely that the 
nature of Flavian’s ‘corruption’ is kept obscure partly because this allows Pater to 
hint at the fact that Flavian and Marius are lovers; yet this does not explain why 
homosexual love corrupts Flavian but not Marius. Within the network of 
analogies Pater establishes between Antonine Rome and the Victorian age, 
Flavian seems to embody the nebulous atmosphere of moral corruption that 
surrounded both aestheticism and materialism in the Victorian imaginary. In the 
figure of Flavian, Pater seems to reinforce these imaginative links between 
immorality, aestheticism and materialism even as he plays with their tendency to 
slide between the metaphorical and the literal.  
At first, Flavian’s immorality seems, if not just an effect of his charisma, 
then an entirely literary affair – a suspect emanation of his literary tastes and 
style. Pater underscores the literariness of Flavian’s ‘corruption’ when he portrays 
Flavian and Marius’s ‘fascination’ with Apuleius: 
 
But the merely marvellous, a delight in which is one of the really 
serious parts in most boys … passed at times, those young readers 
still feeling the fascination of it, into what French writers call the 
macabre – that species of almost insane preoccupation with the 
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materialities of the mouldering flesh, that luxury of disgust in 
gazing on corruption …93 
 
Pater links Flavian and Marius’s reading habits to aestheticism when he 
goes on to liken the macabre moments in Apuleius’s work to those in Gautier’s.94 
What is striking is how Pater limns the slippages between aesthetic pleasure, 
moral corruption, and the corruption of the body. Such slippages are also 
inscribed within the novel’s plot: Flavian dies slowly of plague while composing 
a Lucretian ode, and thus on a symbolic level, he seems actually to die of his 
aestheticised materialism. It is the sight of Flavian’s ‘perished body’ (as well as 
the act of transcribing Flavian’s poem) that makes Marius a decided ‘materialist’, 
and in this respect, Flavian’s corrupting influence is quite literal: he instills in 
Marius the belief that he is wholly constituted by corruptible matter.95 By the 
same logic that Flavian’s opulent literary style and physical perfection reify the 
beauty of materialism, his death by plague reifies the corruption of that same 
philosophy, its reduction of selfhood to ‘mouldering flesh’. 
  That Flavian’s poem is made to sound very like Lucretius’s De Rerum 
Natura is crucial to his unexplained aura of corruption. It is often noted that the 
‘fatal book’ – that is, a book with quasi-supernatural power to seduce and corrupt 
a reader – is a common topos in the literature of aestheticism and decadence.96 
Through the homoerotic poet-amanuensis relationship between Flavian and 
Marius, Pater reminds us that De Rerum Natura is perhaps Western culture’s 
original ‘fatal book’. Natania Meeker observes that, throughout its reception 
history, De Rerum Natura has been imagined as an irresistibly seductive 
proselytic work, capable of converting readers to Epicureanism through its 
appeals to a ‘voluptuous’ reader – that is, a fully embodied reader who seeks 
aesthetic pleasure from the text. Meeker writes that the poem has persistently 
been imagined ‘as a kind of “philtre”, mixing madness and reason to advance a 
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process of seduction that betrays the reader into materialist belief … From this 
perspective, Lucretian poetry is written to engage a bodily response, and in doing 
so seeks to transform the fundamental conditions governing its readers’ 
knowledge of the world’.97 Pater uses the figure of Flavian not simply to equate 
Epicurean materialism with decadent morality, but to unravel the imaginative 
logic by which they are conventionally conflated. As Meeker explains, 
Epicureanism has been susceptible to a kind of semantic contagion at least since 
ancient Rome:  
 
… the centrality of pleasure (hêdonê in Greek, voluptas in Latin) to 
Epicurean philosophy has conventionally represented the aspect of 
the doctrine most vulnerable to critical misreading. For Cicero, the 
use of the word voluptas was alone enough to render the 
philosophy suspect and ‘notorious’. This process of contamination 
was often understood as transitively infectious, so that eighteenth-
century rehabilitations of volupté, for instance, customarily start by 
addressing the related problem of Epicurus’s sullied reputation as a 
piggish hedonist.98  
 
Pater was acutely aware of the fact Epicureanism trailed vague yet 
besmirching implications; as he complained to Gosse in 1876, ‘I wish they 
wouldn’t call me a “hedonist”; it produces such a bad effect on the minds of 
people who don’t know Greek’.99 Pater’s suspicion that the scandal of The 
Renaissance arose not because of the book’s actual content but from a kind of 
connotative hex activated by any apparently sympathetic consideration of 
‘hedonism’ is a theory that Marius sets out to test. Pater shows via the figure of 
Flavian that Epicureanism may be imagined in terms of decadent aesthetics – but 
he also shows that it might just as easily be imagined as wholesome and noble if 
associated with Christianity. 
Marius is organised around the proposition that Christianity could be 
received – at least by a man of fine temperament who had perfected his aesthetic 
capacities – as a more or less frictionless extension of Epicureanism. In one of the 
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novel’s philosophical digressions, Pater’s narrator asserts that ‘anti-mundane’ 
puritanism was a later heresy, a toxic interpolation of Montanus’s; early 
Christianity was a radically incarnate religion that celebrated ‘the earth and the 
body … [and] the dignity of man’s whole nature’.100 The continuity between 
Marius’s Epicureanism and his attraction to Christianity is also underscored by 
the fact that his conversion to each system (or in the case of Christianity, his near-
conversion) is triggered by the physical beauty of one of its adherents – first 
Flavian, then Cornelius, who possesses a ‘charm, rather physical than moral’ for 
Marius.101 Critics sometimes suggest that Marius harkens to Christianity because 
it represents a higher morality than any he finds in pagan religion or philosophy, 
but Pater in fact goes to extraordinary lengths to avoid any simple privileging of 
Christian over pagan morality.102 Pater’s critique of pagan morality is focused not 
on Epicureanism but on Marcus Aurelius’s Stoicism. In the ‘Manly Amusements’ 
chapter, Marius grows disillusioned with Aurelius because the emperor maintains 
apathaeia in front of the gladiatorial games, and Pater emphasises that it is 
Marius’s Epicureanism that makes him sensitive to the horror of the spectacle.103 
Monsman suggests that this episode reflects Pater’s sense of the moral inferiority 
of paganism to Christianity tout court, but in fact Pater is sinuously altering the 
terms of that traditional contrast and elevating both Epicureanism and Christianity 
over Stoicism.104 Where Marius’s Epicureanism is aligned with the ‘right side’ in 
the struggle against evil that Christianity will take up, Stoicism is identified with a 
cold, renunciatory attitude which does not value life adequately and so cannot 
apprehend the nature of evil. Pater associates Marcus Aurelius’s indifference to 
evil with a contempt for the earthly and bodily; unlike Marius, Aurelius can 
‘tolera[te]’ the pain of others because he strives to suppress his own capacity for 
pain, and he can condone horror because he has not properly cultivated his sense 
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of beauty.105 Through his representation of Aurelius, Pater also critiques Christian 
asceticism, and distinguishes between an ideal, early Christianity, compatible with 
Epicureanism, and ‘heretical’ later developments in Christianity, which revive 
Stoicism’s contemptus mundi.  
Pater suggests that Christianity ‘complement[s]’ Epicureanism because 
each creed addresses itself to one pole of life’s ambivalence, its admixture of 
pleasure and suffering.106 In the ‘Second Thoughts’ chapter, Pater argues that 
Epicureanism is a philosophy that honours the truths of youthful optimism; it 
appeals to the ‘the strong young man in all the freshness of his thought and 
feeling, fascinated by the notion of at least lifting his life to the level of some 
bold, adventurous theory; while, in the first genial heat of existence, physical 
objects, also fair and strong, beat potently upon his unwearied and widely opened 
senses’.107 Pater is careful to avoid representing Christianity simply as a mature 
advancement on Epicureanism. Instead, Christianity is equally one-sided, and 
honours the truths of illness and age. Marius becomes receptive to Christianity as 
he comes to feel that ‘we are constructed for suffering! What proofs of it does but 
one day afford, if we care to note them, as we go – a whole long chaplet of 
sorrowful mysteries!’108 We are meant to catch the strain of hyperbole here, and 
indeed, Pater often insinuates that Christianity’s allure for Marius has a morbid 
aspect which aligns it with the characteristics of decadent aestheticism. In an 
allusion to Baudelaire, Marius comes to perceive the ‘whole world’ as a ‘hospital 
of sick persons’, and his movement toward Christianity is sometimes figured as a 
fall into a pathological pessimism which, within the novel’s imaginative 
economy, is problematically close to Marcus Aurelius’s Stoicism.109 Pater also 
suggests that Christianity is decadent insofar as it is a coercive and limiting creed, 
an idea he reinforces when he startlingly compares it to the Medusa: ‘Might this 
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new vision, like the malignant beauty of that old pagan Medusa, be exclusive of 
all admiring gaze on anything save itself?’110 There is an irony at work here: the 
exclusivity of Christianity threatens to petrify the very ethic of receptivity to 
experience which opened Marius to the possibility of Christianity in the first 
place. Yet Pater does not characterise Christianity in terms of decadent 
aestheticism in order to register tensions between Marius’s attraction to Christian 
faith and his Epicureanism. Rather, Pater seeks to demonstrate that Christianity is 
just as vulnerable to charges of decadence as Epicureanism, since like 
Epicureanism, it is a profound confrontation with the problem of mortality, and as 
such, is likely to be contaminated by the nature of the problem it strives to 
address. Marius finds Christianity akin to Epicureanism because both creeds are 
‘something of a meditatio mortis, ever facing toward the final act of 
detachment’.111 Pater balances his representations of Christianity as judiciously as 
he does his representations of Epicureanism, deploying both his Hellenising idiom 
of radiance, gaiety, and sensuousness, and his decadent idiom of exhaustion and 
morbidity. Thus, while Christianity is frequently constructed in Pater’s sunny 
Hellenic vocabulary – it is ‘amiable’, ‘comely’, ‘full of reasonable gaiety’ – it 
also constitutes a decadent ‘infection’.112 In an apparent reversal of a conventional 
Christian conversion novel, Marius’s movement toward conversion is frequently 
characterised not as a movement toward repentance and enlightenment, but as the 
progress of a disease which somehow at once blinds him and makes him the 
material world seem leprous.113 Just as Flavian’s illness and death seem to 
literalise the truth of his materialism, Marius’s physical and emotional decline 
seems to literalise the idea that a Christian conversion involves a necrosis or 
‘dying into life’ (i.e. the self must metaphorically die so that may be born again in 
Christ).114 In other words, Pater’s application of decadent poetics to Christianity 
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allows him to face two directions at once: such decadent poetics seem both to 
affirm and to pathologise conventional Christian sentiments. 
Both Romola and Marius are receptive to Christianity by virtue of a 
paradoxical, agnostic logic, though Pater and Eliot justify this logic on different 
grounds. After Romola undergoes a ‘baptism’ in the gospel of practical altruism 
(she tends the sick in a plague-stricken village and thus overcomes the anguish of 
her disillusionment with both Tito’s Epicureanism and Savonarola’s Christianity), 
she reflects: ‘If everything else is doubtful, this suffering that I can help is certain; 
if the glory of the cross is an illusion, the sorrow is only the truer’.115 In other 
words, if there is no God, commitment to Christianity is only the more warranted, 
since its message of hope and compassion is more necessary to humanity. In his 
dying moments, Marius reflects: 
 
Even then, just ere his eyes were to be shut for ever, the things they 
had seen seemed a veritable possession in hand; the persons, the 
places, above all, the touching image of Jesus, apprehended dimly 
through the expressive places, the crying of children, in that 
mysterious drama, with a sudden sense of peace and satisfaction 
now, which he could not explain to himself. For still, in a shadowy 
world, his deeper wisdom had ever been … to use life, not as the 
means to some problematic end, but, as far as might be, from dying 
hour to dying hour, an end in itself – a kind of music, all-sufficing 
to the duly trained ear, even as it died out on the air.116 
 
Just as Marius’s thoughts are circling ever more around the possibility of 
Christian transcendence and the reader expects a final conversion, Pater 
recapitulates the same life-for-life’s sake logic that characterised Marius’s earlier 
Epicureanism (as well as Pater’s own ‘Conclusion’). Far from simply 
undercutting Marius’s receptivity to Christianity, however, the reassertion of 
Epicureanism only emphasises its paradoxical character: Marius is open to the 
possibility of Christian transcendence because such openness represents an 
enhancement of the here and now and is thus an end in itself. Marius does not 
seem invested in whether such transcendence comes to pass; he entertains the 
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possibility of it because entertaining it gives, in the words of the ‘Conclusion’, 
‘the highest quality to [his] moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ 
sake’. 
The fact that Eliot’s secular-Christianity paradox resolves itself into an 
inspiring moral dictum while Pater embeds his own ambiguously in the 
impressionistic flux of Marius’s consciousness is itself revealing. One reason 
many readers find it hard to conceive of Marius as a retraction of the aestheticism 
of The Renaissance is that the novel seems to affirm even more explicitly and in 
much greater detail than the earlier book the pleasures of cultivating one’s 
individual subjectivity. It is unsurprising that Eliot, so dedicated in her own work 
to demonstrating that a secular morality could be as stringent as Christianity in 
demanding self-renunciation for the sake of others, considered The Renaissance a 
‘poisonous’ book.117  Eliot’s romance of self-renunciation made her secularism 
palatable to many religious readers, as the Catholic critic Richard Simpson 
observed mordantly in 1863: ‘We … tolerate pantheism, and atheism itself, if it 
comes to us in the garb of self-sacrifice, renunciation and universal charity’.118 By 
contrast, Pater’s aestheticism, even when it is contemplating the merits of askêsis, 
places a premium on subjective happiness, and is forever enjoining us to regard 
experience as a kind of cornucopia which we should sample widely; the ideal is 
not absolute dedication to any one aim, but a quest for ‘fullness of life’.119 For this 
reason, Pater tends to be sceptical toward the idealisation of self-sacrifice, which 
he associates with dogmatic, totalising ideologies: ‘The theory, the idea, or system 
which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration 
of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract morality we have 
not identified with ourselves, or what is only conventional, has no real claim on 
us’.120 The Bishop of Oxford, John Mackarness, seized on these sentences from 
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the ‘Conclusion’ and decried the anti-Christian implications of such a rejection of 
self-sacrifice: ‘Learners in the school of unbelief have been taught that it is folly 
to disturb themselves for the sake of others: they have lost all motive for serious 
action: self-restraint and self-sacrifice are discovered to be mere moral babble; it 
is, at the best, an amiable weakness to do good’.121  
As Marius makes clear, Pater’s aestheticism has its roots in a reaction not 
simply against Christian orthodoxy, but against the highly moralistic codes of 
unbelief and agnosticism that became conspicuous in Victorian culture from the 
1860s onwards. As Thomas Dixon has shown, the popularisation of the Comtean 
coinage, ‘altruism’, significantly enhanced the credibility of the idea of an 
exclusively secular morality in the late Victorian period. As a term with secularist 
overtones, ‘altruism’ was frequently subject to critique by the devout who 
perceived it as an attempt, in Nietzsche’s phrase, to ‘out-Christian Christianity’; 
such critics often argued that the doctrine of ‘altruism’ actually demanded a 
degree of self-abnegation in excess of Christian ideals of agape and charity.122 
‘Altruism’ was also often conflated with ‘agnosticism’, since both neologisms 
were often considered disingenuous pieces of secularist code which, when 
cracked, simply amounted – in Frances Power Cobbe’s withering assessment – to 
‘magnanimous atheism’. In 1877, Cobbe mocked the transvaluation of Christian 
values by which the ‘agnostic’ arrogated claims to a higher morality: 
 
If we are to accept his own statement of the case, the Agnostic has 
completely turned the front of the theological battle. It is now the 
Pagans who have seized and hold aloft the sacred Labarum of Duty 
and Self-sacrifice, and in hoc signo are destined to victory … Only 
the thorough sceptic, we are assured, can be the perfect saint.123 
 
Although Eliot rarely used the term herself, she was often celebrated and 
attacked as the age’s most illustrious proponent of the secularist creed of 
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‘altruism’, and the thesis that Christian morality can perfect itself in a secular 
altruism is elaborated more boldly and explicitly in Romola than in any of her 
novels.124 Romola’s rebellion against Savonarola’s authority seems to necessitate 
that she subsequently surpass Savonarola in Christian duty and self-sacrifice, 
though for the sake of a secular humanitarianism rather than Christianity. Eliot 
makes it clear that it is Romola’s secular orientation that enables her to 
accomplish so much practical good in the world, while Savonarola’s mysticism 
warps his moral judgment and renders him profoundly dangerous. Romola’s 
principled rejection of Savonarola’s command that she ‘bow before a divine law’ 
and honour her marriage vows is paralleled with Savonarola’s own rebellion 
against the papacy, thus establishing a link between Romola’s secular heresy and 
Savonarola’s proto-Protestant one:125 
 
The law was sacred. Yes, but rebellion might be sacred too. It 
flashed upon her mind that the problem before her was essentially 
the same as that which had lain before Savonarola – the problem 
where the sacredness of obedience began, and where the 
sacredness of rebellion ended.126 
 
As can be felt here, Eliot strives to construct Romola’s secular rebellion as 
a form of righteous Protestant individualism. We are encouraged to think that 
Romola’s secular orientation only places her one redemptive step further away 
from the corrupting legalism of the papacy than the proto-Protestant Savonarola 
manages to be – a difference that proves crucial when, in the novel’s final book, 
Savonarola reverts all too symptomatically to a corrupt, ‘Catholic’ legalism, and 
sentences Romola’s uncle to death for the sake of political expediency. 
 Given the extent to which ‘Epicureanism’ functioned as a shibboleth in 
Victorian culture that enabled the devout to equate the possibility of an 
exclusively secular morality with grossness and sexual license, it is unsurprising 
that Eliot distinguishes so rigorously between secular morality and Epicureanism 
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in Romola.127After Romola’s rebellion against Savonarola, she briefly succumbs 
to a Tito-like Epicureanism: ‘she longed for that repose in mere sensation which 
she had sometimes dreamed of in the sultry afternoons of her early girlhood, when 
she had fancied herself floating naïad-like in the waters’.128 Tellingly, Eliot 
identifies Romola’s desire for pleasure here with suicidal despair; Romola drifts 
away in a boat in the hope that she will die, and we are meant to notice the 
parallel between Romola’s sensual nihilism at this moment and Tito’s 
Epicureanism, which entangled him in the very web of deception and callousness 
that has brought Romola to this crisis. Sleep has a negative moral valence 
throughout Romola and often stands in for sexual self-loss; in the opening 
chapter, Eliot first hints at Tito’s sexual deviance by depicting him as a 
languorous ‘dreamer’ napping in the streets of Florence, and his fall into adultery 
is rendered as a part of his appetite for siestas and his flâneur-like propensity to 
‘lounge and gaze’ during carnival time.129 When Romola is overcome by a Tito-
like urge to daydream and sleep, it similarly marks a drift into a moral slumber, 
and while in her case the temptation is suicide, not sex, Eliot’s sensuous imagery 
encourages us to confuse the two. Given that the longing for death here bears such 
strong connotations of sexuality and Epicureanism, it comes as no surprise that 
Romola’s moment of despair is later condemned as if it were a sexual fall: ‘She 
had felt herself without bonds, without motive; sinking in mere egoistic 
complaining that life could bring her no content; feeling a right to say, “I am tired 
of life, I want to die’’.130   
Like Marius, Romola apprehends the value of Christianity when she 
becomes conscious of the tears in things: ‘Romola had lost her belief in the 
happiness she had once thirsted for: it was a hateful, smiling, soft-handed thing, 
with a narrow, selfish heart’.131 Romola’s revulsion at Tito’s Epicureanism – 
which by this point in the novel signifies only a form of suave immorality – 
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renders her sympathetic to Savonarola’s ascetic Christianity: ‘she understood now 
how men could be prompted to rush away for ever from earthly delights, how 
they could be prompted to dwell on images of sorrow rather than of beauty and 
joy’.132 Although Romola eventually rebels against Savonarola’s Christianity, she 
never recovers belief in personal happiness, which, within the novel’s moral 
economy, is wholly contaminated by its association with Tito’s Epicureanism. 
(This logic of contamination applies to Epicureanism only: Savonarola’s ethic of 
self-renunciation is not similarly ruined by its association with his messianism, 
but can be recuperated by Romola in a properly secular form.) The novel 
concludes with Romola as a positivist Madonna figure, inculcating the doctrine of 
altruism into Lillo, Tito’s illegitimate little boy:  
 
‘It is only a poor sort of happiness that could ever come by caring 
very much about our own narrow pleasures. We can have only the 
highest happiness, such as goes along with being a great man, by 
having wide thoughts, and much feeling for the rest of the world as 
well as ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much 
pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we 
would choose before everything else …’133 
 
The reader is here in the position of schoolchild or catechumen; we 
receive the novel’s final message as Lillo receives Romola’s positivist lesson. 
However, this lesson seems superfluous, since the consequences of Epicureanism 
have already been writ mythically large by the Pentheus-like fate visited upon 
Tito: he narrowly escapes being rent to pieces by a vengeful mob only to 
encounter the equally frenzied Baldassarre, who strangles him. Tito the Epicurean 
is of course also a symbolic scapegoat in terms of Eliot’s construction of the 
‘strange web of belief and unbelief’: his pleasure-seeking unbelief – and its 
violent expulsion from the narrative – works to clarify the rectitude of Romola’s 
self-renouncing form of secularism. Like Middlemarch (1871-2) and The Mill on 
the Floss (1860), Romola draws upon hagiographic discourses in order to 
highlight the sublimity of its heroine’s self-renunciation, and calls to mind Stefan 
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Collini’s much-quoted observation that Victorian culture was characterised ‘by an 
obsessive antipathy to selfishness’ and ‘structured by a sharp and sometimes 
exhaustive polarity between egoism and altruism’.134 In Romola’s case, the 
renunciation of ‘narrow pleasures’ has an unmistakably penitential flavour; she 
only achieves a state of humanist grace after she has atoned for her apostasies 
against the authority of both her husband and Savonarola.  
 Throughout Marius, Pater lingers over the satisfaction that his hero takes 
in sleeping and daydreaming. Even at the point of his death, which is ‘of the 
nature of a martyrdom’, Marius luxuriates in the way that death comes upon him 
like sleep.135 Although Marius is an exemplary Christian insofar as he forfeits his 
life for the sake of a friend, he never forfeits his Epicurean faith in pleasure. Even 
as he is honoured as a ‘martyr’, Marius resists the idea of martyrdom:  
 
To him, in truth, a death such as the recent death of those saintly 
brothers, seemed no glorious end. In his case, at least, the 
Martyrdom, as it was called – the overpowering act of testimony 
that Heaven had come down among men – would be but a common 
execution: from the drops of his blood would spring no 
miraculous, poetic flowers; no eternal aroma would indicate the 
place of his burial; no plenary grace, overflowing forever upon 
those who might stand around it.136  
 
Pater encourages us to feel that Marius’s martyrdom is meaningful 
precisely because he sacrifices a life whose pleasures he appreciates fully and 
because he anticipates no ‘miraculous, poetic’ reward; he is truly a Christian 
martyr because he is an Epicurean. (The obverse logic is explored in Pater’s 
‘Sebastian van Storck’ [1886], in which the self-sacrificing gesture of the tale’s 
hero – he dies rescuing a child from a flood – seems merely to consummate his 
desire for oblivion. As Giles Whiteley notes, we left with the suspicion that the 
nihilistic Sebastian made no sacrifice at all, since he surrendered a life he did not 
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value.)137 There is a further irony: Marius saves Cornelius’s life by falsely 
claiming that he, rather than Cornelius, is a committed Christian. In so doing, 
Marius assumes a role that is more legitimately Cornelius’s. Marius effectively 
deprives Cornelius of the opportunity to be a martyr because he (that is, Marius) 
perceives nothing ‘glorious’ in it and thinks it better that Cornelius marry and 
enjoy life.138  
Pater distinguishes the Antonine phase of Christianity he celebrates in 
Marius from an earlier one, ‘when men became Christians under some sudden 
and overpowering impression, and with all the disturbing results of such a 
crisis’.139 As Shuter observes, this reflects Pater’s distrust of conversion 
narratives: ‘the religious temperament he admired was undisturbed by such crises 
… unlike his critics, Pater did not assume that to be converted to a new belief it 
was necessary to be converted from an old’.140 Read allegorically, the fact that 
Marius’s movement toward Christianity is not a conversion but a more ambiguous 
drift also encodes Pater’s sense of distance from an earlier phase of Victorian 
doubt; where a previous generation of young Oxford men such as Froude and 
Clough experienced tumultuous crises of faith, Pater preferred to represent his 
scepticism as a more subtle and belated affair. Equally, the conclusion of Marius, 
which reaffirms the Epicureanism of the hero even as he dies a Christian martyr, 
complicates the sense of teleological closure apparently secured by the fact that 
Christianity is the last creed encountered by Marius in his quest. The fact that the 
novel ends not with Marius’s conversion but with a Christian community 
ascribing a Christian meaning to his death – a meaning Marius rejects in his last 
moments – aims to alert the reader to the extent to which such designations of 
religious identity often belie the fluid and equivocal quality of experience. The 
novel’s ‘agnostic’ non-conclusion also gestures at the difficulty of sifting belief 
from unbelief in the 1880s, when sceptical arguments were wielded by both 
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fideistic theologians and crusading men of science. The question of what to call 
Marius – and the question of what may be bracketed as ‘Christian’ – is shifted 
onto the reader, who is placed in a quandary similar to that faced by Eliot’s 
obituarists. In this respect, Marius should be read a meditation on the ironies 
which attended late Victorian efforts to decide who may be interpreted as a 
religious writer;  more broadly, it reflects upon the extent to which a cultural 
preoccupation with the legibility and sincerity of the beliefs of others has the 
ironic effect of displacing a religious perception of the mysteries of the sacred 
onto an (at least apparently) secular fascination with the mysterious depths of 
literary characters and of the writers who invent them. 
In Marius, Pater argues that aestheticism has a naturally privileged role 
within a self-consciously agnostic zeitgeist. At one point, Marius muses that a 
sense of the limits of human knowledge liberates us to view religion as one of the 
‘observable, perhaps amiable appearances – among the rest’.141 In other words, 
once the premises of agnosticism are accepted, one is left to choose on the basis 
of what seems most attractive. One of the rare occasions on which Pater actually 
uses the word ‘agnostic’ is also an attempt to assert the philosophical dignity of 
aestheticism: in an essay he wrote for the Guardian, he observes that the 
eighteenth century was an ‘age of negative, or agnostic philosophy … in which 
men’s minds must needs be limited to the superficialities of things, with a kind of 
narrowness amounting to a positive gift’.142 This is another iteration of Pater’s 
secular felix culpa trope, but here the prize won by the loss of positive religious 
belief is explicitly aesthetic. An agnostic restriction of knowledge to the 
phenomenal world means literary style comes into its inheritance at last: it need 
no longer lament its Platonic secondariness or its failure to capture things-in-
themselves, but may be pleased with its ambiguous limitations.  
In the New Republic (1877), his satirical roman à clef, W. H. Mallock 
travestied Pater as a vampiric decadent who drew sustenance from the decline of 
Christianity. As his caricatural avatar Mr Rose, Pater opines that religion ‘never 
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lights our lives so beautifully as when it is leaving them like the evening sun’.143 
Mallock accurately captures a central theme in Pater’s aestheticism, which often 
suggests that the apparently liminal character of the age – that is, Christianity is 
losing its privileged status, yet still retains an ambiguous influence – is to be 
relished rather than lamented. He first makes this point in his ‘Coleridge’s 
Writings’, where he remarks that ‘religious belief, the craving for objects of 
belief, may be refined out of our hearts, but they must leave their sacred perfume, 
their spiritual sweetness, behind’.144 He echoes it twenty four years later in 
‘Prosper Mérimée’ (1890): 
 
Fundamental belief gone, in almost all of us, at least some relics of 
it remain – queries, echoes, reactions, after-thoughts; and they help 
to make an atmosphere, a mental atmosphere, hazy perhaps, yet 
with many secrets of soothing light and shade, associating more 
definite objects with each other by a perspective pleasant to the 
inward eye against a hopefully receding background of remoter 
and ever remoter possibilities.145 
 
Here the fading of faith strangely seems to carry on the work of faith 
without hiatus; the idea of a departing Christianity seems to soothe, haunt and 
enchant just as Christianity itself presumably did.  
What Mallock’s travesty misses is that Pater often problematises the age’s 
decline-of-Christianity platitude even as his work takes inspiration from it. In 
particular, Pater often questions whether there ever was in fact ‘an age of faith’, or 
a seamlessly Christian culture prior to a fall into ‘modern’ scepticism, and such 
logic often works to destabilise the concept of the secular as much as it does the 
concept of the religious. Early in his career, Pater persistently suggests that much 
religious art and culture contains, in a veiled or sublimated form, a primordial 
enchantment with the secular, or at least traces of the heretical intentions of its 
creator, both of which it is the special task of the aesthetic critic to decipher. The 
unverifiable and counter-intuitive conviction that religious subject matter in the 
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greatest Western art and literature is really an alibi for other, profane 
preoccupations is what stimulates the elaborate hermeneutic flights of Pater’s 
early aestheticism, which participate ironically in the logic of veiled secularism in 
the very act of attempting to unveil the same hidden intention in works of art or in 
fragments of the past. As Williams has noted, the most audacious of these veiled 
unveilings of the secular is Pater’s ecphrasis of Leonardo da Vinci’s ‘Last 
Supper’, in which he discovers a narrative of secularisation inscribed within an 
image of Christ’s face: 
 
Five years afterwards, the young Raffaelle, at Florence, painted 
[the last supper] with sweet and solemn effect … but still with all 
the mystical unreality of the school of Perugino. Vasari pretends 
that the central head was never finished; but finished or unfinished, 
or owing part of its effect to a mellowing decay, his central head 
does but consummate the sentiment of the whole company – ghosts 
through which you see the wall, faint as the shadows of the leaves 
upon the wall on autumn afternoons, this figure is but the faintest, 
most spectral of them all. It is the image of what the history it 
symbolises has been more and more ever since, paler and paler as 
it recedes from us. Criticism came with its appeal from mystical 
unrealities to originals, and restored no life-like reality but these 
transparent shadows, spirits which have not flesh and bones.146 
 
Williams offers a bravura reading of this passage: 
 
… the loss of spirituality has been figured as the loss of aesthetic 
form, which paradoxically creates the sense of greater spirituality – 
but this time as an aesthetic and historical effect. Images of human 
“nature” and aesthetic colour avail only partially to represent 
spirituality, and, always ironically, this particular Renaissance 
attempt to turn Christian imagery to a more natural and sensual 
reality has produced instead the denatured effect of ghosts, 
spectres, shadows, and transparencies.147  
 
Yet Williams’s logic only partly registers the complexity of ghostliness as 
a metaphor for secularisation. In this ekphrasis as throughout Marius, Pater uses 
chiasmus to blur the distinction between the Christian and the secular, but here the 
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play of terms conflates a real, ‘original’ Christianity with its ‘pale’, apparently 
secularised afterlife. Since medieval Christianity is also characterised as ‘pale’, 
the fact that Christianity has become ‘paler and paler’ in the period extending 
from the Renaissance to modernity ironically makes the concept of secularisation 
itself seem spectral: is there a radical difference between the medieval world, 
preoccupied by ‘pale’ Christian images and ‘mystical unrealities’, and the 
supposedly secular present, haunted by spectres of a ‘reced[ing]’ Christianity? 
The way Pater’s metaphors hesitate between the natural and the supernatural – 
one generally assumes that ghosts are not subject to autumnal decay – reflects a 
difficulty in his effort to allegorise the process of secularisation. While Williams 
aptly characterises this ekphrasis as an ‘allegory of the remorseless irony of 
secularisation’, she misses the fact that Pater does not immunise himself against 
this irony, for he registers the extent to which the concept of ‘secularisation’ 
becomes spectral as soon as it is imagined from a purely secular perspective. It  
simply turns into a crude tautology: the spiritual is not there; it ‘has not flesh and 
bones’.148 Since it is impossible to describe the fading of the unseen and 
impalpable without recourse to metaphors that endow it with the very qualities it 
both intrinsically lacks and is apparently losing, or to register a decline in a sense 
of spirituality without at least partly entering into the imaginative logic that once 
endowed it with a ‘life-like reality’, it is impossible to evoke the apparent fading 
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The imaginative traffic between Swinburne and Pater is usually presumed to flow 
in one direction only, with Swinburne thought to exert a powerful influence upon 
Pater’s early essays and his own aestheticism to have reached full development 
before Pater published Studies in the History of the Renaissance. To my 
knowledge, no critic has speculated about how Pater might have influenced 
Swinburne’s later work. As I have noted, Swinburne’s later poetry, while 
remaining faithful to his earlier vision of life as a compound of indivisible 
contraries – pleasure and pain, desire and loss, and so on – nevertheless draws 
more redemptive lessons from the same core principle: where the early poetry 
certainly emphasises that pleasure and beauty can be wrested from even the 
bleakest insights, the later poetry much more explicitly pushes this logic toward 
holistic affirmations of life. If Swinburne’s early poems often seem to take a 
masochistic satisfaction in the way ideals such as a romantic love are corroded 
from within by time, or bestow pleasure only by way of pain, his later poetry 
often suggests that there is a consoling grandeur in the ways that things are 
internally bound to their opposites. And where the early poetry sometimes adopts 
a rather cool, Olympian view of the interplay between suffering and pleasure, or 
advocates a libertine’s irony or a manly stoicism in the face of fate, the later 
poetry tends to advocate receptivity to experience more insistently, sometimes in 
terms akin to those of Pater’s ‘Conclusion’.  
It is possible hear echoes of the ‘Conclusion’ in one of the finest of 
Swinburne’s late poems, ‘A Nympholept’ (1891). Here the speaker seems to have 
internalised all the injunctions of Pater’s essay: he is an apparently insomniac 
lover of the momentary who ‘dare not sleep for delight of the perfect hour’ (9), 
and though he tries to fix his ‘steadfast eyes’ (224) on the teeming flux of 
experience, he can register only fleeting impressions: ‘a form, a face, a wonder to 
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sense and sight’ (215), ‘light that flickers or spray that flies’ (221).1 Thus 
Swinburne’s speaker has learnt to luxuriate in transience itself: ‘And here is my 
sense fulfilled of the joys of earth,/Light, silence, bloom, shade, murmur of leaves 
that meet’ (237). By the end of the poem, the speaker has absorbed the lesson so 
fully that he cannot imagine how one could desire anything other than finite, 
earthly life; indeed, he comes to perceive that joy and desire are predicated on 
transience:  
 
I lean my face to the heather, and drink the sun 
Whose flame-lit odour satiates the flowers: mine eyes 
Close, and the goal of delight and of life is one: 
No more I crave of earth or kindred skies. 
No more? But the joy that springs from them smiles and flies: 
The sweet work wrought of them surely, the good work done, 
If the mind and the face of the season be loveless, dies.  
         (246-250) 
 Yet this does not amount to calm contentment, nor to a wise acceptance of 
the nature of things; like Pater’s ‘Conclusion’, ‘A Nympholept’ underscores that 
such moments of bliss are produced by a hyperawareness of mortality:  
 
Is it rapture or terror that circles me round, and invades 
Each vein of my life with hope – if it be not fear? 
Each pulse that awakens my blood into rapture fades, 
Each pulse that subsides into dread of a strange thing near 
Requickens with sense of a terror less dread than dear. 
                                                                              (57-61)  
 The poem’s figure for such a ‘quickened’ apprehension of life is 
nympholepsy: in ancient Greek poetry and cult, this refers to the frenzy induced 
when one is possessed by a nymph, and it often serves as a metaphor for poetic 
inspiration.  The poem as a whole is a paean to the wild god of nature, Pan, and 
Swinburne wrote it to refute the ‘folly and the falsehood of the cry that “Pan is 
dead” which was uttered on a certain occasion not necessary to specify, and over 
which premature cry the old wood-god chuckles satirically’ (he is perhaps 
referring to Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s poem, ‘The Dead Pan’ [1844], which 
follows a long tradition of interpreting a story related in Plutarch as a herald of the 
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death of paganism and the triumph of Christianity).2 Like the ‘Conclusion’, then, 
‘A Nympholept’ was written to vindicate the continuing vitality of ‘pagan fables’, 
but it seems to do so in order to prescribe a radically affirmative stance toward 
secular materialism: his speaker exults in the fact that he is ‘an earth-born 
dreamer, constrained by the bonds of birth,/Held fast by the flesh, compelled by 
the veins that beat’ (231-233), and who ‘may hear not surely the fall of immortal 
feet’ (235). Swinburne is so eager to spell out the fact that the rapture he 
celebrates is achieved by waiving hopes for immortality or any conventional 
concept of a deity that he undercuts the poem’s mythological apparatus, casting 
doubt on whether his speaker can in fact hear ‘immortal feet’ even as he invokes 
the ‘one God, Pan’ (14). Similarly, Swinburne insists that if Pan is truly a god of 
nature, then he ought to be a mortal god: ‘Gods too but endure for a season’ (156), 
and Pan is glorious because he is ‘the God who has change to wife’ (181). In this, 
the speaker articulates in less truculent terms the position of Swinburne’s Sappho, 
who also holds that a mortal god would be the only kind tolerable to her 
imagination (she longs to ‘pierce the cold lips of God with human breath,/And 
mix his immortality with death’ [183-184]).3 Yet where in ‘Anactoria’ 
sadomasochism is a form of Promethean defiance, a means of extorting pleasure 
from a cruel God, the same apprehension of the reciprocity of pleasure and pain is 
redemptive in ‘A Nympholept’. While Swinburne duly emphasises that Pan is not 
only ‘Lord God of life and of light and of all things fair’ but also of ‘ravin and 
ruin and all things dim’ (148-149), the energy of the poem is overwhelmingly 
celebratory; just as in Pater’s ‘Conclusion’, darker apprehensions only subserve a 
higher love of earthly experience. There is a kind of secular theodicy latent in 
such poems: they seek to reassure us that all is for the best, not despite but 
because of mortality and the panic and all the ‘ravin and ruin’. As the whole, the 
poem plays on the dual meaning of the word ‘pan’, which is the etymological root 
of the concept of panic, but also suggests all-inclusiveness, particularly the 
wholeness of nature. From this doubleness, Swinburne strives to show that the 
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panic induced by our apprehension of mortality is the origin of all ecstasy and 
poetic inspiration, and can be integrated into a sense of a natural whole. The poem 
is also typical of Swinburne’s aestheticism in that it strives to offer enchantment 
in secular terms: on the one hand, there is the desire for the wild ecstasies of Pan, 
and an attraction to a sense of the unknowable; on the other, there is resistance to 
the concept of God, even in a pagan guise, and thus the need to make so many 
rationalising specifications: Pan is a purely ‘immanent presence’, one of the ‘gods 
hard by’ rather than a transcendent deity (105, 43); he is mortal; he is indifferent 
to prayer (40-42); and the heavenly rapture he offers is an entirely earthly 
experience (‘Heaven is as earth, and as heaven to me/Earth’ [271-272]). Every bid 
at secular re-enchantment inspires further demystification. 
 
2. 
After Marius, aestheticism no longer seemed to Pater a viable means of critiquing 
and advancing beyond the terms of Victorian debates about religion and 
secularism. In Gaston de Latour (1893) his unfinished novel, aestheticism itself 
produces a stalemate. This is conspicuous in the ‘Modernity’ chapter of the novel, 
which focuses on Gaston’s impressions of Ronsard and the Pleiade school (the 
novel is set in sixteenth-century France; Gaston is Pater’s invention).4 I noted in 
my discussion of Swinburne’s carpe diem poems than Pater uses the Pleiade 
school to tender a theory of aestheticist poetics in his ‘Joachim du Bellay’ essay. 
As if allegorising his need to return to his original ideas and exorcise them, 
Gaston rehearses the same gesture, but where ‘Joachim du Bellay’ is an apology 
for such poetics, the ‘Modernity’ chapter begins by conceding the allure of 
aestheticism and ends in a strong condemnation of it. Ronsard inspires these 
reflections in Gaston: 
 
The worship of physical beauty – a religion, the proper faculty of 
which would be the bodily eye! Looked at in this way, some of the 
                                                
4 Pater published the first five chapters of Gaston in Macmillan’s Magazine in 1888 and 
one chapter (in the form of an essay on Giordano Bruno) in the Fortnightly in 1889. The 




well-marked characteristics of the poetry of the Pleiad assumed a 
hieratic, almost an ecclesiastical air. That rigid correctness; that 
gracious unction, as of the medieval Latin psalmody; that aspiring 
fervor; that jealousy of the profane “vulgar”; the sense, flattering to 
one who is in the secret, that this thing, even in its utmost triumph 
– could never really be popular: - why were these so welcome to 
him but from the continuity of early mental habit? He might renew 
the over-grown tonsure, and wait, devoutly, rapturously, in this 
goodly sanctuary of earth and sky about him, for the manifestation 
… of flawless humanity, in some undreamed-of depth and 
perfection of the loveliness of bodily form. 
And therewith came the consciousness … of 
incompatibility between two rival claimants upon him, of two 
ideals. Might that new religion, so to term it, be a religion not 
altogether of goodness, a profane religion, in spite of its poetic 
fervours? There were “flowers of evil”, among the rest. It came in 
part, avowedly, as kind of consecration of evil, seeming to lend it 
the beauty of holiness.5 
 
 Scholars often note that Pater’s portrait of Ronsard is a veiled portrait of 
Baudelaire, though Lene Østermark-Johansen points out that Swinburne also 
seems implicated in the critique.6 Pater’s jaundiced view of aestheticism in this 
period is partly a defensive reaction to Wilde’s appropriations of his work.7 Yet 
what is most striking here is that Pater critiques aestheticism by characterising it 
not as a form of secularism but as perverse religion, ‘so to term it’ – thereby 
effectively echoing the complaints of his early detractors. Arguably, Pater is 
trying to dramatise the fact that Gaston assimilates everything he encounters into 
the terms of his childhood faith, no matter how much a given element appears to 
oppose the logic of that faith; certainly the chapter ends with Gaston lamenting 
the ineluctability of the Christian imaginary and wishing he could simply enjoy 
his new, profane religion without ambivalence if the conflict between the worldly 
and the Christian is in fact intractable. Yet the passage also seems to allegorise 
Pater’s own imaginative impasse. As Monsman suggests, the ‘agonisingly slow 
pace’ of the composition of Gaston indicates that there was a ‘basic thematic or 
                                                
5 Pater, Gaston, 36-37. 
6 Østermark-Johansen, Language of Sculpture, 149. 
7 Ibid., 150. 
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structural problem in the novel’.8 Gaston was intended to follow Marius as the 
second installment of a trilogy of bildungsromans, and surely part of the problem 
was that Gaston has no obvious philosophical or religious destination: the 
religious wars the novel takes as its backdrop seem to preclude the sort of 
ambiguous idealisation of Christianity Pater had recourse to in Marius, and 
Gaston has already recoiled from aestheticism as a profane religion.9 (He also 
recoils in turn from the philosophies of Montaigne and Giordano Bruno, detecting 
a sinister moral relativism submerged in each.)10 Where in Marius Pater 
celebrated the concurrences between aestheticism and religion, here the two ways 
of looking at the world seem mutually contaminating: the desire to affirm the 
beauty of the ‘earth and sky about him’, always strong in Pater, now seems 
problematic whether it is construed as a Christian impulse or a ‘devoutly’ 
aesthetic one. Everything is ‘profane religion’ because the distinctions between 
the religious and the irreligious have been effaced; Gaston is only tempted by an 
apparently secular aestheticism because it reminds him of Christianity, and even 
he does not seem to know if the ‘manifestation’ he awaits ‘rapturously’ is Christ 
or a beautiful lover. In other words, Gaston is troubled by the ‘rival claimants’ 
because they are somehow radically opposed and yet impossible to distinguish; he 
does not know if he loves the world because the divine is immanent within it or 
purely for its own sake.11  
Yet Pater cannot let go of aestheticism. Every critique of it inspires 
another apology for the seriousness of its original task. Thus, in the following 
chapter, the title of Pater’s first book enables him to imply a connection between 
Gaston’s predicament and his own early work, which aimed at nothing less than a 
reinterpretation of ‘human nature’ in the light of a new recognition of its 
                                                
8 Monsman, ‘Introduction’, ibid., xviii. 
9 Pater, Gaston, 58-59. 
10 Ibid., 58-59 and 82-83. 
11 Lesley Higgins gives a useful account of Pater’s attitude to Christianity in this period. 
Drawing upon his unpublished, fragmentary manuscripts, she shows how he oscillates 
between undercutting the ‘absolute truth claims’ of Christianity and recuperating the 
‘imaginative and idealistic potential’ of religious discourses. See ‘Doubting Pater: 
Religious Discourse and “the conditions of modern life”’, English Literature in 
Transition 38.3 (1995), 287. 
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capacities for purely secular fulfillment, though Pater is now anxious about the 
propriety of such a reimagining: 
 
In those earlier days of the Renaissance, a whole generation had 
been exactly in the position in which Gaston now found himself. 
An older ideal, moral and religious, certain theories of man and 
nature actually in possession, still haunted humanity, at the very 
moment when it was called, through a full knowledge of the past, 
to enjoy the present with unrestricted expansion of its own 
capacities. – Might one enjoy? Might one eat of all the trees? – 
There were those who had already eaten and needed, 
retrospectively, a theoretical justification, a sanction of their actual 
liberties, in some new reading of human nature itself and its 
relation to the world around it. – Explain to us the propriety, on the 
full view of things, of this bold course we have taken, or know we 
shall take.12 
 
Perhaps Gaston would have found a balance between vindicating and 
critiquing aestheticism if Pater had managed to complete it, but the imaginative 
impasse seems profound. We gain an insight into this impasse in Pater’s elegiac 
portrait of the Pleiade school. At the level of allegory, the fate of the Pleiade 
seems to encode Pater’s perception that aestheticism has become the victim of its 
own success – it has permeated Victorian culture and shaped the zeitgeist so 
decisively that it has lost all its distinctiveness and gone into a dramatic decline: 
 
It was a manner, a habit of thought, which would invade ordinary 
life, and mould that to its intention. In truth, all the world was 
already aware, and delighted. The “school” was soon to pay the 
penalty of that immediate acceptance, that intimate fitness to the 
mind of its own time, by sudden and profound neglect, as a thing 
preternaturally tarnished and tame, like magic youth, or magic 
beauty, turned in a moment by magic’s own last word into 
withered age.13 
 
 Yet if Pater lost faith in the capacity of aestheticism to enchant in either 
secular or religious terms, news of the decline of aestheticism did not trouble 
                                                
12 Pater, Gaston, 43. 
13 Ibid., 30. 
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